passed by opposite party no.1 shows that the punishing authority of course has not discussed any charge in detail. In the dismissal order only the charges have been mentioned, which are fifteen in numbers. It appears as if the charges from the charge sheet have been copied down in the order. There is no discussion by the punishing authority on any of the charges nor it has been stated as to how these charges have been found proved. No show- cause notice was given before passing of the dismissal order. No finding has been given as to how the punishment of dismissal was justified in the circumstances of the case. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions in S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India 1990(4) SCC 594, Jagdish Pratap Singh vs. State of U.P. 1990(1) L.C.D. 486 and Chaurasiya's case reported in 2009(3) SCC 124.
Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India (supra) has clearly laid down that the disciplinary authority has to apply his mind to the circumstances of the case and come to a definite conclusion that the punishment awarded was really warranted in the circumstances of the case. In para-37 of report, Hon'ble the Apex Court held as under :-
"Having considered the rationale for the requirement to record the reasons for the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions we may now examine the legal basis for imposing this obligation. While considering this aspect the Donoughmore Committee observed that it may well be argued that there is a third principle of natural justice, namely that party is entitled to know the reason for the decision, be it judicial or quasi- judicial. The Committee expressed the opinion that "there are some cases where the refusal to give grounds for a decision may be plainly unfair; and this may be so, even when the decision is final and no further proceedings are open to the disappointed party by way of appeal or otherwise' and that 'where further proceedings are open to a disappointed party, it is contrary to natural justice that the silence of the Minister or the Ministerial Tribunal should deprive them of the opportunity". (p.80) Prof. HWR Wade has also expressed the view that "natural justice may provide the best rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man's 5 sens of justice" (See Wade, Administrative Law, 6th edn. p. 548.) In Siemens Engineering Co. case, this Court has taken the same view when it observed that "the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principles of audi- alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process." This decision proceeds on the basis that the two well known principles of natural justice, namely (I) that no man should be a judge in his own cause, and ( ii ) that no person should be judged without a hearing, are not exhaustive and that in addition to these two principles there may be rules which seek to ensure fairness in the process of decision making and can be regarded as part of the principles of natural justice."
Out of three arguments of the petitioner, two arguments succeed.
From the perusal of the affidavit and rival contention of the counsel, the Court comes to a definite conclusion that no date, time and place was fixed by the inquiry officer for proving the charges and conducting the oral inquiry/ cross- examining the witnesses and further there is non application of mind by the punishing authority and the dismissal order fails to show the reason for awarding punishment of dismissal. As per the ratio of the judgments shown by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it becomes quite clear that the inquiry was conducted in defective manner.
Accordingly the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order of dismissal dated 9.6. 1986 as contained in annexure- 4 to the writ petition, is quashed. The petitioner was about 49 years of age when the petition was filed. He must have definitely retired. Since the opposite parties have defaulted in carrying out the inquiry in improper manner, it is provided that they may conduct a fresh inquiry from the stage where the oral inquiry and examination was required to be done, if they so chose. It is admitted that the charge sheet was given and the reply was submitted. Further the petitioner had inspected the documents to his satisfaction. The inquiry has to proceed from that stage onwards. Since long period has passed and the petitioner must be an old man, the inquiry should be positively completed within a period of two months from the date a certified copy of this order is placed before the opposite parties. Sadiq/-