1. In all the contempt petitions, similar relief (s) has been prayed for by the applicants/petitioners, therefore, they are being decided collectively by this common order. For the sake of convenience, facts of Contempt Petition No.2622 of 2015 (Nirankar Pathak and others vs. Sri Ashish Goel, Posted As Prin. Secy. Basic Edu. Lko.& Ors.) are being taken up for deciding the matter.
2. All the contempt petitions have been filed for willful non-compliance of order dated 29.04.2008 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in a Bunch of Special Appeals leading Special Appeal No.530 of 2004 (U.P. Board of Basic Education vs. Om Prakash Shukla and others) by which it was directed to the opposite parties to consider the case of the appellants. The operative portion of the order reads as under:
"We, therefore, while upholding the order passed by the learned Single Judge direct that all such candidates be considered for being sent on training as per Rules and it norms by giving them preference but for that matter, age will not come in their way and their candidatures shall not be rejected merely on the ground of being over age.
Let aforesaid exercise be completed within a maximum period of two months. The candidates who are selected for being sent for Special B.T.C. Training Course shall be considered for appointment as per Rules. We further direct that all those candidates who have filed writ petitions and if they have worked, for any period, they shall be paid salary only for the period for which tehy had worked.
With the aforesaid directives, all the Special Appeals stands disposed of."
3. The brief facts of the case for proper adjudication of the contempt petitions are as follows:
i. On 19.01.1991, 315 posts of Assistant Teachers in Basic and Primary School, District Bahraich were advertised and the qualification of the candidates having B.T.C. or equivalent to B.T.C. were required. Some of the applicants, who had possessed B.Ed. degree have not been found eligible and their applications were not entertained. They have filed a Bunch of writ petitions leading No.2447 (S/S) of 1991 (Triveni Prasad Pandey and others vs. State of U.P. and others) before this Court. All the writ petitions were partly allowed by a common judgment and order dated 23.12.1992, against which the State of U.P. has preferred a Special Appeal bearing No.21 of 1993 (State of U.P. Vs. Triveni Prasad Pandey), which was dismissed on 01.11.2001. The Special Leave Petition was filed before the Hon'ble Suprme Court by the State against the judgment and order dated 01.11.2001 passed by the Division Bench. The Special Leave to Appeal was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 22.04.2002. Another Special Leave Petition has also been filed against the judgment and order dated 01.11.2001, which was also dismissed as withdrawn by the Hon'ble Apex Court vide order dated 01.08.2003.
ii. On 20.12.1995, nearly 1000 (one thousand) fresh vacancies of Assistant Teacher in Bahraich District were advertised in which the qualification was B.T.C. or equivalent to B.T.C. Against the said advertisement dated 20.12.1995, various writ petitions were filed. The said writ petitions were decided by common judgment and order dated 30.11.2002 extending the benefit of judgment and order dated 23.12.1992 passed in the Bunch of petitions leading No.2447 (S/S) of 1991 (Triveni Prasad Pandey and others vs. State of U.P. and others) and also the benefit of judgment and order dated 01.11.2001 passed in Special Appeal no.21 of 1993 (State of U.P. Vs. Triveni Prasad Pandey).
iii. Several contempt petitions were filed for non-compliance of the order dated 30.11.2012. The State of U.P. vide order dated 10.04.2003 and 28.05.2003 had given the appointment to all the candidates. They had joined their services.
iv. Vide order dated 07.08.2003; 08.08.2003 and 11.08.2003, the appointments so made as Assistant Teacher were cancelled by declaring all appointments as void abinitio.
v. Against the cancellation of the appointments, several writ petitions were filed before the High Court. Interim orders were also passed by the High Court in the writ petitions. During the pendency of the writ petitions, an advertisement dated 22.01.2004 was issued for the selection of Special B.T.C. training. Vide order dated 26.05.2004, the High Court, Lucknow Bench has modified the interim order to the extent that the result of the selection for Special B.T.C. Training can be declared but the selected candidates shall not be appointed on the post of Assistant Teachers occupied by the writ petitioners. It was further directed that 263 posts shall be kept vacant till the disposal of the writ petitions. Subsequently, all the writ petitions which were filed against the cancellation of the appointment were decided by common judgment and order dated 17.09.2004 passed by the learned Single Bench. The operative portion of the order reads as under :
"In view of the above, all the aforesaid writ petitions are disposed of finally with the following directions :
The impugned orders of cancellation of appointment in case of the petitioners who were party to the writ petitions which were decided as bunch of writ petitions vide judgment dated 13.12.1992, Annexure 7, are set aside. They will be reinstated on their posts on which they were working at the time of issuance of the impugned orders of cancellation of appointments. They shall also be paid salary for the period they have worked as Teacher. They will be considered for sending Special B. T. C. Course, 2004.
In case of the other petitioners who are not party in the writ petitions decided on 23.12.1992 vide judgment Annexure 7, the impugned orders for cancellation of appointment are set aside on the statement of Advocate General with the direction to the opposite parties to consider their cases for selection to the special B.T.C. course irrespective of the fact whether they have applied for the same or not. If they are found suitable in accordance with the amended provision under the Basic Teachers Education Rules, they will be sent for Special B.T.C. Course 2004 in preference of others. The age limit will not come in their way if they have crossed the upper age limit in litigating the matter after their appointment and if they were within the maximum age limit on the date of the earlier appointment they will be entitled to get relaxation in age if they are over age on the date of consideration for special B.T.C. These petitioners will be paid salary for the period they have worked and they will not be entitled to get any salary till they are sent for training to Special B.T.C. They will be given the same allowance during the training period which other candidates of Special B.T.C. shall be paid and after completion of Special B.T.C. they will be given appointment on the post of Assistant Teacher in primary schools like others.
