(Judgment of the Court was made by Prabha Sridevan,J.) The Management of a College governed by the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regularized) Act (the Act in short) issued show cause notice, conducted an enquiry and decided that the second respondent should be dismissed from service in view of proved grave misconduct. Therefore, they applied for prior approval. Approval was not given, but the order did not indicate whether the authorities had applied their mind to the proved misconduct.
2. A vexed question that arises often before us is the right of the employer to proceed against the employee after the retirement.
3. In 1997 WLR 120 (N.M. Somasundaram Vs. The Director General of Police) the First Bench annulled the disciplinary proceedings in a charge of corruption with a heavy heart and they said We find ourselves helpless in the matter. That was a case where orders have not been obtained from the Government or the competent authority for not permitting the delinquent officer from retiring. The Division Bench of our Court observed that if care and caution is not taken by the authorities and if casual and cavalier approach is made by the authorities, the Government servant charged with serious misconduct may go scotfree. Disciplinary proceedings are quashed because appropriate orders are not obtained for not permitting the delinquent officer from retiring or because there are no rules for continuing the proceedings after the age of superannuation. Two of the reasons why this happens is, a person may take advantage of this legal position and deliberately commit misconduct which causes huge loss to the Government or the authorities on the eve of the retirement and walk away happily; or the delinquent officer with the connivance of his subordinates or colleagues may postpone the initiation of charge memo until the very last moment and thus go scot-free or thirdly he may challenge the initiation of disciplinary proceedings at every stage and obtain interim orders from Court and attempt to go scotfree. If even one officer manages to evade his just desserts by any of these reasons, then there is a signal failure of good governance. The organization may be the State; it may be an educational institution; it may be a public sector undertaking. It does not matter. If the system allows the wrong one to escape by these means then there is a gaping hole in the system. In this case, the proceedings were concluded and yet the School is hopeless.
4. Now we will look at the facts of the case. The appellant, N.K.T. National College of Education for Women is one of the educational institution established by N.K.Thirumalachariar, a leading member of the Bar. Several educational institutions are administered by the Society founded by him and the appellant is one such. Earlier, the Headmaster of a School administered by the Society committed irregularities. Therefore, he was not elected to the office in 1993. Peeved by this, he allowed intruders to interfere in the administration which nearly destroyed the society. W.P.No.10525 of 1998 was filed and the genuine committee started to function with effect from 20-08-1998. There was a Principal of the appellant during the period 1993-98. The second respondent was a teacher who was reporting to the Principal. According to the appellant, she took advantage of the confusion created by the Headmaster of one of the Schools established by the society and she proclaimed herself to be the Principal. Though she did not have the necessary qualification she usurped the powers. In 1999, after normalcy was restored and the genuine committee started functioning, a charge sheet was issued to the second respondent setting out the misconduct. There were as many as 12 charges. Briefly they include tampering with the attendance register; knocking the Principals room and preventing the legally appointed Principal from functioning; signing the pay-bills as if she was the Principal which was negatived by the Joint Director of Collegiate Education with the result college staff could not be paid in time; connivance with certain persons; acts disrepute and damage to the institution; operation of bank account without due authorization and collecting funds from students promising to give admission; abusing the Principal by use of filthy language. An explanation was given by the second respondent on 14-05-1999, that was unsatisfactory. Thereafter one Mrs. Jayakothai Pillai was appointed as the Enquiry Officer. When the enquiry was in progress some lapses were pointed out by the second respondent. Therefore, the appellants committee examined the objection and found that since the Enquiry Officer was not trained and was unaware of legal intricacies, she had committed certain procedural irregularities. Therefore, the Enquiry that was conducted till that date was set aside and a de novo enquiry was ordered on 03-12-1999 and a new Enquiry Officer was appointed. Though this was to her advantage, the second respondent filed W.P.No.19952 of 1999,which was disposed of on 24-12-1999 by this Court holding that the order of the de novo enquiry was correct. The second respondent prayed that the enquiry may be deferred because of her visit to United States of America. She filed an affidavit of undertaking to participate in the enquiry after she returned. Despite the fact, she had agreed to participate in the de novo enquiry, she filed W.P.No.17303 of 2000 challenging the de novo