The present petition has been filed by Shri Om Prakash Manchanda aged about 93 years son of Late Fakir Chand Manchanda, Resident of B-22, 117/124A Sarvodaya Nagar, Kanpur Nagar seeking quashing of the order dated 21.6.2016 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Sadar, Kanpur Nagar on the application of the petitioner as also the order dated 30.1.2017 passed by the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar in an appeal filed by the petitioner. Further prayer in the petition is to issue a direction commanding the said respondents to compel the respondent no.3 to refund a sum of Rs.46,54,465/- along with interest to the petitioner and also to handover the possession of the third floor of House No.117/124A, Sarvodaya Nagar, Kanpur Nagar to the petitioner forthwith.
The petitioner herein is a man aged about 93 years, father of three sons namely Naresh Manchanda, Mahesh Manchanda and Raj Manchanda and filed the present petition supported with the affidavit of Raj Manchanda (one of his sons) with the grievances that his one son namely Mahesh Manchanda (respondent no.3 herein) is not refunding Rs.46 lakhs and odd, which was given to him as loan by the petitioner for the soap business being run in the name of Sheetal Gramodyog Sansthan. On the said loan amount, interest was payable to the petitioner which was being credited in his account upto the year 2013. The Sheetal Gramodyog Sansthan is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and is also registered with the U.P. Khadi Gramodyog Board Ayog. It has been engaged in the business of manufacturing soap to derive income for social and charitable purposes i.e. to help the downtrodden of the Society. The soap factory is being run at Village Bhelamau, Bhaunti, Kanpur Nagar. The accounts of Sheetal Gramodyog Sansthan is presently being managed by respondent no.3 as its Secretary. The respondent no.3 had stopped crediting interest in the account of the petitioner and started harassing him, as such the notice dated 23.2.2015 was sent to respondent no.3 asking him to vacate the premises in question. The respondent no.3 is living at the third floor of House No.117/124A, Sarvodaya Nagar, Kanpur Nagar which has been constructed on the Plot No.B-22 Block-C, Scheme-I, Kakadev, Kanpur Nagar, which was jointly purchased by the petitioner with his two brothers and his eldest son Naresh Manchanda. The contention of the petitioner is that the petitioner had permitted his son namely respondent no.3 to live at one floor of the house in question but on account of harassment at his (his son) hands, he (the petitioner) now requires vacant peaceful possession of the third floor of the house which is his (the petitioner) exclusive ownership. The application under Section 5 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents And Senior Citizens Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (in short 'the Senior Citizens Act, 2007') was filed by the petitioner with the relief of refund of the aforesaid money and to obtain vacant possession of his house. The said application was illegally rejected vide order dated 21.6.2016 with the observation that the relief sought therein are not maintainable being beyond the jurisdiction of the Authorities under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007.
This order was further challenged in appeal filed under Section 17 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, which has been rejected by the Collector, Kanpur Nagar. The Authorities under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 found that a serious dispute is going on between the family members and, as such, they may seek appropriate relief before the Court concerned.
Shri Shesh Kumar Srivastava, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner vehemently contended that both the Statutory Authorities have committed a grave error of law in rejecting the application and appeal on the ground that the eviction of respondent no.3 from the house in question could not be ordered as the applicant did not claim any maintenance from the respondent no.3, his son.
