JUDGMENT Palok Basu, J.
1. Navin Chandra Pandey claimant has filed this appeal against the judgment and order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kanpur dated 19.10.83 whereby the Tribunal allowed Rs. 22,000 as compensation for the accident which took place on 28.10.1979, at about 11.45 a.m. in which Adesh Kumari alias Kunti Devi aged about 22 years, claimant's wife and his daughter Rinki aged about two months lost their lives. The Tribunal has, however, granted a sum of Rs. 10,000 further, which was to be indemnified by the insurance company, namely, the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. with which the vehicle in question, i.e., a bus bearing registration No. UPV 4229 was insured.
2. In short, the appellant says that he is entitled to much higher amount of compensation than what has been awarded by the Tribunal.
3. Mr. S.D.N. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant has been heard at substantial length and Mr. Rajeev Chaddha appearing for the insurance company has also been heard at substantial length. The entire record has been placed by the learned counsel for the parties.
4. No other private party impleaded in this appeal has put in appearance through any counsel.
5. The arguments of Mr. Singh on behalf of the appellant are on two folds, first, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of fixed liability compensation payable by the insurance company under Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the old Act') and second, since the appeal is continuation of the proceedings of the trial, appellant is entitled to the benefit of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the new Act'). Mr. Rajeev Chaddha, however, countered both these arguments and has said that by no proposition of law Section 92-A of the old Act much less Section 140 of the new Act is attracted to the facts of the case because admittedly, the accident had taken place on 28.10.1979, when neither aforesaid Section 92-A of the old Act nor also Section 140 of the new Act were available in the Act and, therefore, the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is more than sufficient compensation as may have been awardable for the aforesaid accident. Reliance has been placed by Mr. S.D.N. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant on the decision of the learned single Judge reported in Kamta Prasad v. Jaggan & Co. 1996 ACJ 57 (Allahabad).
6. Mr. Chaddha has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Singh v. Cinta Devi 1996 ACJ 730 (SC) and on the strength of the observations argued that the principles behind Section 6 of General Clauses Act should be applied in this case and, therefore, the Tribunal rightly applied only the law as was available on the date of the accident and rightly did not apply Section 92-A of the old Act to the facts of the case and for that reason, the said judgment should be upheld and there is no question of applying Section 140 of the new Act.
7. The question that, therefore, survives in this appeal is as to whether Section 92-A of the old Act or section 140 of the new Act is applicable on the facts of the case or not and whether the fixed minimum liability to pay compensation as provided in either of these two sections binds the respondent.
8. It may be mentioned here that insofar as the provision contained in section 6 of the General Clauses Act is concerned, it is attracted to only repealing enactments. While it is true that by the new Act which was enforced with effect from 1.7.1989, the old Act stood repealed, the controversy may, therefore, arise as to whether Section 140 of the new Act will apply to the facts of the case or not. Admittedly, the Tribunal's judgment is dated 19.10.1983. The appeal was consequently filed by appellant in this court on 26.2.84, as is evident from the memorandum of appeal filed in this court. Consequently, the appellant filed the appeal under the old Act and the Tribunal decided the claim petition under the old Act. It is only the time consumed in this court for deciding the appeal that has permitted the counsel to try to invoke Section 140 of the new Act also. If the arrears of cases in this court may not have stood in the way the appeal of the appellant may have been decided much earlier than the new Act came into vogue. No party can suffer for the fault of the court. While it was the duty of this court to decide the appeal as expeditiously as possible in accordance with law, its delayed decision cannot empower the contending parties to rely upon the provisions of the new Act in order to inflate the less compensation amount which may be available after the amended provisions under the old Act are attracted to the facts of the case. No other authority has been cited which may empower the repealed enactment to be replaced by the provisions of the new Act. In this connection, it may be mentioned that Ramesh Singh's case 1996 ACJ 730 (SC), would go against the respondent's counsel rather than support him. Provisions of the old Act were held to be applied to the appeal even though filed after coming into force of the new Act because it has been ultimately held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in this case that the deposit of Rs. 25,000 which was made mandatory in the new Act was not necessary under the old Act and, therefore, even after the appeal was filed under the new Act, insistence for the said deposit was misplaced. Coming to the next surviving question as to whether Section 92-A of the old Act will be attracted to the facts of the case or not, it may be pointed out that Chapter VII-A was added to the old Act by Act No. 47 of 1982 which came into force w.e.f. 1.10.1982. That being so, these provisions were in existence much prior to the date of the judgment of the Tribunal in the instant case which is dated 19.10.1983. Chapter VII-A consists of five sections which are numbered as Sections 92-A to 92-E. For dealing with the point in controversy, provisions of Section 92-E may be relevant. It says that the provision of Chapter VII-A shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of the old Act or of any other law for the time being in force. This overriding effect puts an end to the argument advanced by Mr. Chaddha. The Tribunal was bound to arm itself with the provisions contained in Chapter VII-A. It has overriding effect on any other law for the time being in force as also on any other provision of the old Act. Apart from this, there is already amendment in Section 95 of the old Act inasmuch as Clause (ii) of Sub-clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 95 was inserted by aforesaid Act No. 47 of 1982 which in substance permits awarding of Rs. 15,000 as fixed liability in case of an accidental death for each passenger. It may be pointed out that in Kamta Prasad's cast 1996 ACJ 57 (Allahabad), the learned single Judge upheld the applicability of Section 92-A of the old Act and did not bring in Section 140 of the new Act for granting relief to the appellant in that case. Mr. Chaddha has also relied upon a case of Division Bench of this court in Ram Mani Gupta v. Mohammad Ibrahim 1985 ACJ 476 (Allahabad), and has said that since the said decision held that Section 92-A of the old Act could not be applicable on an accident which took place on 2.2.1977, this court should follow the said dictum. It may be pointed out that neither Section 92-E of the old Act nor Section 6 of the General Clauses Act was referred to in the aforesaid judgment because it does not appear to have been placed before the said Division Bench. The judgment in the said case was pronounced by the Tribunal on 25.4.1980, that is, prior to the coming into force of the aforesaid Act No. 47 of 1982. Further while making reference to the provisions of Section 92-A of the old Act, the Division Bench was not informed of the overriding effect specially formulated by Section 92-E which has not been noticed because apparently, it was not placed before the Bench. Hon'ble S.R. Singh, J., therefore, in the case of Kamta Prasad (supra), had made a reference to the said Division Bench's decision but did not discuss any further and went on to hold that Kamta Prasad case was covered by the amended provisions under Section 92-A of the old Act. We have no hesitation, therefore, to uphold the learned single Judge's view that even though the accident had occurred before Act No. 47 of 1982 came into vogue, the provisions of Section 92-A of the old Act were attracted to the facts of this case.
9. In view of the aforesaid discussions in the instant case also, provision of Section 92-A of the old Act as also amended provision contained in Section 95 of the old Act were applicable and the appellant was entitled to claim compensation of Rs. 15,000 each for the two deaths, i.e., for his wife and for his daughter. This minimum liability ought to have been decreed by the Tribunal as compensation payable to the appellant. This has not been done. This court has to set the judgment right.
10. The appeal, consequently, succeeds and is allowed in part. Rs. 15,000 for the death of Kunti Devi and Rs. 15,000 for the death of the child Rinki are awarded to be paid to the appellant by the insurance company. The deposit shall be made within 3 months from today in the Tribunal which may be withdrawn by the appellant.
11. The other awards of the Tribunal regarding injury of Navin Chandra Pandey are hereby upheld. If the amount has not been deposited, it shall also be deposited within 3 months from today as directed earlier with regard to other amount of compensation. Parties will bear their own costs.