1. Heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for State-respondents.
2. Petitioner has approached this Court challenging the order dated 14.03.1997, whereby he was reverted from Class III post to Class IV post, without giving any opportunity of hearing. The impugned order also does not give any reason for reverting the petitioner.
3. When the present writ petition was filed, an interim order dated 15.04.1997 was passed. On the basis of the said interim order, petitioner continued to work as a class III employee and was also treated by the respondents as a regular class III employee and was given promotions and other benefits of service. The writ petition was dismissed in default by order dated 10.07.2014. The said fact did not come in the knowledge of the petitioner. It appears that the department also came to know about the dismissal of the writ petition in the year 2020 and by an order dated 04.09.2020, petitioner was reverted to his original post on the ground that his writ petition has been dismissed. Petitioner filed a recall application in the present writ petition which was allowed by this Court by its order dated 07.12.2020.
4. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vareed Jacob vs. Sosamma Geevarghese and others reported in (2004) 6 SCC 378, all the restoration of the writ petition on the interim order also stood restored, therefore, the petitioner now be permitted to work on class III post. He further submits that even on merits, the impugned order dated 14.03.1997 cannot stand as the same neither assigned any reason for passing the said order nor any opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner before passing the same.
5. Learned Standing Counsel states that the reasons for passing the impugned order dated 14.03.1997 are given in the counter affidavit, which is that person, who had promoted the petitioner did not have proper authority to do so. In paragraph 4 of the aforesaid judgment Vareed Jacob (supra) holds:
"4. Per contra, Mr. P. Krishnamoorthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent decree-holder contended that on the restoration of the suit dismissed for default all ancillary orders passed therein stood automatically revived. He therefore, contended that in the present case when the dismissed Suit No. 209 of 1969 came to be restored on 20-12-1974, the order of temporary injunction dated 25-6-1969 stood revived and consequently, the decree-holder could not have executed the decree and, therefore, he was entitled to exclude the period between 25-6-1969 to 21-3-1975 (when the suit was dismissed on merits) in computation of the period of limitation of 12 years for the purposes of executing the decree dated 21-5-1964, which was finally put in execution on 18-3-1981 after the judgment-debtor had exhausted all his remedies by way of the appeals. In this connection reliance was placed on the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of Tavvala Veeraswami vs. Pulim Ramanna, AIR 1935 Mad 365 : ILR 58 Mad 721 (FB). Reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Patna High Court in the case of Bankim Chandra Vs. Chandi Prasad, AIR 1956 Pat 271 : 1956 BLJR 454. Similarly, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Nandipati Rami Reddi vs. Nandipati Padma Reddy, AIR 1978 AP 30 : (1977) 2 APLJ 64 in which it has been laid down that when the dismissed suit is restored, the interim orders and their operation during the period of interregnum are revived and the plaintiff must be restored to the position in which he was situated when the court dismissed the suit for default and consequently all interlocutory orders passed before the order of dismissal would also revive along with the suit when the order of dismissal is set aside and the suit is restored, unless the court expressly or by implication excludes the operation of interlocutory orders during the period between the dismissal and the restoration."
6. In view of the aforesaid, petitioner is entitled to be restored to the position where he was when the writ petition was dismissed in default.
7. Even on merits, I find force in the submission of learned counsel for petitioner, the impugned order dated 14.03.1997 is a one line order which does not give any reason for passing the said order. It also admittedly, is an ex parte order, therefore, the same cannot stand.
8. The law is settled since long in the case of Mahinder Singh Gill vs. The Chief Election Commission, New Delhi and others reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 that reasons cannot be subscribed by counter affidavit and must be provided in the order itself.
9. In view of the aforesaid settled position, the impugned order dated 14.03.1997 cannot stand and is set aside. As a consequence, later order dated 04.09.2020 also cannot stand which only revise the earlier impugned interim order dated 15.04.1997 and the same is also set aside. The writ petition is allowed. It shall however be open for the respondents, if they so desire, to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law after complying with the principals of natural justice.
Order Date :- 19.2.2021 Shubhankar (Vivek Chaudhary, J.)