Hon'ble Brijesh Kumar Srivastava-II,J.
(Delivered by Hon'ble V.K. Shukla,J.) Smt. Uma Devi Chairperson of Nagar Panchayat, Safipur, District Unnao is before this Court, questioning the validity of the order dated 29.01.2014 passed by the State Government proceeding to cease her financial and administrative power to function as Chairperson of Nagar Panchayat, Safipur, District Unnao pending proceedings of removal from the office of Chairperson of Nagar Panchayat, Safipur, District Unnao.
Brief background of the case as is reflected from the pleadings that has been set out is that Smt. Uma Devi was elected as Chairperson in the election of Nagar Panchayat, Safipur, District Unnao in the month of July, 2012 and petitioner took oath of the office of Chairperson, Nagar Panchayat Safipur, District Unnao on 17.07.2012 alongwith other member on the same date.
Petitioner has stated that she has been performing and discharging her duties as Chairperson of Nagar Panchayat, Safipur, District Unnao strictly as per the provision as envisaged under U.P. Municipalities Act 1916 by adopting free, fair and transparent procedure and her submission is that the first meeting of the Nagar Panchayat was called on 6.8.2012. Petitioner has further stated that thereafter, petitioner directed the Executive Officer of Nagar Panchayat to call the meeting of Nagar Panchayat and passed requisite order in this regard on 13.9.2012, but the meeting was not called by the Executive Officer of Nagar Panchayat. Petitioner has further submitted that no regular Executive Officer (EO) has been posted at Nagar Panchayat Safipur and either S.D.M Safipur discharged the duties of EO or EO of other Nagar Panchayats took additional charge of EO of Nagar Panchayat Safipur. Petitioner thereafter has stated that a meeting of Nagar Panchayat was called on 10.12.2012. In the said meeting the member of Nagar Panchayat from Ward No. 8, Shri Vinod Kumar Mishra, joined the meeting late, by which time the minutes of the meeting were already reduced in writing. Shri Vinod Kumar Mishra was not present in the first meeting dated 6.8.2012, in which meeting several works were decided to be completed and since he was absent in the meeting, therefore, no decision could be taken regarding development work to be carried out in his Ward No. 8, however, Chairperson was authorized to carry out the development work in ward No. 8. In reference to next meeting of the Board he again came late in the meeting and as earlier there was no discussion about the works to be carried out in his ward he forced the other members and the petitioner no.2 to have discussion regarding development work in his ward and also forced all the present members to incorporate the discussions on the minutes book. Petitioner has stated that on such insistence of Shri Vinod Kumar Mishra five development work of Ward No. 8 was noted down in the minutes book in the presence of all the members and Executive Officer of Nagar Panchayat. On the very next day the petitioner communicated the minutes of the meeting dated 10.12.2012 of Nagar Palika to the District Magistrate through In-charge Officer of Local Bodies under Section 94(4) of the Act.
Petitioner has stated that complaint was lodged against her and on the said complaint being lodged, State Government directed the District Magistrate to conduct inquiry against the petitioner on the letter/ complaint of Nasim Ahmad, District Secretary of Samajwadi Party, District Unnao, respondent no.4 whose wife had contested the election against the petitioner and had lost. As per letter of the State Government dated 25.6.2013, Additional District Magistrate (Finance & Revenue) directed the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Safipur, District Unnao to conduct enquiry against the petitioner vide order dated 6.7.2013. Based on the said directive, which has been so issued, Sub Divisional Magistrate conducted inquiry and submitted report on 10.7.21013 to the District Magistrate, Unnao and District Magistrate, Unnao in his turn forwarded the same to the State Government vide letter dated 17.7.2013. After receiving report, State Government in its turn on 22.8.2013 asked the petitioner to show cause why her powers of Chairperson may not be ceased and further why she may not be removed from her office under Section 48 of U.P. Municipalities Act 1916. Petitioner in her turn submitted reply to the State Government on 16.9.2013. After said reply has been submitted, it appears that State Government proceeded to send the said reply that has been so submitted by the petitioner to the District Magistrate, Unnao and District Magistrate, Unnao, thereafter on 12.11.2013 called upon the petitioner on 16.11.2013 to place her case before him and thereafter, District Magistrate submitted his report to the State Government. Thereafter, State Government on 29.1.2014 has proceeded to pass order impugned ceasing financial and administrative power of petitioner in exercise of authority vested under the Proviso of Section 48(2) of U.P. Municipalities Act 1916 and same has impelled the petitioner to be before this Court.
In the present case, counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State Government justifying the action, and to the said counter affidavit, rejoinder affidavit has been filed and thereafter with the consent of the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel matter has been taken up for final hearing/disposal.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the validity of the order on following grounds; (I) Various amendments have been made from time to time under Section 48(2) of the Act and Section 2-A of the Act has been deleted, then net effect of the same is that State Government does not have power to direct removal of Chairperson of Nagar Panchayat, Safipur, District Unnao and accordingly entire proceedings are totally without jurisdiction. (ii) In the case in hand there was no occasion or justification to cease the financial and administrative power of the petitioner on the basis of ex-parte report of the District Magistrate, Unnao and that to even without supplying the copy of the same to the petitioner and even without considering the reply so submitted by the petitioner, and as such this is glaring case wherein authority to divest the duly elected office bearer has been in effect colourably exercised and same has to be accepted in the facts of case as nothing but malice under law, and facts of the case never warranted any action as has been taken in the present case, and accordingly writ petition in question deserves to be allowed.
Request that has been so made by the petitioner, has been resisted by learned Standing Counsel by contending that rightful action has been taken, as there has been prima facie material against the petitioner showing large scale irregularities committed by her, and once State Government has been conferred with the authority to pass order of removal from the office of Chairperson of Nagar Panchayat, Safipur, District Unnao and there is material on record that warranted issuance of notice of removal then during this interregnum period, rightful exercise has been undertaken for ceasing financial and administrative power of the petitioner and in view of same, this Court should not come to the rescue and reprieve of the petitioner as has been prayed for.
