Hon'ble Ritu Raj Awasthi, J.
Heard the counsel for the appellant Dr. L.P. Misra and Sri Sudhakar Pandey holding brief of Sri C.V. Singh for the private respondent.
The writ petition preferred by the appellant challenging the order passed by the State Government dated 18.11.2010 has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge, after holding that this Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
It appears that an objection was raised by the respondents on the maintainability of the writ petition, on the ground that on the same subject matter, one writ petition was filed before this Court sitting at Allahabad i.e. Writ Petition No. 68582 of 2010, which was dismissed for want of prosecution, wherein a restoration application is pending and pleas were also raised with respect to manoeuvring of the elections by one party or the other but the learned Single Judge, by making the following observations, held that the petition was not maintainable at Lucknow.
"Without being prejudiced with the aforesaid fact, I am of the view that the basic dispute is the dispute of election of the Committee of Management of the Institution in question and cumulative facts for deciding the dispute are available within the territorial jurisdiction of this court sitting at Allahabad. Being the matter of district Kushinagar as well as the educational authorities also being situated within the territorial jurisdiction at Allahabad, I am of the view that once this court enters to adjudicate upon the authority of the State Government that requires some basic facts for its adjudication, which are available within the territorial jurisdiction of this court sitting at Allahabad, therefore, I hereby dismissed the writ petition due to lack of territorial jurisdiction."
Before us, counsel for the appellant has urged that the order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition for want of territorial jurisdiction is per se against the law propounded by the apex court in the case of Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (1975) 2 SCC 671 and U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow v. The State of U.P. and others, 1995 SCC (4) 738.
In the case of Nasiruddin (supra) the apex court held as under:
"If the cause of action arise wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If the cause of actions arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would have exclusive jurisdiction in a such a matter. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum conveniens. The litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. The Court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the Court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action."
In the case of U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad (supra), following observations were made by the Supreme Court.
"It is unsound because the expression "cause of action" in an application under Article 226 would be as the expression is understood and if the cause of action arose because of the appellate order or the revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow then Lucknow would have jurisdiction though the original order was passed at a place outside the areas in Oudh. It may be that the original order was in favour of the person applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate order might be the cause of action. The expression "cause of action " is well-known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in part within the specified areas in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum conveniens. The litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular Court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the Court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court. Similarly, if the cause of action can be said to have arisen partly within specified areas in Oudh and partly outside the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have the choice to institute proceedings either at Allahabad or Lucknow. The Court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the Court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action."
Respondent places reliance upon the case of Manju Varma (Dr.) v. State of U.P. and others, (2005) 1 SCC 73, wherein the order passed by the then Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court (S.K. Sen, CJ.)under Para 14 of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, directing a writ petition pending at Lucknow to be transferred to Allahabad was under challenge, the Supreme Court set aside the order passed by the Chief Justice.
The aforesaid judgement is, therefore, of no relevance.
Learned counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgement in the case of Vikram Singh Kathait v. Union of India and others, (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 52241 of 2007) decided on 29.10.07, wherein a Divisioin Bench of this Court at Allahabad, relying upon the case of M/s. Ambica Industries Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2007 (6) SCC 769, considering the preliminary objection about maintainability of the writ petition filed at Allahabad, as against the plea that it should be filed at Uttarakhand, observed that the matter was covered by the dictum of the apex court in the aforesaid case and the writ petition was not maintainable at Allahabad.
In the case of Vikram Singh Kathait (supra), the petitioners were appointed in Kendriya Vidyualaya, New Tehri Town, Uttarakhand i.e. within the State of Uttarakhand. Since the Tribunal at Allahabad exercised jurisdiction in respect of both the States, therefore, the Original Application under Section 19 of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 was filed at Allahabad. In the circumstances, the Division Bench held, that mere judgement of Tribunal at Allahabad, could not give rise to a cause of action, partly or wholly, to file a writ petition in Allahabad High Court.
While laying down the aforesaid proposition, the Court also took note of the fact that the case of Nasiruddin (supra) and Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India, 2004 (6) SCC 254, were also noted in the case of M/s. Ambica Industries (supra) in Para 30 but the Court found that jurisdiction in the case of M/s. Ambica Industries was with the Allahabad High Court and not Delhi High Court.