enquiry. She protracted the matter as much as possible and delayed the process of enquiry. Finally, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report. A notice was issued on 09-11-2001, wherein the appellant informed the second respondent that since she has been found guilty of all the charges by the Enquiry Officer, it was decided to terminate her services and she should give reasons why the decision should not be confirmed. On 16-11-2001, the Court directed the parties to maintain status quo. But, the appellant could not proceed further, since the matter was not heard. The appellant filed an application to vacate the interim order of status quo. On 30-04-2002, the second respondent attained the age of super-annuation. The appellant wrote to the second respondent on 26-04-2002 that her super-annuation would be deferred. Only on 30-01-2003, W.P.No.22046 of 2001 was disposed of, holding that the fourth respondent is permitted to proceed with his further proceedings from the stage of giving show cause notice as the petitioner has already been served with the notice of the Enquiry Officer. The reference to the fourth respondent is to the appellant herein and the reference to the petitioner is to the second respondent herein. It must be noted that by that time, the respondent had attained the age of superannuation. So thereafter, he submitted an interim explanation on 04-03-2003. The second respondent gave a final explanation on 18-03-2003 which was considered by the Committee on 30-04-2003. They resolved to dismiss her with effect from 31-05-2002 and applied for approval. Under Section 19(1) of the Act, the Director of Collegiate Education had by its proceedings dated 27-06-2003 delegated the powers to the first respondent. The first respondent by proceedings dated 15-07-2003 decided that the second respondent ought to have been superannuated on 30-04-2002 and the extension of time till 31-05-2002 without permission of the first respondent was not correct and therefore the order of dismissal taking effect from 31-05-2002 could not be upheld and she ought to have retired with effect from 30-04-2002. There is no indication that the second respondent had taken note of the disciplinary proceedings. Thereafter, the Committee met and resolved to amend the application for approval and they forwarded a letter dated 17-07-2003 amending the request to grant approval for dismissal from 30-04-2003(the date of superannuation). The respondents rejected it by saying that there is no possibility of revising the request. The saga did not end here. There are other writ petitions which will be dealt with after.
5. The learned Single Judge concluded that it was the appellant who was at fault for not bringing it to the notice of the Court that the respondent had retired on 30-04-2003 and that the first respondent was justified in refusing the approval.
6. The learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Somayaji, submitted that at no point of time had the appellant ever committed any lapse. The second respondent had committed such acts of misconduct that she very nearly brought a very reputable institution to a standstill. He submitted that the signature of a very senior member of the Bar was forged by the persons, with whom the second respondent had associated herself. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that it is only by persuasive effort of this Court in earlier proceedings that the School came back to the hands of the genuine committee.
7. The learned Senior counsel submitted that there was no progress after the Enquiry Report was filed and the second show cause notice only because of the status quo ordered by this Court. Though an application had been filed for vacating the status quo, in spite of best efforts it could not be listed. So only on 30-01-2003 final orders were passed that the matter should proceed from the stage of second show cause notice in W.P.No.22046 of 2002 filed by the second respondent.
8. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that no party should suffer for the fault of the Court and it is only because of the pendency of the Court proceedings and the interim orders, that the hands of the appellants were tied. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the authorities had not exercised the discretionary power granted to them under Section 19(1) of the Act. On 26-04-2002, the College had written to the respondent that they had filed a petition to vacate the stay and that the second respondent is not permitted to retire on 30-04-2002. She was informed that her reply to the issue of extension of service would determine the timely payment of salary. The respondent informed the appellant that she was not interested in extension and that her retiral benefits should be settled at the earliest. She accepted the order passed by this Court permitting the fourth respondent to proceed with further proceedings from the stage of giving show cause notice.
9. The counsel for the respondent as well as the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the second respondent supported the order of the first respondent. We must remember that W.P.No.22406 of 2001 was filed by the second respondent to quash the enquiry report. This Court did not grant her that relief, but only sent it back for further action after the second show cause notice. So the enquiry officers report stands. It was not quashed. Both the parties accepted this order.
