JUDGMENT R.K. Agrawal, J.
1. Before deciding the present application for recall of the order dated 14.5.2002, passed by this Court issuing notice to O.P.S. Malik, it is necessary to state the facts giving rise to the application filed for contempt and the proceedings taken by this Court.
2. Naresh Chandra Kapoor, hereinafter referred to as the petitioner, who has filed the present petition under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as the Act, for the alleged violation and disobedience of the order dated 16th March, 1993, passed by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. Nil of 1993, Naresh Chandra Kapoor v. Smt. Sayeeda Farooqui and Ors., is the landlord and owner of House No, 12/24 Hastings Road (Nyaya Marg), Allahabad. He had filed a Small Causes Court Suit being S.C.C. Suit No. 19 of 1982 for ejectment of Smt. Sayeeda Farooqui and others. It was decreed by the Additional District Judge, Allahabad, on 27th April, 1985. Smt. Sayeeda Farooqui filed Revision No. 325 of 1985 before this Court. The petitioner also filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, before the Prescribed Authority which was registered as Case No. 113 of 1983 for release of the premises on the ground of bonafide requirement. It is alleged that during the pendency of the revision Smt. Sayeeda Farooqui and another person were on a look out to pass on Illegal possession of the premises to third persons and contacted O.P.S. Malik, opposite party No. 1. He moved an application for allotment. While the application for allotment was pending the petitioner apprehended that the Prescribed Authority may allot the premises in favour of the opposite party No. 1 as he was an I.P.S. Officer and was holding a very high position in the district being the D.I.G., C.R.P.F., Allahabad. The petitioner also apprehended that the Prescribed Authority is colluding with the opposite party No. 1. He approached this Court by filing Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. Nil of 1993 in which this Court passed the following order on 16th March, 1993 :
"Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.
It is asserted that in the facts arid circumstances of the present case, specially considering the ratio of the decision of this Court in the case of B.D. Seth v. Vth Additional City Magistrate and Ors., 1988 (2) ARC 442, no vacancy could have been deemed to come into existence so as to confer Jurisdiction on the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to proceed under Section 16 of the Act. It is further asserted that the date fixed in the case was preponed without any notice to the petitioner.
Apart from the normal mode of service, the petitioner shall serve the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 out of Court, for which purpose, if the requisite steps taken by 22nd March, 1993, the office shall handover necessary notices etc., to the learned counsel for the petitioner. The notices issued shall indicate that the writ petition shall be listed for admission on 19th April, 1993, by which date the said respondents may file a counter-affidavit.
An affidavit of service shall be filed within 15 days.
List this petition for admission on 19th April, 1993.
In the meanwhile, the further proceedings consequent upon the order dated 20.2.1993 as well as the order dated 12.3.1993, shall remain stayed till 19th April, 1993."
3. It is alleged by the petitioner that when he along with one of his sons went to serve a certified copy of the order dated 16th March, 1993, passed by this Court upon O.P.S. Malik, opposite party No. 1 and S.N. Pandey, Prescribed Authority, opposite party No. 2 at the residence, the opposite party No. 1 was present at the residence of opposite party No. 2 in Collectorate compound. The opposite party No. 1 took the order and after seeing the same he returned it back to the petitioner with abusive language to the petitioner as well as the Hon'ble Judges of this Court. The words which were said to have been uttered by O.P.S. Malik and as alleged by the petitioner are being reproduced below :
"Main yeh bungalow chhodunga nahin chahe jo bhi mujhe isake liye karna pade High Court ke Judge sale to andhey hain stay order dena unake liye majak hai kisake khilaph order dey rahe hain yeh bhi nahin dekhate yehan se bhag jao nahin to sale ander kar dunga."
