JUDGMENT Tarun Agarwala, J.
1. The petitioner was enrolled in the Indian Army in 1994. The petitioner was posted at Bangalore and pursuant to an incident dated 30.7.1994, he was chargesheeted for using criminal force against his superior officers. The Summary Court Martial proceedings were held at Bangalore in July 1999 in which an order dated 21.7.97 was passed imposing minor punishment of reduction in rank and three months rigorous imprisonment. The petitioner thereafter filed a statutory representation under Section 164[2] of the Army Act 1950 before the G.O.C.-in-Command, Head Quarter Southern Command, Pune. The said representation was rejected by the competent authority on 24.2.1998 and a communication to this effect was sent by the office of the Additional Directorate General, Discipline and Vigilance [DV-3] Adjutant General's Branch, Army Head quarters, New Delhi vide its letter dated 29.5.1998 to the petitioner's address in Tamilnadu. The petitioner has now filed the present writ petition before this Court at Allahabad for quashing of the Summary Court Martial proceedings, the order of penalty as well as the order passed in the petition under Section 164[2] of the Army Act.
2. A preliminary objection has been raised by the respondents that this Court does riot have the territorial jurisdiction to hear the petition, inasmuch as no cause of action arose in the State of U.P. and therefore, no writ could be issued by this Court. It was contended that the petitioner was posted at Bangalore, the incident occurred at Bangalore and that the Court Martial proceedings were also conducted at Bangalore and that the order of punishment was also passed at Bangalore. Not only this, the petitioner under Section 164(2) of the Army Act was also remitted by the petitioner from Bangalore and that the order of dismissal of his petition was communicated to the petitioner in Tamilnadu and therefore, no cause of action wholly or in part arose in the State of U.P.
3. Heard Colonel Ashok Kumar, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Subodh Kumar, the learned Counsel for the respondents.
4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Chief of the Army Staff could be sued anywhere in the country as held by the Supreme Court in Dinesh Chandra Gahotri v. Chief of the Army Staff 2001[2] UPLBEC 1275. The petitioner was posted in Ordinance Depot at Allahabad in the month of April 1999 and therefore, he was entitled to file a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court.
5. The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is wholly devoid of any merit and is liable to be rejected. The mere fact that the petitioner was posted at Allahabad does not give him any cause of action to file a petition at Allahabad.
6. In Rakesh Dhar Tripathi v. Union of India AIR 1998 Alld. 47 a division bench of this Court held that since all the respondents were residing at New Delhi and that the cause of action arose only in New Delhi, the mere fact that the petitioner was residing at Allahabad would not entitle him to file a writ petition at Allahabad. The Court held that it had no territorial jurisdiction.
7. In Daya Shanker Bhardwaj v. Chief of the Air Staff, New Delhi and Ors. , a division bench of this Court held-
A right of action arises as soon as there is an invasion of right. But ' cause of action' and 'right of action'...are not synonymous or interchangeable. A right of action is the right to enforce a cause of action (American Jurisprudence 2nd Edition vol. I.) A person residing anywhere in the country being aggrieved by an order of government Central or State or authority or person may have a right of action at law but it can be enforced or the jurisdiction under Article 226 can be invoked of that High Court only within whose territorial limits the cause of action wholly or in part arises. The cause of action arises by action of the government or authority and not by residence of the person aggrieved.
8. In Chabi Nath Rai v. Union of India and Ors. 1997[1] UPLBEC 236 a division bench of this Court held-
The mere fact that he sent a representation from Allahabad and the decision on his representation was communicated at Allahabad did not give any cause of action at Allahabad. In Special Appeal No. 300 of 1995, Sipoy Ranchhor Singh v. Union of India and Ors. it was held that -- " merely because the delinquent served the sentence in district Jail, the cause of action does not arise at the place where he is serving the sentence, but it is the place where the person is tried, sentence and convicted. The Court declined to issue a writ of mandamus to decide the representation by the Chief of Army Staff at New Delhi.
9. In Lt. Col. [Mrs.] Saroj Mahanta v. Union of India and Ors. 2003 [3] Allahabad Law Journal 2511 a division bench of this Court held "thus in view of the above we are of the considered opinion that in order to determine as to whether the writ Court has a jurisdiction to entertain a petition the pleadings in the petition have to be examined and opinion is to be formed as in whether a cause of action partly or fully has arisen or the respondents reside or have office within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. In absence thereof if the view is taken that petition is to be entertained on merit without considering as to whether such pre-requisite conditions are there the provisions of clauses [1] and [2] of Article 226 of the Constitution would render nugatory."
10. From the pleadings in the petition it is clear that the order of punishment was passed and served upon the petitioner in Bangalore and that he made a statutory representation under Section 164[2] of the Army Act from Bangalore itself Therefore, the cause of action arose only at Bangalore. The representation under Section 164(2) of the Act was decided at New Delhi and communicated to the petitioner in Tamilnadu. Therefore, no cause of action or part of cause of action arose in the State of U.P. Thus, this Court does not have any territorial jurisdiction to decide the matter. The mere fact that the petitioner was posted at Allahabad does not give him any cause of action to file the petition at Allahabad.
11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the Chief of the Army Staff could be sued anywhere in the country. In this regard, the learned Counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dinesh Chandra Gahtori [supra].
12. The aforesaid decision has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Lieutenant Colonel [Mrs.] Saroj Mahanta v. Union of India and Ors. [supra]. In paragraph 50 of the judgment, the division bench of this Court held -
From the above it is evident that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dinesh Chandra Gahotri [supra] has not laid down any law of universal application. The observations have been made to meet a particular situation where the case remain pending for about a decade. Thus, the direction issued therein if considered in the light of other judgments referred to above does not seem to have a binding effect.
13. Further, I find that the Supreme Court in Dinesh Chandra Gahotri judgment [supra] had held " that the Chief of the Army Staff may be sued anywhere in the country."
14. In my view, the word 'may' is only directory and is not mandatory nor does it give a right to the petitioner to sue the Chief of the Army Staff anywhere in the country according to his own choice, whims or caprice. The chief of the Army Staff can be sued anywhere in the country provided, the cause of action or a part of the cause of action arose in that State.
15. In view of the aforesaid it is clear that this Court has ho territorial jurisdiction to decide the writ petition. There is another aspect of the matter, the writ petition is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. From the averments made in the writ petition it is clear that the order of punishment was passed on. 21.7.1997 and the statutory petition of the petitioner under Section 164[2] was rejected on 24.2.98. According to the petitioner he was transferred and posted to Allahabad in April 1999 and thereafter filed the writ petition in May 2000 before this Court. No explanation has been given as to why the petitioner could not file a writ petition between the period 24.2.1998 and April 1999 i.e. from the date of rejection of the petition under Section 164[2] of the Army Act and his posting at Allahabad. Further, the explanation given by the petitioner for the period April 1999 to May 2000 is vague and does not inspire any confidence. The explanation given seems to be an afterthought in order to cover up the delay.
16. Accordingly, I find that the petitioner is not entitled to any discretionary relief from this Court. The writ petition is dismissed with cost on the ground of laches as well as on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.