JUDGMENT Louis Kershaw, C.J. and Burkitt, J.
1. In this case an action was brought by Sadullah, the present respondent, against the N.W.P. Club, through Mr. G.B. Goyder, the secretary of the said club, for work done by the plaintiff to the order of some one who at that time was occupying the position of the secretary of the said club. The plaintiff has been paid a sum which has satisfied his demand, but the defendant has made this application in revision on the ground that then* was no liability on him as disclosed by the plaint, and indeed it would be highly undesirable that the secretary of a social club or one-individual member of it should have an action brought against him of this kind, making him personally liable for the goods which were not delivered to him personally, but were delivered to, and became the property of, the social body of which he was the secretary. We take it the law with regard to this matter is accurately laid down in the case cited in 3 Times Law Reports, at page 248, which lays down that an individual member of a club or a member of the committee of management who has not in any way pledged his personal credit, is not liable for goods ordered for, and supplied to the club, i.e., as meaning an abstract entity unknown to the law.
2. It has been found as a fact by the learned Judge below in - this present case that at the time the order was given Mr. Goyder was not secretary of the club, and as a fact this very order was given not by him but by a prior secretary of the club.
3. Therefore it stands to reason that Mr. Goyder did not pledge his personal credit, and he took no part at all in the transaction. Now the action may be said by those who brought it to be an alternative action, first, against the N.W.P. Club, secondly, against Mr. Goyder, secretary of the club. We have dealt with the question as to whether Mr. Goyder is or is not personally liable. The question remains as to whether the action can rightly be said to have been brought against the N.W.P. Club, that is, what the case mentioned above calls an abstract entity unknown to the law. To hold that an action lay against it and to give judgment in such action would be to hold that an action lay against a great number of individuals who had not been cited in the action, who had no opportunity of appearing, but who should have been so cited, and who should have had such opportunity given to them to appear and contest the action. On that ground the action should have been dismissed against the club.
4. We think that there is another ground upon which the action against the club should be dismissed, and that is, that as alleged in the plaint the contract was entered into by the club through its secretary. It is clearly shown as a fact that at the time the contract was entered into, Mr. Goyder was not secretary at all. Our order is: We allow this application, set aside the decree of the Court below, and we dismiss the plaintiff's suit.