IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION No. 516 of 2012 For Approval and Signature:
HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI =================================================
1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?
Whether this case involves a substantial question of law
4 as to the interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ?
5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
================================================= NARESHBHAI LALJIBHAI TANK & 1 - Petitioner(s) Versus CHHAGANBHAI RANCHHODBHAI THRO POA KALPESH BABUBHAI SHAH & 2 - Respondent(s) ================================================= Appearance :
MR MEHUL S SHAH with MR SURESH M SHAH for Petitioner(s) : 1 - 2. NOTICE SERVED BY DS for Respondent(s) : 1 - 2.
MR MAULIK G NANAVATI for Respondent(s) : 3, ================================================= CORAM : HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI Date : 26/06/2012 CAV JUDGMENT
1. The petitioners (original plaintiffs) preferred Civil Suit No.400 of 2006 against heirs of Ranchhodbhai Parmar through the power of attorney for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 26.11.1996 executed by him. Respondents No. 4 and 5, who purchased the suit land subsequent to the suit agreement to sell also, were impleaded as party respondents.
The respondents filed purshis Exh.102 stating therein that original defendant Nos.1 and 3 had died pending the suit on 24.9.2010 and 30.9.2009 respectively. It was also declared that the suit is abated qua those respondents. The petitioner herein preferred an application Exh.108 for joining the heirs of the deceased defendants on the ground that power of attorney holder respondents No.1 to 3 gave no information about the demise of original defendants No.1 and 3. The Court after hearing the parties rejected the application and declared the suit to have been abated essentially on the ground that there was no prayer for setting aside abatement or condonation of delay. The impugned order dated 26.12.2011 is challenged in the present petition.
2. Heard learned advocate Mr. S.M.Shah for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr.Maulik Nanavati for the respondent.
3. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties, it would be desirable to refer to the judgments of the High Court and the Supreme Court sought to be relied upon.
In the case of K.Rudrappa vs. Shivappa reported in AIR 2004 SC 4346 in a matter before the Supreme Court in a suit for allotment of land by the Government, there was death of original applicant. The petitioner there was not aware of the pendency of the appeal and came to know about the same when he received the communication from the advocate engaged by his father. When application was rejected on the ground that no prayer of setting aside the abatement of appeal was made, the Supreme Court held it to be liable to set aside and further held that technical objection should not come in the way of doing substantive justice.
In case of P.P.K.Gopalan Nambiar vs. P.P.K.Balakrishnan Nambiar and others reported in 1995 Supp(2) SCC 664, in a partition decree appeal was preferred and some of the respondents, since had expired, their legal representatives were not brought on record.
However, before the death, all of them had sold the respective shares by registered deeds in favour of other respondents and their respective interest devolved by transfer on the respondents, who were already on record. Therefore, the Court held that in a partition decree, there was no need to bring legal representatives of the deceased on record or to transpose them as legal representatives.
3. Respondents herein have sought to rely upon the case of Jatav Panchayat Committee, Etawah vs. Viitha Additional District, Etawah reported in 2000 AIR (All) 253. The question before Allahabad High Court was the requirement of filing an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Article 120 of the Limitation Act provides that unless application of substitution is made within 90 days from the date of death, the suit abates and such abatement can be set aside within 60 days after the expiry of 90 days. Therefore, the application made after 90 days from the date of death is an application for substitution upon setting aside the abatement. The prayer for abatement, if made within the period of limitation, the substitution would be made only after setting aside the abatement. However, it held that the said application cannot be maintained without the prayer for setting aside the abatement and, if such an application for setting aside the abatement is made after the expiry of 150 days, in that event application under Section 5 would be necessary, in as much as, in the said case, the period of limitation for setting aside the abatement would also expire after the expiry of 150 days from the date of death, necessitating explanation of the delay.
In the said case also, the deceased was a tenant in respect of the property along with the opposite party No.2 and there was no pleading that there was splitting up for tenancy and the tenancy was stated to be joint. Joint interest was existing in the opposite party No.2 being one of the heirs and there being no conflict of interest between the opposite party No.2 and the heirs of the deceased, it was held that there was no question of abatement.
High Court of Karnataka, in the case of Shamavathi, Hindu w/o Vishwanath Rai vs. Appi S. Pergade w/o late Shantharama Pergade, Hindu reported in 2009 LawSuit (Kar) 536, also was dealing with the similar issue where it had already taken the similar view and stated that if the petitioners on abatement of the suit and on expiry of the period of limitation, seeks to implead the heirs, he has to make an application for condonation of delay in filing the application for setting aside the abatement, where he needs to explain the delay from the date of death till the date of filing of the application for condonation of delay and it is for the trial Court to satisfy itself of the cause of the petitioner's failure to apply for the impleadment of the legal representative of the deceased and for setting aside the abatement within the time prescribed. It also referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Union of India vs. Ram Charan reported in 1964 A.I.R.(SC) 215, paragraph 9 of which is reproduced hereunder:-
“9. It is true, as contended, that it is no duty of the appellant to make regular enquiries from time to time about the health or existence of the opposite party, but it does not mean that the mere fact of the appellant's coming to know of the respondent's death belatedly will, by itself, justify his application for setting aside the abatement. That is not the law. Rule 9 of Order XXII of the Code requires and plaintiff to prove that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from continuing the suit. The mere allegation about his not coming to know of the death of the opposite party is not sufficient. He had to state reasons which, according to him, led to his not knowing of the death of the defendant within reasonable time and to establish those reasons to the satisfaction of the Court, specially when the correctness of those reasons is challenged by the legal representatives of the deceased who have secured a valuable right on the abatement of the suit.”
4. In light of the decisions relied upon by the parties, it can be stated that for the reasons to be mentioned hereinafter, this order impugned as in the present circumstances requires no interference. The suit for specific performance has been preferred in the present case by the plaintiff. However, defendant No.3 passed away. Purshis in that respect has been placed before the Court. Therefore, an application was moved by the plaintiff petitioner to implead his heirs as the party defendants.
5. The trial Court noted the fact that the death of defendant No.3 was on 30.8.2009 and disclosure was made by the defendant before this Court on 16.8.2010 vide Exh.79 which was not within 90 days. Trial Court rightly held that the heirs ought to have been brought on record otherwise the suit would stand abated automatically on expiry of statutory period. It also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dhrundhar Pradadsingh vs. Jayprakash University reported in AIR 2001 SC 2552 that the suit would automatically get abated. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Union of India vs. Ramcharan (supra) that the limitation of 90 days start running from the date of death and not from the date of knowledge of the death.
6. On having considered these judgments, the Court noted that no application has been moved by the plaintiff for setting aside the abatement, as the application tendered by the plaintiff was on 16.3.2011 admittedly beyond the period of 90 days. Even if one considers the application from the date of disclosure of these aspects by the heirs, then also, the period of 90 days would expire on 17.11.2010. Therefore, the Court was right in holding that the suit would abate qua deceased defendant and neither there is application for setting aside such abatement nor for condoning the delay. Therefore, it did not allow the heirs to be impleaded.
7. There does not appear to be any error as such in trial Court insisting for particular application for setting aside the abatement accompanied by the application for condoning the delay.
8. As can be noted from all the judgments relied upon by both the sides, it is necessary for the party to move such an application for abatement along with the application for condonation of delay.
9. Learned advocate Mr. Nanavati at this stage has fairly submitted that he would have no objection, if still on application is made by the plaintiff before the trial Court, which can be decided on its own merit. It needs to be noted that in the decision of K. Rudrappa vs. Shivappa(supra), the Supreme Court, of course, was not happy with the hyper- technical approach of the District Court in rejecting the application. It requires to be noted from the facts of that case that separate application was already made along with application for condonation of delay and there was sufficiency of the case that the applicant was unaware of the death of the concerned person and, therefore, the Apex Court held that such technical objection should not come in the way of doing full and complete justice between the parties, whereas, in the instant case, neither an application for setting aside the abatement is made nor for condonation of delay other side have an opportunity to contest the same and hence it is the Court to decide the application as is required under the law.
10. Only on considering substantive cause involved and as fairness is shown by the respondent's side order impugned is directed to be revisited by this order. Request was made to this Court to allow the application by setting aside the abatement rather than relegating the parties to the trial Court once again. However, this Court is of the opinion that it is not a mere empty formality and as other side is also required to be given an opportunity to participate, contesting such application and, as procedural law requires certain things to be done in a particular manner, there are no supervening circumstances for this Court to overreach the Court process prescribed under the law and accede to the request of doing away with the requirement of preferring such an application.
11. Resultantly, this petition is partly allowed in the above circumstances. The petitioner herein is permitted to move once again the trial Court within two weeks of receipt of this order by filing an appropriate application for setting aside the abatement along with an application for condonation of delay for impleadment of heris consequently and the trial Court shall decide the same in accordance with law without being influence by its earlier order.
12. With this the petition stands disposed of accordingly.
(Ms. Sonia Gokani, J.) sudhir /pt*