JUDGMENT Krishna Murari, J.
1. By means of this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged the judgment and order dated 2.8.2006, passed by the District Judge, Allahabad allowing the misc. appeal filed by the defendant-respondent against the order of the trial court granting temporary injunction.
2. Heard Sri Murlidhar, senior advocate assisted by Sri Lihazur R. Khan appearing for the petitioners, Sri Maya Shankar for respondent No. 1 and Sri A.K. Mishra and Sri B.B. Paul for respondent No. 2.
3. Relevant facts giving rise to the present dispute are as under:
An area of 277.42 acres of land which includes the suit property falling In Mauza Jahangirabad Uparhar Ganjia, Pargana Arail, Tehsil Karchhana district Allahabad was acquired by the State Government in the year 1915 for Municipal Board, Allahabad (Now Nagar Nigam, Allahabad) for public purposes namely Sewage plant and drainage. Out of the total acquired land an area 45 hectares was decided to be transferred against consideration of Rs. 11 crores to the Allahabad Development Authority vide resolution dated 22.2.2005 for development of residential scheme namely, 'Nav Prayag'. When the Allahabad Development Authority started development of the land for the said purposes the petitioners and several other persons filed various writ petitions before this Court seeking a direction to the respondent not to evict them except in accordance with law. Writ petition filed by the present petitioners was numbered as Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 76191 of 2005. Ahmad Mustafa and 34 Ors. v. State of U.P. and 3 Ors. All the writ petitions were clubbed together and were dismissed vide order dated 23.3.2006 with an observation that the petitioners may, if so advised, file a suit for declaration and injunction. The aforesaid order passed by the Division Bench of this Court was affirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court vide judgment dated 8.5.2006.
4. After dismissal of the special leave petition by the Hon'ble Apex Court the petitioners filed Original Suit No. 384 of 2006 before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Allahabad claiming perpetual injunction against the defendant-respondent, their personnel/employees, representatives not to interfere in the peaceful possession of the property in dispute and also not to evict them without following the procedure prescribed by law. An application for grant of temporary injunction was also moved.
5. The suit was filed on the allegations that the land in dispute is situate in village Jahangirabad Uparhar Ganjia, Pargana Arail, Tehsil Karchhana district Allahabad where the Zamindari has not been abolished and the ancestors of the plaintiffs were occupancy tenants of the plots shown in List-Ka with the plaint and the plaintiffs and other co-tenants were also occupancy tenants of the plots shown in List-Kha. Earlier Nagar Palika, Allahabad was Zamindar of the plots in dispute mentioned in the two lists who recovered rent from the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs and other co-tenants are in continuous possession of the plots in question and are cultivaitng the same. It was further pleaded that defendant-respondent No. 2, Allahabad Development Authority has no concern with the disputed plots as it is not the owner of the same. The plots in dispute have not been acquired by the Allahabad Development Authority nor any compensation has been paid. It was also pleaded that the land in dispute was acquired for Nagar Palika, Allahabad in the year 1915 for the purpose of constructing a tank of dirty water and Sewer plant. Nagar Palika constructed a tank for dirty water and a drain has also been constructed which is being used by the plaintiffs-petitioners for irrigating their plots. The suit was contested by the defendant-2 Allahabad Development Authority by filing written statement and objections and counter-affidavit to the ad interim injunction application. It was pleaded that with the acquisition of the property in dispute by the State of U.P. for the Municipality Allahabad in the year 1915 all rights, title and interest of the plaintiffs or their ancestors in the property in dispute stood extinguished. It was further pleaded that in Writ Petition No. 76191 of 2005 it was admitted to the plaintiffs that suit property was acquired by the State for the Municipality Allahabad in accordance with the provision of Land Acquisition Act and after acquisition some portion of the acquired land was leased out to them for a limited period which expired on 30.6.1969 and since then it has never been renewed. It was further pleaded that 45 hectares of the acquired land was transferred by Nagar Nigam, Allahabad to the Allahabad Development Authority for a consideration of Rs. 11 crores over which a residential scheme known as 'Nav Prayag' is being developed with an investment of Rs. 20 crores. It was also pleaded that the writ petition and special leave petition filed by the plaintiffs was dismissed by the High Court and Hon'ble Apex Court since the plaintiffs failed to establish their right, title and interest over the suit property.