10. On 13-05-2003, the College addressed a letter to the Director of Collegiate Education, through the Joint Director of Collegiate Education informing them that the Minutes of the Meeting of the Governing Body and College Committee were enclosed and the permission under Section 19(1) of the Act is sought. The Director of Collegiate Education informed the College on 27-06-2003 that it would be the Joint Director of Collegiate Education who would take the decision. The Joint Director of Collegiate Education by his proceedings dated 15-07-2003 has not addressed his mind, to the fact that she was subject to disciplinary proceedings, or that the Enquiry Officer had submitted the findings or that the Management had decided to dismiss her in view of the very serious charges proved against her. He glibly stated that the above mentioned lecturer was about to retire on 30-04-2002 and the College had extended her service without obtaining prior permission and since the permission sought for removal from service from 31-05-2002 is not accepted, final orders for pensionary benefits should be passed. The second respondent had in the meantime filed W.P.No.4557 of 2002 for grant of retiral benefits. On 16-01-2003, the Director of Collegiate Education directed the Director to look into the legal entitlement of the petitioner on her reaching the age of superannuation and pass orders of disbursement in view of the order in W.P.No.4557 of 2002. Then comes the impugned letter from the Director of Collegiate Education Anx-35, Rc.No.9547/D4/2001 dated 12-08-2003, which we must extract:
As the Joint Director of Collegiate Education of Chennai Region has passed final orders under section 19(1) of Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act 1976 in respect of Tmt. G.Premakumari, S.G. Lecturer in Tamil for removal of her service with effect from 31-05-2002 after reaching the age of superannuation, there is no provision under this Act to reconsider the issue. Hence the request of the Secretary to reconsider to approve the removal of service with effect from 30-04-2002 cannot be complied with.
11. Section 19(1) of the Act provides that no teacher can be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank nor shall his payment be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the competent authority. Section 19(2) provides whether such a proposal is communicated to the competent authority, the authority shall approve such dismissal, removal, reduction in rank if it is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such process. So the authority shall grant approval if there are adequate reasons. The authority cannot refuse to grant approval without reasons. Reasons are the check on arbitrariness and unbridled exercise of power.
12. The Directorate of Collegiate Education has refused approval because the approval is for a date which is beyond the age of retirement and directed the College to forward the pension proposals. Again on 05-08-2003, the appellant had written a letter where they have enclosed the Minutes of the Committee, which shows that they should be permitted to dismiss her from 30-04-2002. This is virtually an amendment of the earlier request. Earlier, they had asked that they should be permitted to remove her with effect from 31-05-2002. The authorities refused.
13. The second respondent then filed W.P.No.26413 of 2003m where the first respondent is the Director of Collegiate Education. The second respondent is the original Joint Director of Collegiate Education. The third respondent is the appellant. The prayer was for directing the respondents to settle her retiral benefits. This was disposed of on 22-09-2003. From the order it is seen that the matter has been taken up for hearing by consent at the admission stage. The learned Government Pleader had taken notice for the first and second respondents. The third respondent was neither served nor heard and the petitioners counsel informed the Court that the third respondent-School is not sending the proposal claiming the benefit. So a direction was given against the third respondent to send the proposals claiming the pensionary benefit. This is an order which has been passed behind the third respondents back and which has caused much damage and prejudice to the third respondent, considering the facts and circumstances of the case. From 1999, the appellant had been fighting the battle. The appellant has been thwarted, restricted and defeated by continuous writ petitions filed by the respondent and finally without hearing the appellant who is the person who has a say in whether the second respondent is entitled to retiral benefits, an order has been passed in their absence to send the proposal. Immediately, the Joint Director of Collegiate Education addressed a letter to the College informing them that the pension proposals should be immediately sent without any further delay. The appellants have come to this Court seeking relief. We are unable to see any lapse on the part of the appellant at any stage. The show cause notice was given on 30-03-1999 which was almost three years before the date of superannuation. Notwithstanding two or three writ petitions filed by the second respondent and her trip to USA the enquiry got concluded on November 9,2001. This is five months before the date of superannuation. The appellants enclosed a copy of the report and asked her to give reasons why she should not be terminated. She immediately filed W.P.No.22046 of 2001 and stalled all further progress in the proceedings. On 16-11-2001, status quo was directed to be maintained by this Court. So until 2003, they could not do anything. In 2003, the Writ Petition was disposed of and the appellant was directed to continue from the stage of second show cause notice. The Committee found her explanation unsatisfactory and wanted to dismiss her from service and so they asked for approval. The charges were proved. The misconduct was grave. As on date, the disciplinary proceedings have not been challenged.