In the case of M/s. Ambica Industries (supra), the appellant carried on business at Lucknow. The matter came up before the Central Excise and Service Tax Appellate (CESTAT), New Delhi, which had been exercising territorial jurisdiction over U.P., NCT of Delhi and Maharashtra. Having regard to the situs of the Tribunal, appeal under Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was filed before the Delhi High Court, which was dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Supreme Court while considering the plea of jurisdiction, in appeal under Central Excise Act, observed as under:
"CESTAT, New Delhi exercises jurisdiction over all the three States. In all the three States there are High Courts. In the event, the aggrieved person is treated to be the dominus litus, as a result whereof, he elects to file the appeal before one or the other High Court, the decision of the High Court shall be binding only on the authorities which are within its jurisdiction. It will only be of persuasive value on the authorities functioning under a different jurisdiction. If the binding authority of a High Court does not extend beyond its territorial jurisdiction and the decision of one High Court would not be a binding precedent for other High Courts or Courts or Tribunals outside its territorial jurisdiction, some sort of judicial anarchy shall come into play. An assessee, affected by an order of assessment made at Bombay, may invoke the jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court to take advantage of the law laid down by it and which might suit him and thus he would be able to successfully evade the law laid down by the High Court at Bombay.
Furthermore, when an appeal is provided under a statute, Parliament must have thought of one High Court. It is a different matter that by way of necessity, a Tribunal may have to exercise jurisdiction over several States but it does not appeal to any reason that Parliament intended, despite providing for an appeal before the High Court, that appeals may be filed before different High Courts at the sweet will of the party aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal. In a case of this nature, therefore, the cause of action doctrine may not be invoked."
While dealing with the aforesaid issue, their Lordships also took note of the fact that similar problems have arisen in respect of the decision rendered by the tribunals constituted under different Acts, for exam;le the Income Tax Act and made the following observations:
"Similar problems have arisen in respect of the decisions rendered by Tribunals constituted under different Acts, for example Income Tax Act.
We are also not unmindful of a catena of decisions rendered by some High Courts that situs of the Tribunal is the determinative factor for reference and/or appeal before the High Court."
Noticing the case of Nasiruddin (supra), their Lordships observed that in the said case the Court was not dealing with a question of this nature. Therefore, the same are not authorities for the proposition that the High Court, which is situated at the same place as the situs of the Tribunal, alone will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action doctrine, as analysed hereinbefore is given effect to, invariably more than one high Court may have jurisdiction, which is not contemplated.
The aforesaid case of M/s. Ambica Industries (supra) was thus, a case where the question of jurisdiction of different High Courts was considered in the light of the appellate provision under the Central Excise Act and it was not a case, where the question of territorial jurisdiction of the two Benches of the same High Court was involved.
Nasiruddin (supra) case dealt with the territorial jurisdiction of the two Benches of the Allahabad High Court, after taking into account the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948. While dealing with the aforesaid issue, their Lordships observed that the reasoning of the High Court that the permanent seat of the High Court is at Allahabad is not quite sound. The order states that the High Court shall sit as the new High Court and the Judges and Division Bench thereof shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces, appoint.
Further in Para 33 of the report the Court observed as under:
"To sum up. Our conclusions are as follows. First there is no permanent seat of the High Court at Allahabad. The seats at Allahabad and at Lucknow may be changed in accordance with the provisions of the order. Second, the Chief Justice of the High Court has no power to increase or decrease the areas in oudh from time to time. The areas in oudh have been determined once by the Chief Justice and, therefore, there is no scope for changing the areas. Third. the Chief Justice has power under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the order to direct in his discretion that any case or class of cases arising in oudh areas shall be heard at Allahabad. Any case or class of cases are those which are instituted at Lucknow. The interpretation given by the High Court that the word "heard" confers powers on the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of cases arising in oudh areas shall be instituted or filed at Allahabad, instead of Lucknow is wrong. The word "heard" means that cases which have already been instituted or filed at Lucknow may in the discretion of the Chief Justice under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the order he directed to be heard at Allahabad. Fourth, the expression "cause of action" with regard to a civil matter means that it should be left to the litigant to institute cases at Lucknow Bench or at Allahabad Bench according to the cause of action arising wholly or in part within either of the areas. If the cause of action arises wholly within oudh areas then the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similarly, if the cause of action arises wholly outside the specified areas in oudh then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action in part arises in the specified oudh areas and part of the cause of action arises outside the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to attract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at Allahabad.
