JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner-tenant against the order dated 21.9.1988 passed by the prescribed authority and the order dated 3.9.1990 passed by the appellate authority. The brief facts leading to filing of this writ petition are as under:
The landlord filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for release of the accommodation in dispute on the ground that he requires the accommodation in dispute for personal use. The prescribed authority after considering the material available on record found that the need of the landlord is bonafide and more pressing than that of the tenant. Thus, the application of the landlord was allowed by the prescribed authority. Aggrieved thereby the prescribed authority the tenant preferred an appeal and appellate authority after considering the material on record in detail by its order which runs in 18 typed pages dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings recorded by the prescribed authority.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can look into the facts which came into existence after decision of the appellate authority. For this purpose learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1981 SC 1711 and other decisions. The fact that has been emphasized to be considered by petitioner was that since Smt. Meena Rastogi died in the year 1991, therefore, the need itself has vanished. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1992 SC 700; