JUDGMENT
1. The appeal is taken up and summarily disposed of. The appellant-writ petitioners were issued letters of ad-hoc appointment but they filed the writ for the purpose of continuing to work. The term of appointment on the ad-hoc basis ran out on 17th February, 2004; when they were stopped from discharging their duty, they came to Court.
2. We are in respectful agreement with the order passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarun Agarwal dated 12th April, 2004 where by his Lordship has held that the writ petitioners were not entitled to any relief and they had no right to hold their respective posts
3. We assume for the purposes of this appeal, though the Hon'ble Judge has held otherwise in the court below, that he posts were in the nature of substantive permanent vacancies. However, it is the admitted position that though the selection committee after advertisement had recommended appointments with a probationary period, the appointing authority chose quite a different procedure and issued ad-hoc letters of appointments to all the writ petitioners.
4. On behalf of the appellants, it has been contended that on the facts of this case, the appointments granted must be treated by the Court as permanent appointments to substantive posts; mere running out of the period of ad-hoc appointment would not entitle the Court to allow the writ petitioners' services to be terminated summarily.
5. On the part of the respondents, the impugned judgment was supported on the basis that if an ad-hoc appointment comes to an end with the running out of the period of the granted tenure, the employee would not necessarily have the right to continue in the post.
6. In our opinion, in these service matters, the facts and circumstances of each case have to be looked at with regard to the special attending details. On that basis the Court has come to a conclusion whether the intention of the appointing authority was to treat the selection process as continuing regularly as a regular sequence after the advertisement and the selection committee's report. The Court has to consider alternatively, whether the appointing authority did not choose to centime the process of selection on a regular basis or on the basis of the recommendations made by the selection committee and clause instead, to adopt a procedure which cannot be called the culmination of the regular selection process. Similarly, the point of view of the employee has also got to be judged. If the employee has undergone a fully regular selection process and at the end thereof has been issued a regular letter of selection with the usual probationary period, then and in that event the employee would be entitled to harbour legitimate expectation of regularisation after the probationary period has been properly served out.
7. In the instant case, as the Hon'ble single Judge has also noted, the grant of ad-hoc appointment expressly described as such made a word of difference. The, appointing authority was not minded to grant probationary periods of service to the Class-IV employees; the reason why it did not do so is his own business and the writ Court need not necessarily enquire into that. The appellants on being issued the ad-hoc letters of appointment did not there and then raise an objection that they should have been issued probationary periods and not more ad-hoc appointments for one year. As such they were aware of the tenuous nature of the appointment which was being offered to them and they accepted even such offer. It could not be said that even on the ad-hoc appointments they had the same legitimate expectation of getting permanent job just as if they have been issued. normal letters for probationary service.
8. On this basis we respectfully agree with his Lordships reasoning that the appointment of the writ petitioners was purely temporary and was for a limited period upto 17.2.2004. We also agree with his Lordship's finding. at it was not a case of hire and fire which was found in the case reported at 1986 (3) S.C.C. 156; Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguli and Anr.
9. The Division Bench judgment referred to on behalf of the appellant being the case of Dr. (Kumari) Ranjana Saxena v. Vice Chancellor, Rohilkhand University, Bareilly and Ors. reported at 1980 U.P.L.B.E.C. 225, is distinguishable on this essential factual difference that in that case the writ petitioner had objected in the very beginning as to the offered nature of temporary employment.
10. As such the appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.