4. The opposite party No. 2 returned the order after seeing the same and told the petitioner to file the same in Court on the next date. It is also alleged that O.P.S. Malik has also threatened on telephone with dire consequences not only to the petitioner but to his entire family and also abused him. It is also alleged that on 17th March, 1993, when the petitioner went to the Court of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to serve certified copy of the order on 16th March, 1993, passed by this Court, S. N. Pandey, opposite party No. 2 did not come to Court on that date at all. On 18th March, 1993, the petitioner went to serve the copy of the notices, writ petition, etc. upon O.P.S. Malik, opposite party No. 1 along with two advocate witnesses but the opposite party No. 1 refused to accept the notices and copies of the writ petition and application and returned it back to the petitioner. He also entered into the possession of the premises with the help of S.N. Pandey, opposite party No. 2. It is also alleged that S.N. Pandey, opposite party No. 2 passed by this Court under the pressure of O.P.S. Malik, opposite party No. 1 allotted the premises in favour of O.P.S. Malik, opposite party No. 1 secretly without giving any hearing to the petitioner. Thus, both the opposite parties have violated the orders passed by this Court on 16th March, 1993 and have intentionally disobeyed the said order, thus, have committed contempt of this Court. In view of these allegations, the petitioner had approached this Court by filing an application under Section 12 of the Act for taking action against the opposite parties for committing contempt. This Court vide order dated 9th April, 1993, directed the opposite party No. 2, S. N. Pandey, to appear, in person with record. The order passed on 9th April, 1993 is reproduced below ;
"Opposite party No. 2 Sri S.N. Pandey is directed to appear in person before this Court and is further directed to place the entire record relating to premises No. 12/24, Nyaya Marg, Allahabad, involved in Case No. 100 of 1992 on 27.4.1993. Office is directed to send the notice immediately to the C.J.M., Allahabad, for the opposite party and the C.J.M., Allahabad, is further directed to serve the notices of this case on Sri S.N. Pandey through the District Magistrate, Allahabad to secure his presence before this Court on 27.4.1993.
This case shall remain tied up to me."
Thereafter on 27th April, 1993, the Court passed the following order :
"List this petition on 4th May, 1993. Sri S. N. Pandey will again appear on that date. The record will remain under sealed cover with the Court.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of Sri Pandey has desired to obtain a photo copy of the order sheet of the record of Case No. 100 of 1992 which is to be kept of in sealed cover. The Registrar is directed to arrange to give a photo copy of the order sheet of Case No. 100 of 1992 to Sri Pandey within 48 hours.
5. On 4th May, 1993, the Court directed the opposite party No. 2 to place before the Court the daily cause list register and the diary of the cause list maintained by his Reader containing list of case that were fixed on 11th, 12th, 16th and 19th March, 1993. The case was fixed for 5th, 1993 on which date the Court passed the following order ;
Sri S.N. Pandey, has appeared before me and has stated that there is only one daily cause list register maintained in his office. There is no other diary, etc. maintained by his Reader regarding the cause list of cases. The daily cause list register was produced before me, as directed by order dated 4.5.1993.
The Registrar is directed to obtain photocopy of the daily cause list register for the dates 11.3. 1993, 12.3.1993, 13.3.1993, 14.3.1993, 15.3.1993, (which has been over written as 16.3.1993), 16.3.1993 (which has been over written as 17.3.1993) and 18.3.1993 which appears to be earlier written as 17.3.1993. After photocopy are obtained the original register may be returned to Sri Pandey. The photocopy of the same be kept on record under the signatures of the Registrar.
In case the Registrar, receives any application for Issuance of copy of register, the same may be Issued from the original to the respective applicant.
The opposite party No. 2 has prayed for and is granted seven days time to file his reply to the affidavit filed in support of the Contempt application.
List on 14.5.1993. On that Sri S.N. Pandey is directed to appear before me."
6. It appears that the opposite party No. 2 filed a special appeal being Special Appeal No. 306 of 1993 in which the Court vide order dated 10th May, 1993, had stayed further proceedings. In view of the stay order passed in the special appeal, the proceedings remained stayed. The Division Bench had passed the following orders :
"Shri Umesh Narain Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant has brought to our notice the fact that the writ petition giving rise to contempt application was dismissed on 4th May, 1993 and thereafter an application was made by the applicant in the contempt application praying that the proceeding in the contempt case may be stayed. The learned contempt Judge allowed the applicant time to file counter-affidavit and directed the contemner to appear before the contempt Judge, on 14th May, 1993. In the circumstances we direct that further proceeding in the contempt application shall remain stayed.
List on 17th May, 1993.
Learned counsel for the respondent has prayed that record of the contempt case should be available to the Hon'ble Contempt Judge when the case is next listed on 14th May. 1993.
Since the case is listed before the Hon'ble Contempt Judge on 14th May, 1993, it is obvious that the record shall be produced before the Hon'ble Contempt Judge.
The appellant need not appear in person in the contempt proceedings till further orders of this Court."