In order to appreciate respective arguments that has been so advanced, this Court proceeds to mention that in order to have participation of people at all level for fulfilling the saying that 'democracy is for the people, of the people; and by the people' and it is the will of the people that is paramount for the purposes of self governance for urban areas, Municipalities have been created and same forms part of Local Self Government under U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, wherein elections are held and peoples representative are elected based on secret ballot basis, and such elected members have the right to govern the affairs of the Municipality concerned as per the statutory provisions under U.P. Municipalities Act 1916. Municipality consists of President who is the Chairperson, and elected Members. Apart from elected Member, Municipality also has ex-officio Members as enumerated in sub-section (b), (c), (d) of Section 9 of the Act. Municipalities were earlier having statutory status, and now they have been conferred with constitutional status as in Part-IX and IXA of the Constitution, Article 243 to 243ZG has been introduced to bring Panchayats, Zila Parshads and Municipalities as constitutional instrumentalities to elongate the socio economic and political democracy under the Rule of law. 74th amendment of the Constitution deals with Municipalities covering urban areas of the District and same also takes within its fold;
(I) Rural area in transition to becoming urban area, earlier known as Town Area now designated as Nagar Panchayat (II) Urban areas, depending on its size, are known as Municipality (smaller urban area) or Municipal Corporation (larger urban area).
Once constitutional status has been given to the Municipality and it is a democratic institution and its functioning is governed by rule of law provided for in the statute book, known as U.P. Municipalities Act 1916, wherein an incumbent elected to the office is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by procedure known to law or he is removed by procedure established under law. In this background the relevant provision holding the field of removal of President for answering the issues raised are being looked into. Section 48 of U.P. Municipalities Act 1916 provides for as follows;
"48. Removal of President.- (1) [omitted] (2) Where the State Government has, at any time, reason to believe that -
(a) there has been a failure on the part of the President in performing his duties, or
(b) the President has
(i) incurred any of the disqualifications mentioned in Sections 12-D and 43-AA; or
(ii) within the meaning of Section 82 knowingly acquired or continued to have, directly or indirectly, or by a partner, any share or interest, whether pecuniary or of any other nature, in any contract or employment with, by or on behalf of the Municipality; or
(iii) knowingly acted as a President or as a member in a matter other than a matter referred to in clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 32, in which he has, directly or indirectly, or by a partner, any share or interest, whether pecuniary or of any other nature, or in which he was professionally interested on behalf of a client, principal or other person; or
(iv) being a legal practitioner acted or appeared in any suit or other proceeding on behalf of any person against the Municipality or against the State Government in respect of nazul land entrusted to the management of the municipality, or acted or appeared for or on behalf of any person against whom a criminal proceeding has been instituted by or on behalf of the municipality; or
(v) abandoned his ordinary place of residence in the municipal area concerned; or
(vi) been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties; or
(vii) during the current or the last preceding term of the Municipality, acting as President or Vice- President, or as Chairman of a Committee, or as member or in any other capacity whatever, whether before or after the commencement of the Uttar Padesh Urban Local Self Government Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 so flagrantly abused his position or so wilfully contravened any of the provisions of the Act or any rule, regulation or bye-law, or caused such loss or damage to the fund or property of the Municipality as to render him unfit to continue to be President; or
(viii) been guilty of any other misconduct whether committed before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Local Self Government Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 whether as President or as Vice-President, exercising the powers of President or as Vice- President,or as member; or [(ix) caused loss or damage to any property of the Municipality; or;
(x)misappropriated or misused of Municipal fund; or
(xi)acted against the interest of the Municipality; or
(xii)contravened the provisions of this Act or the Rules made thereunder; or
(xiii)created an obstacle in a meeting of the Municipality in such manner that it becomes impossible for the Municipality to conduct its business in the meeting or instigated someone to do so; or
(xiv)wilfully contravened any order or direction of the State Government given under this Act; or
(xv)misbehaved without any lawful justification with the officers or employees of the Municipality; or
(vi)disposed of any property belonging to the Municipality at a price less than its market value; or (xvii)encroached, or assisted or instigated any other person to encroach upon the land, building or any other immovable property of the Municipality,] it may call upon him to show cause within the time to be specified in the notice why he should not be removed from office]:
[Provided that where the State Government has reason to believe that the allegations do not appear to be groundless and the President is prima-facie guilty on any of the grounds of this sub-section resulting in the issuance of the show cause notice and proceedings under this sub-section he shall, from the date of issuance of the show cause notice containing charges, cease to exercise, perform and discharge the financial and administrative powers, functions and duties of the President until he is exonerated of the charges mentioned in the show cause notice issued to him under this sub-section and finalization of the proceedings under sub-section (2-A) and the said powers, functions and duties of the President during the period of such ceasing, shall be exercised, performed and discharged by the District Magistrate or an officer nominated by him not below the rank of Deputy Collector.) Section 48 of U.P. Municipalities Act 1916, provides for procedure as well as ground on which a President can be removed. Proviso to Section 48(2) provides for cessation of financial and administrative powers under specified conditions mentioned therein.
On the parameter of the existing provision, the first issue raised is that when sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the Act has been done away with and there does not exist any substantive provision for removal from the post of Chairperson then entire proceeding that has been so undertaken are totally without jurisdiction.
Issue that has been raised before this Court sans merit, inasmuch as, this particular issue has already been answered on 18.04.2007 by a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 16839 of 2007 Girish Chandra Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. And others 2007 (4) ALJ 268 (DB) and said Division Bench judgement has been accorded approval by the another Division Bench in the case of Imran Masood Vs State of U.P. and others 2008(70) ALR 33. Relevant para nos. 9 and 10 are being extracted below:-
9. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner further contended before the Court that by virtue of subsequent amendment with effect from 27 2.2004, Sub-section (2A) of Section 48 of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, has been inserted whereas in the original Act, the same was omitted.
