JUDGMENT Prakash Krishna, J.
1. Present revision is directed against the Judgment and decree dated 14.7.2000 passed by XIth Additional District Judge, Allahabad in S.C.C. Suit No. 11 of 1993, whereby it decreed the suit for ejectment of the defendants and recovery of arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 1,200 per month for the period 1.5.1992 to 31.8.1992, and thereafter, for damages at the rate of Rs. 1,300 per month alongwith the cost of the notice till the date of delivery of the possession of the disputed shop.
2. Smt. Urmila Devi, opposite party No. 1 instituted S.C.C. Suit No. 11 of 1993 against Smt. Pushpa Kapoor (opposite party No. 2 in the present revision) and Smt. Sheela Kapoor, who died during pendency of suit and her heirs and legal representatives were substituted. The present revision is on behalf of the heirs and legal representatives of Smt. Sheela Kapoor.
3. Suit giving rise to the above revision was filed by Smt. Urmila Devi, claiming herself owner and landlady of the disputed shop 471, Katra, Allahabad for the recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment of Smt. Pushpa Kapoor and Smt. Sheela Kapoor on the pleas inter alia that she let out the disputed shop to Smt. Pushpa Kapoor under a rent note, details of which have been annexed alongwith the plaint on monthly rent of Rs. 1,200. The shop was taken by defendant No. 1, namely, Smt. Pushpa Kapoor to run the cloth business under the name and style of M/s. Kapoor Lattoo Wala. The defendant No. 1 defaulted in making payment of rent since 1.5.1992. Defendant No. 1 has surreptitiously and illegally has subletted the said shop to one of her close relation, Smt. Sheela Kapoor, defendant No. 2. A notice dated 20.3.1993 demanding the entire arrears of rent from 1.5.1991 to 28.2.1993 was served on both the defendants asking them to vacate the disputed shop and deliver its peaceful and vacant possession to the plaintiff on the expiry of thirty days from the date of receipt of the notice. The defendants failed to vacate the disputed shop and they have also failed to pay arrears of rent, hence the suit was filed. It was further pleaded that in response to the aforesaid notice a sum of Rs. 13,200 was remitted by defendant No. 2 to the plaintiff towards rent up to March, 1993. The plaintiff being semi illiterate lady accepted the money orders sent by defendant No. 2, though the defendant No. 2 was not authorized to send the arrears of rent through six money orders being subtenant. The plaintiff immediately returned the aforesaid amount through six money orders on 23.4.1993 to defendant No. 2.
4. Defendant No. 1 filed a written statement stating that the shop in question was taken by her on rent for doing the family business in partnership with the members of her Joint family, namely, Smt. Sheela Kapoor, Raj Kapoor and Madhu Kapoor. The said firm was dissolved w.e.f. 2.5.1984 and its vacant possession was handed over to the plaintiff in the first week of May, 1984 and she ceased to be a tenant of the disputed shop thereafter and has no concern with the business carried on from the said shop and is not liable to pay any rent for the period May, 1984 onwards.
5. Defendant No. 2, Smt. Sheela Kapoor in her separate written statement stated that the shop in question was initially let out to M/s New Kapoor Lattoo Wala through Smt. Pushpa Kapoor, defendant No. 1 in the year 1980, wherein the members of the family, namely, Smt. Sheela Kapoor, Raj Kapoor and Madhu Kapoor carried on the business to the knowledge of the plaintiff. The said firm was dissolved w.e.f. 2.5.1984. The tenancy of the shop was surrendered by defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff, who in turn let it out to defendant No. 2 on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,100 w.e.f. May, 1984, which was enhanced to Rs. 1,200 in the month of October, 1987 and thus, there was privy of contract in between the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 and there is no default in payment of rent.
6. The parties led evidence in support of their respective cases. The trial court framed two points for determination in the suit. The first point is whether the defendants have defaulted in making payment of rent for the period 1.5.1992 to 28.2.1993 amounting to Rs. 12,600 and the plaintiff is entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 15,321 from the defendants. The second point is whether the defendant No. 1 has sublet the disputed shop to defendant No. 2 and as such the defendants are liable for eviction.
