JUDGMENT Ashok Bhushan, J.
1. Heard counsel for the petitioner and Sri Devi Shanker Shukla, Additional Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents.
2. By this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 7th March, 1997 passed by Commandant, C.R.P.F., Phesama, Kohima, Nagaland dismissing the petitioner from service with effect from 13th March, 1'997 and the order of the appellate authority, Deputy Inspector General of Police, C.R.P.F., Bhubaneshwar dated 6th November, 2003.
3. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Union of India has raised a preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the writ petition in this Court on the ground that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. Learned Counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner at the relevant time was posted at Nagaland, the departmental inquiry was initiated and was conducted at Nagaland. He further submits that dismissal order dismissing the petitioner from service was also passed in the State of Nagaland. The appeal of the petitioner having been dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Bhubaneshwar no part of cause of action arose in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court so as to enable the petitioner to file this writ petition in this Court.
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, replying the submission, contended that this Court on prima facie being satisfied regarding maintainability of the writ petition in this Court entertained the writ petition vide its order dated 24th February, 2004 and called for counter affidavit. He further submits that petitioner is resident of district Ghazipur, UP., hence this Court has territorial jurisdiction. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also referred to an earlier order of this Court dated 23rd July, 2003 passed in Writ Petition No. 19423 of 1998 filed by the petitioner by which this Court disposed of the writ petition refusing to entertain the same on the ground of availability of statutory remedy of appeal when the petitioner initially challenged the order dated 7th March, 1997 dismissing the petitioner. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on a Division Bench of this Court in (2002)1 UPLBEC468; Kailash Nath Tiwari v. Union of India and Ors.
5. Learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on a Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in (2005) 1 UPLBEC 108; Rajendra Kumar Mishra v. Union of India and Ors. Division Bench judgment of this Court ; Daya Shanker Bhardwaj v. Chief of the Army Staff judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court reported in Mil.L.J. 2004 Alld. 12; Sep/Dvt (MT) Phool Chandra v. Union of India and Division Bench judgment dated 20th September, 2005 of this Court in Writ Petition No. 61529 of 2005 Shri J.C. Thind v. Union of India and Ors.
6. I have considered the submissions of counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. The submission of the petitioner that this Court after being prima facie satisfied entertained the writ petition vide order dated 24.2.2004 needs to be considered first. From the order dated 24.2.2004 it is clear that the observation in the said order was made by this Court on the basis of prima facie satisfaction. This Court while passing the order has relied on the judgment of this Court in (2001) 2 UPLBEC 1275; Dinesh Chandra Gahtori v. Chief of Army Staff and Anr. and has also referred to the Full Bench judgment of this Court in 2003(1) UPLBEC 1; Vijay Bihari Srivastava v. U.P. Postal Primary Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Anr. The above Full Bench was with regard to maintainability of the writ petition against a Cooperative Society. The Court also considered the question as to whether the cooperative societies can be treated to be "other authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The Full Bench judgment in Vijay Bihari Srivastava's case (supra) was not a case laying down any proposition with regard to territorial jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The said Full Bench has, thus, no application on the facts of the present case.
8. The question of territorial jurisdiction with regard to entertainment of the writ petition of army personnels came for consideration before the Full Bench of this Court in Rajendra Kumar Mishra's case (supra). The Full Bench noticed the conflict between two Division Bench judgments of this Court, namely, 2003(3) ESC. 1419; Lt. Col. Saroj Mahanta v. Union of India and Ors. and Kailash Nath Tiwari's case (supra). The Full Bench after considering several judgments of the Apex Court laid down that unless a part of cause of action arises in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, the writ petition cannot be entertained by this Court. The Full Bench has also considered and explained the Apex Court judgment in Dinesh Chandra Gahtori's case (supra). The Full Bench also explained the observation of the Apex Court in Dinesh Chandra Gahtori case (supra) and held that the said observation cannot override the Larger Bench decisions of the Supreme Court. Further the Full Bench held that judgments cannot be read as Statute; a word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as full exposition of the law.
9. Following are the relevant paragraphs of the Full Bench judgment in Rajendra Kumar Mishra's case (supra):
10. In our opinion the observation in the aforesaid decision "The Chief of Army Staff may be sued in any High Court in the Country" cannot be construed to mean that the Supreme Court has laid down any absolute proposition that it is open to the petitioner to file a writ petition in any High Court in India. Such an absolute proposition as canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner may lead to conflicting decisions because different petitions can be filed in different High Courts by co-accused in the same case and conflicting decisions can be given.