6. In the rejoinder-affidavit filed by the plaintiffs-petitioners the factum of acquisition of the suit property by the State of U.P. for Municipality, Allahabad in the year 1915 was admitted. It was admitted that after acquisition of the land, some portion of the acquired land was let out to them on lease. However, the fact that lease was temporary and was expired was denied. It was further stated that Nagar Nigam has realised the lease rent from the plaintiffs upto 2005.
7. Trial court allowed the application for interim injunction. However, on appeal, lower appellate court upset the finding recorded by the trial court on the ground that the plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case in their favour as they could not produce the lease deed which was the basis of their claim. Lower appellate court further refused to place reliance upon the alleged revenue receipts produced by the plaintiffs on the ground that the extract of khatauni produced by the plaintiffs, Column-VI pertaining to revenue is blank and there is no mention of any rent having been paid. On the basis of the averments made in the affidavits of the parties, lower appellate court further recorded a finding that since it is admitted fact that plots in dispute were acquired for Municipality in the year 1915 in accordance with law as such after acquisition right, title or interest, if any, of the plaintiffs in the suit property came to an end.
8. On the question of balance of convenience, the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that since no lease deed on the basis of which the plaintiffs claim their right and possession has been filed and the suit property having been acquired under the provision of Land Acquisition Act and has been transferred to the Allahabad Development Authority which is carrying out development work in the interest of public at large as such there is no balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiffs for grant of ad-interim injunction. With respect to the irreparable loss it was held that in case the plaintiffs succeed in the suit they can very well be compensated in terms of money as such there was no question of irreparable loss.
9. Thus, the lower appellate court finding that all three necessary ingredients for grant of temporary injunction were not in favour of the plaintiffs allowed the appeal filed by defendant-respondent No. 2 and set aside the order of trial court granting temporary injunction.
10. At the very outset, Sri Murlidhar, senior advocate appearing for the petitioners has conceded that petitioners do not claim and possibly cannot have any title over the suit property. He has confined his argument on the question of grant of temporary injunction on the basis of long and uninterrupted possession of the plaintiffs-petitioners over the suit property. It has been urged that from the evidence brought on record it was conclusively established that the petitioners are in uninterrupted possession over the suit property and the lower appellate court has wrongly and illegally upset the judgment of the trial court only on the ground that the petitioners have failed to produce the lease deed without considering the factum of possession of the petitioners inasmuch as while considering the question of grant of ad-interim injunction, possession is a very important factor to be considered. It has further been urged that petitioners being former lessee having continued in actual physical possession of the suit property cannot be dispossessed by force and even though they may not be having title but having continued in possession for a long period even after expiry of the lease they can only be dispossessed by following procedure established by law. Reliance in support of the contention has been placed on the following observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. and Ors. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors. :
A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression reentry' in the lease deed does not authorise extra-judicial methods to resume possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited ; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law.
11. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance on another decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and Anr. v. Mohinder Pal and Ors. , wherein it has been held as under:
The question of examining the title of the parties does not arise at all as admittedly the respondents were in possession of the property in question and had put up structures thereon. On that admitted position the High Court took the view that ejectment of the respondents forcibly without due recourse of law was not in due process. No exception can be taken to that view at all.
12. In reply, it has been contended that petitioners having conceded that they do not claim any title in the suit property are not entitled to any injunction only on the basis of possession inasmuch as after expiry of the lease the same becomes unlawful and no injunction can be granted against a true owner at the instance of a person in unlawful possession. It has further been urged that grant of an ad interim injunction would delay the implementation of scheme of residential colony which is a public purpose and by passage of time the said public purpose may even stand defeated.