7. The Division Bench thereafter on 18th May, 1993, dismissed the "special appeal."
8. After about 21 months of the dismissal of the special appeal the Registry put a note on 29th February, 1997, for placing the case before the Court. It is not clear as to whether the case was listed before the Court or not as there is nothing on the order sheet. However, there is another note on the order sheet of 19th January, 2001, for putting up the case before the Court. It appears that the Registry did not place the case before the Court as the said note has been followed by the subsequent dates 1st February, 2001 and 5th February, 2001. However, vide order dated 12th March, 2001 the records of Civil Revision Nos. 105 of 1993 and 106 of 1993 which were called for by this Court were directed to be remitted back to the office of the District Judge, Allahabad, The matter was again placed before the Court on a note submitted by the Registry on 2nd May, 2001, on the order sheet regarding compliance of the order dated 12th March, 2001. The compliance was noted by the Court vide order dated 17th May, 2001 and the case directed to be listed in the 3rd week of July, 2001. It appears that either the case was not listed before the Court or for one reason or the other it was not taken up by the Court as there is nothing on the order sheet. On an application being moved by the petitioner on 19th March, 2002, for taking action against the opposite party for committing contempt, which application was directed to be listed with previous papers vide order dated 21st March, 2002, the case was listed before the Court on 14th May, 2002. As notice has not been issued to either of the opposite parties and there were serious allegations made in the petition, which was duly supported by an affidavit, the Court vide order dated 14th, May, 2002, issued notices to both the opposite parties. The Court had passed the following order :
"It has been stated by Shri S.C. Dwivedi learned counsel for the petitioner that the Special Appeal No. 306 of 1993 which was filed against the order dated 27.4.1993, passed by the learned single Judge, wherein notice has been issued to the opposite party No. 2 directing him to appear in person, has been dismissed on 18.5.1995. A copy of the order is contained in Annexure-2 to the affidavit of the petitioner filed in support of the Application No. 53854 of 2002.
Let notice be issued to the opposite party No. 2.
Serious allegations have been made in paragraph 18 of the affidavit filed in support of the contempt petition against the opposite party No. 1 which have reiterated in para 19 of the affidavit of the petitioner.
In this view of the matter, let notice be issued to the opposite party No. 1 also.
Notice shall be sent to the Director General of Police to be served upon Shri O.P.S. Malik wherever is posted presently. The notice shall communicate that the case will be taken up on 2.7.2002.
The opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 shall appear In person on 2.7.2002.
List the matter on 2.7.2002."
9. Both the opposite parties preferred special appeals against the order dated 14th May, 2002 being Special Appeal Nos. 168 and 169 of 2002, in which the Special Appeal Bench was not inclined to proceed with the appeals and disposed of the same vide order dated 2nd July, 2002. On 2nd July, 2002, the opposite party No. 2 S.N. Pahdey personally appeared before the Court. An application for exemption of personal appearance as also for recall of the order dated 14th May, 2002 was filed by the opposite party No. 1 O. P. S. Malik. In the application for exemption it was stated that he is presently posted as I.G. Border Security Force at Rajasthan-Gujarat Frontier (Border) and seeing the tense situation on Indo-Pak Border there has been a standing order to all officers posted at the Boarder not to leave station and area at any cost. Considering the grounds given by the O.P.S. Malik, opposite party No. 1, the Court vide order dated 2nd July, 2002, had exempted his personal appearance on that date and for future dates. The following order was passed by the Court on 2nd July, 2002.
"Pursuant to the order dated 14.5.2002, S. N. Pandey O. P. No. 2 is personally present in court today. However, O. P. No. 1 is not personally present today as he is posted as I.G. Border Security Force. Rajasthan. His personal appearance for today and future dates is exempted. Sri S.C. Dwivedi prays for and is allowed ten days for filing a reply.
List on 26.7.2002.
O. P. No. 2 shall appeal personally on the said date."
10. Thereafter the case was listed several times but could not be taken up for one reason or the other, mainly, on the request of the learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1.
11. Under the Rules of the Court, the application for recall of an order is placed before the same Judge, if available, who has passed the said order and therefore the application for recall has been placed before me.
12. I have heard Sri U.N. Sharma, learned senior counsel on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 and S/Sri P.N. Saxena and Ashok Khare, learned senior counsels assisted by Sri S.C. Dwivedi on behalf of the petitioner on the application for recalling the order dated 14th May, 2002.
13. Sri U.N. Sharma learned senior counsel sought recalling of the order dated 14th May, 2002, passed by this Court on the following grounds :
(1) The Court cannot initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed as, according to him, the alleged violation/ disobedience of the order dated 16th March, 1993 is said to have been committed on 16th April, 1993 and 18th April, 1993 and a period of more than one year had expired since then. This Court had issued notices to the opposite party No. 1 only on 14th May, 2002, i.e., after about nine years and, therefore, it is hit by Section 20 of the Act.