7. The trial court has decided both the above points in favour of the plaintiff. It has been found that the defendants have failed to make payment of rent for the period 1.5.1992 to 28.2.1993. On the question of subletting it disbelieved the theory of surrender of tenancy rights by defendant No. 1 to the plaintiff and found on the basis of the material on record that defendant No. 2 is a sub-tenant on behalf of defendant No. 1.
8. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid judgment and decree of the trial court the present revision has been filed by the heirs of defendant No. 2 (Late Smt. Sheela Kapoor). Defendant No. 1 Smt. Pushpa Kapoor (the chief tenant), has chosen not to file any revision and the order against her has attained finality.
9. Sri B.D. Mandhyan, learned senior counsel for the applicant in the revision submitted that the finding of the Court below on the question of subletting is vitiated and against the material on record. Elaborating the argument he submitted that to establish sub-tenancy two things namely transfer of possession by the chief tenant and payment of rent by the sub-tenant, to the chief tenant has to be established. In the case in hand there is no evidence to show that any rent was being paid by the alleged sub-tenant namely defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1, i.e., the chief tenant. He also submitted that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are sister-in-laws being wives of two real brothers. Initially the business was being carried on by Smt. Pushpa Kapoor. Smt. Pushpa Kapoor took the disputed shop for carrying on the joint family business. She subsequently retired from the Joint family business, surrendered the tenancy rights in favour of the plaintiff/landlady who inducted defendant No. 2 as her tenant as such defendant No. 2 has become direct tenant of the plaintiff/opposite party No. 1, namely, Smt. Urmila Devi. In this view of the matter he submitted that the finding of the sub-tenancy is liable to be set aside. With regard to the question of non payment of rent, he submitted that if the aforesaid issue of sub-letting is decided in his favour, the finding on the question of default automatically becomes vitiated inasmuch as the rent as demanded in the notice was sent by defendant No. 2 to the plaintiff through six money orders, which were received by her though subsequently she protested and returned them and thus the notice determining the tenancy stood waived.
10. In reply, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff/opposite party No. 1 submitted that the findings recorded by the Court below are findings of fact and are based on material on record. He pointed out that there is no evidence worth the name to show that Smt. Pushpa Kapoor surrendered her tenancy right to the landlady. The defendants could not produce any reliable or cogent material on record to show that Smt. Pushpa Kapoor ever ceased to be the tenant of the disputed shop or she at any point of time vacated and handed over its vacant possession to the plaintiff/landlady.
11. I have given careful consideration to the respective submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. The first point which falls for determination is whether the disputed shop was taken on rent by defendant No. 1 in her personal capacity or on behalf of a firm for the business of the firm. There is no much in dispute between the parties that a rent agreement was executed in between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1, which has been witnessed and attested by the husband of defendant No. 1. The terms of the said agreement have been made part of the plaint. The trial court on appreciation of the oral deposition of the husband of defendant No. 1 has come to the conclusion that the said rent note stands approved. Om Prakash Kapoor D.W. 1, husband of Smt. Pushpa Kapoor defendant No. 1 (chief tenant) was examined who has stated that the shop in question was taken on monthly rent of Rs. 1,000 in the year 1980 through a rent note. The rent note is paper Nos. 39A/3 and 39A/4. The execution of the rent note has not been denied by the aforesaid witness. The trial court after careful examination of the statement of D.W. 1 has reached to the conclusion that paper Nos. 39A/3 and 39A/4 is the rent note with respect to the disputed property executed by defendant No. 1. The said rent note was executed in presence of D.W. 1. Significantly, Smt. Pushpa Kapoor defendant No. 1 who took the disputed shop on rent and set up the theory that she surrendered the tenancy right on 2.5.1984 did not appear in the witness box. A bare perusal of the aforesaid rent note shows beyond doubt that the said shop was taken on rent by Smt. Pushpa Kapoor, who was the first party in the rent note, in her individual capacity on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000 with stipulation that the rent would be enhanced by Rs. 100 per month after expiry of each four years. Under condition No. 9 the first party was prohibited to sub let the disputed shop to any body. In this view of the matter the contention that the disputed shop was taken for joint family business by Smt. Pushpa Kapoor does not borne out from the evidence on record. In the absence of any reliable evidence it is difficult to accept the contention of the applicants that the shop was taken on rent to carry on the joint family business or under a partnership firm and that Smt. Pushpa Kapoor was one of the partners.
