JUDGMENT M.L. Bhat, J.
1. This appeal is filed by the insurance company against the judgment of the court below exercising the powers of Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act.
2. It appears that Tribunal had dismissed the claim petition qua the appellant and decreed the claim of the claimants against the owner of the vehicle on the ground that driver of the vehicle who was driving the vehicle at the time of accident did not have a valid licence for driving. The owner of the vehicle, thereafter, seems to have filed a review petition before the Tribunal and the Tribunal, while deciding the review petition and granting the same, held that driver had a valid licence at the time of the accident, therefore, appellant was liable to pay the compensation and not the owner.
3. It appeals that in the written statement the owner had given the driving licence number of the driver as 2481/80 which was valid up to 14.1.1991. In the review petition it was stated that the number of the driving licence was 21181/80 and it was valid up to 14.7.1991. The occurrence had taken place after 14.1.1991 and before 14.7.1991. The Tribunal's findings on the review petition are said to be without jurisdiction, bad and unwarranted. On facts also it is stated that Tribunal could not rewrite the judgment by fastening the liability on the insurance company when in the first instance the liability was fastened on the owner of the vehicle.
4. Two points are urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. In the first place it is stated that Tribunal had no power to review its own judgment. In the second place it is stated that Tribunal could not rewrite the judgment and alter the liability of the owner by exonerating him and fastening the same on the appellant when the owner himself had stated in the written statement that driver of the vehicle was driving with a licence which had already expired on 14.1.1991.
5. The appeal is contested by the claimants as also by the owner of the vehicle who are respondents in this appeal. It was contended on behalf of the claimants also that liability should be fastened on the insurance company and the order of review was correct. Owner obviously would be benefited if liability is fastened on the insurance company. Therefore, the owner of the vehicle and the claimants seem to have made a common cause and prayed that order of review be maintained. It was contended by the learned counsel for the claimants that Tribunal had the power of the civil court, therefore, it could review its own order.
6. Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides procedure and powers of the Claims Tribunal. This section reads as under:
169. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals.-(1) In holding any inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit.
(2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).' (3) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the Claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of any matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry.
7. The procedure to be adopted by the Claims Tribunal for an inquiry under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act is contained in Section 169 or in the Rules which are made in this behalf. Rule 21 of the Rules framed by the Uttar Pradesh Government applies certain provisions of Civil Procedure Code to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and for certain purposes Claims Tribunal is to be deemed as a civil court. It is deemed civil court for purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Criminal Procedure Code.
8. It is contended by the learned counsel for the claimants that Tribunal is a civil court for all practical purposes and it can resort to provisions of Civil Procedure Code which are not inconsistent with the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act. He has referred various authorities in support of his contention, few of the said authorities are referred hereunder.
9. In Narinder Kaur v. State of Himachal Pradesh 1983 ACJ 34 (HP), provisions of Order 22 of Civil Procedure Code were applied by the Accidents Claims Tribunal to the proceedings pending before it. The provision of the Civil Procedure Code contained in Order 22 applies to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal despite the fact that Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act or rule 21 framed under the Act does not make any mention about Order 22. In U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Geeta Devi 1983 ACJ 360 (Allahabad), a Division Bench of this court had held that no procedure is laid down by the Motor Vehicles Act with regard to the hearing of the appeals by the High Court. It was held that appeal filed under Section 110D will be dealt with in the same manner as if it was under Section 96 of Civil Procedure Code and appellate court has power to reconstruct the record of the appeal under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code if the record is destroyed by fire. This authority is not, however, directly on the point involved in this appeal. With regard to the procedure which is to be followed by the appellate court against the decree and the award of the Accidents Claims Tribunal, High Court can deal with the said appeal as if it was filed under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, because no procedure is given in the Motor Vehicles Act about the regulation and hearing of the appeals before the High Court, therefore, the High Court has to fall back on Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code and treat the appeal to have been filed under the said section. In the present case I am concerned about the powers of the Accidents Claims Tribunal itself with regard to its jurisdiction to invoke powers of review. In State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi 1979 ACJ 205 (SC), it was held that provisions of Order 33, Civil Procedure Code are applicable to the auto accident claims by indigent persons before the Claims Tribunal though in the Act or the Rules framed under the Act there is no mention of this provision being applicable to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. In Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd. v. Srinivasa Roadways, Madurai 1979 ACJ 397 (Madras), it was held that Section 152 of the Civil Procedure Code would apply to the Accidents Claims Tribunal for correcting the award which suffers from accidental errors. In Shardaben v. M.I. Pandya 1971 ACJ 222 (Gujarat), it has been held that Accidents Claims Tribunal is for all intents and purposes a civil court, therefore, it will follow the procedure as laid down in the Civil Procedure Code. In Shanti Devi v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways 1971 ACJ 247 (P&H), it was held that Accidents Claims Tribunal for all intents and purposes discharges the same functions and duties, and in the same manner, as a court of law. The proceedings before the Claims Tribunal are not in the nature of arbitration proceedings. On the other hand, they closely resemble the proceedings in a civil court. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Minguel Lourenco Correia 1986 ACJ 646 (Bombay), it was held that Claims Tribunal has power to review its own order and power to review was held to be not inconsistent with the Act or Rules framed thereunder. Rule 6 of the Rules framed by Goa, Daman and Diu vested in the Claims Tribunal all powers of a civil court which are not inconsistent with the Motor Vehicles Act or the Rules framed thereunder. In Anand Kumar Jain v. Union of India 1986 ACJ 774 (SC), Order 6, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code was held to be applicable to the proceedings before the Accidents Claims Tribunal. In Mansingh Sajjusingh v. Sudhir Ganpatrao Girdhari 1986 ACJ 828 (Bombay), Order 38, Rule 5 of Civil Procedure Code was held to be applicable to the proceedings before the Accidents Claims Tribunal if it had sufficient material before it to justify passing of such an order.
10. From the discussions of the authorities referred to above, it appears that the Accidents Claims Tribunal has all the attributes and trappings of a civil court. The provisions of Section 169 and rule 21 of the Rules framed by Uttar Pradesh Government apply limited provisions of Civil Procedure Code to the Accidents Claims Tribunal but Accidents Claims Tribunal having the trappings and attributes of a civil court can resort to other provisions of the Civil Procedure Code also if the said provisions are not inconsistent with the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act and with the policy underlying the creation of Accidents Claims Tribunal. The Claims Tribunals are created to decide cases with regard to payment of compensation expeditiously with a view to render timely help to the dependants of the deceased who was a breadwinner of such dependants. A creation of the Accidents Claims Tribunal is a step towards achieving the goal of social justice. The Supreme Court has in State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi 1979 ACJ 205 (C), observed that access to such a court which determines compensation is an aspect of social justice and the State has no rational litigation policy if it forgets this fundamental. A quotation from Australian Law Reforms Commission which was projected by Cappelletti was reproduced by the Supreme Court in its judgment. The quotation reads as under:
The right of effective access to justice has emerged with the new social rights. Indeed, it is of paramount importance among these new rights since, clearly, the enjoyment of traditional as well as new social rights presupposes mechanisms for their effective protection. Such protection, moreover, is best assured by a workable remedy within the framework of the judicial system. Effective access to justice can thus be seen as the most basic requirement-the most 'basic human right'-of a system which purports to guarantee legal right.
11. In the light of the aforesaid discussion it is to be seen whether Accidents Claims Tribunal is vested with the powers to review its order or not. Having all the attributes and trappings of a civil court it is possible to say that Accidents Claims Tribunal in order to achieve the object for which it is set up will be deemed to have a power to review its own orders if such orders are found to contain errors which are fundamental and destructive of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. It can correct accidental errors in its judgment with regard to calculation of the amount and with regard to any mistake in the multiplier, if the same is not consistent with its judgment. However, it cannot rewrite a judgment after it has fastened the liability either on the owner or the insurance company with regard to the payment of compensation. It cannot change basis of the judgment but it can make a judgment effective by correcting fundamental errors which are apparent on the face of the record for which it has not to travel beyond the record. If for correction of its errors some additional material is required in order to enable it to rewrite its judgment, it will not be permissible for the Tribunal to do that while exercising the powers of review. The power given to review a judgment is a very limited power. It does not extend to sitting in appeal on its own judgment by the Accidents Claims Tribunal nor it permits to rewrite a judgment on the basis of fresh material which was not before the Tribunal when it decided the matter. The Tribunal having the trappings and attributes of a civil court will definitely be entitled to exercise the power of review within the limit of principles which are laid down in the aforesaid authorities. Therefore, the objection of the learned counsel for the appellant that Accidents Claims Tribunal has no power to review its own judgment on any ground whatsoever does not appear to be correct. The objection is accordingly overruled in the light of the discussions made hereinabove.
12. The second limb of the argument that the Tribunal after having found owner of the vehicle liable for compensation cannot fasten the liability on the appellant insurance company by, rewriting the judgment, cannot be said to be without force.
13. It appears that in the written statement the owner had mentioned that the driver had no licence on the date the accident took place. The licence of the driver as stated by the owner in his written statement is said to have expired on 14.1.1991. If this plea is sought to be changed and Tribunal is asked to give a fresh finding on the photostat copy of the licence and if the Tribunal has accepted such plea it has fallen in an error as it has rewritten the judgment on the basis of the evidence which was not before it when it first decided the case. It allowed the fresh evidence to be led and shifted the liability of the owner on the insurance company. The exercise of this power appears to be fundamentally wrong and Claims Tribunal could not do it because the owner had categorically stated that the driver's licence had expired on 14.1.1991. It could not allow the owner to take a different stand and fall in line with the owner to uphold that stand. The order passed by the Tribunal on the review application is, therefore, legally bad and inconsistent with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is inconsistent with the provisions of Civil Procedure Code also. After deciding the matter it has allowed a plea which was neither before it during the proceedings nor at the time of hearing. If the owner had said something categorically he could not change it without amending the written statement. The Tribunal could not allow the review petition and shift the liability on the appellant by accepting the review application of the owner. The Tribunal has, therefore, fallen in a great error by passing an order on a review petition. The order dated 5th May, 1992, is accordingly held to be erroneous, incorrect and bad in law.
14. As a result of the aforesaid discussions order dated 5th May, 1992, is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The original order of the Tribunal fastening the liability on the owner to pay the compensation to the claimants need not be changed. However, there will be no order as to costs.