(2) The order dated 16th March, 1993, passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. Nil of 1993 has merged in the final order dated 4th May, 1993, when the writ petition itself had been dismissed by this Court and, therefore, the opposite party No. 1 cannot be proceeded for the alleged violation/disobedience of the order dated 16th March, 1993, which no longer exists after 4th May 1993.
14. He relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Shanti Kunwar Chaudhary v. Committee of Management, Vidyawati Darbari Girls Inter College, Allahabad and Anr., 1991 (2) AWC 881, wherein this Court has held that an order passed in pursuance of or on the basis of any order or direction issued by the Court in writ petition, falls automatically with the dismissal of the writ petition.
15. He further relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahabir Jute Mills Ltd. v. Shibban Lal, AIR 1975 SC 2057, wherein it was held that an order of reference made by the State Government under the Industrial Disputes Act on the basis of an order passed in writ petition falls automatically with the dismissal of the writ petition and it is not even necessary for making a prayer for quashing of such an order of reference.
16. He further referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association C.S.I. Cinod Secretarial, Madras, (1992) 3 SCC 1, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that staying of the operation of an order would mean that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of the passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence.
17. He further relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Indra Bahadur v. State of U.P., through its Collector and another, 1997 (1) AWC 453, wherein this Court has held that even where the writ petition is withdrawn the effect is that the interim order passed in earlier petition stood merged in the final order and the order of appointment of the petitioner on a Class III post in pursuance of the earlier order passed by this Court nullified.
18. Sri P.N. Saxena and Sri Ashok Khare, learned senior counsels on behalf of the petitioner submitted that for the alleged violation and disobedience of the order dated 16th March. 1993, passed by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. Nil of 1993, the petitioner had approached the Court by filing the petition on 8th April. 1993. It came-up before the Court on 9th April, 1993 in which the Court had passed an order directing S.N. Pandey, opposite party No. 2 to appear in person along with the records. They submitted that under Section 20 of the Act, the time limit for initiation of the proceedings for contempt has been fixed as one year. According to them, initiation of the proceedings and taking of the cognizance are two different things. They submitted that as the proceedings were initiated by filing of the petition, the limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Act was not attracted. They relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pallav Seth v. Custodian and Ors., JT 2001 (6) SC 330, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that filing of a petition drawing attention of the Court for taking cognizance of the contempt would be initiating the proceeding for contempt and the subsequent action taken thereon of refusal or issuance of a notice or punishment are only steps following or succeeding to such initiation. They further submitted that all the persons and the parties are obliged to follow the interim orders passed by a court of law and they cannot disobey the same merely on the ground that final orders have not been passed or the matter is still pending before the Court for adjudication. They further submitted that contempt proceedings can be initiated for disobedience/ violation of the interim orders passed by a court of law even where the petition is ultimately dismissed. They relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tayabhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., etc., AIR 1997 SC 1240.
19. Sri U.N. Sharma, learned senior counsel submitted that when this Court on 9th April, 1993, had directed the opposite party No. 2 to appear in person, it was presumed that Court did not find any good grounds for issuance of notice and taking action against the opposite party No. 1 and, therefore, appears to have confined the contempt proceeding against opposite party No. 2 alone.
20. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties I find that the petitioner has alleged the violation/ disobedience of the order dated 16th March, 1993, passed by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. Nil of 1993. The opposite parties are said to have violated/disobeyed the orders dated 16th March, 1993 and 18th March, 1993. The present petition was filed in the Registry on 8th April, 1993, i.e., within a month. It came up before the Court on 9th April, 1993 when the Court directed the opposite party No. 2, S.N. Pandey, who was the Prescribed Authority at that time, to appear before the Court along with certain records. Notices had not been issued to either of the opposite parties. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pallav Seth (supra) has held that proceedings for civil contempt normally commence with a person aggrieved bringing to the notice of the Court the wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, order, etc. which could amount to the commission of the offence. The attention of the Court is drawn to such a contempt being committed only by a person filing an application to that behalf. In other orders, unless a court was to take a suo motu action, the proceeding under the Act would normally commence with the filing of an application drawing to the attention of the Court to the contempt having committed. When the judicial procedure requires an application being filed either before the Court or consent being sought by a person from the Advocate General or a Law Officer it must logically follow that proceeding for contempt are initiated when the applications are made.
