JUDGMENT D.K. Seth, J.
1. The petitioner was promoted to the post of Assistant Development Officer temporarily as local stop gap arrangement for a period of 89 days only. The said promotion order itself indicated that it was by way of local stop gap arrangement and that the promotion was purely temporary limited for a period of 89 days. It also stipulated that on the expiry of the limited period, the petitioner will be automatically reverted without any notice and that he will not be entitled to claim any benefit on account thereof. However, on the same terms, the said promotion was being extended for 89 days consecutively for quite some time right from 25th August, 1990 till 30th September, 1994. The last order of extension was issued on the same terms for a period of 89 days with a condition that as soon as 89 days would be over, the petitioner would be automatically reverted without any notice to his original post and that he would not be entitled to claim any right on account of such temporary promotion. By the impugned order dated 3.10.1994 contained in Annexure-13 to the writ petition, the said fact was intimated to the office of Chief Development Authority with an instruction that on the expiry of said period of 89 days, by virtue of the terms contained in the order of promotion and extension thereof, the petitioner would stand reverted (o his original post and that he may be adjusted after obtaining instructions from the District Development Authority, Etawah. This order has since been challenged in this writ petition.
2. Mr. H. N. Tripathi. learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the order of reversion has been passed by the District Assistant Registrar whereas the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies. U. P.. Agra, is the petitioner's appointing authority and therefore the said order contained in Annexure-13 is wholly without jurisdiction. In support of his contention, Mr. Tripathi had relied on the decision in the case of Kuldip Chand Sharma v. Delhi Administration, 1978 AISLJ 461 in order to contend that ad hoc appointee can be reverted to his original post only for some valid reasons. Mr. Tripathi contends that the ratio decided In the said case, clearly fits in the facts and circumstances of the present case, therefore, the impugned order of reversion cannot be sustained. He further contends that the impugned order of reversion contained in Annexure-13 to the writ petition having been passed by an authority which is not the petitioner's appointing authority, is void ab initio.
3. 1 have heard Mr. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned standing counsel at length.
4. It appears that the appointment was made purely as local stop gap arrangement on temporary basis for a limited, period, with a stipulation therein that upon expiry of the limited period, the petitioner would be deemed to have been reverted to his original post and that he will not be entitled to claim any right in respect of such limited promotion. The said promotion was extended from time to time and every time same conditions were repeated. Admittedly, after 30th September, 1994, there was no extension given. Mr. Tripathi has not been able to show anything either from the pleadings or from the annexures that after 30th September, 1994. there was any further extension. Since the promotion was limited by time and the order having contained specific stipulation that the petitioner would be automatically reverted with the expiry of the limited period, the petitioner cannot claim any right after such limited period has expired. In the absence of any extension given to the petitioner's appointment after 30th September 1994. the petitioner cannot continue on the said post. The very expression used in the order itself shows about the consequence on account of non-extension of the order, there is no scope for the petitioner to claim any right over the same. In the case of State of U. P. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, 1991 SCC 691. and in the case of Director, Institute of Management and Development v. Pushpa Srivastava. AIR 1992 SC 2070, the Apex Court had held that the appointment which are limited by time, does not create any right on the incumbent to continue after expiry of the period so limited in the order of appointment itself. Drawing inspiration from the said two decisions, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Tripathi. Inasmuch as the appointment or promotion being limited by time with specific stipulation that on expiry of such limited period, the petitioner shall be reverted automatically and his promotion being purely on local stop gap arrangement and temporary without creating any right in favour of the petitioner, there is no scope to hold otherwise. The order of extension having come to an end automatically and there being no further extension, the order issued by the District Assistant Registrar has not prejudiced the right of the petitioner since it had not created or extinguished any right of the petitioner. The petitioner's right, if any, had already extinguished by reason of the said stipulation in the order of appointment itself.
5. The order dated 3.10.1994, since Impugned had only pointed out the consequence that follow on account of non-extension of the order which in effect had automatically reverted the petitioner to his original post. Therefore, the order contained in Annexure-13 is not an order by which the petitioner's promotion is negatived. On the other hand it directed the consequences of the promotion given to the petitioner. Therefore, the said order need not be passed by the appointing authority alone. The appointing authority had issued the order of promotion limiting the period of such promotion which came to an end on expiry of the limited period.
6. The petitioner having accepted the promotion with the condition stipulated therein having his eyes open, now he Is estopped from challenging the same and cannot claim any right on the basis of such appointment which itself stipulated that he will not be entitled to claim any right on the basis of the promotion as local stop gap arrangement.
7. In the decision of Kuldip Chand Sharma (supra), it was held that the ad hoc appointment though by its nature a precarious tenure nevertheless carries a limited right to the extent and if such an appointee is reverted without a valid reason he would be entitled to challenge it and seek enforcement of the right and that ad hoc appointee cannot therefore be reverted without any rhyme or reason.
8. The decision in the case of Kuldip Chand Sharma (supra) rendered by the Delhi High Court is distinguishab' on the facts and circumstances of the present sase. Inasmuch as in the said case the appointment to a higher post was not limited by time neither the said appointment contained such stipulation which has been specifically introduced in the order by which the petitioner was so promoted. Here in this case the petitioner has not been reverted but on the other hand the promotion which was limited by time had come to an end. It was purely on local stop gap arrangement. In the ease of Kuldip Chand Sharma (supra), the grounds of reversion were also indicated that reversion can be made on the ground of unfitness to hold the post, availability of the person holding a lien on the post, selection of a regular incumbent etc. Thus, appointments were in respect of period not limited by time and subject to the contingencies referred to therein and on that analogy such finding was arrived at and which fact is absent in the present case. Therefore, the ratio decided in the case of Kuldip Chand Sharma (supra), cannot be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case and the same does not help Mr. Tripathi.
9. In that view of the matter, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
10. At this stage, Mr. Tripathi submits that the petitioner has been paid salary for the post of Assistant Development Officer till July 1994 whereas he has worked on the said post till 30th September. 1994, therefore, payment of difference of pay for the post of Assistant Development Officer should be made to the petitioner for the month of August and September, 1994, This order shall not prevent the petitioner from making a representation for such purpose. If such a representation is made and if the petitioner had worked on the post of Assistant Development Officer till 30th September, 1994, in that event the respondents shall consider the question of making payment of difference of pay, if it so appear from the records of the respondents. However, such payment would not confer any right on the petitioner to claim any other benefit in respect of the service in any manner whatsoever.