Placing reliance upon the judgments of this Court in Misc. Bench No.11773 of 2014 (Majeedan v. State of U.P. & Ors.) and Writ Petition No.31851 of 2016 Janki Devi & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors.) and that of the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition (C) No.10463 of 2015 (Sunny Paul & Anr. v. State NCT of Delhi & Ors.) and another judgment of Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No.10611 of 2018 (Dattatrey Shivaji Mane v. Lilabai Shivaji Mane & Ors.), it is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, the Tribunal created under Section 5 and the Appellate Tribunal constituted under Section 15 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 are empowered to pass appropriate orders so as to evict the son or a relative from the property of the senior citizen, who is/are residing against his (the father) wishes. It is contended that the provisions as contained in Sections 21, 22 and 23 are enacted for the purpose of protection of not only the life but also the property of a senior citizen. The petitioner being a man 93 years old cannot be asked to go through the lengthy and complicated process of civil suit so as to get vacant possession of his own house. The power of the Tribunal established under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is wide enough to take all measures so as to implement the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The Senior Citizens Act, 2007 has been enacted with the objective to institutionalize a mechanism for protection of life and property of senior citizen and to set up an appropriate mechanism for providing needs/maintenance to parents and senior citizens. Under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, the Tribunal can order for eviction of a son or a relative who is living in the property owned by senior citizen, without his consent. This provision has been enacted so as to ensure that every senior citizen may peacefully live and enjoy the property owned by him. Both the Tribunals had, therefore, illegally rejected the application terming it beyond their jurisdiction conferred under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007.
Shri Nitin Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent no.3, on the other hand, placing various paragraphs of the counter affidavit submits that the petitioner is owner of the disputed property along with his two other brothers. The said property was acquired from joint family funds but the name of Shri Naresh Manchanda had been included being the eldest son. The petitioner is living at the second floor along with Shri Naresh Manchanda, his elder son having common kitchen and common areas such as drawing room and dinning room etc. The respondent no.3 is living at the third floor of the building. This arrangement is in existence for more than 20 years. Because of the said arrangement, the petitioner had also purchased two flats in Swaroop Nagar Building No.7/105-A, 8th Floor, Villa Apartments Shiv Nagar, Kanpur Nagar from family funds for his third son namely Raj Manchanda.
The family dispute arose because of the greed of his two brothers namely Shri Naresh Manchanda and Raj Manchanda but in furtherance of their evil design, distorted facts have been placed to negate the genuine share and claim of respondent no.3 i.e. the answering respondent. Under the influence of his two sons, the petitioner also started litigating with his real brothers and the answering respondent, his third son. Shri Naresh Manchanda raised a dispute regarding 1/4th shares of his uncle in the building saying that front portion must be given to him. The preliminary decree of partition in Original Suit No.2039 of 2007 filed by Shri Har Prakash Manchanda (brother of the petitioner) has already been passed and a permanent injunction has also been granted on 18.8.2012. The First Appeal No.1023 of 2013 was filed by the petitioner along with his another son wherein an interim order was initially passed on 14.12.2012. As per the information of the answering respondent no.3, the said appeal has been dismissed for want of prosecution.
Further, the dispute regarding partnership of M/s Manchanda Enterprises a family business, is also going on. The petitioner alongwith his two sons Naresh Manchanda and Raj Manchanda formed a new partnership concern namely M/s Manchanda Agency using the entire infrastructure of M/s Manchanda Enterprises whereunder they were marketing the soaps manufactured from outside and tried to dispose of the assets of M/s Manchanda Enterprises. As a result of it, respondent no.3 filed a case against his brothers and father namely the petitioner namely Case No.119/70 of 2014, Shri Mahesh Manchanda v. Raj Manchanda, Manisha Manchanda wife of Shri Naresh Manchanda and Shri Omprakash Manchanda (under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996) which is pending. It is further contended that the petitioner is living peacefully with his elder son Naresh Manchanda at the second floor of the disputed property and is having personal driver, domestic staff/helpers and has also engaged part-time domestic helper. Shri Naresh Manchanda further instituted Original Suit No.989 of 2014 seeking permanent injunction against the respondent no.3 namely Mahesh Manchanda. It is admitted to respondent no.3 that he is living at the third floor of the house and was inducted by the petitioner being his father.
In the rejoinder affidavit of Raj Manchanda (one son if the petitioner) filed on behalf of the petitioner, it is contended that the allegation in the counter affidavit regarding any collusion between the petitioner and his two sons is incorrect. The respondent no.3 has no share in the disputed property. The allegation that two sons had inflicted any pressure on the petitioner for litigating with his third son is a baseless allegation. The factum of litigation pending between the parties is admitted. It is contended that the respondent no.3 was occupying third floor not in his own independent capacity but was allowed by the petitioner to live therein. Now when the petitioner does not want him to live in the said house, he has no option but to vacate it. The assertion of the respondent no.3 regarding the disputed properties having been purchased out of the family funds, is highly disputed.
