JUDGMENT
1. This is a plain case. Under the United Provinces Town Improvement Act, No. VIII of 1919, of the Local Legislature, a tribunal has been constituted which, according to Section 57 of that Act, has to perform the functions of the Court with reference to the acquisition of land for the Trust under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. In other words, the new tribunal is substituted for the old Court with which every body is familiar under the 1894 Act. The constitution of that Court is provided for by Section 59 which covers all possible contingencies and provides for the appointment of a person to fill a vacancy created by a member of the tribunal who is absent either from illness or other unavoidable cause. For some reason or another, which is immaterial for the purpose of this judgment, the Acquisition Officer referred a question arising under the Town Improvement Act to the District Judge, although a question arising in respect of the acquisition of the same land by the Improvement Trust had already been before the Improvement Trust Tribunal. He had no power to do anything of the kind, and the Judge ought to have refused to entertain the matter. However, he did net, but, without the slightest jurisdiction, proceeded to consider whether he had jurisdiction or not. He has decided, on grounds which are quite unintelligible to us, that the Tribunal constituted under the 1919 Act has ceased to exist. He has gone on presumably to hold that he is its natural successor. But this is quite immaterial. It is abundantly clear that it had not ceased to exist, and that the Judge had no jurisdiction to consider whether it had or it had not. A decision by the District Judge of Cawnpore that it had ceased to exist, is equivalent to a sentence of death upon the Tribunal, and is a decision in direct breach of the provisions of sections 56 to 59 of the Town Improvement Act, and of such serious import as to wreck the whole of the machinery carefully created by Government for the determination of questions under this Act. We have no alternative but to quash the order. The parties must bear their own costs in the Court below. In this Court the applicant is entitled to his costs with fees on the higher scale.