These directions shall be complied with within a period of four weeks from the date of this judgment."
vi. Against the said order dated 17.09.2004, various special appeals had been filed and the said special appeals were decided by common judgment and order dated 29.04.2008. The judgment and order dated 29.04.2008 were not complied with by the State/opposite parties, then the applicants have filed various contempt petitions including the present one before this Court.
vii. The State Government had preferred Special Leave Petition before Hon'ble the Apex Court. Hon'ble the Apex Court vide order dated 26.09.2008, stayed the contempt proceedings pending before this court. Vide order dated 09.09.2011, the interim order dated 26.09.2008 was vacated. The State has filed the recall application of the order dated 09.09.2011, which was rejected vide order dated 07.12.2011 and the Hon'ble Apex Court directed to the opposite parties to comply with the judgment and order dated 29.04.2008 within a period of ten weeks.
viii. After the order dated 07.12.2011 passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, the Secretary, Basic Education had given an undertaking on 08.12.2011 to comply with the judgment and order dated 29.04.2008. On the basis of undertaking given, the Secretary, Basic Education has issued an order dated 06.03.2012 canceling the termination order dated 07.08.2003. Thereafter another Government Order dated 16.04.2012 was issued directing the Director of Basic Education, U.P., Lucknow to ensure the compliance of the order passed by this Court.
ix. Special Leave Petitions filed against the judgment and order dated 29.04.2008 came up for hearing on 03.09.2015, where statement was made that the process for issuance of appointment letters were in process and the decision shall be taken within four weeks. Vide order dated 14.10.2015, all the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed. The State has filed a recall application for recall of judgment and order dated 14.10.2015 but the same had been dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 09.09.2016. The State has filed a review application for reviewing of the judgment and order dated 14.10.2015 before Hon'ble the Apex Court, which was also dismissed vide order dated 12.04.2017.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has submitted that all the respondents have full knowledge of the judgment and order dated 17.09.2004, 29.04.2008 and 14.10.2015 but all the opposite parties were sitting tight over the matter and not complying with the directions given by this Hon'ble Court as well as the undertaking given before Hon'ble the Apex Court.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that against the common judgment and order dated 17.09.2003, various Special Appeals were filed by the respondents. While deciding all the Special Appeals, the Division Bench of this Court directed the opposite parties to consider the applicants for being sent on training within the maximum period of two months vide order dated 29.04.2008. The petitioners have served the copy of judgment upon the Basic Shiksha Adhikari on 07.06.2008 and the secretary Basic Education. The opposite parties have not complied with the orders passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the Special Appeals and the petitioners were not sent for the training as directed by the Court though all the petitioners are fully eligible and qualified to be sent for training of B.T.C. Course. When no action was taken on the basis of the judgment and order dated 29.04.2008, then the petitioners have filed the contempt petition bearing no.1485 of 2008. In the said contempt petition, notices were issued to the responsible officers i.e. the Secretary Basic Education, U.P., Lucknow, Director of Education Basic.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that after receiving the notice under the Contempt of Courts Act, the opposite parties have preferred a Civil Appeal No.7792-78110 of 2011 before Hon'ble the Apex Court. Hon'ble the Apex Court has stayed the contempt proceedings. It is submitted that the said stay was vacated vide order dated 09.09.2011. The State had filed a recall application before Hon'ble the Apex Court and the same was rejected vide order dated 07.12.2011. The State has filed second application for recall of order dated 09.09.2011 but again the Hon'ble Apex Court had rejected the application for recall of order dated 09.09.2011 and directed the opposite parties to comply with the directions issued by the Division Bench of the High Court vide order dated 29.04.2008. The contempt petition was listed on 08.12.2011 on which date the then Secretary Basic Education has given an undertaking that the order of the High Court dated 29.04.2008 will be complied with within the period extended by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. On the statement/undertaking given by the then Secretary, Basic Education the contempt petition was dismissed on 08.12.2011.
7. Th learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the Civil Appeal Nos. 7792 - 78110 of 2011 have also been dismissed on 14.10.2015 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the opposite parties have full knowledge of the judgment and order dated 17.09.2004, 29.04.2008 and 14.10.2015 but they have not complied with the orders passed by this Hon'ble Court as well as by Hon'ble the Apex Court. Therefore, the action of the opposite parties are deliberate, intentional and amounts to contempt of this Hon'ble Court and the opposite parties are liable to be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that in the earlier contempt petition bearing No.1485 of 2008, an application for recall of the order dated 08.12.2011 was moved but since the said application is not maintainable, therefore, the present petition is preferred.
9. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that on 23.12.2016, the Coordinate Bench of this Hon'ble Court has directed the opposite parties to re-examine the issue and file an affidavit of compliance. In pursuance of the order dated 23.12.2016, the opposite party no.5 instead of re-examining the issue, has constituted a Committee of Director, Rajya Shaikshik Anusandhan Evam Prashikshan Parishad, Uttar Pradesh Lucknow who submitted its report on 10.02.2017 to the opposite party no.5 and on the basis of which, the opposite party no.5 has sought information from the then learned Advocate General and after receiving the information, the opposite party no.5 issued a letter to the opposite party no.2 and Director, S.C.E.R.T. Lucknow on 08.03.2017 that too without application of mind. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that on the basis of the judgment and order dated 29.04.2008, 27 candidates belonging to the Ist Category, the proceedings of reinstatement be done and further proceeding for sending the training of one Gita Sonker be started but nothing has been done in respect of the 229 candidates belonging to the category II, III and IV.
10. It is submitted that the contents of the report of the committee related to the disputes of the illegal appointment of Assistant Teachers of District Bahraich inspite of the facts that this Hon'ble Court was set aside the order of cancellation of the appointment and Special Leave Petition filed by the opposite parties had been dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Therefore, the recommendation of the Committee is nothing but amounts to contempt of this Court.
11. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that in respect of the candidates belonging to the Category II, III and IV, the Committee had given its finding that this Court has decided to send the candidates on training according to the Rules. The committee has further recorded the finding that the appointment of the Assistant Teacher are to be made according to the U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981, which has been framed under the provisions of the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 and all the applicants were appointed on the basis of qualification of B.Ed./L.T. but the said qualification was not included in the Service Rules of 1981. The committee has further accorded the finding that all appointments were illegal. The committee has recorded the finding that from time to time the State Government has issued Government Order for training of B.Ed. candidates after approval from N.C.T.E. such as Special B.T.C. 2004.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that the committee has extended its brief in recording the finding that according to the present guidelines of N.C.T.E., the candidates having B.Ed. qualification are not eligible for appointment as Assistant Teacher in Primary School from Class 1 to 5. The Committee has further recorded the finding that if the Government is taken the decision to send them for training then in such situation, separate training of Special B.T.C. will be required for which approval from N.C.T.E. will be required.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the report of the committee dated 10.02.2017 is perverse and incorrect on the following grounds :
(a) The order of cancellation of appointment was set aside and opposite parties were directed to consider the candidates for training of Special B.T.C. under the amended provisions of the Service Rules. The judgment of this Hon'ble Court dated 17.09.2004 was same for all the categories but committee has failed to understood the same judgment and order dated 17.09.2004.
(b) This Hon'ble Court while upholding the judgment of the Hon'ble Single Judge dated 17.09.2004 in Special Appeal has directed on 29.04.2008 that all such candidates be considered for being sent on training as per Rules and its norms by giving them preference, hence, this manner the finding of the Committee is perverse in nature in respect of Category II, III and IV.
(c) There is no difference of candidature of category I and candidates of category II, III and IV but the committee has adopted different creation in respect of category I and II and III and IV. Hence, the finding in respect of the category II, III and IV is perverse.
(d) The Committee in its report at para 2 page 21 has recorded the finding to the effect that this Hon'ble Court vide its judgment dated 29.04.2008 says that such candidate who are under zone of candidature of Special B.T.C. of 2004, will be considered for appointment according to Rule but this Hon'ble Court has not said any word in such manner, hence, the finding of the committee is perverse in nature.
(e) The Committee has considered the procedure provided in the Government Order dated 14.01.2004 and 20.02.2004 but these Government orders are not applicable as the vacancy relates to the year of 1995 and these Government Orders were issued specially to provide Special B.T.C. Course to 46189 candidates holding B.Ed./L.T. qualification. Hence, the finding of the committee is perverse in nature.
(f) By the Government Order dated 20.02.2004 the candidature of C.P.Ed., D.P.Ed. and B.P.Ed. were only included but the Committee has applied the said Government Order dated 14.01.2004 and 20.02.2004 in the case of category II, III and IV. Hence the finding of the Committee is perverse in nature.
(g) The vacancy in respect of the candidates of category II, III and IV are relates to the year of 1995, hence the decision of the Committee which is based on the basis of the Government Order dated 14.01.2004 and 20.02.2004 is incorrect and perverse in nature.
(h) The committee has also considered the appointments which were made in district Basti, Gorakhpur and Mahrajganj but the fact of the present case are also absolutely different. Hence considering the appointment of other district and including the present case goes the report perverse.
(i) The Committee while giving his report dated 10.02.2017 has not given any preference to the applicants and examine the case of the applicants only on the basis of the Government Order dated 14.01.2004 and 20.02.2004 that too are not applicable in the present case. Hence, the finding of the committee is absolutely perverse and utter violation of the judgment and order passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge as well as by the Hon'ble Division Bench.
(j) The committee in his report has recorded the finding that if a decision for sending the category II, III and IV candidate for training is taken from the State Government for special B.T.C. course then the approval from N.C.T.E. is required but doing so further, committee has taken just opposite decision applying the Government Order dated 14.01.2004 and 20.02.2004, hence the report of the Committee is contradictory in nature itself and made the report perverse.
(k) The committee has relied on a Government Order dated 14.01.2004 and 20.02.2004 for considering the case of the applicants for being sent for training instead of considering the case of the applicants under the Rule of 1981 in utter violation of the judgment and order passed by Hon'ble Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench.
14. The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that from the facts stated hereinabove, it clear that the report of the committee is perverse in nature and on the basis of the such report, the opposite party no.5 has issued letter on 08.03.2017 and thereafter has filed the compliance report before this Hon'ble court, which is liable to be rejected. Learned counsel submits that from the facts and circumstances stated above, till today, the judgment and order dated 17.09.2004, 29.04.2008 have not been complied with and the action of the opposite parties is deliberate, intentional and therefore, amounts to contempt of this Hon'ble Court and they are liable to be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
15. Per contra, Learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State has submitted that prior to enactment of the U.P. Act No.34 of 1972, the U.P. Municipal Board Educational Establishment Service Rules, 1954 was made under sub-section (2) of the Section 73 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916; and under Part XI Rule 26 of the Rules 1954, the training qualifications for appointment as Basic Education Teacher were prescribed as H.T.C. (Hindustani Teachers' Certificate), J.T.C. (Junior Teachers' Certificate), P.T.C. (Primary Teacher's Certificate) and V.T.C. (Vernacular Teachers' Certificate). It has also been submitted that after constitution of Educational Code of Uttar Pradesh, the appointment of untrained as Basic Teacher was barred. Later on the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 was enacted and the Board of Basic Education, U.P. was constituted. Since statutory rules were not made, as such, in absence of statutory rules, the Board issued a Circular dated 25.04.1973 determining the conditions/procedure and qualifications for appointment as a teacher in the Basic institutions under Clause 4 of the said Circular, which were C.T., J.T.C., B.T.C. and H.T.C. On 03.01.1981 the U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981 came into force and the Circular of the Board dated 25.04.1973 automatically became ineffective.