13. I have considered the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.
From the pleadings of the parties and evidence brought on record it does appear that plaintiff-petitioners though may not having any title, but are in possession of the property. It is also not in dispute that they came in possession on the basis of lease given by the defendant-respondent No. 1 and were also paying the rent. The fact that suit land alongwith certain other land has been transferred by defendant-respondent No. 1 in favour of defendant-respondent No. 2, who has planned construction of a huge residential colony over the said land on an investment of about 20 crores is also undisputed. In the backdrop of the above facts, the question which arises for consideration of the Court is that whether the plaintiff, who has based his cause of action only on the basis of the possession, is entitled to ad interim injunction following the principle that he being in possession on the basis of the lease, even though the same has expired, cannot be ousted except in accordance with law even though the grant of injunction would adversely affect the execution/implementation of a scheme of public utility or public interest being undertaken by a public authority.
14. As a general principle dispossession should not be resorted to by use of force and except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law more so by the State or its instrumentality as held by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Maharaja Dharmender Prasad Singh (supra) and State of Haryana v. Mohinder Pal and Ors. (supra).
15. The next question which immediately arises is that what principles should be followed by the Courts in the matter of grant of ad interim injunction in cases where private interest is pitched against public interest and refusai to grant ad interim temporary injunction may adversely affect the private interest and on the other hand the grant of ad interim injunction would adversely affect the public purpose. The answer is contained in the decision of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Mahadeo Sevlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation . In paragraph 14 of the aforesaid judgment it has been observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court as under:
It would thus be clear that in a suit for perpetual (sic) injunction, the Court should enquire on affidavit evidence and other material placed before the Court to find strong prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of granting injunction otherwise irreparable damage or damage would ensue to the plaintiff. The Court should also find whether the plaintiff could adequately be compensated by damages if injunction is not granted. It is common experience that injunction normally is asked for and granted to prevent the public authorities or the respondents to proceed with execution of or implementing scheme of public utility or granted contracts for execution thereof. Public interest is, therefore, one of the material and relevant considerations in either exercising or refusing to grant ad interim injunction.
16. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon'ble the Apex Court has also noted with approval the following observation made by R. A. Buckley in Model Law Review Volume 44 1981 Edition:
a plaintiff may still be deprived of an injunction in such a case on general equitable principles under which factors such as the public interest may, in an appropriate case, be relevant. It is of interest to note, in this connection, that it has not always been regarded as altogether beyond doubt whether a plaintiff who does thus fail to substantiate a claim for equitable relief could be awarded damages.
17. Following observations made by A.A. S. Zuckerman in "Mareva Injunctions and Security for judgment in a Framework of Interlocutory Remedies" has also been approved by 1 Hon'ble the Apex Court:
The Court considering an application for an interlocutory injunction has four factors to, consider: first, whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied: secondly, whether this harm outweighs any irreparable harm that the defendant would suffer from an injunction ; thirdly, the parties' relative prospects of success on the merits ; fourthly, any public interest involved in the decision. The central objective of Interlocutory injunctions should therefore be seen as reducing the risk that rights will be irreparably harmed during the inevitable delay of litigation.
18. In the aforesaid case while dismissing the appeal made against the order of the High Court dissolving the interim injunction passed by the courts below it has been held as under:
Public purpose of removing traffic congestion was sought to be served by acquiring the building for widening the road. By orders of injunction, for 24 years the public purpose was delayed. As a consequence execution of the project has been delayed and the costs now stand mounted. The Courts in the cases where injunctions are to be granted should necessarily consider the effect on public purpose thereof and also suitably mould the A relief.
19. Again in the case of Ramniklal N. Bhutta and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. , the Hon'ble the Apex Court while considering the power of the High Court to pass interim stay orders staying the acquisition proceedings in petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the Land Acquisition proceedings has observed as under:
Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come where the Courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercising their power of granting stay/injunction. The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. Even in a civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally discretionary. The Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226-indeed any of their t discretionary powers.
