JUDGMENT A. K. Yog, J.
1. Smt. Naseem Begum and others have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and seek to challenge the Judgment and order dated 19.8.1999 passed by the IX Additional District Judge. Bareilly/ respondent No. 1 whereby the revisional court allowed the plaintiff's appeal under Section 25. Provincial Small Causes Court Act and set aside the judgment and order dated 14.9.1993 as a consequence of which the Judge Small Causes Court had dismissed the suit for eviction of the defendant-tenant (present petitioner).
2. The question raised is whether the notice determining tenancy by giving thirty days time but giving 15 days to deposit arrear and rent is valid or not.
3. In view of the decisions in Chhotey Lal v. Gajadhar Prasad, 1954 AWC 166, rendered by a Division Bench consisting of Malik, C.J. and D. N. Roy. J., a notice cannot be said to be bad in law.
4. Learned counsel has referred to the decisions in 1982 ARC 185 and 1982 UPRC 241 (paragraph 11). Both these decisions are rendered by a single Judge (A. N. Verma. J.). In none of these decisions. Division Bench case of Chhotey Lal (supra) has been taken note of.
5. Language of Section 20 (2) (a) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. is the same and more or less Identical to the provision of law considered by Division Bench in the case of Chhotey Lal (supra),
6. Sri Rajesh Tandon, learned counsel for the petitioner, then referred to Abdul Jalil v. Haji Abdul Jalil, AJR 1974 All 402. In the said case. Bench was considering validity of a notice which did not give notice of thirty days for determining tenancy. In the instant case, 'notice' fulfils the said requirements of thirty days. However, the noticee (petitioner) was required to pay rent and arrears within fifteen days. As interpreted in the case of Chhotey Lal (supra), the tenant had time of one month to pay arrears as suit was not filed before expiry of one month and hence the notice cannot be said to be bad. The learned counsel for the petitioner failed to show error manifestly apparent on the face of the record warranting interference with the findings of fact.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has filed a supplementary affidavit today (10.9.1999). In paragraphs 3. 5 and 7 of the supplementary affidavit, an attempt is being made to allege that the plea regarding the provisions of Section 20 (4) of "the Act 13 of 1972 was urged and pressed but still the same does not find place in the Judgment. Now averments have been made through this supplementary affidavit, the possibility of the same being manipulated by afterthought cannot be ruled out. However, as held by the Supreme Court and this Court, any plea which has been urged, pressed and raised before the Court below but does not find mention in its judgment, the person aggrieved should approach that very Court before whom it was argued, because it is that very Court which is in the best position to ascertain whether the plea was raised before it or not. In view of the above observations, the writ petition is dismissed.
8. The petitioner may approach the respondent No. 1 and raise her grievance of non-mentioning of her averments, if any, as indicated above. It goes without saying that the concerned authority shall decide the same expeditiously in accordance with law.
9. It will not be out of place to mention that in case the Court below, under some mis-apprehension or inadvertently, failed to deal with a point, it must set right the error forthwith. If a party on the other hand is making wrong averments accusing the Court of not dealing with certain points, which were not urged, it will be appropriate to take action against such litigants.