10. We have examined the notifications. Under Pradesh Municipalities (Amendment) Act, 2004. Sub-section (2A) of Section 48 was inserted although Sub-section (2A) was pre-existing. Therefore, it was a case of double numbering of the Sub-sections. Subsequently by further amendment, the numbering of such sub-section was deleted by the subsequent notification dated 24 1.2005 giving retrospective effect from 27.4.2004. Therefore, according to us, Sub-section (2A) under original Act survives and still operative particularly in view of the decision of the Division Bench of this High Court dated 18th April , 2007 in C.M.W.P. No. 168309 of 2007 (Girish Chandra Srivastava v. State of U.P. and Ors.).
The contention of Shri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that though Sub-section (2-A) was added after Sub-section (2) to Section 48 of the Act by U.P. Act No. 27 of 1964, yet in view of the amendment made in Section 48 of the Act by U.P. Act No. 6 of 2004 by insertion of Sub-section (2-A) after Sub-section (2) in Section 48 of the Act, it must be deemed that earlier Sub-section (2-A) of the Act stood omitted. He, therefore, submitted that in such a situation, there was no power left with the State Government for removing the President from office as Sub-section (2-A) of the Act which was inserted by U.P. Act No. 6 of 2004 does not empower the State Government to remove the President. He further submitted that in any view of the matter, even Sub-section (2- A) which was inserted by U.P. Act No. 6 of 2004 was subsequently omitted by U.P. Act No. 2 of 2005 with effect from 27/2/2004, i.e. the date when U.P. Act No. 6 of 2004 was published in the U.P. Extraordinary Gazette.
We express our inability to accept this submission. The scheme of Section 48 of the Act provides that under Sub-section (2), the State Government can issue a show cause to the President for removing him from office. Under Sub-section (2-A) of the Act as was inserted by U.P. Act No. 27 of 1964, the State Government could remove the President from office after considering the explanation offered by the President and after making such enquiry as it considered necessary. The bone of contention between the parties is the amendment made in Section 48 of the Act by U.P. Act No. 6 of 2004. As seen above, the State Legislature by the aforesaid amendment added Sub-section (2-A) after Sub-section (2) in Section 48 of the ACT whereas there already existed Sub-section (2-A) in Section 48 of the Act in terms of the amendment made by U.P. Act No. 27 of 1964. What is to be noted is that U.P. Act No. 6 of 2004 does not repeal/omit the existing Sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 and nor does it mention that the existing Sub-section (2-A) was being substituted, It merely mentions that Sub-section (2-A) shall be inserted in Section 48 after Sub-section (2). This, in our opinion, appears to be an oversight on the part of the State Legislature in not noticing that Sub-section (2-A) already existed in Section 48 of the Act of Sub-section (2). The insertion of any further sub-section in Section 48 of the Act could have been either before or after the existing Sub-section (2-A). It needs to be mentioned that Sub-section (2-A) which was inserted by U.P. Act No. 6 of 2004 provides that where in an enquiry the President or a Vice president is found prima facie guilty on any of the grounds referred to in Sub-section (2), he snail cease to exercise, perform and discharge the financial and administrative powers, functions and duties of the President or the Vice President, as the case may be, which shall, until he is exonerated of the charges mentioned in the show cause notice issued to him under Sub-section (2), be exercised and performed by the District Magistrate or an officer nominated by him not below the rank of the Deputy Collector. Sub-section (2-A) as inserted by U.P. Act No. 27 of 1964, however, empowers the State Government to make a final order in the enquiry made under Sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the Act after issuance of show cause notice. It is, therefore more than apparent that Sub-section (2-A) as inserted by U.P. Act No. 6 of 2004 and Sub-section (2-A) as inserted by U.P. Act No. 27 of 1964 operate in entirely different fields. This apart, the object and reason for inserting Sub-section (2-A) by U.P. Act No. 6 of 2004 is to cease the financial and administrative powers of the President during the pendency of the enquiry as most of the Presidents used to delay the proceedings by not replying to the show cause notice in time and they continued to misuse their financial powers. It cannot by any stretch of imagination be assumed that by insertion of Sub-section (2-A) by U.P. Act No. 6 of 2004. the State Government intended to divest the State Government of the power to remove the President Section 48 deals with the power of the State Government to remove the president and it would indeed be ironical that the State Government would possess the power to issue notice for removal and also the power to pass an order aivesting the President of his financial and administrative powers for the interagum period but would have no power to pass an order for removal of the President. It is, therefore, more than apparent that there is a mistake in numbering the Sub-section (2-A) that was inserted by U.P. Act No. 6 of 2004 in Section 48 or the Act. The view which we have taken finds support from the contents of the proviso added to Sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the Act by U.P. Act No. 2 of 2005. It provides that where the State Government has reason to believe that the allegations do not appear to be groundless and the President is prima facie guilty on any of the grounds of this Sub-section resulting in the issuance of the show cause notice and proceedings under this sub-section, he shall, from the date of issuance of the show cause notice containing charges, cease to exercise, perform and discharge the financial and administrative powers, functions and duties of the Presiden until he is exonerated from the charges mentioned in the show cause notice issued to him and finalisation of proceedings under Sub-section (2-A). It is, therefore, clear that proviso that was added to Sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the Act by U.P. Act No. P of 2005 is almost identical to Sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 of the A t that was inserted by U.P. Act No. 6 of 2004 and it provides that the President shall cease to exercise, perform and discharge the financial and administrative power until he is exonerated of the charges mentioned in the show cause notice and the finalisation of the proceedings under Sub-section (2-A). The State Legislature was thus conscious of the fact that Sub-section (2-A) contained in Section 48 of the Act that was added by U.P. Act No. 27 of 1964 existed because it is only under tt e said Sub-section (2-A) that proceedings on the basis of the show cause notice are finalised. We, therefore, repel the contention of the learned Senior Counsel that Sub-section (2-A) contained in Section 48 of the Act as was added by U.P. Act No. 27 of 1964 Should be deemed to have been omitted by the amendment made in Section 48 of the Act by U.P. Act No. 6 of 2004.