16. The learned Advocate General has submitted that an advertisement was issued on 22.01.1991 by the Additional Director (Basic Education), Faizabad against about 1200 vacancies prescribing training qualification of B.T.C., out of which 315 posts were for District Bahraich. Against the advertisement dated 22.01.1991, 258 applications were submitted by B.T.C. training holders and 53 by B.Ed./L.T. Training holders but no appointment of any training holder (even of B.T.C.) was made against the said advertisement, as such, the petitioners applications were not considered and after the expiry of one year i.e. on 21.01.1992, the said advertisement itself became ineffective. A Bunch of seven writ petitions against the advertisement dated 19/22.01.1992 was filed, which were partly allowed by this Hon'ble Court on 23.12.1992 and the opposite parties were directed that in case sufficient number of B.T.C. trained candidates are not available for appointment as Assistant Teachers in the Basic Schools, the petitioners who have qualified for appointment on the basis of advertisement dated 22.01.1991 be appointed as Assistant Teachers in the Basic Schools managed and run by the opposite parties, within a period of three weeks.
17. The learned Advocate General has further submitted that another advertisement was made by the B.S.A, Bahraich on 19.12.1995 prescribing B.T.C. training as eligibility qualification and against the said advertisement dated 19.12.1995, 416 applications of B.T.C. training holders and 325 applications of B.Ed./L.T. Training - holders were received.
Judgment dated 23.12.1992 was challenged in Special Appeal No.21 of 1993 filed by the Board, which was dismissed on 01.11.2001. Special Leave Petition of the Board bearing no.3267 (CC) of 2002 (Basic Shiksha Parishad vs. Triveni Prasad Pandey) was got dismissed as withdrawn.
18. In pursuance of the advertisement dated 19.12.1995, several applications were wrongly made by the B.Ed./L.T. Training holders and on the event of their non-consideration, a Bunch of 112 writ petitions was filed which were decided by this Hon'ble Court on 30.11.2002 with direction to the opposite parties to consider the case of petitioners having B.Ed. or L.T. Qualifications for appointment as Assistant Teacher in Basic Schools, if sufficient number of B.T.C. qualification holders are not available for selection. It has been submitted that the B.S.A. of Bahraich District made 263 appointments in compliance to the judgment and order dated 23.11.1992 and 01.11.2001 and the State Government vide G.O. dated 07.08.2003 declared the said appointment as void ab-initio and in pursuance to aforesaid Government Order, Director, Basic Education, U.P. issued order dated 08.08.2003 and in pursuance thereto, all the appointments were cancelled by the then B.S.A.
19. The learned Advocate General has further submitted that against the Government Order dated 07.08.2003 as well as the order dated 08.08.2003 passed by the Director, Basic Education, 19 writ petitions were filed by the candidates of District Bahraich, which were commonly decided vide order dated 17.09.2004. Nineteen Special Appeals against the judgment dated 17.09.2004 and several Special Appeals against the judgment dated 30.11.2002 were filed before this Hon'ble Court and the same were decided on 29.04.2008 with direction that all such candidates be considered for being sent on training as per rules and it norms by giving them preference, but for that matter, age will not come in their way and their candidatures shall not be rejected merely on the ground of being over age. In another bunch of appeals, it has been observed that in view of the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Sartaj vs. State of U.P.; (2006) 2 SCC 313, there hardly remains any controversy in this regard that the candidates who are not possessing B.T.C. training qualification are not entitled for being appointed as Assistant Teachers in Primary Schools and the orders passed by the learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside, which is hereby set aside.
20. It has been submitted by the learned Advocate General that Bunch of writ petitions filed at Allahabad assailing the decisions of the authorities dated 30.01.2008 and other dates was jointly decided on 12.04.2013 considering both the judgments of Hon'ble Lucknow Bench dated 17.09.2004 and 29.04.2008. The judgment dated 12.04.2013 was assailed in nine special appeals (leading no.1031 of 2013 - Sanjay Kumar Chaubey vs. State) and are pending at Allahabad but no interim orders have been passed even till date.
21. It has been submitted that in compliance to order dated 10.02.2017 passed in the present contempt petition, a three Member Committee (Director - S.C.E.R.T., Director - Basic and Secretary - Board) was constituted who submitted its detailed report on 10.02.2017 and in pursuance of the said report, the matter was reconsidered and decided by the State Government on 08.03.2017 that as per the judgment dated 29.04.2008, 27 candidates of first category who are appointed on untrained grade be reinstated and as per the direction of the Hon'ble Court, they should also be paid their salary for the period they have actually work and one candidate Miss Geeta Sonkar who could not be sent for Special B.T.C. training on account of the non-availability of her application in Special B.T.C. 2004 be sent for training.
22. In support of his arguments, learned Advocate General has relied on the judgment of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Secretary, A.P. Public Service Commission vs. Y. V.V.R. Srinivasulu and others reported at 2003 (5) SCC 341 wherein in para 10 and 11 the following has been held :
"10. Both on account of the scheme of selection and the various stages disclosed as necessary to be undergone by every candidate and the manner of actual selection for the appointment in question, the candidates were required to be selected finally for appointment on the basis of the ranks obtained by them in terms of the inter se ranking based on the merit of their respective performance. There is no escape for anyone from this ordeal and claim for any en bloc favoured treatment merely because, anyone of them happened to possess an additional qualification than the relevant basic/general qualification essential for even applying to the post. The word "preference" in our view is capable of different shades of meaning taking colour from the context, purpose and object of its use under the scheme of things envisaged. Hence, it is to be construed not in an isolated or detached manner, ascribing a meaning of universal import, for all contingencies capable of an invariable application. The procedure for selection in the case involve, a qualifying test, a written examination and oral test or interview and the final list of selection has to be on the basis of the marks obtained in them. The suitability and all round merit, if had to be adjudged in that manner only what justification could there be for overriding all these merely because, a particular candidate is in possession of an additional qualification on the basis of which, a preference has also been envisaged. The rules do not provide for separate classification of those candidates or apply different norms of selection for them. The 'preference' envisaged in the rules, in our view, under the scheme of things and contextually also cannot mean, an absolute en bloc preference akin to reservation or separate and distinct method of selection for them alone. A mere rule of preference meant to give weightage to the additional qualification cannot be enforced as a rule of reservation or rule of complete precedence. Such a construction would not only undermine the scheme of selection envisaged through Public Service Commission, on the basis of merit performance but also would work great hardship and injustice to those who possess the required minimum educational qualification with which they are entitled to compete with those possessing additional qualification too, and demonstrate their superiority, merit wise and their suitability for the post. It is not to be viewed as a preferential right conferred even for taking up their claims for consideration. On the other hand, the preference envisaged has to be given only when the claims of all candidates who are eligible are taken for consideration and when anyone or more of them are found equally positioned, by using the additional qualification as a tilting factor, in their favour vis-a-vis others in the matter of actual selection.
