JUDGMENT R.B. Misra, J.
1. In this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the orders dated 24.2.1987 and 4,6.1991 passed by the General Manager with a further prayer seeking directions to the respondents to treat the petitioner in service as a Fitter in 'Blow Room General Shift Mill' No, 1 at Swadeshi Cotton Mills Ltd., Naini, Allahabad upto the year 1995.
2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned counsel for the respondents.
3. The relevant facts necessary for adjudication of the writ petition are that the petitioner was appointed as a Fitter in Blow Room of Swadeshi Cotton Mills Limited. Naini. Allahabad (in short called 'the Mills'), which is owned and controlled by the Union of India. In the service card and identity card, the age of the petitioner was recorded year 1935, however, In the provident fund, the date of birth of the petitioner had been shown year 1928 and taking the same, the petitioner had been made to retire w.e.f. 25.2.1987, i.e,, at the age of 58 years by an order dated 24.2.1987 (Annexure-7). The petitioner claims on the basis of one industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central (Amendment) Rules, 1983, that the age of retirement recorded in service record and service card at item Nos. 3 and 37 respectively, is the exclusive proof of the age of super annuation.
4. The petitioner filed & Writ Petition No. 8908 of 1987 and after exchange of counter and rejoinder-affidavit, the same was finally disposed on 20.2.1991 (Annexure-9) directing the General Manger to decide the date of birth on the basis of evidences. In this order dated 20.2.1991, the High Court has been pleased to observe as below :
"After examining the counter-affidavit, it is clear that the question of date of birth of the petitioner is the disputed question of fact which cannot be gone into by the Court in this petition. However, the petitioner may make representation now again to the General Manager giving full facts about the date of birth supported by evidence. In case such a representation is made along with the certified copy of the order passed by this Court today, the respondent No. 5 Is directed to decide the same within a period of three months from the date of representation in accordance with law."
5. In pursuance to the above order, the General Manager decided the representation of the petitioner by Its order dated 4.6.1991 (Annexure-11).
6. The petitioner challenged the above order dated 4.6.1991 and an order dated 24.2.1987, already challenged in earlier Writ Petition No. 8908 of 1987 and had made following contentions :
(iii) The respondent Nos. 5 and 6 out of enmity prepared, petitioner's High School leaving certificate for the purpose of retiring him. The decision of respondent retiring the petitioner is against the principle of natural Justice and fair play and without giving opportunity to adduce oral and documentary evidence in support of his claim.
7. On the other hand, the following controvertions were made in the respective paragraphs of the counter-affidavit :
(a) In paragraph 4, it was denied that the Provident Fund records are maintained on the basis of declaration signed by the workmen and the date of birth of the petitioner was recorded there as the year 1928 in the 'P.F., record' maintained in the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner's Office, Varanasi.
(b) According to paragraph 5, the extract of model standing orders relied by the petitioner, is not applicable whereas, in the present case the certificate standing order applicable to the respondent indicate that the age of superannuation of worker is 58 years.
(c) According to paragraph 10, the petitioner had filed a School leaving certificate of junior high school, district Allahabad showing his date of birth as 1.10.1935, the management by its letter dated 14.1.1987 enquired from the principal who replied that the petitioner had neither studied in the said school nor any record of the said school shows that he had ever studied in that school and no such school leaving certificate was ever issued In favour of the petitioner. A photocopy of the reply dated 11.2.1987 of the principal is enclosed as Annexure-4 to the counter-affidavit which falsifies the claim of date of birth of the petitioner as 1935, however, the petitioner was retained for a few months in the respondent's Mills, so that proper enquiry could be made for recording the date of birth and after satisfaction the petitioner was rightly superannuated w.e.f. 25.2.1987.
(d) According to paragraph 20 the petitioner filed a C.B. Case No. 70 of 1991 before Conciliation Officer/Assistant Labour Commissioner and raised similar dispute about his date of birth and the above case had also been decided and finally dismissed in favour of the Management.