This judgment in the case of Girish Ghandra Srivastava (Supra) has been approved by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Hafiz Ataullah Ansari Versus State of U.P. and others 2011 (2 ) UPLBEC 889.
The Full Bench has noted the legislative history of Section 48, and has proceeded to mention that sub-section (2-A) of Section 48 was already inserted by U.P. Act No. 26 of 1964. By U.P Act No. 6 of 2004, it was again inserted. This was a mistake already explained in the case of Girish Chandra Srivastava. Relevant extract of the Full Bench judgement is as follows:
31. Section 48 of the Municipalities Act is titled as 'Removal of President'. It provides procedure as well as ground on which a President can be removed. This section was amended by UP Municipalities (Amendment) Act, 1964 (the UP Act No. 26 of 1964). By this amendment;
Section 48(2) providing grounds for removing the president were substituted;
Sub-section 2A to section 48 {section 48(2A)} was inserted. It empowered the State Government to remove the President for the reasons to be recorded in writing after considering his explanation under section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act. This sub-section had a proviso that provided that instead of removing the president he could be given only a warning;
Sub-section 3 of section 48 {Section 48(3)} was substituted. The newly substituted section empowered the State Government to suspend a president, in case he was asked to show cause in respect of some of the grounds mentioned in section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act.
Sections 48(2A) and 48(3) of the Act as amended by UP Act No. 26 of 1964 are given in Appendix-2; whereas Appendix-1 is the index of appendices and includes abbreviations used in the judgement.
32. UP Urban Local Self Government Laws (Amendment) Act, 1994 (the UP Act No. 12 of 1994) was enacted to amend the laws relating to local self government in order to bring them in tune with 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Act. By this Act Section 48(3) was omitted. This meant that there was no power to suspend the president of a municipality during the pendency of proceeding for his removal.
33. The Municipalities Act was again amended by the UP Municipalities (Amendment) Act 2001 (UP Act No. 22 of 2001). Among others, it amended section 48(2-A) of the Act. It deleted the proviso that empowered the State to give a warning instead of removal.
34. The aforesaid position continued for some years. However, UP Municipalities (Amendment) Act, 2004 (UP Act No. 6 of 2004) was enacted. By this amending Act another sub section 2-A was inserted in section 48. This sub section provided that:
If a President or vice President was prima facie found to be guilty on any of the ground referred to in section 48(2) on an inquiry by a person and under the procedure as might be prescribed; and A show cause notice was issued to him containing the charges; then The president would cease to exercise the financial and administrative powers till he was exonerated in the inquiry. Section 48(2-A) as added by UP Act No.6 of 2004 is detailed in Appendix-2.
35. Sub-section 2A of Section 48 was already inserted by UP Act No. 26 of 1964. By UP Act no. 6 of 2004, it was again inserted. This was a mistake. This was also explained by a division bench (see below)1 of our court.
36. The aforesaid mistake was realised by the legislature and UP Municipalities (Amendment) Act, 2005 (UP Act No. 2 of 2005) was enacted to rectify it. By this amending Act, sub-section 2A to section 48 as inserted by UP Act No. 6 of 2004 was omitted and in its place the proviso was added in sub-section 2. This proviso is still in force and we have to interpret the same. The relevant part of section 48 as in existence at the time of issuance of show cause notice is detailed Appendix-3.
Once such is the factual situation that is so emerging then to say that State Government has no authority to issue notice for removal cannot be accepted, as State Government even in the present form has absolute power to issue show cause notice for removal and accordingly issue raised in reference of lack of jurisdiction has no substance and same is accordingly turned down.
Now coming to the second issue that has been so raised before this Court, as to whether in the facts of present case at the point of time when show cause notice has been issued under Section 48(2) of the Act, State Government was justified in ceasing financial and administrative power of the petitioner?.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the Full Bench judgement of this Court in Hafiz Ataullah Ansari (supra).
The Full Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the issues in paragraph 40. The issues which were considered by the Full Bench of this Court have been noted which is to the following effect.
"40 The division bench has referred three questions. They are mentioned under the heading 'QUESTIONS REFERRED'. For convenience, we have reformulated them into the following points for determination and have added preliminary objection of the respondent as the first point.
(i) Whether the reference should be sent back unanswered;
(ii) Can there be proceeding for removal of a president under section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act, without ceasing his financial and administrative powers;
(iii) Whether any separate or specific order is required under proviso to section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act for ceasing financial and administrative power
(iv) If the notice purported be given under proviso to Section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act does not comply with it then what is the consequence;
(v) What are the condition precedent (other than mentioned in the next point) for ceasing financial and administrative powers under proviso to section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act;
(vi) Whether any opportunity is also required to be afforded before ceasing financial and administrative powers;
(vii) In case opportunity is required to be afforded then what is its extent;"
The Full Bench in the case of Hafizataullah Ansari (supra) has laid down following principles in paragraphs 59, 60, 61, 79 and 84 which are quoted below:
"59. The president ceases to exercise the financial and administrative powers as soon as a show cause notice under section 48(2) satisfying the conditions of the proviso to section 48(2) or a valid show cause notice under proviso to section 48(2)of the Municipalities Act is issued. The cessation of power is automatic: it is so contemplated in the proviso itself.
60. Once, a valid notice under proviso to section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act is issued, then even if it is not mentioned that the financial and administrative powers of the president have ceased, it does not mean that he can still exercise them. The cessation of the president's power is automatic and necessary consequence of issuance of the valid notice complying with the conditions under the proviso.
61. In view of above, it is not necessary that order ceasing the right to exercise financial and administrative powers should be mentioned in the separate order or in the show cause notice itself but what is necessary is that the notice should be valid; it should comply with the conditions of the proviso to section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act.
79. The notice that results in ceasing the financial and administrative powers under the proviso to section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act is not a simple show cause notice--it must contain the charges as well. It is only when the show cause notice contains the charges that the cessation of the financial and administrative power takes place.
84. In our opinion, the cessation of financial and administrative power can take place only if the power under the proviso to section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act is rightly exercised. It is rightly exercised only if at least the following conditions are satisfied in the notice/ order:
(i) There should be objective satisfaction of the State government that:
The allegations do not appear to be groundless; and The president is prima facie guilty of the ground that have to be indicated under section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act.
(ii) The show cause notice should contain the charges;
(iii) The show cause notice should not only indicates the material on which the reason to believe or objective satisfaction is based, but the evidence by which charges are to be proved should also mentioned. However, in most of the cases they might be the same and there would not be any point in repeating them."
Ultimately, the Full Bench in the case of Hafizataullah Ansari (supra) in paragraph 133 recorded its conclusion which is quoted below:
"133. Our conclusions are as follows:
(a) There can be proceeding for removal of president under section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act without ceasing his financial and administrative power under its proviso;
(b) The following conditions must be satisfied before cessation of financial and administrative powers of a president of a Municipality can take place:
(i)The explanation or point of view or the version of the affected president should be obtained regarding charges and should be considered before recording satisfaction and issuing notice/ order under proviso to section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act;
(ii) The State government should be objectively satisfied on the basis of relevant material that:
The allegations do not appear to be groundless; and The president is prima facie guilty of any of the grounds under section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act.
(iii)The show cause notice must contain the charges against the president;
(iv)The show cause notice should also indicate the material on which the objective satisfaction for reason to believe is based as well as the evidence by which charges against the president are to be proved. Though in most of the cases they may be the same;
(c) It is not necessary to pass separate order under proviso to section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act. It could be included in the notice satisfying the other conditions under proviso to section 48(2). In fact it is not even necessary. It comes into operation by the Statute itself on issuance of a valid notice under proviso to Section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act.
(d).............................
(e).............................
(f)............................."
From the above pronouncement made, it is clear that the cessation of financial and administrative powers can take place only when view point of Chairperson is called for in reference of the charges and same has to be considered before recording satisfaction and issuing notice/order under the proviso to Section 48(2). Consideration is not to be a lip service or an empty formality, as State Government is obligated to objectively satisfy itself on the basis of relevant material, that the allegations do not appear to be groundless and the Chairperson is prima facie guilty of any of the grounds under Section 48(2) of U.P. Municipalities Act. Once all these per-requisite conditions are not at all fulfilled, then the State Government merely on its whims and fancies, cannot cease financial and administrative powers of Chairperson, as a duly elected Chairperson, in the garb of making inquiry, in democratic set up, without following the fair procedure prescribed under law, cannot be restrained from performing and discharging duties enjoined upon him /her under Section 50, 51, 51-A, 52, 53A of U.P. Municipalities Act 1916 Apex Court in the case of Sharda Kailash Mittal Vs. State of M.P. 2010(2) SCC 319, while considering the scope of application of Section 41-A of M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 that dealt with removal of President, took the view that President under M.P. Municipalities Act 1961 is democratically elected officer ,and removal of such an officer is an extreme step which must be resorted to only in grave and exceptional circumstances. Relevant extract of said judgement is as follows:-
24. In Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab and Ors.(2001) 6 SCC 260, this Court while dealing with the removal ofa President of the Council under Punjab Municipal Act of1911, held in Paragraph 6 as under:
"7. In a democracy governed by rule of law, once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his elections set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law... Removal from such an office is a serious matter. It curtails the statutory term of the holder of the office a stigma is cast on the holder of the office in view of certain allegations having been held proved rendering him unworthy of holding the office which he held."
In Paragraph 11 this Court observed as under:
"11. ...A singular or causal aberration or failure in exercise of power is not enough ; a course of conduct or plurality of aberration or failure in exercise of power and that too involving, dishonesty of intention is... The legislature could not have intended the occupant of an elective office, seated by popular verdict, to be shown exit for a single innocuous action or error of decision."
The same consideration must be taken into account while interpreting Section 41- A of the Act. The President under the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 is a democratically elected officer, and the removal of such an officer is an extreme step which must be resorted to only in grave and exceptional circumstances.
25 For taking action under Section 41-A for removal of President, Vice-President or Chairman of any Committee, power is conferred on the State Government with no provision of any appeal. The action of removal casts a serious stigma on the personal and public life of the concerned office bearer and may result in his/her disqualification to hold such office for the next term. The exercise of power, therefore, has serious civil consequences on the status of an office bearer.
26. There are no sufficient guidelines in the provisions of Section 41-A as to the manner in which the power has to be exercised, except that it requires that reasonable opportunity of hearing has to be afforded to the office bearer proceeded against. Keeping in view the nature of the power and the consequences that flows on its exercise it has to be held that such power can be invoked by the State Government only for very strong and weighty reason. Such a power is not to be exercised for minor irregularities in discharge of duties by the holder of the elected post. The provision has to be construed in strict manner because the holder of office occupies it by election and he/she is deprived of the office by an executive order in which the electorate has no chance of participation.
27. In the present case, the actions of the appellant, even if proved, only amount to irregularities, and not grave forms of illegalities, which may allow the State Government to invoke its extreme power under Section 41 - A.
Apex Court , once again in the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Vs. Collector 2012(4) SCC 407, has reiterated that removal proceedings are quasi judicial, removal has serious repercussions as it takes away the right of people of their respective constituencies to be represented by him/her. Relevant extract of the judgement is as follows:-
21. The municipalities have been conferred Constitutional status by amending the Constitution vide 74th Amendment Act, 1992 w.e.f. 1.6.1993. The municipalities have also been conferred various powers under Article 243B of the Constitution.
22.. Amendment in the Constitution by adding Parts IX and IXA confers upon the local self Government a complete autonomy on the basic democratic unit unshackled from official control. Thus,exercise of any power having effect of destroying the Constitutional Institution besides being outrageous is dangerous to the democratic set-up of this country. Therefore, an elected official cannot be permitted to be removed unceremoniously without following the procedure prescribed by law, in violation of the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution, by the State by adopting a casual approach and resorting to manipulations to achieve ulterior purpose. The Court being the custodian of law cannot tolerate any attempt to thwart the Institution.