21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held as follows :
"40. In other words, the beginning of the action prescribed for taking cognizance of criminal contempt under Section 15 would be initiating the proceedings for contempt and the subsequent action taken thereon of refusal or issuance of a notice or punishment thereafter are only steps following or succeeding to such Initiation. Similarly, in the case of a civil contempt filing of an application drawing the attention of the Court is necessary for further steps to be taken under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
41. One of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a litigant must act diligently and not sleep over its rights. In this background such an interpretation should be placed on Section 20 of the Act which does not lead to an anomalous result causing hardship to the party who may have acted with utmost diligence and because of the inaction on the part of the Court a contemner cannot be made to suffer. Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed by Mr. Venugopal would mean that the Court would be rendered powerless to punish even though it may be fully convinced of the blatant nature of a contempt having been committed and the same having been brought to the notice of the Court soon after the committal of the contempt and within the period of one year of the same. Section 20, therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid such an anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigant as also by placing a pointless fetter on the part of the Court to punish for its contempt. An interpretation of Section 20, like the one canvassed by the appellant, which would render the constitutional power of the Courts nugatory in taking action for contempt even in cases of gross contempt, successfully hidden for a period of one year by practicing fraud by the contemner would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215. Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be avoided.
42. The decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal's case (supra) to the effect that Initiation of proceedings under Section 20 can only be said to have occurred when the Court formed the prima facie opinion that contempt has been committed and issued notice to the contemner to show cause why it should not be punished, is taking too narrow a view of Section 20 which does not seem to be warranted and is not only going to cause hardship but would perpetrate injustice. A provision like Section 20 has to be interpreted having regard to the realities of the situation. For Instance, in a case where a contempt of a subordinate court is committed a report is prepared whether on an application to Court or otherwise, and reference made by the subordinate court to the High Court can take further action under Section 15. In the process, more often than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20 put in Om Prakash Jaiswal's case (supra) is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the High Court would become powerless to take any action. On the other hand, if the filing of an application before the subordinate court or the High Court making of a reference by a subordinate court on its own motion or the filing an application before an Advocate-General for permission to initiate contempt proceedings is regarded as initiation by the Court for the purposes of Section 20, then such an interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the power of the High Court to punish for contempt which power, Director of Education de hors the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise that section with the powers of the Courts to punish for contempt which is recognized by the Constitution."
22. Applying the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to the facts of the present case I find that the in the present case the proceedings for contempt commenced when the petitioner filed the present application/petition on 8th April, 1993 and, therefore, the bar of Section 20 of the Act is not applicable.
23. So far as to whether the Court could take cognizance and issue notices to the opposite parties for the alleged violation/disobedience of the order dated 16th March, 1993, which was an interim order and the writ petition in which the said order had been passed had been finally dismissed by this Court is concerned, it may be mentioned here that it is well-settled that an order even though interim in nature is binding till it is set aside by a competent court and it cannot be ignored on the ground that the Court which passed the order had no jurisdiction to pass the same. Any disobedience and violation of the interim orders can expose the person alleged to be disobeying/violating the order for action under the Act. In the case of Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, 1994 (Suppl) 2 SCC 641, the Honble Supreme Court has held as follows :
"In the absence of an authoritative pronouncement by this Court the stay order passed by the High Court could be ignored by the Speaker on the view that his order could not be subject-matter of Court proceedings and his decision was final. It is settled law that an order, even though interim in nature, is binding still it is set aside by a competent court and it cannot be ignored on the ground that the Court which passed the order had no jurisdiction to pass the same. Moreover the stay order was passed by the High Court which is a superior court of record and in the case of a superior court of record, it is for the Court to consider whether any matter falls within its Jurisdiction or not. Unlike a court of limited Jurisdiction, the superior court is entitled to determine for itself questions about its own jurisdiction. (See Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 : 1965 (1) SCR 413 at p 499 ; AIR 1965 SC 745 at p. 789)."
24. In the cases of K. S. Villasa v. Ladies Corner and Anr., AIR 1999 SC 2140 and Madan Lal Gupta v. Ravinder Kumar, JT 2001 (1) SC 123, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if an interim order is intentionally violated or disobeyed action can be taken under the provisions of the Act.
25. In the case of State of U.P. v. Ratan Shukla, AIR 1956 All 258, this Court has held that it is not the law that a Court dealing with a matter which is beyond its jurisdiction can be contemned with impunity or that the liability of a person to be punished for contempt of a court depends upon whether the Court was acting within its jurisdiction at the time when it is alleged to have been contemned the opposite party. This Court has held as follows :
"That fact that Shri S.M. Ifrahim had no jurisdiction to hear the appeals, however, does not mean that no contempt could be committed of him. So long as he was seized of the appeals no contempt could be committed of him.