In the supplementary counter affidavit, the papers pertaining to the litigation pending between the parties have been brought on record. It has also come up on record that a First Information Report was lodged by the respondent no.3 against the petitioner and his two brothers whereafter they had to approach this Court to seek bail, wherein this Court had stayed the non-bailable warrant issued to them.
From the facts noted above, it is evident that certain litigations with regard to the business established by the petitioner alongwith his two sons in the name of M/s Sheetal Gramudyog Sansthan are pending before the Civil Court. A suit filed by Naresh Manchanda (one son of the petitioner) seeking permanent injunction and declaration of transfer in favour of his son regarding the plant, machinery and articles lying in the rented factory premises, is also pending.
From the abovenoted facts, this much is evident that the parties i.e. the petitioner alongwith his two sons Naresh Manchanda and Raj Manchanda on one side and respondent no.3 on the other side, are litigating. The affidavit in support of the present petition and the rejoinder affidavit had been filed by one of the sons of the petitioner namely Raj Manchanda who is living separately in a House No.7/106, Sarvodaya Nagar, Kanpur Nagar. There are rival allegations of mis-appropriation of funds of the joint family business established by them. The fact that the parties are litigating is evident on record but there is no averment not even a whisper in the application filed under Section 5 of the Act, 2007 or in the present petition that respondent no.3 i.e. the son of petitioner had ever mis-behaved or ill-treated the petitioner. There are no allegation of parental abuse whether mental or physical at the hands of respondent no.3.
At the cost of repetition, it is noteworthy that the averments in the application moved by the petitioner under Section 5 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and the appeal under Section 16 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 are that the soap manufacturing business established in the name of M/s Sheetal Gramudyog Sansthan, a Cooperative Society was established from the H.U.F. funds and the funds of the applicant/petitioner but interest on the money given under loan by the petitioner is not being paid by respondent no.3 and, as such, the applicant has no money to maintain himself. Further that the third floor of the house in which the respondent no.3 was living with the permission of the petitioner, has not been vacated by him despite repeated communications. The petitioner has been forced to live with his eldest son on the second floor of the same building, which was purchased jointly, in the name of the petitioner and his eldest son, and other brothers of the petitioner.
From the said facts, it is evident that the family dispute is going on in between the parties with regard to a business arrangement for which initially, the respondent no.3 filed the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and later a suit has been filed by Shri Naresh Manchanda with regard to the possession of the factory premises and machinery. In the said scenario, it is to be seen as to whether the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 can be invoked to evict one of the sons of the petitioner/applicant from the house which, according to the petitioner, has been purchased in his name and the name of his eldest son.
This takes the Court to the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007` so as to see the whole object and reasons of the same. The statement of object and reasons of the Act as set out are that the traditional norms and values of the Indian Society laid stress in providing care for the elderly due to withering of the joint family system, a large number of elderly are facing emotionally neglect and lack of physical and mental support. Thus, ageing has become a major social challenge and despite provisions of maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, it was deemed necessary to provide simple, inexpensive and speedy mechanism to claim maintenance for the parents. The bill proposes to cast obligation on the persons who inherit the property of their aged relatives to maintain such aged relatives and also proposes to make provisions for setting up of old-age homes for providing maintenance to the indigent, older persons.