12. The main question for determination which arises in the present revision is whether there is evidence on record to show that Smt. Pushpa Kapoor has sub let the disputed shop to defendant No. 2. The trial court has examined the evidence on this issue in great detail. It has not accepted theory of surrender of tenancy rights on account of absence of relevant and material evidence in this regard. The defendants have examined Om Prakash husband of defendant No. 1 on this point. He has stated that presently Smt. Pushpa Kapoor is residing at Delhi alongwith her daughter and has surrendered the tenancy rights. He has further stated that no tenancy agreement was executed by Smt. Sheela Kapoor with the plaintiff. He is the star witness of the defendants, who has admitted that the landlady Smt. Urmila Devi never issued any rent receipt to Smt. Sheela Kapoor. In further cross-examination he admits that he was not present at the time of surrender of tenancy rights by Smt. Pushpa Kapoor nor he witnessed any writing about the surrender. No document of surrender was prepared in his presence. He had no personal knowledge of surrender as he got hearsay knowledge from his wife Smt. Pushpa Kapoor, who has not been examined, on the other hand Smt. Urmila Devi, the landlady, has appeared in the witness box and is firm in her statement that she does not know Smt. Sheela Kapoor nor she ever issued any rent receipt to her, nor she received any rent from her. In further cross-examination, she denies the suggestion that she let out the disputed shop in the year 1984 to Smt. Sheela Kapoor.
13. It has come in evidence that the disputed shop was let out under an agreement of tenancy and rent receipts were used to be issued to the tenant namely Smt. Pushpa Kapoor. Taking into consideration of the entire evidence on record, it is clear that there is no reliable evidence to prove or establish the theory of surrender of tenancy right by Smt. Pushpa Kapoor. Issuance of rent receipts to Smt. Pushpa Kapoor and also tenancy agreement with her, and their absence with Smt. Sheela Kapoor, demolishes the theory of surrender as set up by the defendants. The findings of the trial court are based on cogent and relevant material on record. Learned Counsel for the applicant could not point out any evidence from which theory of surrender of tenancy right by Smt. Pushpa Kapoor can be established.
14. As a matter of fact during the course of argument it was also submitted that even if the theory of surrender is not accepted even then the subletting is not established as the landlady has failed to establish the necessary ingredients of subletting. In this connection he has relied upon the following decisions:
(1) Kala and Anr. v. Madho Prasad Vaidhva JT 1998 (6) SC 187, wherein the Apex Court has held that the onus to prove sub-tenancy is on the landlord and if he establishes parting of with possession in favour of a third party, the onus would shift to the tenant to explain. This has been followed by the Apex Court in Joginder Singh Sodhi v. Amar Kaur .
(2) Shama Prashant Raje v. Ganpat Rao and Ors. , wherein it has been held by the Apex Court that to prove subtenancy, two ingredients namely parting with possession and some consideration therefor had to be established.
(3) K. Ganesh Seth v. A.K. Jai Ram 2005 ACJ 752 : 2005 (1) SCCD 52 : 2004 (4) AWC 2976 (SC), wherein the Apex Court set aside the judgment of the High Court wherein it was held by the High Court that if sub-tenancy was created by the tenant and the tenant has died then the legal heirs of the tenant and the sub-tenant would not be evicted "for the sin committed by the deceased tenant". It was held that heirs would be liable for eviction even if the tenant had died.
(4) Mahendra Saree Emporium v. G.B. Sriniwasa Murthy 2005 ACJ 745. The Apex Court has held that in the case of subletting the onus lies on the landlord to establish that there is transfer of right to use the tenanted property to the exclusion of all others during the term of lease and payment of consideration by the sub-lessee to the tenant. It has been held that from a mere change in the constitution of firm an interference as to subletting could not be drawn in the absence of further evidence adduced to establish subletting as the premises continued to be in possession of the one of the original tenant.