14. We will extract the charges for understanding the factual position.
1. Whereas it is reported that on 6.4.98 you have claimed yourself to have been appointed as the Principal of the College by one N.S. Viswanathan inspite of you having been fully aware that the said N.S. Viswanathan had no jurisdiction to issue such appointment.
2. Whereas it is reported that you have tampered twice attendance register for the teaching staff of the college knowing well that the attendance register of the teaching staff which is an essential document of the college to be submitted at the time of pension proposals etc. by writing twice unauthorisedly that you have joined duty as Principal on 6.4.1998 and 1.6.1998.
3. Whereas it is reported that you have further prevented the legally appointed Principal Dr. Suseela Kumari Vyas to discharge her duties by keeping the Principals room locked on 1.6.98 and keeping all the keys of the College till 28.8.98.
4. Whereas it is reported that you have permitted the entry of persons unconnected with the Institution whereby you have actively assisted goondaisam and hooliganism inside the College Campus thereby leading to a complete standstill in the College administration between 1.6.98 and 28.8.98.
5. Whereas it is brought to the notice of the Management that you inspite of being aware that the Principal of the College Dr. Suseela Kumari Vyas, has being granted order by the Honourable High Court to enable her to continue to function as Princpal, you with active assistance and connivance of your husband Narayanan who is not in any way connected with the College administration prevented the Principal form discharging her official duties between 1.6.98 and 28.8.98.
6. Whereas it is reported that inspite of you being fully aware of the legal position that the Principal of the College having been validly appointed and duly approved by the Department cannot be replaced unless a person is duly selected and appointed after undergoing the Selection procedures per the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges Regulation Act; and the UGC Guidelines and duly approved by the director of Collegiate Education, you have claimed yourself to be the Principal of the College and continued to do so inspite of the Judgment of the Honourable High Court, thereby grossly violating the Code of Conduct.
7. Whereas it is brought to the notice of the Management that you had prevented the Principal from representing the College when UGC Review Committee visited the College to grant extension of Autonomy for the College on 16.7.98 and that you had misrepresented as the Principal thereby giving an impression to the visiting UGC Review Committee a feeling that the College lacked proper administration which act is highly detrimental to the goodwill of the College, enjoyed all these years and your defiance of rightful authority resulted in bringing bad name to the College.
8. Whereas it is seen from the records namely the staff grant stated that you have signed the pay bill for the months of June, July and August 1998 claiming yourself to be the Principal which was negatived by the Joint Director of Collegiate Education as a result of which the College staff could not be paid salary on time.
9. Whereas it is reported that you have actively involved yourself and connived with Mrs. Shakunthala Sundaram, J. Balan, S.K. Sundaram and other group of bad elements to cause disrepute and damage to the Institution solely with malafide intentions and also interfered in the admission of students for the year 1998-99.
10. Whereas it is reported that you have called upon the Office Staff Mrs. Vimala Bai (Junior Assistant) and Mrs. Banumathi (Typist) to hand over the files relating to the Foreign Students Exchange Programme, Examination voucher file and failed to return the same inspite of memo dated 30.11.98 issued by the Management.
11. Whereas it is reported and seen from the Bank records that you have operated the Bank Account of the College without due authorization and misrepresented and collected funds from students promising to give admissions, inspite of you being well aware that you had no jurisdiction to do any admission and further it is seen from the records that you have misused your usurped position and operated the General Fund Account which could be operated only by the Secretary of the College Committee.
12. Whereas it has been brought to the notice of the Management you have abused the Principal on 1.6.98 by using filthy language and also joined hands with Mrs. Shakunthala Sundaram and J. Balan who insulted. Dr. Susila Kumar Vyas by using abusive languages at her. If these charges are proved what is the valid or acceptable reason for the authorities to reject the approval under Section 19 of the Act. It is true that the appellant had made a mistake by seeking approval for dismissal with effect from 31-05-2002. What was subsequently asked was only a correction. We find that there is total abdication of the powers vested under Section 19(1) in this case. The Joint Director of Collegiate Education has not at all applied his mind to what was before him. He is not doing a ministerial job. His order gives an advantage to the person who has been found guilty of all charges, by expeditious settlement of pension proposals. Perhaps this is another kind of golden handshake. Retirement age past? No approval. Give benefits. We do not think this is a proper exercise of discretion.