It is not the law that a court dealing with a matter which is beyond its jurisdiction can be contemned with impunity or that the liability of a person to be punished for contempt of a court depends upon whether the Court was acting within its jurisdiction at the time when it is alleged to have been contemned the opposite party, therefore, cannot claim that he is not guilty of contempt because Shri S.M. Ifrahim had no jurisdiction to decide the appeals."
26. In D.M. Samyulla v. Commissioner, Corporation of the City of Bangalore, 1991 KLJ 352, the Karnataka High Court stated the law In the following terms, with reference to the decision of the Court of appeal In Hadkinson v. Hadkinson, 1952 (2) All ER 567 : "the principle laid down In the said decision is a party who knows an order, whether it is null or valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it and it would be dangerous to allow the party to decide as to whether an order was null or valid or whether it was regular or irregular."
27. In Hadkinson v. Hadkinson, (1952) 2 All ER 567, the Court of appeal held :
"It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of whom an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void. Lord Cottemnham, L.C. said in Chuck v. Cremer, (1846) 1 Co-op Temp Cott 205 (342).
'A party, who knows of an order, whether null or valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it........... It would be most dangerous to hold that the suitors, or their solicitors, could themselves Judge whether an order was null or valid-whether it was regular or irregular, that they should come to the Court and not take upon themselves to determine such a question. That the course of a party knowing of an order, which was null or irregular, and who might be affected by it, was plain. He should apply to the Court that it might be discharged. As long as it existed it must not be disobeyed.' Such being the nature of this obligation, two consequences will in general follow from its breach. The first is that anyone who disobeys an order of the Court (and I am not now considering disobedience of orders relating merely to matters of procedure) is in contempt and may be punished by committal or attachment or otherwise. The second is that no application to the Court by such a person will be entertained until he was purged himself of his contempt."
28. Approving the view taken by this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Ratan Shukla (supra) and of the Karnataka High Court in the case of D. M. Samyulla (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd., etc., AIR 1997 SC 1240, has held that where the interim orders have been flouted and disobeyed when they were in force and ultimately it has held that the civil court has no jurisdiction to certain the suit, the interim orders made therein do not become non est and the person can be punished for their violation/ disobedience. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows :
"........ Ultimately, no doubt, High Court has found that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit but all this took about six years. Can it be said that orders passed by the civil court and the High Court during this period of six years were all non est and that it is open to the defendant to flout them merrily, without fear of any consequence. Admittedly, this could not be done until the High Court's decision on the question of jurisdiction. The question is whether the said decision of the High Court means that no person can be punished for flouting or disobeying the interim/interlocutory orders while they were in force, i.e., for violations and disobedience committed prior to the decision of the High Court on the question of jurisdiction. Holding that by virtue of the said decision of the High Court (on the question of jurisdiction), no one can be punished thereafter for disobedience or violation of the interim orders committed prior to the said decision of the High Court, would indeed be subversive of rule of law and would seriously erode the dignity and the authority of the Courts. We must repeat that this is not even a case where a suit was filed in wrong court knowingly or only with a view to snatch an interim order. As pointed out hereinabove, the suit was filed in the civil court bona fide. We are of the opinion that in such a case the defendants cannot escape the consequences of their disobedience and violation of the interim injunction committed by them prior to the High Court's decision on the question of jurisdiction."
29. Thus, in view of the settled proposition that one cannot escape the consequences of disobedience and violation of interim orders committed by them prior to the dismissal of the writ petition, the argument of Sri Sharma that since the writ petition has finally dismissed the notices could not have been issued is misplaced. If the argument of Sri Sharma is accepted then it would be subversive of the Rule of Law and would seriously erode the majesty and dignity of the Courts. There cannot be any dispute that after the dismissal of the writ petition no benefit can be derived from the interim order as it stands merged but the position for action being taken for the alleged disobedience/violation of the interim orders prior to the dismissal/final orders being passed in the proceeding stands on a different footing.
30. In view of the forgoing discussion, I do not find any good ground for recalling the order dated 14th May, 2002. The application for recall is, therefore, rejected.
31. As about 10 years are shortly going to expire and the proceedings are only at the stage just after issue of Notice, the opposite parties be directed to appear personally before the Court on 24th February, 2004. List this case before the appropriate Bench on 24th February 2004.