8. A written note has been filed on behalf of the respondents indicating that the petitioner has efficacious alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act in which question of the correction of date of birth can be decided. The earlier Writ Petition No. 8908 of 1987 for same cause filed by the petitioner has already been disposed of by order dated 24.2.1997, as indicated above, therefore in view of the judgment in U. P. Jal Nigam and another v. Nareshwar Sahai Mathur and another, AIR 1994 SC 2, the respondents contended that the Government servants had to first avail statutory remedy before the Tribunal and, If they, were aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the remedy under Article 226 was always available to them.
9. The learned counsel for the respondents, has also relied on the Judgment in Scooters India and others v. Vgai E. V. Eldred, (1998) 6 SCC 549, where the Supreme Court has held that there was no occasion for the High Court to entertain the writ petition directly for adjudication of an industrial dispute involving the termination of service and disputed questions of fact for which remedy under the industrial laws was available to the workman.
10. (a) In the case of K. K. Sriuastaua v. Bhupendra Kumar Jain. AIR 1977 SC 1703, it was observed by Supreme Court :
"It is well-settled law that while Article 226 of the Constitution confers a wide power on the High Court there are equally well settled limitations which this Court has repeatedly pointed out on the exercise of such power, one of them which is relevant for the present case is that where there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy the Court should keep its hand off.........."
(b) The case of K. K. Srivastava (supra) was referred in Bar Council of Delhi and another u. Surjeet Singh and others. AIR 1980 SC 1612, and subsequently the Supreme Court provided where a statute provides a complete machinery for obtaining a relief against the order passed by the authorities, the petitioner should not he permitted to Invoke the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution as was noticed by Supreme Court in Gujarat University u. N. V. Rqjguru and others. AIR 1988 SC 66, has relying on the following judgment observed :
"We do not consider it necessary to burden the judgment by referring to decisions of this Court laying down the principle that where a statute provides a complete machinery for obtaining relief against the orders passed by the authorities a petitioner cannot be permitted to abandon that machinery and to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution..................."
(c) In view of the above observations, it is clear that where a complete machinery/remedy for obtaining relief is provided in statute and such machinery and remedy fully covers the grievance of the petitioner then, unless extraordinary or exceptional circumstances exist the machinery remedy does not cover the grievance of the petitioner or the machinery remedy is demonstrated and proved by the petitioner to be inadequate or inefficacious, the petitioner has to be relegated to the alternative remedy and the Court should not entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for redressal of the grievance of the petitioner.
(d) The Supreme Court (five Hon'ble Judges) in Basant Kumar Sarkar and others u. Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd, and others. AIR 1964 SC 1260, while rejecting the challenge of the workmen, confirmed the finding of the High Court that the proper remedy of the workmen was reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
11. Full Bench of this High Court in Chandrama Singh v. Managing Director, V. P. Co-operative Union. Luckncw and others. (1991} 2 UPLBEC 898, has also held that the person aggrieved cannot invoke remedy under Article 226 unless he establishes that remedy of reference is not adequate and efficacious. In para 13 this High Court in Chandrama Singh has observed :
"The High Court must not allow its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to be invoked if the petitioner has got an alternative remedy and such remedy is not pleaded and proved to be inadequate or inefficacious, or if it is not established from the material on record that there exist exceptional or extraordinary circumstances to deviate from the well-settled normal rule of relegating the petitioner to alternative remedy and permit him to by-pass the alternative remedy. The hurdle of alternative remedy cannot be allowed to be skipped over lightly on a causal and bald statement in the petition that "there is no other equally efficacious or adequate alternative remedy than to invoke the extraordinary Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India." The petitioner must furnish material facts and particulars to sustain such a plea."
12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the contents of the writ petition, counter-affidavit and in my considered view, since the petitioner has already retired and is still disputing for his date of birth for which he had already approached this Court earlier by way of filing writ petition, more so, to decide the correctness of the date of birth of a person, inter alia, amongst the rival contentions and pleadings becomes the disputed question of fact cannot be gone into by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present facts and circumstances, when, the petitioner has an alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court Is not inclined to invoke its Jurisdiction of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution, therefore, the writ petition and the prayers made herein are liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is dismissed accordingly.