23. The democratic set-up of the country has always been recognized as a basic feature of the Constitution, like other features e.g. Supremacy of the Constitution, Rule of law, Principle of separation of powers, Power of judicial review under Articles 32, 226 and 227 of the Constitution etc. (Vide: His Holiness Keshwananda Bharti Sripadagalvaru & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., AIR 1973 SC 1461; Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1789; Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr., AIR 2002 SC 2112; Special Reference No. 1 of 2002 (Gujarat Assembly Election Matter), AIR 2003 SC 87; and Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India &
24. It is not permissible to destroy any of the basic features of the Constitution even by any form of amendment, and therefore, it is beyond imagination that it can be eroded by the executive on its whims without any reason. The Constitution accords full faith and credit to the act done by the executive in exercise of its statutory powers, but they have a primary responsibility to serve the nation and enlighten the citizens to further strengthen a democratic State.
25. Public administration is responsible for the effective implication of the rule of law and constitutional commands which effectuate fairly the objective standard set for adjudicating good administrative decisions. However, wherever the executive fails, the Courts come forward to strike down an order passed by them passionately and to remove arbitrariness and unreasonableness, for the reason, that the State by its illegal action becomes liable for forfeiting the full faith and credit trusted with it. (Vide: Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes officers Welfare Council v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1451; and State of Punjab & Ors. v. G.S. Gill & Anr.,
26. . Basic means the basis of a thing on which it stands, and on the failure of which it falls. In democracy all citizens have equal political rights. Democracy means actual, active and effective exercise of power by the people in this regard. It means political participation of the people in running the administration of the Government. It conveys the State of affair in which each citizen is assured of the right of equal participation in the polity. (See: R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India & Ors.
28. In State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh etc. etc., AIR 1999 SC 2378, this Court considered the issue of removal of an elected office bearer and held that where the statutory provision has a very serious repercussions, it implicitly makes it imperative and obligatory on the part of the authority to have strict adherence to the statutory provisions. All the safeguards and protections provided under the statute have to be kept in mind while exercising such a power. The Court considering its earlier judgments in Mohinder Kumar v. State, Panaji, Goa (1998) 8 SCC 655; and Ali Mustafa Abdul Rehman Moosa v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 244, held as under:-
"28. It must be borne in mind that severer the punishment, greater has to be the care taken to see that all the safeguards provided in a statute are scrupulously followed."
29. The Constitution Bench of this Court in G. Sadanandan v. State of Kerala & Anr., AIR 1966 SC 1925, held that if all the safeguards provided under the Statute are not observed, an order having serious consequences is passed without proper application of mind, having a casual approach to the matter, the same can be characterised as having been passed mala fide, and thus, is liable to be quashed.
30. There can also be no quarrel with the settled legal proposition that removal of a duly elected Member on the basis of proved misconduct is a quasi-judicial proceeding in nature. (Vide: Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 2158). This view stands further fortified by the Constitution Bench judgments of this Court in Bachhitar Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., AIR 1963 SC 395 and Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364. Therefore, the principles of natural justice are required to be given full play and strict compliance should be ensured, even in the absence of any provision providing for the same. Principles of natural justice require a fair opportunity of defence to such an elected office bearer.
31. Undoubtedly, any elected official in local self-government has to be put on a higher pedestal as against a government servant. If a temporary government employee cannot be removed on the ground of misconduct without holding a full fledged inquiry, it is difficult to imagine how an elected office bearer can be removed without holding a full fledged inquiry.
32.In service jurisprudence, minor punishment is permissible to be imposed while holding the inquiry as per the procedure prescribed for it but for removal, termination or reduction in rank, a full fledged inquiry is required otherwise it will be violative of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The case is to be understood in an entirely different context as compared to the government employees, for the reason, that for the removal of the elected officials, a more stringent procedure and standard of proof is required.
34. In a democratic institution, like ours, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law or he is removed by the procedure established under law. The proceedings for removal must satisfy the requirement of natural justice and the decision must show that the authority has applied its mind to the allegations made and the explanation furnished by the elected office bearer sought to be removed.
35. The elected official is accountable to its electorate because he is being elected by a large number of voters. His removal has serious repercussions as he is removed from the post and declared disqualified to contest the elections for a further stipulated period, but it also takes away the right of the people of his constituency to be represented by him. Undoubtedly, the right to hold such a post is statutory and no person can claim any absolute or vested right to the post, but he cannot be removed without strictly adhering to the provisions provided by the legislature for his removal (Vide: Jyoti Basu & Ors. v. Debi Ghosal & Ors., AIR 1982 SC 983; Mohan Lal Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Rai Barelly & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2042; and Ram Beti etc. etc. v. District Panchayat Rajadhikari
36. In view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallized to the effect that an elected member can be removed in exceptional circumstances giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and holding the enquiry, meeting the requirement of principles of natural justice and giving an incumbent an opportunity to defend himself, for the reason that removal of an elected person casts stigma upon him and takes away his valuable statutory right. Not only the elected office bearer but his constituency/electoral college is also deprived of representation by the person of his choice.
37. A duly elected person is entitled to hold office for the term for which he has been elected and he can be removed only on a proved misconduct or any other procedure established under law like ''No Confidence Motion' etc. The elected official is accountable to its electorate as he has been elected by a large number of voters and it could have serious repercussions when he is removed from the office and further declared disqualified to contest the election for a further stipulated period.
On these parameters it is to be examined in the fact of the case, as to whether authority that has been so exercised by the State Government ceasing financial and administrative power is rightful exercise of authority or it is mechanical exercise of authority and as to whether in the facts of present case the procedure that has been adhered to same complies with rule of fair play or not?.