The preamble of the Act describes the same as an Act to provide for more effective provisions for the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens guaranteed and recognised under the Constitution and for matters connected therewith and or incidental thereof. Section 3 of the Act gives it an overriding effect over any other enactment or instrument which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Section 4 in Chapter II titled "Maintenance of Parents and Senior Citizens" provides in sub-section (2) that the obligation of the children or relative, as the case may be, to maintain a senior citizen extends to the needs of such citizen so that senior citizen may live a normal life. Section 5 provides for making an application for maintenance under Section 4, by a senior citizen, or if he is incapable, by any other person or organisation authorised by him. The Tribunal may also take cognizance suo motu. On receipt of such application for maintenance, a notice is to be given to the children or relative and an enquiry is to be held for determining the amount of maintenance, after giving the parties an opportunity of hearing.
Section 7 provides for constitution of Maintenance Tribunal by the State Government and Section 9 deals with the maximum maintenance allowance which may be ordered by such Tribunal. Section 11 provides the power of the Tribunal to enforce its order of maintenance. Section 15 provides for constitution of Appellate Tribunal which shall be provided by an Officer not below the rank of District Magistrate. The appeal against the order of Tribunal shall lie before the Appellate Tribunal. The Maintenance Officer within the meaning of Section 18 shall be designated by the State Government who shall represent the parents or if he so desires during the proceedings of the Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be. Sections 19 and 20 deals with establishment of old age home, obligation of the State for medical support for senior citizens.
Now comes the relevant Chapter V which deals with the protection of life and property of a senior citizen. Section 21 mandates that the State shall take all measures to ensure that the Act is given wide publicity and there is effective coordination between the services provided by the concerned Ministries and the Departments to address the issues relating to the welfare of the senior citizens and periodical review of the same. Section 22 provides that the State Government may confer powers and impose duties on the District Magistrate, who shall exercise all or any such power which is necessary for performance of all or any of the duties, conferred or imposed upon them so as to carry out the objects of the Act. Section 23 provides that any transfer of property by a senior citizen to his children or a relative who shall provide basic amenities and address the basic physical needs of the senior citizen, if fails to do so, such a transfer shall be deemed a result of fraud or coercion or undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal under the Act.
Under Rule 21 of the U.P. Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2014, framed under Section 32 of the Act, the District Magistrate has been assigned powers and duties to ensure that life and property of senior citizens of the district are protected and that they are able to live life with security and dignity. The District Magistrate has also been given powers to monitor that adequate and timely payment of maintenance is provided to the senior citizens and to ensure that the object and purpose of the Act is carried out.
Rule 22 provides that the District Superintendent of Police and District Inspector of Police, as the case may be, shall take all necessary steps to protect the life and property of the senior citizens.
Having regard to the objects of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and intention of the legislature, the words "normal life" used in Section 4 would certainly mean a right to peacefully live in one's own property and on being prevented from use thereof, the senior citizen would have a right to recover the same so as to use it for any purpose including a purpose to augment his income. The word 'transfer' cannot be restricted to mean only actual transfer of title and ownership rather it would also include possession of property for the term 'transfer' employed in Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The object of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is to provide simple, inexpensive and speedy remedy to the parents and senior citizens who are in distress, by summary enquiry. The provisions have to be liberally construed as the primary object is to give social justice to the parents and senior citizens.