15. Coming to the facts of the present case it is defendant's own case that Smt. Pushpa Kapoor defendant No. 1 who entered into a contract of tenancy with the plaintiff ceased to be in occupation of the disputed shop w.e.f. 2.5.1984, meaning thereby it is the admitted case of the defendants that the original tenant Smt. Pushpa Kapoor, defendant No. 1 parted with the possession of the tenanted shop on 2.5.1984. As a matter of fact Smt. Pushpa Kapoor in her written statement has pleaded that she has no concern with the disputed tenanted shop for the period subsequent to May, 1984. Thus, by her own showing it is established that the tenant Pushpa Kapoor ceased to be in possession of the disputed shop after 2.5.1984. In this view of the matter the first ingredient of subletting is established beyond doubt even on the pleadings of the defendants. The onus as laid down by the Apex Court in Kala and another (supra) and Joginder Singh Sodhi (supra) would be on the tenants to explain, the facts and circumstances as to how defendant No. 2 has come into possession of the disputed shop. The case of the defendants is that after vacation of the disputed shop by defendant No. 1, the plaintiff/landlady let it out to defendant No. 2. On this issue the trial court has found as fact that in the absence of any cogent material on record, the theory of surrender of tenancy rights by defendant No. 1 and its fresh letting by the landlady to defendant No. 2 is not established. The argument of the learned Counsel for the applicant is that defendant No. 2 came in possession of the disputed shop to the knowledge of the landlady as she Is admittedly residing over the first floor of the disputed shop. Moreover, defendant No. 2 took the electric connection, telephone connection etc. in her name and it was never objected by the landlady, therefore, it was submitted that an inference be drawn that the landlady consented the transfer of possession to defendant No. 2 and as such the defendant No. 2 became the tenant of the disputed shop in her own right. It is difficult to accept the said submission specially in view of the specific statement of the landlady that the said connections were not taken either with her permission nor she has any knowledge in whose names they stand. It is not in dispute that the business continued to be carried on under the same name and style even Smt. Pushpa Devi ceased to be one of the partners of the alleged firm, it was dissolved and reconstituted on 2.5.1984. Apart from the above, the specific case of the landlady is that she never consented for the electric connection or telephone connection and as a matter of fact she never came to know that these connections have been taken by defendant No. 2 in her name. There is no material on record to show that at any point of time, the landlady acquired the direct or indirect knowledge or any kind of knowledge that these connections were taken by defendant No. 2 in her name. The business continued to be carried on under the old name and style, there was no reason for the landlady to suspect that there has been a change in the constitution of the firm proprietorship.
16. Moreover as found above, the shop in question was not taken on rent by a firm but it was taken by defendant No. 1 in her individual capacity. It is also not in dispute that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are the wives of two real brothers and as such it was difficult for the landlady to find out the change if any in the constitution of the firm or ownership of business. In view of the fact that the theory of surrender has not been established or proved the burden lies upon the defendants to prove that there was no sub-tenancy when parting with the possession by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 is admitted case of defendants.
17. In this connection above paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 20 from the judgment of Joginder Singh Sodhi (supra) being relevant are reproduced below:
17. We are unable to appreciate the contention. As observed by this Court in Bharat Sales Ltd. v. L.I.C. of India, sub-tenancy or subletting comes into existence when the tenant gives up possession of the tenanted accommodation, wholly or in part, and puts another person in exclusive possession thereof. This arrangement comes about obviously under a mutual agreement or understanding between the tenant and the person to whom the possession is so delivered. In this process, the landlord is kept out of the scene. Rather, the scene is enacted behind the back of the landlord, concealing the over acts and transferring possession clandestinely to a person who is an utter stranger to the landlord, in the sense that the landlord had not let out the premises to that person nor had he allowed or consented to his entering Into possession of that person, instead of the tenant, which ultimately reveals to the landlord that the tenant to whom the property was let out has put some other person in possession of that property. In such a situation, it would be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, the contract or agreement or understanding between the tenant and the subtenant. It would also be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, that the person to whom the property had been sublet had paid monetary consideration to the tenant. Payment of rent, undoubtedly, is an essential element of lease or sub-lease. It may be paid in cash or in kind or may have been paid or promised to be paid. It may have been paid in lump sum in advance covering the period for which the press is let out or sublet or it may have been paid or promised to be paid periodically. Since payment of rent or monetary consideration may have been made secretly, the law does not require such payment to be proved by affirmative evidence and the Court is permitted to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case proved at the trial, including the delivery of exclusive possession to infer that the premises were sub-let.