11. It may be noted that the aforesaid observation in the three Judges decision of the Supreme Court in Dinesh Chandra Gahtori's case (supra) is only a laconic observation and it cannot be override Larger Bench decisions of the Supreme Court.
12. In the present case it may be noted that the misconduct was committed at Calcutta and Summary Court Martial was also held at Calcutta. Thus the entire cause of action arose at Calcutta. We, therefore, fail to understand how a writ petition can be entertained at Allahabad High Court where no part of the cause of action had arisen.
14. The Constitution Bench decisions of the Supreme Court in K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax investigation Commission , and in Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao , have held that a writ cannot be issued beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court.
31. In our opinion the judgment of the three Judges Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Dinesh Chandra Gahori's case (supra) cannot prevail over the Constitution Bench decisions of the Supreme Court in K.S. Rashid v. Income Tax Investigation Commission (supra) and Election Commission v. S. Venkata Rao (supra). It is well settled that if there is a conflict between a Larger Bench decision of the Supreme Court and a Smaller Bench decision then the view of the Larger Bench will prevail.
32.In Union of India v. K.S. Subramanian , the Supreme Court observed:
The proper course for a High Court in such a case, is to try to find out and follow the opinions expressed by Larger Benches of this Court in preference to those expressed by earlier Benches of the Court. That is the practice followed by this Court itself. The practice has now crystallised into a rule of law declared by this Court.
34. In Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Mumbai Shramik Sangh , a five Judges Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed:
We are of the view that a decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court binds a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court and that judicial discipline obliges them to follow it, regardless of their doubts about its correctness. At the most, they could have ordered that the matter be heard by a Bench of three learned Judges.
35. Moreover, as observed by the Supreme Court in Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab , the observation of a Judge are not to be read as Euclid's Theorem, nor as provisions of a statute. In State of Punjab v. Baldeo Singh , the Supreme Court observed that everything in a decision is not a precedent. In Divisional Controller v. Mahadeva Shetty , the Supreme Court observed:
The Scope and authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation-Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. Mere casual expression carry no weight at all, nor every passing expression of a Judge, however, eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement having the weight of authority.
36. In Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab (supra), the Supreme Court observed that judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. Judges interpret words of statutes, but their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton 1951 AC 737 at p. 761, Lord Mac Dermot observed:
The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by the most distinguished Judge.
39.Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law.
40. For the reasons given above we are of the opinion that the Chief of Army Staff can only be sued either at Delhi where he is located or at a place where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
In paragraph 13 of the judgment it was specifically held that mere fact that petitioner is residing in a particular district (district Ballia in that case) will not give jurisdiction to this Court. The judgment of the Aex Court in ; Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India and Ors. was relied by the Full Bench. Learned Single Judge when entertained the writ petition on 24th February, 2004, the Full Bench judgment in Rajendra Kumar Mishra's case (supra) was not even delivered. The judgment in Kailash Chandra Tiwari's case (supra) on which reliance has been placed by counsel for the petitioner has been specifically overruled by the Full Bench in Rajendra Kumar Mishra's case (supra).
Coming to the facts of the present case, the petitioner at the relevant time was posted at the State of Nagaland, the inquiry against the petitioner was held in the State of Nagaland and the order dismissing the petitioner dated 7th March, 1997 was passed by the office of the Commandant, C.R.P.F. Phesama, Kohima, Nagaland. In the counter affidavit the respondents have specifically stated in paragraph 9 that the dismissal order was duly delivered on 17.3.1997 at Kohima, Nagaland. Copy of the dismissal order containing the endorsement of the petitioner has been filed as Annexure-8 to the counter affidavit. The appeal was filed by the petitioner which too has been dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General, C.R.P.F. at Bhubaneshwar, State of Orissa. It is true that petitioner has earlier come to this Court by filing writ petition No. 19423 of 1998 in which this Court although refused to entertain the writ petition on the ground of statutory remedy of appeal but did not inter into the question of territorial jurisdiction. The question of territorial jurisdiction was neither raised nor decided by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition, hence the entertainment of the writ petition by this Court on 23rd July, 2003 cannot estop the respondents from raising the point of lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Moreso the question having now been raised, it is necessary to consider the submission and decide the same because unless the Court has territorial jurisdiction no effective orders can be passed by the Court. There is nothing in the writ petition to establish that any part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, hence writ petition for quashing the dismissal order passed at the State of Nagaland cannot be entertained. It is, however, clarified that this writ petition is not being entertained due to the lack of the territorial jurisdiction and it will be open for the petitioner to seek his appropriate relief from the Court having territorial jurisdiction.
11. With the above observation, the writ petition is dismissed.