15. We can only feel anguish at the total non-application of mind on the part of the authorities. No doubt, the power under Section 19(1) is given to the authority to control arbitrariness in the action of the Management. At the same time, care and caution must be taken by the authorities without letting the petitioner scotfree.
16. To show how the second respondent has abused the process of law, we will give the sequences of various writ petitions which she has filed:
W.P.No.19952 of 1999 challenging the de novo enquiry, disposed of on 24-12-1999 holding that the order of de novo enquiry was correct;
W.P.No.17703 of 2000 again challenging the de novo enquiry inspite of her giving an undertaking to co-operate in the earlier writ petition;
W.P.No.22046 of 2001 against the notice issued by the Committee on receipt of the enquiry officers report. It is in this writ that status quo was ordered;
W.P.No.12768 of 2002 for stay of an order of suspension that was passed for another act of misconduct;
W.P.No.4557 of 2002 claiming disbursement of her pensionary benefits;
W.P.No.26413 of 2003 again claiming retiral benefits in which orders were passed without hearing the appellant herein.
The appellant is not bound to comply with the order dated 22-09-2003, in W.P.No.26413 of 2003 since that order was passed without hearing him. In this case, there was no retrospective retrenchment of service. All that the appellant requests is that the second respondents service would come to an end on 30-04-2002 not on account of superannuation but by way of dismissal and they seek the approval of the authorities. Materials have been placed before the authorities so that they may satisfy themselves if approval must be granted. As per Section 19(1) of the Act, if there are materials for satisfaction, the authority shall grant approval. The application for approval under Section 19(1) was put on hold because of the petitioners own action i.e., her writ petitions and the interim applications. For that, the appellant cannot suffer. Nor can the appellant be made to suffer by an order that is passed by this Court in their absence mulling them with liability to forward the pension proposal in respect of a person who was found guilty of grave misconduct.
17. We called for the records in W.P.No.26413 of 2003. Apart from vague statements that she was proceeded departmentally alleging baseless allegations etc., she has not stated in this affidavit that on 15-09-2003, the date on which she has sworn to the affidavit, the College had already decided to terminate her services since she has been found guilty of all charges and that the College had in fact forwarded the proposal for approval. Had the Court been informed that the disciplinary proceedings had in fact come to an end and in fact she had been called upon to show cause why she should not be terminated and that the Court in an earlier writ petition had directed the appellant to proceed from the stage of second show cause notice, perhaps the impugned order might not have been passed. But as it is, this order that has been passed and especially without hearing the affected party. Therefore, the appellant can rightly ignore that.
18. The appellant prays for quashing of the order dated 15-07-2003 of the Deputy Director in charge of Zonal College Education which we have extracted as confirmed by the order dated 12-08-2003 by which the Joint Director informed the appellant that there is no provision under the Act to reconsider the issue. The order dated 15-07-2003, does not show any application of mind regarding the circumstances under which the appellant was forced to order dismissal and seek approval and therefore, the same must be quashed. As regards the order dated 12-08-2003, the authorities fail to see what the appellant were seeking was approval to dismiss the second respondent with effect from the date on which she attains superannuation.
19. Section 19(2) of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 reads as follows:
Where the proposal to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank or otherwise terminate the appointment of any teacher or other person employed in any private college is communicated to the competent authority, that authority shall, if it is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such proposal, approve such dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of appointment. This is identical to Section 22(2) of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools Recognition Act, 1973 and in 2003 (5) SCC 200(Secretary, School Committee, Thiruvalluvar Higher Secondary School Vs. Government of T.N.), the Supreme Court at paragraph No.10 has held thus:
10. Though attempt was made to contend that at the stage of consideration under Sections 22(1) and 22(2) and Rule 17(1), there is no scope for looking into the proportionality of punishment aspect, the same is clearly without any substance. What an authority is required to do at that stage is to see whether the proposed punishment is to be approved. Obviously, it has to consider whether the punishment as proposed is a proper one; otherwise there is no need for seeking its approval. The crucial words used in Sub-section (2) of Section 22 are "adequate and reasonable grounds" for the proposal. The proposal relates to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or otherwise termination of appointment of any teacher or any other person employed in a private school. While considering whether adequate and reasonable grounds exist for giving approval, the authority is certainly required to look into the gravity of the proved charges and whether the punishment as proposed commensurates with it. Any other interpretation would make the question of approval an exercise in futility.