18. In Rajbir Kaur v. S. Chokesiri and Co. this Court, speaking through Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was) stated : (SCC p. 43, para 59) If exclusive possession is established, and the version of the respondent as to the particulars and the incidents of the transaction is found acceptable in the particular facts and circumstances of the case, it may not be impermissible for the Court to draw an inference that the transaction was entered into with monetary consideration in mind. It is open to the respondent to rebut this. Such transactions of subletting in the guise of licences are, in their very nature, clandestine arrangements between the tenant and the sub-tenant and there cannot be direct evidence got. It is not, unoften, a matter for legitimate inference. The burden of making good a case of subletting is, of course, on the appellants. The burden of establishing facts and contentions which support the party's case is on the party who takes the risk of non-persuasion. If at the conclusion of the trial, a party has failed to establish these to the appropriate standard, he will lose. Though the burden of proof as a matter of law remains constant throughout a trial, the evidential burden which rests initially upon a party rearing the legal burden, shifts according as the weight of the evidence adduced by the party during the trial. In the circumstances of the case, we think, that, appellants having been forced by the Courts below to have established exclusive possession of the ice cream vendor of a part of the demised premises and the explanation of the transaction offered by the respondent having been found by the Courts below to be unsatisfactory and unacceptable, it was not impermissible for the Courts to draw an inference, having regard to the ordinary course of human conduct, that the transaction must have been entered into for monetary considerations. There is no explanation forthcoming from the respondent appropriate to the situation as found.
19. Again in Kala v. Madho Parshad Vaidya this Court reiterated the same principle. It was observed that the burden of proof of sub-letting is on the landlord but once he establishes parting of possession by the tenant to a third party, the onus would shift on the tenant to explain his possession. If he is unable to discharge that onus, it is permissible for the Court to raise an inference that such possession was for monetary consideration.
20. We are in agreement with the observations in the above cases. In our considered opinion, proof of monetary consideration by the sub-tenant to the tenant is not a sine qua non to establish subletting.
18. In view of the above discussion it is difficult to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the applicant that the sub-letting of the disputed premises by defendant No. 1 to defendant No. 2 is not established. The parting of possession by defendant No. 1 to defendant No. 2 having been established an Inference of payment of consideration may be drawn, unless otherwise is proved. On the facts of the present case, no fault can be find out in the judgment of the trial court, holding subletting by defendant No. 1 to defendant No. 2.
19. On point relating to default in payment of rent, the learned Counsel vehemently argued that indisputably the rent was sent through six money orders by defendant No. 2, which were accepted by the landlady and, therefore, in the facts of the case, the landlady has waived her notice determining the tenancy and there is no default in payment of rent. It was pointed out that the landlady has also filed an application under Section 21 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for release of the disputed shop on the ground of bona fide need of her son wherein she has also impleaded defendant No. 2 as opposite party. The said proceedings are still pending consideration. Reliance has been placed upon a Judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Munni Devi and Ors. v. IInd Additional District Judge . It is true as pointed out by the learned Counsel that in this case it was held that when the money order was accepted by the landlady, the landlord cannot escape from the responsibility of accepting the money order and thus, the consequence is that the notice which has already been issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act stood waived. With respect to the learned Judge it is difficult to agree with the broad proposition as laid down above for the reasons more than one. It appears that the relevant judgments of the Apex Court were not brought to notice of the Court nor there is discussion of any principle of law. Even the statutory provision, namely Section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act has not been taken note of. The aforesaid Judgment with great respect to the Hon'ble Judge is per incurium.