20. In Shiv Kumar Chaddha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors. , Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as follows:
It has been pointed out repeatedly that a party is not entitled to an order of injunction as a matter of right or course. Grant of injunction is within the discretion of the Court and such discretion is to be exercised in favour of the plaintiff only if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that unless the defendant is restrained by an order of injunction, an irreparable loss or damage will be caused to the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of temporary injunction is, thus, to maintain the status quo. The Court granu. such relief according to the legal principles - ex debito Justitiae. Before any such order is passed the Court must be satisfied that a strong prima facie case has been made out by the plaintiff including on the question of maintainability of the suit and the balance of convenience is in his favour and refusal of injunction would cause irreparable injury to him.
Under the changed circumstances with so many cases pending in Courts, once an interim order of injunction is passed, in many cases, such interim orders continue for months ; if not for years. At final hearing while vacating such interim orders of injunction in many cases, it has been discovered that while protecting the plaintiffs from suffering the alleged injury, more serious injury has been caused to the defendants due to continuance of Interim orders of injunction without final hearing. It is a matter of common knowledge that on many occasions even public interest also suffers in view of such interim orders of injunction, because persons in whose favour such orders are passed are interested in perpetuating the contraventions made by them by delaying the final disposal of such applications.
21. The legal position as culls out from the aforesaid and various other pronouncements of various Courts is that power to grant ad interim injunction is discretionary and depends upon the establishment of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss and in cases where public interest is pitched against private interest, the Court should be extremely slow in passing orders of ad interim injunction against public interest and should explore other means of redressing the wrong, one of which can be awarding compensation to the plaintiff.
22. According to the observations made in Mahadeo's case (supra) apart from considering three cardinal principles of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss the Courts while making an order of temporary injunction have also to take into account the parties relevant prospects of success on merits and effect on the public interest, if any, involved.
23. In the present case, even after liberty given by this Court to the plaintiffs to file suit for declaration and injunction no relief of declaration was claimed. From a perusal of the plaint, the sole basis of the claim of the plaintiff-petitioner is possession. There is not even a whisper about the semblance of any title. Rather it has been conceded on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioner during the course'] of argument that claim is based only on possession. On the other hand, suit land alongwith certain other lands which came to be vested in defendant-respondent No. 1, after acquisition by the State has been transferred in favour of defendant-respondent No. 2 for a valuable consideration of eleven crores rupees. The defendant-respondent No. 1 is coming up with a huge project of residential colony over the suit land with an investment of about 20 crores rupees. Obviously the money spent by the defendant-respondent No. 2 is out of public exchequer and construction of residential colony is a public purpose.
24. In such facts and circumstances, even if it is presumed that plaintiff-petitioner have some prima facie case (not prima facie title) on the basis of long possession definitely balance of convenience is not in their favour. There being no semblance of title in their favour and the present proceedings being based only on possession, the balance of convenience cannot be said to tilt in their favour nor would they suffer any Irreparable loss as ultimately, in the absence of any title, they would ultimately be liable to be ejected in appropriate proceedings. On the other hand, delay in implementation of the project of residential colony would definitely result in irreparable loss to the defendant-respondents and public purpose would be defeated as such balance of convenience is in their favour. Further, while balancing the interest of the plaintiff-petitioner as against that of defendant-respondents which is a public interest it is clear that grant of a temporary injunction would only result in delay of execution of the project of residential colony planned by the defendant-respondent No. 2 and projected cost of Rs. 20 crores would stand mounted, may be many more times, thus, affecting the public purpose and as such also factor of balance of convenience and Irreparable loss stand tilted in favour of defendant-respondent and for this reason also the plaintiff-petitioner cannot be held entitled for any temporary injunction.
25. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I find no illegality in the impugned order passed by the lower appellate court.
26. The writ petition accordingly Jails and stands dismissed. Registry is directed to return the record of the court below forthwith.