Right to hold the office of Chair person under the scheme of things provided for is a statutory right and no one can claim any absolute or vested right to hold the post, but in democratic set up, the elected incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law or he is removed by procedure established under law. Cessation of administrative and financial power of Chairman, pending notice under Section 48(2) for removal is also temporary deprivation of office for the reason that Chair person under U.P. Municipalities Act 1916, has various duties to be performed by his/her as per the commitment made to his/her constituency and the net effect of cessation of financial and administrative power is that for all practical purposes the elected incumbent is not at all entitled to function and fulfill the commitment made. Even in the matter of exercise of authority of cessation of financial and administrative powers of the Chairperson, the safeguards provided for and laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Hafiz Ata Ullah Ansari (Supra) has to be strictly adhered to as, it is not always necessary that while issuing notice under Section 48(2) financial and administrative powers be ceased and even otherwise said power can be ceased only after explanation or point of view or the version of the affected President/Chairperson is obtained regarding charges and the State government thereafter in its turn should be objectively satisfied on the basis of relevant material that the allegations do not appear to be groundless; and the President/Chairperson is prima facie guilty of any of the grounds under section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act before issuing notice/order under proviso to section 48(2) of the Municipalities Act.
In reference of democratic institution, such as the case in hand, even in the matter of temporary deprivation of office, the proceeding has to comply requirement of natural justice and the decision has to reflect and indicate that the authority has applied its mind. This is the minimum requirement to be adhered before proceeding to take decision for ceasing financial and administrative power of elected Chairperson. The existence of authority to cease financial and administrative power is one thing, the justification for exercise of it is quiet another.
On these parameter when we proceed to examine the facts of the present case then this Court finds that State Government on receipt of complaint in its turn had asked the District Magistrate to get matter inquired. District Magistrate in his turn asked the Sub Divisional Magistrate to conduct inquiry vide order dated 6.7.2013 and it appears that prior to it some inquiry was being made at the level of Sub Divisional Magistrate of the similar nature and after conducting inquiry, Sub Divisional Magistrate submitted his report dated 10.7.2013 and copy of the said report was passed on to the District Magistrate, Unnao and District Magistrate on 17.7.2013 has proceeded to refer the matter to the State Government. After receiving the said report, State Government on 22.8.2013 proceeded to issue notice mentioning therein that as per inquiry report dated 10.7.2013, charges levelled have been found proved and it was expected from the petitioner to submit his reply within fifteen days, failing which it would be presumed that he has to say nothing in the matter.
Petitioner thereafter has submitted detailed elaborate reply and therein petitioner has proceeded to mention that as far as first allegation that there was manipulation in the minutes of the Board Meeting dated 10.12.2012 is concerned, the said allegation is totally false as would be evident from the perusal of affidavit of Shri Vinod Kumar Mishra and also from perusal of letter of Shri Shiv Bux Singh, Clerk of Nagar Panchayat, Safipur, District Unnao in which he has specially stated that the proposal of works relating to Ward No. 8 was added on insistence of Shri Vinod Kumar Mishra and since he was late in the meeting, therefore, the proposals were reduced in writing on the blank space available. This action of reducing in writing the proposal of works of Ward No. 8 was done during the meeting and not even a word has been added after conclusion of meeting of Nagar Panchayat dated 10.12.2012. Each and every word in the minutes of meeting was written during the meeting dated 10.12.2012 in presence of all the members present and also in presence of Executive Officer and this minutes of meeting dated 10.12.2012 was approved in the next meeting on 27.2.2013. Petitioner has also stated that allegation contained at item no.2 in the show cause notice is also repetition of the allegations made in charge no.1 and the reply is also one and the same that there was no manipulation done in the minutes of the meeting.
Petitioner submitted that charge contained in item no.3 of the show cause notice dated 22.8.2013 that payment of Rs. 17,68,715/- was made without any resolution of the Board are concerned, the said work was done on the proposal of seven members of Nagar Panchayat, who gave their joint application on 23.7.2012 and the petitioner directed the Executive Officer to do the necessary work. Thereafter the Executive Officer proceeded in accordance with law in the matter and published advertisement in two daily newspapers and thereafter the tenders were invited by publishing advertisement and then the work was done after passing of the tenders. The procedure adopted in doing the work was totally transparent. The estimate of work was prepared by the Engineer of Public Works Department, the said estimate was examined by Assistant Engineer of Public Works Department, who is the nominated officer of State Government of U.P. to examine the estimates of work and he found the estimate correct. Thereafter, the bids were opened and comparative chart was prepared and the work was allotted to a firm having lowest bid. The order for doing the work was passed by the petitioner on 23.7.2012 and the first meeting of the Board was called on 6.10.2012, it was incumbent upon the Executive Officer to place the matter before the Board in the first meeting but Executive Officer has not placed the matter before the Board and the petitioner cannot be faulted with for this allegation. The petitioner is a lady and was elected as Chairperson of Nagar Panchayat for the first time and, therefore, this allegation levelled against the petitioner is also totally false. In reference of calling of meeting, petitioner submitted that as far as four meeting of the Board in ten months is concerned, the said allegation against the petitioner is also totally false, as there is no full fledged Executive Officer of Nagar Panchayat since the start of the terms of the petitioner as Chairperson at Safipur and the Sub Divisional Officer, Safipur is looking after the work of Executive Officer of Nagar Panchayat, Safipur, who is having a lot of business. The petitioners had asked several times for calling meeting of the Board and have passed even written order for the same two times i.e. on 13.9.2012 and 6.10.2012 but the meeting were not called frequently. The petitioner no.2 has also informed the State Government vide her letter dated 24..6.2013 for posting a full fledged Executive Officer in the Nagar Panchayat, Safipur, Unnao but in vain. The petitioner no.2 and members of the Nagar Panchayat had frequent meetings for discussing problems and matters of Nagar Panchayt, Safipur twice/thrice in a month and no complaint has been made by any member regarding non holding of meeting. Therefore, the allegation contained in charge no.4 is also baseless.