11. Whenever, a selection is to be made on the basis of merit performance involving competition, and possession of any additional qualification or factor is also envisaged to accord preference, it cannot be for the purpose of putting them as a whole lot ahead of others, dehors their intrinsic worth or proven inter se merit and suitability, duly assessed by the competent authority. Preference, in the context of all such competitive scheme of selection would only mean that other things being qualitatively and quantitatively equal, those with the additional qualification have to be preferred. There is no question of eliminating all others preventing thereby even an effective and comparative consideration on merits, by according en bloc precedence in favour of those in possession of additional qualification irrespective of the respective merits and demerits of all candidates to be considered. If it is to be viewed they way the High Court and Tribunal have chosen to, it would amount to first exhausting in the matter of selection all those, dehors their inter se merit performance, only those in possession of additional qualification and take only thereafter separately those with ordinary degree and who does not possess the additional qualification. Assuming for consideration without even accepting the same to be right or correct view to be taken, at least among the class or category of those possessing the additional qualification, inter se merit performance should be the decisive factor for actual selection for appointment and relief could not have been granted to respondents for the mere asking only on the basis of the interpretation of the provision to some one who came to court, ignoring the fact that those before the court at any rate in spite of the view taken do not come up to the level of selection considered in the context of numerous others with higher ranks of merit performance, in addition to they being also in possession of the additional qualification, as those before the court. That apart, the old rule relating to the post of ACTO, which has become obsolete having been superseded, or even the advertisement if it has stated on the basis of the obslete rule, that preference will be given first to candidates who possess a degree in Commerce and degree in Law, secondly to those who possess a degree in Commerce and thirdly to those who possess a degree in Law, cannot either support the claim of the respondents No.1 to 3 nor in any manner lend credence to the interpretation placed by the High Court and the Tribunal. The word 'first' has to be construed in the context of even giving preference only in the order and manner indicated therein, inter se among more than one holding such different class of degrees in addition and not to be interpreted vis-a-vis others who do not possess such additional qualification, to completely exclude them, en bloc."
23. The learned Advocate General has lastly submitted that in compliance to the judgments dated 17.09.2004 and 29.04.2008 and also in compliance to order of Hon'ble Contempt Court dated 23.12.2006, the matter in dispute has been reconsidered and finally decided by the State Government vide order dated 08.03.2017, as such, the orders have been complied with and nothing is left in the present contempt petition and the present contempt petition is liable to be dismissed. However, if the petitioners are aggrieved with such compliance, they may approach in fresh proceedings.
24. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties at length and perused the materials available on record.
25. In order to decide whether the opposite parties are guilty of civil contempt, I would like to refer to Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which reads as under:-
"2. Definitions:
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-
XXXXX
(b) "civil contempt" means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a court;"
Referring to the aforesaid Section, the Supreme Court in Rama Narang versus Ramesh Narang and Another, (2006) 11 SCC 114 had referred to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, which did not contain many of the provisions of the Act, for the Legislature had left formulation of the law of contempt to the Courts, which had resulted in conflicting views expressed by different High Courts. Reference was made to the conflicting view expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Nisha Kanto Roy Chowdhury versus Smt. Saroj Bashini Goho, AIR 1948 Calcutta 294 and the Bombay High Court in Bajranglal Gangadhar Khemka and Another versus Messrs. Kapurchand Limited, AIR 1950 Bombay 336.
26. According to section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 civil contempt means willful disobedience to any judgement, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a court.
27. Thus, from the above, it can be ascertained that there are two important essentials to constitute civil contempt:
i. Disobedience of any judgement, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or an undertaking given to the court. There should be disobedience of a valid order to constitute contempt of court. An order includes all kinds of judgements, orders-final, preliminary, ex-parte, contempt order. Disobedience of a decree, direction, writ or other process of a court, or an undertaking given to the court, will also amount to contempt of court.
ii. The Disobedience or breach must be willful, deliberate and intentional. It is well settled that mere disobedience or breach of the court's order by the person is not sufficient to constitute civil contempt. Such a disobedience or breach must be willful, deliberate and intentional.
28. In the case of Ashok Paper Kamgar Union And Ors. vs Dharam Godha And Ors. reported at AIR 2004 SC 105, Hon'ble the Apex Court has examined the provisions of section 2 (b) of the Contempt of Court Act 1971 that defines the terms of Civil Contempt and held that the term 'Wilful' means an act or omission which is done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids or with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. It signifies a deliberate action done with evil intent or with a bad motive or purpose. Therefore, in order to constitute contempt, the order of the Court must be of such a nature which is capable of execution by the person charged in normal circumstances. It should not require any extra ordinary effort nor should be dependent, either wholly or in part, upon any act or omission of a third party for its compliance. This has to be judged having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.
29. According to the Oxford Dictionary, contempt is the state of being despised or dishonored; disgrace. Any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect or disregard or to interfere with or prejudice parties or their witness during litigation is considered to be contempt of Court. The contempt is defined by Halsbury, as consisting of words spoken or written which obstruct or tends to obstruct the administration of justice. The Indian legislature does not provide with a concrete definition of contempt, however section 2(a) of The Contempt of Courts, 1971 says ''contempt of court means civil contempt or criminal contempt'. Section 2(b) & section 2(c) of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines civil and criminal contempt. Although the legislature has not defined what amounts to contempt, it has defined civil and criminal contempt. Thus contempt cannot be confined to four walls of a definition. Therefore, what would offend the court's dignity and what would lower the court's prestige is thus a matter which can be decided by the court itself and it's for the court to deal with each case of contempt under the facts and circumstances of that case.