In the light of the said facts, the question came up for consideration before the High Court of Kerala in C.K. Vasu v. The Circle Inspector of Police in W.P. (C) 20850 of 2011, decided on 25.5.2012 wherein it was held that the order of Maintenance Tribunal restraining the petitioner from interfering with his mother occupying the first floor of the property or from recovering the rental income of the other two floors of the property and further providing petitioner to maintain peace in house and not to disturb his aged mother, were perfectly justified. Emphasis was supplied to the judgment of Gujarat High Court in Jayantram Vallabhdas Meswania v. Vallabhdas Govindram Meswania, AIR 2013 Guj. 160, wherein it has been held that the question whether the term 'transfer' in Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 should be construed, having regard to the object of the Act and the provisions under Section 2(b), 2(d), 2 (f) and 2 (h) and 4, so as to also include possession of the property as well. It is noticed that sub-section (4) of Section 4 provides that any person who would inherit the property (which includes right or interest in such property) and is "in possession of property" shall maintain such senior citizen which includes the needs of such senior citizen to lead normal life. Having regard to the object of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and intention of the legislature, it was held therein that there is no reason, justification or indication to restrict the meaning and scope of the term 'transfer' so as to mean only actual transfer of title and ownership and to exclude 'possession of property' from the purview of Section 23 or from the term transfer. It is held that the said term cannot carry a very narrow and liberal meaning so as to mean only actual transfer of title and ownership. The term transfer of title under Section 23 should receive wide and liberal construction so as to include an act of allowing possession and of/or occupation of premises or part of premises to be taken into consideration. The provision contemplates a situation that once transferor has right to receive maintenance from such property then such transferor can enforce the right to receive maintenance from the transferee. It has been held that the provisions of Section 23 of the Act cannot be, and need not be, read in isolation or by divorcing the said provision from the other provision, particularly Section 4 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 read with Sections 2(b), 2(f), 2(g) and 2(h) of the Act. In the facts of the said case, it was held that the respondent-son was not entitled for property as he was not taking sufficient and proper care of the respondent. The Competent Authority, therefore, having regard to the relevant facts before it, has rightly directed the petitioner to handover the possession of the part of the property/premises which is in his possession.
In Promil Tomar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 175 (1) PLR 94, the application under Section 23 was found maintainable. It was held therein that peaceful living of the senior citizen in his property is the apparent objective of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The property in dispute had been transferred and purchased in the name of the petitioners after commencement of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. It was claimed that the purchase was with solemn assurance of the petitioners that they will provide basic amenities and physical needs to their parents. The parent claimed that the petitioners had started torturing in every possible manner and as such the property was liable to be reverted back to him and the matter shall fall within the purview of Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The continuance of the petitioner in the house of respondent no.5 was detrimental to his life and liberty. There were several allegations of such acts of the petitioners therein. It was, therefore, held that in view of the stained relationship inter se parties, the directions could be issued to deliver possession of house of the parent.
In Justice Shanti Sarup Dewan, Chief Justice (Retired) & Anr. v. Union Territory, Chandigarh & Ors., LPA No.1007/2013, the Punjab and Haryana High Court gave direction to the State Authorities to ensure shifting of the petitioner's son from the residential house of his father. It was observed by the Division Bench that the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is not restricted to only providing maintenance but cast obligation on the persons who inherit the property of their aged relatives to maintain such aged relatives. With the objective to achieve the purpose of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, it had exercised power under Section 226 of the Constitution of India to issue direction to vacate the house belonging to the senior citizen.
In Sunny Paul (supra) taking note of the aforesaid judgments, it was concluded that the Courts cannot left them helpless but shall assist the senior citizens whose rights are protected under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 because of any unreasonable stand of the son. The son and his family members who were insisting to live with the father were directed to vacate the property to the extent, it was occupied by them. The right in the property, if any, can be claimed by the son by filing a proper civil proceedings but in such case, no injunction can be granted. It was, thus, held that even the permissible use amounts to transfer and would contemplate the condition that son would not harm his parents physically or mentally. It was found that since the Maintenance Tribunal has found that the son had committed acts of physical assault and mental cruelty on the parents, the pre-condition mentioned in Section 23 stood satisfied. As in such eventuality, the power to declare a transfer of property void lies with the Tribunal. It was finally concluded that in order to achieve the objectives of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 so as to provide speedy relief to them against the threat posed by their own children or any relative who would inherit his property, under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, the Maintenance Tribunal is empowered to issue eviction order to ensure that senior citizen live peacefully and son may not get any opportunity to traumatize his parents physically or mentally. Unless the consequential relief of eviction is granted, the purpose of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 would not be achieved.