20. In a recent Judgment the Apex Court has examined the question of waiver of notice to quit where rent has been accepted by the landlord after service of notice to quit and before initiation of any eviction proceeding in Swaroop Singh Gupta v. Jagdish Singh . It considered Section 113 of T.P. Act as well as decision of Calcutta High Court in Manik Lal Chaudhary v. Khadam Das AIR 1926 Cal 763 and held that there must be some act on the part of lessor evidencing the intention to treat lease as subsisting. The Court while deciding the question of waiver must consider all relevant facts and circumstances of the case "and mere fact that rent has been detained and accepted cannot be determinative". In the case in hand except at the most the rent was accepted (which was sent by defendant No. 2) by the lessor after giving notice to quit there is no material on record to show that the lessor by his any action expressed the intention to treat lease as subsisting. Relevant portion from the aforesaid decision of Apex Court Is quoted below:
A mere perusal of Section 113 leaves no room for doubt that In a given case, a notice given under Section 111, Clause (h) may be treated as having been waived, but the necessary conditions is that there must be some act on the part of the person giving the notice evidencing an intention to treat the lease as subsisting. Of course, the express or implied consent of the person to whom such notice is given must also be established. The question as to whether the person giving the notice has by his act shown an intention to treat the lease as subsisting is essentially a question of fact. In reaching a conclusion on this aspect of the matter, the Court must consider all relevant facts and circumstances, and the mere fact that rent has been tendered and accepted, cannot be determinative.
21. The landlady Smt. Urmila Devi has examined herself as one of the witnesses. She in her statement has categorically stated that the rent was being realized by her husband who used to issue the rent receipt. She can only make her signature as she is not well literate. She has further deposed that her husband used to look after all the matters relating to the house and the tenancy. She accepted the money orders as the post man told her that money order was sent by Sri Kapoor. She accepted the money order without knowing the sender's name. Subsequently, she came to know that the money order was sent by Smt. Sheela Kapoor, her husband became annoyed as to why she has accepted the money order and she immediately returned a sum of Rs. 13,200 through money orders being paper Nos. 24C1 to 24C2 etc. The money orders thus were not accepted by the landlady as they were sent by Smt. Sheela Kapoor. She under some confusion without properly understanding received them believing that her tenant Smt. Pushpa Kapoor is the payer. She has pleaded as also proved that she received the money orders due to confusion and misunderstanding. She has acted like an ordinary semi literate house wife. She reiterated in the witness box that she can only make "her signature but is unable to read or write. In the entire cross-examination her testimony that she is incapable of reading or writing remains unshattered. The emphasis laid by the learned Counsel for the applicant that in the money order coupon it was clearly written that the sender is Smt. Sheela Kapoor, defendant No. 2, and as such by acceptance of rent a contract of tenancy has been created between the parties and the notice of determination of tenancy stood waived cannot be accepted and has not been rightly accepted by the trial court.
22. Thus, from the material on record, it is established that the contract of tenancy was in between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1, Smt. Pushpa Kapoor and the sending of rent by Smt. Sheela Kapoor was of little consequence. Smt. Sheela Kapoor Indisputably is not a family member of Smt. Pushpa Kapoor. In this view of the matter even assuming for the sake of argument that the rent tendered by defendant No. 2 was accepted by the landlady the fact remains that defendant No. 1 was defaulter in payment of rent as It was not sent on her behalf. The contention of the landlady that the money orders were accepted under some confusion or misunderstanding as she was informed by the Postman that they were sent by Kapoor is plausible and is quite natural. The subsequent conduct of the landlady of returning the whole amount through money orders immediately to Smt. Sheela Kapoor also corroborates the fact that she received the money orders under some confusion. There is no specific denial by Smt. Sheela Kapoor or her witnesses that the money orders were not returned by Smt. Urmila Devi immediately.
23. The learned senior counsel also placed reliance on Sri Krishna Oil Mill v. Radha Krishna Ram Chandra , wherein it has been held that once the arrears of rent have been paid and accepted by the landlord, no cause of action for filing the eviction petition remains and the vacation petition is liable to be dismissed as having become infructuous. In this case it was found as fact that the rent for the period in question was received by the landlord before filing of the eviction petition without any protest by the landlord. The only grievance raised in the petition was that the tenant did not pay rent on the due date. In this facts situation as noted in para 5 of the report, the Apex Court set aside the eviction decree.
24. In view of above, the judgment of the Court below is based on the material on record and the findings recorded by it on the aforesaid issues are based on relevant considerations and do not suffer from any error of law or fact. There is no merit in the revision. The revision is dismissed summarily.