30. If the order whose contempt is alleged involves more than one reasonable and rational interpretation and the respondent adopts one of them and acts in accordance with one such interpretation, he cannot be held liable for contempt of court. However, this defense is available only when a bonafide question of interpretation arises. In case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481, it was held that this defense would not be allowed if a doubt about the order has been deliberately created when actually there is no doubt at all. It is well settled that in proceedings for civil contempt, it would be a valid defence that the compliance of the order is impossible. However, the cases of impossibility must be distinguished from the cases of mere difficulty. In case of Amar Singh vs. K. P. Geetakrishnan, the court granted certain pensionary benefits to a large number of retired employees with effect from a particular back date. The plea of impossibility was taken on the ground that the implementation of the order would result in heavy financial burden on the exchequer. However, the plea of impossibility was rejected by the court with the observation that although it's difficult to comply with the order but it's not impossible to comply and therefore, it should be complied with.
31. In the case of the S. Balasubramaniyam vs P. Janakaraju and another reported at 2004 (5) Kar L.J. 338, the High Court of Karnatka observed that the orders of Courts have to be obeyed unless and until they are set aside in appeal/revision.
32. While elucidating on the principles relating to contempt law the Court remarked that the definition of Civil Contempt includes willful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. Public interest requires that solemn undertakings given to a Court with the intention of obtaining any benefit should not be breached willfully. No litigant can be allowed to wriggle away from a solemn undertaking given to the Court, as it will open dangerous trends and defeat the very purpose of giving undertakings to Court. It was further observed that once litigants give an undertaking to a Court, they should comply with it in all circumstances, the only exceptions being fraud or statutory bar. They cannot break an undertaking with impunity and then attempt to justify it. The breach of solemn undertaking given to a Court is a serious matter and will have to be dealt with seriously.
33. The Bombay High Court, in Bajranglal Gangadhar Khemka and Another (supra) had drawn a distinction between execution proceedings and proceedings for contempt which arise from wilful default of an undertaking. The judgment referred to the long standing practice as per which the expression "undertaking" had come to acquire a technical and legal meaning and understanding. It was observed that the expression "when a party undertakes" is used to give an undertaking to the Court as distinct from when a counsel states that he undertakes on behalf of his client. When a person gives an undertaking to the Court, it is not given to the other side but to the Court itself, and that being said must carry sanctity. Therefore, when a Court passes a decree after an undertaking was embodied in the consent terms, it would show that the Court had sanctioned the particular course and put its imprimatur on the consent terms. The Supreme Court agreed with the view expressed in Bajranglal Gangadhar Khemka and Another (supra) in preference over the view expressed in by the Calcutta High Court in Nisha Kanto Roy Chowdhury (supra). Thereafter, reference was made to Sanyal Committee report, which had preceded framing of the enactment of the Act and thereupon interpreting Section 2(b) of the Act the Supreme Court in Rama Narang (supra) had observed:-
"18. The Act has been duly widened. It provides inter alia for definitions of the terms and lays down firmer bases for exercise of the court's jurisdiction in contempt. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines civil contempt as meaning "wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court". (emphasis supplied) Analysed, the definition provides for two categories of cases, namely, (1) wilful disobedience to a process of court, and (2) wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. As far as the first category is concerned, the word "any" further indicates the wide nature of the power. No distinction is statutorily drawn between an order passed after an adjudication and an order passed by consent. This first category is separate from the second and cannot be treated as forming part of or taking colour from the second category. The legislative intention clearly was to distinguish between the two and create distinct classes of contumacious behaviour. Interestingly, the courts in England have held that the breach of a consent decree of specific performance by refusal to execute the agreement is punishable by way of proceedings in contempt (see C.H. Giles and Co. Ltd. v. Morris [(1972) 1 All ER 960 : (1972) 1 WLR 307 (Ch D)] )..
34. It is to be, therefore, clearly understood that Section 2(b) of the Act, which defines civil contempt, consists of two different parts and categories, namely, (i) wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court and (ii) wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. The expression "any" used with reference to the first category indicates the wide nature of power given to the Court and that the statute does not draw a difference between an order passed after adjudication or an order passed by consent. The first part or category is distinct and cannot be treated as a part or taking colour from the second category. The Supreme Court consciously observed that the Courts in England have held that breach of consent decree of performance by refusal to execute an agreement was punishable by way of contempt proceedings. With reference to the second part, in Rama Narang (supra) it was observed that giving of an undertaking is distinct from a consent order recording compromise. In the latter case of violation of compromise, no question of contempt arises, but the party can enforce the order of compromise either by execution or injunction from a Court. However, in the former case, when there is wilful disobedience, contempt application and proceedings would be maintainable.
35. In Rama Narang (supra), several suits inter se and legal proceedings between the second wife of the deceased and her step sons were compromised, with both the parties agreeing that the suits/proceedings be disposed of in terms of the settlement agreement by minutes of the consent order. Consent contained various terms agreed upon by the parties. Allegations were that the step sons had not complied with the consent terms consequent to which contempt proceedings were initiated for willful disobedience. In this case, the Supreme Court relied upon first part/category mentioned in Section 2(b), i.e., wilful violation of any order or decree that would amount to contempt. It was observed that a consent decree is a compromise by way of command or a contract and the Bombay High Court‟s view in Bajranglal Gangadhar Khemka and Another (supra) correctly holds that a consent decree is a contract with imprimatur of the Court, which means authorised and approved by the Court. Such decrees are executable under the Code of Civil Procedure, but merely because an order or decree is executable would not take away the Court‟s jurisdiction to deal with the matter under the Act, provided the Court is satisfied that the violation of the order or decree is such that if proved, it would warrant punishment under Section 13 of the Act on the ground that the contempt substantially interferes or tends to substantially interfere with the course of justice. Reference was made to Bank of Baroda versus Sadruddin Hasan Daya and Another, (2004) 1 SCC 360 wherein the ratio in Bajranglal Gangadhar Khemka and Another (supra) that violation or breach of an undertaking, which becomes part of the court decree itself, amounts to contempt, irrespective of whether it is open to the decree holder to execute the decree, was upheld. This, it was observed was the law and it cannot be argued that if the party aggrieved can execute a decree per se, it can be a defence having bearing on the contempt proceedings.