The Court further observed that 'applications under Article 226 will similarly lie either at Lucknow or at Allahabad as the applicant will allege that the whole of cause of action or part of the cause of action arose at Lucknow within the specified areas of oudh or part of the cause of action arose at a place outside the specified oudh areas'.
The High Court at Allahabad being one High Court with two Benches, one at Allahabad and the other at Lucknow, exercise their respective territorial jurisdiction in respect of cause of action, which arise in their territorial jurisdiction, either wholly or in part, as the case may be.
Instant is not a case, where the appellant could have approached more than one High Court, in addition to the Allahabad High Court. It was a simple case, where the territorial jurisdiction was to be determined in accordance with the law propounded in the case of Nasiruddin (supra) and followed in the case of U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad (supra).
The case of Vikram Singh Kathait (supra) is also of no assistance as there also the issue raised was, whether writ would lie in the Uttarakhand High Court or in the Allahabad High Court.
Relying upon the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and others,(1997) 3 SCC 261, also a plea has been raised that this Court would not have territorial jurisdiction. The apex court in the said case observed that all decisions of Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323A or Article 323B of the Constitution, will be subject to the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls. The Tribunal lies where the matter has been considered.
The plea was that it was the Central Administrative Tribunal at Allahabad who had decided the Original Application and, therefore, since the High Court at Allahabad is the High Court under whose jurisdiction, the said Tribunal was functioning, this Court sitting at Lucknow would not have territorial jurisdiction.
In the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) the Court held that "in view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that Clause 2(d) of Article 323A and Clause 3(d) of Article 323B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323A and 323B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article 323B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal".
In the case of Dr. A.K. Verma and others vs. Union of India and others [Writ Petition No. 732 (SB) of 2000] decided on 7.3.02, challenge was made to the selection of I.A.S. Officers under the Non-State Civil Service quota before the Central Administrative Tribunal at Allahabad. The order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench was challenged at Lucknow. Similar objection was raised that this Court sitting at Lucknow would not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain such a petition, as it is only that High Court in whose jurisdiction Tribunal the Original Application is pending or decided, is situated, can entertain a writ petition.
In the aforesaid case, a Division Bench of this Court in which one of us (Pradeep Kant,J.) was a member vide order dated 7.3.02 held that part of the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within territorial jurisdiction of this Court sitting at Lucknow, as it was the State Government who had made the selection, which was under challenge. The Original Application was filed before the Tribunal at Allahabad but challenge to the aforesaid order was made at the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court. This Court considered the aforesaid objection and held that the Court at Lucknow would also have jurisdiction in such a matter also, as the original cause of action had accrued at Lucknow. The aforesaid judgement in the case of Dr. A.K. Verma was affirmed by the apex court.
Present is a case, where the State Government has not only entertained some representation but, as a matter of fact, it has decided a dispute by declaring that the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools is illegal. After declaring the same as illegal, a direction has been issued to the Director for getting the necessary orders passed by the District Inspector of Schools.
We do not intend to enter into the validity of the order passed by the State Government but we find that the State Government has passed an order, declaring the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools, illegal, presuming that by concealing the facts, the elections were got conducted and the order dated 19.5.09 was obtained.
The territorial jurisdiction of the Court would depend upon the fact as to where the cause of action accrued and whether any cause of action or part thereof has accrued within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court sitting at Lucknow.
Part of cause of action would mean any part of the cause of action or in a case where appeal or revision is filed, then also the place, where the orders are passed therein.
In the instant case, the State Government's order was challenged before this Court and if the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petitions with respect to any cause of action or part of the cause of action, all ancillary matters, can also be seen by the High Court, whether cause of action for such ancillary matter has actually arisen within territorial jurisdiction of this Court or not.
We thus, hold that the instant was not a case where this Court would lack territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and, therefore, we set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge and remit the matter to the learned Single Judge having jurisdiction to decide the same at an early date.
Before parting, we may clarify that the learned counsel for the respondents has raised several other pleas regarding maintainability of the writ petition, which though have been disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant but we have not allowed them to be raised, for the reason that all such issues about the maintainability of the writ petition otherwise, can be looked into by the learned Single Judge, where the matter is to be heard, in accordance with law.
The special appeal is thus, allowed.
Liberty is given to the parties to move appropriate application before the learned Single Judge for listing of the petition at an early date.
Dated: 30.11.2010 MFA