20. We are quashing the order because the authority has not applied its mind to see whether the proposed punishment is to be approved. The Supreme Court has observed that they should look into the gravity of the proved charges and whether the punishment proposed is commensurate with it and in Paragraph No.11 of the same judgment, the Supreme Court also observed that since the proposed action is a punishment, there is an inbuilt requirement to see whether the quantum of punishment commensurates with the gravity of the proved charges. The Supreme Court also held that at the stage of consideration under Section 22, the teacher does not get any opportunity for presenting his side of the case. That opportunity is provided in Section 23 and 24 of the Private Schools Act which are almost identical to Section 20 and 21 of this Act. Therefore, the second respondent cannot at this stage contend that at the stage of approval she must be heard for a decision regarding the quantum of punishment. This is something that the authority will have to do.
12. The second plea of learned counsel for the management was even it the authority had jurisdiction, there was no application of mind, as relevant factors have not been looked into. The basis duties of a teacher and what is expected from him were highlighted. It was strenuously contended that the welfare of the students' aspect was not even taken note of.
13. The role a teacher plays in shaping the career and future of a student needs no great emphasis. In olden times, a teacher was considered equal to God. He is required to ensure good conduct of his pupils in addition to teaching lessons to them. The situation has not changed now so far as this basis concept is concerned. But nevertheless, the number of such teachers it sadly on the decline, and instead of tribe of such teachers increasing, it is alarming decreasing. A teacher is required to remove darkness and ignorance from the minds of students. But present day experiences show that the teachers are themselves ill-equipped and take their jobs very casually. No doubt, there are exceptions and those teachers who belong to the exception category are trying their best to make up the deficiency of their brothers in service. In the hands of these ill-equipped teachers, the destiny of the students does not get moulded in the way it ought to be. The centers of learning are becoming trade and money-making business centers. Learned counsel for the appellant is correct in his submission that welfare of the students has to receive utmost priority. But his submission that there was no application of mind by the authorities to the materials has not borne out from the records.
21. In that case, the misconduct was continued absence. The authority refused approval on the ground that the allegations were not so grave as to warrant punishment like dismissal and presumption was refused and the Supreme Court therefore was of the opinion that the authorities had applied their mind and had come to a conclusion with the proposed punishment was harsh and disproportionate. The following extract from Paragraph No.13 is also relevant:
Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that once the disciplinary authority comes to a view that there was adequate material for imposing a particular punishment, the approving authority should not lightly interfere with the findings. This submission holds good only when the authority does not apply its mind to the materials forming the foundation of the proposed action. When after consideration of the material, it comes to a conclusion that the proposed punishment is harsh or disproportionate to the proved charges, the scope of interference with the finding is rather limited. This is because the approving authority has to consider whether the proved charges on the facts and the materials justify a particular action. Since reasons have been given on consideration of the materials, there is no scope for interference.
22. In the present case, since the impugned order is devoid of reasons for declining to grant approval except to state that the age of superannuation has passed which for reasons given above, we hold as being unsustainable, it is quashed. All orders which were consequent to and subsequent to the order refusing to grant approval will have no effect, since we are quashing both the orders. The matter is sent back to the first respondent to consider the request for approval under Section 19(1) and exercise the discretion as required and pass orders in accordance with law within one month from the date of the order. All that we have said above are only to show the extent to which there has been no application of mind by the authorities. The authorities shall decide independently, whether the proved charges justify the particular decision and give reasons for the orders that they pass.
23. The writ appeal is allowed accordingly. However, there will be no order as to costs. The connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
glp To
1. Joint Director of Collegiate Education Chennai Region, Chennai 1