36. In Kanwar Singh Saini versus High Court of Delhi, (2012) 4 SCC 307, the Supreme Court had cautioned that if there is non-compliance of a decree passed in a civil suit, the remedy available to an aggrieved person in case of non-compliance of a decree passed in a civil suit is to institute execution proceedings under Order XXI Rule 32 of the Code, which provides for elaborate proceedings in which the parties can adduce evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses. Proceedings under the Act are discretionary and, therefore, when the matter relates to infringement of a decree or decretal order that embodies rights, it may not be expedient to invoke and exercise contempt jurisdiction. The Supreme Court had referred to civil contempt as defined in Section 2(b) of the Act to mean wilful breach of an undertaking as distinct from criminal contempt. In civil contempt, disobedience of a civil action is a matter involving private rights of a party, albeit contempt jurisdiction is exercised when administration of justice is undermined if the order of the competent court is permitted to be disregarded with impunity. Criminal contempt, on the other hand, is predicated on public interest. In cases of civil contempt where the civil contempt jurisdiction is invoked, there should be violation of judgment, decree, direction or order and such disobedience should be wilful and intentional. In cases of execution, an executing court may not be bothered whether the disobedience was wilful or not, as the Court was bound to execute the decree irrespective of the consequences. In contempt proceedings, however, the Court may not direct execution if the disobedience has been under compelling circumstances and in that situation, no punishment need be awarded. In the said case, criminal contempt proceedings were quashed. Kanwar Singh Saini (supra), makes reference to Daroga Singh versus B.K. Pandey, (2004) 5 SCC 26 and other judgments and has observed:-
In Daroga Singh v. B.K. Pandey [(2004) 5 SCC 26 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1521], the Court rejected the plea of the contemnors that the High Court could not initiate the contempt proceedings in respect of the contempt of the courts subordinate to it placing reliance upon earlier judgments in Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Madras [AIR 1952 SC 149 : 1952 Cri LJ 832] , Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of U.P. [AIR 1954 SC 10 : 1954 Cri LJ 238] and State of M.P. v. Revashankar [AIR 1959 SC 102 : 1959 Cri LJ 251] . The Court further explained the scope of contempt proceedings observing: (Daroga Singh case [(2004) 5 SCC 26 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1521] , SCC pp. 46-47, para 33) :
"33. ... For the survival of the rule of law the orders of the courts have to be obeyed and continue to be obeyed unless overturned, modified or stayed by the appellate or revisional courts. The court does not have any agency of its own to enforce its orders. The executive authority of the State has to come to the aid of the party seeking implementation of the court orders. The might of the State must stand behind the court orders for the survival of the rule of the court in the country. Incidents which undermine the dignity of the courts should be condemned and dealt with swiftly. ... If the judiciary has to perform its duties and functions in a fair and free manner, the dignity and the authority of the courts has to be respected and maintained at all stages and by all concerned failing which the very constitutional scheme and public faith in the judiciary runs the risk of being lost."
37. It would be relevant and important to understand meaning of the term ''wilful disobedience'. The word ''wilful' as defined in dictionaries means Contempt purposely without reference to bona fides, deliberately, intentionally with evil intention, wantonly and causelessly. The Supreme Court in Niaz Mohammad and Others versus State of Haryana and Others, (1994) 6 SCC 332 explaining the expression ''wilful disobedience' had held:-
"9. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act') defines "civil contempt" to mean "wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court ...". Where the contempt consists in failure to comply with or carry out an order of a court made in favour of a party, it is a civil contempt. The person or persons in whose favour such order or direction has been made can move the court for initiating proceeding for contempt against the alleged contemner, with a view to enforce the right flowing from the order or direction in question. But such a proceeding is not like an execution proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure. The party in whose favour an order has been passed, is entitled to the benefit of such order. The court while considering the issue as to whether the alleged contemner should be punished for not having complied with and carried out the direction of the court, has to take into consideration all facts and circumstances of a particular case. That is why the framers of the Act while defining civil contempt, have said that it must be wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court. Before a contemner is punished for non-compliance of the direction of a court, the court must not only be satisfied about the disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction or writ but should also be satisfied that such disobedience was wilful and intentional. The civil court while executing a decree against the judgment-debtor is not concerned and bothered whether the disobedience to any judgment, or decree was wilful. Once a decree has been passed it is the duty of the court to execute the decree whatever may be consequence thereof. But while examining the grievance of the person who has invoked the jurisdiction of the court to initiate the proceeding for contempt for disobedience of its order, before any such contemner is held guilty and punished, the court has to record a finding that such disobedience was wilful and intentional. If from the circumstances of a particular case, brought to the notice of the court, the court is satisfied that although there has been a disobedience but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the contemner to comply with the order, the court may not punish the alleged contemner."
38. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union versus Dharam Godha and Others, (2003) 11 SCC 1, the expression 'wilful disobedience' in the context of Section 2(b) of the Act was read to mean an act or omission done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent to do something, which the law forbids or with the specific intention to fail to do something which the law requires to be done. Wilfulness signifies deliberate action done with evil intent and bad motive and purpose. It should not be an act, which requires and is dependent upon, either wholly or partly, any act or omission by a third party for compliance.