Thus, from the aforesaid discussion, it is evident that the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 has been enacted in order to provide speedy remedy to the aged parents as against the atrocities of their near and dear ones including their children. If the parent is aged and old and incapacitated to maintain himself/herself, the son or the relative may be held liable to maintain his/her parent. The maintenance can be fixed by the Tribunal after making a summary enquiry and effective measures can be taken to ensure that the same is paid and the senior citizen gets sufficient money to meet his daily need and medical expenses so that he may live his life with dignity. Further, in case of any harassment by son or relative living in the house of the senior citizen, who subject him (the senior citizen) to mental cruelty or physical torture, he (the son or relative of the senior citizen) would make himself liable to eviction under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007, despite the fact that the property in which he is living has been transferred in his name by such senior citizen. The reason being that the transfer made with the condition to maintain the transferor shall be deemed to be void in case of any such condition. The word 'transfer' used in Section 23 would not only mean to include actual transfer rather it would be given a liberal consideration so as to include the "transfer of possession" to son or relative. The son or relative living in the property of the senior citizen would be only a licensee who has been allowed to occupy the same out of parental love. And such a licencee of the senior citizen would be subjected to the proceedings under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 if a case of mental torture or physical assault is found.
In the said scenario, it cannot be said that applicant/petitioner could not have invoked the jurisdiction of the Maintenance Tribunal framed under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007.
However, in the instant case, none of the two conditions as indicated in Section 23 of any complaint of physical or mental torture or non-maintenance by the son living in the premises allegedly owned by father is found existing. There is no whisper nor even a suggestion of the petitioner that respondent no.3 his son had committed any act of physical assault on the petitioner or mentally tortured him in any manner. No such averment has been made in the application or in the memo of appeal or in the present petition. Only this much is stated that the respondent no.3 had pushed the applicant forcing him to live with his another son at the second floor of the house. It is not stated by the applicant that his second son namely Naresh Manchanda with whom he is living is not maintaining him or he is finding it difficult to maintain his day to day needs, while living with him.
From the records, it is evident that the parties are at loggerheads and the petitioner is fighting against respondent no.3 his son with the help of his other two sons who are supporting him. The prayer relating to refund of money is of a joint family business. As per own admission of the petitioner, the said business was established from the money of H.U.F. The respondent no.3, on the other hand, also claims that the properties purchased in the name of the petitioner i.e. his father and two brothers namely Naresh Manchanda and Raj Manchanda were from the joint family pool fund.
It appears that the application seeking eviction of one of the son has been filed by the father, at the instigation of his other two sons who are standing with him.
From the records, it cannot be said that respondent no.3 has mis-behaved with his father or physically assaulted him or caused any mental or physical torture. It does not appear to be case of parental abuse. In view thereof, in absence of any such averment in the application, this Court is of the view that the requisite conditions for invoking powers under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 do not exist in the instant case. The dispute appears to be a family dispute where neither the District Magistrate nor Senior Superintendent of Police would have authority to issue a mandatory injunction assuming that the respondent no.3 is in unauthorised possession in a portion of the residential house in which, the petitioner/applicant is also living.
The petitioner/applicant is living in the house in question with his elder son and there is no partition amongst the family members. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, several triable issues are to be formulated and adjudicated which are not within the scope of summary enquiry within the scope of powers of the Tribunal created within the meaning of Senior Citizens Act, 2007. It , therefore, appears that it would be appropriate that the parties may pursue the pending litigations or may take recourse to such legal remedy, as is available to them. The Maintenance Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be said to have committed any error of law in rejecting the application.
However, before parting with the judgment, it would be relevant to record that the dismissal of the present petition would not give right to respondent no.3 to claim himself an owner of the third floor of the house in which he is residing and to inflict any kind of abuse whether physical or mental to his aged father rather he would be required to take all possible steps to remove any misunderstanding between him and his father. The parties may also take recourse of mediation so as to settle their disputes out of the Court.
Lastly, it is observed that in case of any act of respondent no.3 of parental abuse in future, in any manner, it would be open for the petitioner to invoke jurisdiction of the Maintenance Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007. In that eventuality, any observation made hereinabove would not be of any significance. The Competent Authority would be under obligation to take an independent decision in accordance with law.
Subject to the above, the present petition is disposed of.
(Sunita Agarwal, J.) Order Date :- 29.11.2018.
Jyotsana