JUDGMENT Palok Basu and D.K. Seth, JJ.
1. The petitioner Nityanand Sharma's father was admittedly a member of Department of the Central Government known as General Reserve Engineering Force having been employed therein as a Driver. The petitioner claims that he is entitled, being the heir of an employee of the Armed Forces who had died, the special quota of allotment of L.P.G. Gas distributorship which as so allocated by the Indian Oil Corporation, therefore, the advertisement made by the respondents concerning the L.P.G. Gas agency as a general category is incorrect and the petitioner's prayer for allocation of that agency have been wrongly rejected by the respondents. Consequently the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be exercised, advertisement may be quashed and the respondents be direct to allot one L.P.G. gas agency in the armed quota for the petitioner.
2. Sri Ravidra Rai, learned Counsel for the petitioner has been heard at substantial length. He has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of R. Viswan and Ors. v. Union of India, reported in A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 658 and Vishaka and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, reported in A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011. Dr. R.G. Padia has put in appearance on behalf of the Indian Oil Corporation while Sri R.C. Shukla Advocate has appeared on behalf of the Union of India. Both these Counsel have opposed the writ petition.
3. During the course of arguments, it transpired that the petitioner had already filled writ petition No. 8838 of 1997 in which counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged. The prayer in that writ petition is that the letter dated 13.12.1996 where by the application of the petitioner for allocation of special quota on the grant of certificate to be issued by the respondents be quashed. As prayed the aforesaid writ petition was directed to be listed with the present writ petition as cause of action for both the writ petition is more or less the same. Both the petitions are consequently being disposed of by this order.
4. Before taking up the matter on merits, it may be pointed out that the, petitioner had filed yet another writ petition even prior to these two which was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court oh 29th October, 1996 (See writ petition No. 18423 of 1996) asking the respondents to decided, the representation of the petitioner. The petitioner appears to have moved a representation alongwith a certified copy of this order praying for certificate for allocation of special quota and that certificate was refused to him vide the order dated 13.12.1996 giving rise to aforesaid writ petition No. 8838 of 1997.
5. Further reliance was based on the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court made in paragraphs 1,9 and 14 in the case of R. Viswan (supra), it was contended by Sri Ravindra Rai that petitioner thus become an active member of the armed force and therefore, for all practical purposes, the aforesaid ruling should be applied to up-hold the claim of the petitioner that he is entitled to a certificate of that effect.
6. It may be pointed out that the argument of the learned Counsel suffers from a great fallacy. In the cited decision itself their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have made the personnel working In G.R.E.F. as being members of the armed forces only to attract Article 33 of the Constitution of India, had argument of Sri Ravindra Rai been correct, there was no need to apply the principles of Article 333 alone to the members of the G.R.E.F. and this itself Is enough indication that the members of the G.R.E.F. are not per se members of the armed forces.
7. A close examination of the aforesaid decision in R. Viswan (supra), further reveals that even sources of recruitment etc. are different and by a notification the Government of India has made the Army Rules applicable for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings against the principles of the G.R.E.F. only, Moreover, the applicability of those disciplinary proceedings also Is only to a limited extent and In addition to the provisions contained In Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. Therefore, It is not possible to uphold the argument of Sri Ravindra Rai that the petitioner's father should have been treated as part of the armed forces and therefore, the petitioner being his heir was entitled to special quota for army personnel for allocation of the L.P.G. Gas distributorship.
8. The reliance in the second case is obviously out of point. The controversy in the case of Vishakha and others (supra), was totally different from the one raided in this writ petition. Consequently it need not be discussed.
9. In view of aforesaid discussions, the respondent's decision on refusing the certificate to the petitioner is fully In accordance with law and does not call for any interference whatsoever. Writ Petition No. 8838 of 1997 is consequently dismissed and the order refusing to grant certificate to the petitioner is upheld. Likewise writ petition No. 1169 of 1998 also dismissed and there is no error in the advertisement issued by the respondents calling for application for settling distributorship of L.P.G. Gas.