39. In Ram Kishan versus Tarun Bajaj and Others, (2014) 16 SCC 204, it was observed as under:-
"12. Thus, in order to punish a contemnor, it has to be established that disobedience of the order is "wilful". The word "wilful" introduces a mental element and hence, requires looking into the mind of a person/contemnor by gauging his actions, which is an indication of one's state of mind. "Wilful" means knowingly intentional, conscious, calculated and deliberate with full knowledge of consequences flowing therefrom. It excludes casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability. Wilful acts does not encompass involuntarily or negligent actions. The act has to be done with a "bad purpose or without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or perversely". Wilful act is to be distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It does not include any act done negligently or involuntarily. The deliberate conduct of a person means that he knows what he is doing and intends to do the same. Therefore, there has to be a calculated action with evil motive on his part. Even if there is a disobedience of an order, but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the contemnor to comply with the order, the contemnor cannot be punished. "Committal or sequestration will not be ordered unless contempt involves a degree of default or misconduct." (Vide S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman [S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591] , Rakapalli Raja Ram Gopala Rao v. Naragani Govinda Sehararao [Rakapalli Raja Ram Gopala Rao v. NaraganiGovindaSehararao, (1989) 4 SCC 255 : AIR 1989 SC 2185] , Niaz Mohammad v. State of Haryana [Niaz Mohammad v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 332 : AIR 1995 SC 308] , Chordia Automobiles v. S. Moosa [Chordia Automobiles v. S. Moosa, (2000) 3 SCC 282] , Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha [Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha, (2003) 11 SCC 1] , State of Orissa v. Mohd. Illiyas [State of Orissa v. Mohd. Illiyas, (2006) 1 SCC 275 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 122 : AIR 2006 SC 258] and Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. CCE [Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. CCE, (2013) 9 SCC 753] .)"
This decision also holds as under:-
"11. The contempt jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts power to punish an offender for his wilful disobedience/contumacious conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law, for the reason that respect and authority commanded by the courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen that his rights shall be protected and the entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble down if the respect of the judiciary is undermined. Undoubtedly, the contempt jurisdiction is a powerful weapon in the hands of the courts of law but that by itself operates as a string of caution and unless, thus, otherwise satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, it would neither be fair nor reasonable for the law courts to exercise jurisdiction under the Act. The proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, and therefore, standard of proof required in these proceedings is beyond all reasonable doubt. It would rather be hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on the authorities in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction on mere probabilities. (Vide V.G. Nigam v. Kedar Nath Gupta [V.G. Nigam v. KedarNath Gupta, (1992) 4 SCC 697 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 202 : (1993) 23 ATC 400], Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati [Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati, (2001) 7 SCC 530 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1196] , Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh [Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh, (2002) 4 SCC 21] , Bank of Baroda v. Sadruddin Hasan Daya [Bank of Baroda v. Sadruddin Hasan Daya, (2004) 1 SCC 360] , Sahdeo v. State of U.P. [Sahdeo v. State of U.P., (2010) 3 SCC 705 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 451] and National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Tuncay Alankus [National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Tuncay Alankus, (2013) 9 SCC 600 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 481 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 172] .)"
40. Thus, in case of a reasonable doubt, it is not fair and reasonable for the Courts to exercise jurisdiction under the Act for the proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and the standard of proof required in these proceedings is beyond all reasonable doubt and not mere probabilities. Thus, in cases where two interpretations of an order are possible and if the action is not contumacious, contempt proceedings are not maintainable and for this purpose the order must be read in entirety. It may also be noted that there is a difference between "standard of proof" and "manner of proof" in contempt proceedings. Contempt proceedings are sui generis in the sense that strict law of evidence and Code of Criminal Procedure are not applicable. However, the procedure adopted in the contempt proceedings must be fair and just.
41. In compliance of the judgment and order of this Court dated 17.09.2004 as well as the undertaking given by the authorities before the Court, the entire matter has been reconsidered and decided by the opposite parties and passed an order dated 08.03.2017 by which twenty five candidates out of twenty seven were reinstated; the arrears in favour of twenty five candidates have also been paid; the arrears of seven candidates selected for Special B.T.C. Training - prior to judgment dated 17.09.2004 - have also been paid for their working period by the Basic Shiksha Adhikari on 17.08.2017; the current salary of the aforesaid twenty five candidates, as untrained grade, are being paid; the arrears of two dead persons namely Surendra Nath Mishra and Sri Mayaram Verma have been received by their legal heirs and as per the G.O. dated 14.01.2004 and letter of Director S.C.E.R.T. dated 24.07.2004, 24.08.2004 as well as G.O. dated 28.01.2005, Principal D.I.E.T. Bahraich has been requested to provide required training to all the twenty five reinstated teachers, so that they may get trained grade salary.
42. In view of the above discussions, it is clear that the opposite parties have complied with the directions issued by the Courts and if the contempt petitioners have found that the order is not in conformity with the directions passed by this court, they may avail of the opportunity to seek judicial review of the order passed by the authorities. The order passed by the authorities is on the basis of the directions issued by the Court. There arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The order passed by the authorities concerned may be wrong or may not be in conformity with the direction, that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity in judicial review but that cannot be considered to be a willful violation of the order.
43. It is stated and observed in several cases that the contempt is between the Court and the contemnor and the aggrieved party cannot insist that the Court should exercise such jurisdiction. The discretion is exercised by the Court for maintenance of Court's dignity and majesty of law. However, it would not be entirely correct to state that punishment under the contempt jurisdiction is granted to uphold the dignity of the Court. Contempt jurisdiction is invoked and punishment is imposed to uphold the authority of Court to punish the contemnor and to act as a deterrent to others. This deterrent is motivated in the interest of the public in order to prevent future incidents of wilful disregard and disobedience of the Court orders by a party. Further, contempt jurisdiction may even invoke belated compliance, which is in public interest and when such compliance is made, the contemnor may seek reduction or discharge of the sentence in view of subsequent conduct to purge the contempt by complying with the order. Contempt jurisdiction is invoked when breaches are of the highest level of culpability in the sense that they are wilful. Further, persistence and continuous damage and disobedience could in a given case reflect no remorse from the person against whom action is taken.
44. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I do not find any merit in the present contempt petitions.
The contempt petitions are accordingly dismissed.
Order Date : 26th September, 2019 VNP/-
[Chandra Dhari Singh, J]