Record in question further reflects that after submission of the reply, State Government in its turn once again forwarded the said reply to the District Magistrate and District Magistrate, Unnao called the petitioner to place her case before him on 16.11.2013 and petitioner claims that she appeared and thereafter, District Magistrate submitted his report on 21.11.2013 and thereafter, State Government has proceeded to pass order impugned.
In the present case facts of the case clearly demonstrate and are speaking for itself that procedure that has been so adopted by the State Government, same cannot be said to be free, fair and transparent, at the point of time when State Government has proceeded to cease financial and administrative power of petitioner.
Once petitioner has submitted her reply before the State Government on 16.09.2013, then it was the State Government that was required to record its satisfaction as to why reply submitted by the petitioner was not satisfactory and that there was prima facie material to proceed against the petitioner no.2, but here in the present case contrarily record in question reflects that State Government at the said point of time was not at all in a position to form opinion and State Government asked the District Magistrate to verify the contents of the reply submitted by the petitioner on 22.10.2013. Once State Government had asked the District Magistrate, once again to verify facts in context of reply submitted by petitioner and District Magistrate had called upon the petitioner to appear before him and has proceeded to hear the petitioner, then rule of fair play clearly demanded that copy of the said report of District Magistrate ought to have been supplied to the petitioner before proceeding to place reliance on the same. Procedure that has been so adopted by the State Government clearly violates the principle of natural justice and rule of fair play, inasmuch as, behind the back of petitioner report of the District District Magistrate has been obtained and copy of said report has not even been supplied to the petitioner and same has been relied upon and made foundation and basis for passing order impugned. The order impugned on the face of it suffers from procedural irregularity and infirmity.
This Court even otherwise finds that the very purpose of issuing show cause notice has been frustrated, inasmuch as, once show cause notice has been issued to the petitioner and petitioner submitted her detailed elaborate reply clearly mentioning therein that each of her action was bonafide one, then once State Government was proceeding to mention that reply submitted by the petitioner was unsatisfactory, then some reason ought to have been given in support of the same. In the present case, most surprising feature of the order impugned is that there is no consideration worth name of reply submitted by the petitioner and even without adverting to the contents of the reply it has been contended that reply submitted by the petitioner has been examined and charges are found proved. In what way and manner reply submitted by the petitioner has been examined, and as to why it has not found favour with the State Government, no reason worth name is there, whereas it is settled preposition of law that it is incumbent upon the authorities to pass a reasoned and speaking order, as reasons are the live links in between contentions and conclusion and same also demonstrates how the mind of maker was activated and actuated and their rational nexus and synthesis with the facts considered and conclusions reached at. Apex Court in the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir (Supra) has emphasized on recording of reasons as follows:-
43. In Krishna Swami v. Union of India & Ors., this Court observed that the rule of law requires that any action or decision of a statutory or public authority must be founded on the reason stated in the order or borne-out from the record. The Court further observed.
" 47.... Reasons are the links between the material, the foundation for their erection and the actual conclusions. They would also demonstrate how the mind of the maker was activated and actuated and their rational nexus and synthesis with the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Lest it would be arbitrary, unfair and unjust, violating Article 14 or unfair procedure offending Article 21."
The reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, the order becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity. The absence of reasons renders an order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. Recording of reasons is principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected."
45. In Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna & Ors.,AIR 1987 SC 71, this Court held that on charge of misconduct the authority holding the inquiry must record reasons for reaching its conclusion and record clear findings. The Court further held:
"30. In fairness and justice, the member is entitled to know why he has been found guilty. The case can be so serious that it can attract the harsh penalties provided by the Act. Moreover, the member has been given a right of appeal to the High Court under S. 22 A of the Act. The exercise his right of appeal effectively he must know the basis on which the Council has found him guilty. We have already pointed out that a finding by the Council is the first determinative finding on the guilt of the member. It is a finding by a Tribunal of first instance. The conclusion of the Disciplinary Committee does not enjoy the status of a "finding". Moreover, the reasons contained in the report by the Disciplinary Committee for its conclusion may or may not constitute the basis of the finding rendered by the Council. The Council must, therefore, state the reasons for its finding".
46. The emphasis on recording reason is that if the decision reveals the `inscrutable face of the sphinx', it can be its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind of the authority before the court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made. In other words, a speaking out, the inscrutable face of the sphinx is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.
Here it is fully substantiated that State Government while it proceeded to exercise authority of ceasing financial and administrative power of the petitioner from the post of Chairperson of Nagar Panchayat, Safipur, District Unnao, no reason worth name has been given, that impelled and forced the State Government to come to conclusion that reply submitted by petitioner was unsatisfactory and in comparison to the same report of District Magistrate dated 21.11.2013 was more weighty. The entire action of State Government, on the face of it is lop sided and same reflects that with a per-determined mind set up proceeding has been undertaken, as in the report dated 17.7.2013; notice dated 12.11.2013; report dated 21.11.2013; and even the impugned order, all clearly contain recital of fact, that charges are fully proved. Once charges have been proved, then there was no occasion to issue notice to the petitioner for removing the petitioner from the office of Chairperson of Nagar Panchayat, Safipur, District Unnao. In view of this decision making process in the fact of the case, cannot be said to be free, fair and transparent one, as not only it contravenes and violates principle of natural justice, the entire action is a mechanical one. Entire action taken by State Government in the present case, while ceasing administrative and financial power, is in the teeth of the parameters laid down by Full Bench of this Court in the case of Hafiz Ataullah Ansari (Supra). Such a decision accordingly cannot be approved of, and in the facts of present case State Government, for the reasons already indicated above, was not at all justified in ceasing financial and administrative power of the Chairperson of Nagar Panchayat, Safipur, District Unnao.
Consequently, in the facts of the case, order dated 29.01.2014 passed by the passed by the respondent no.1 State Government is hereby quashed and set aside. The financial and administrative power of petitioner be restored back forthwith. Passing of this order will not come in the way of State Government to proceed in accordance with law, but certainly not in the manner as it has been done in the present case and that has been disapproved by this Court.
Writ petition is allowed.
Order Date :- 19.11.2014 T.S.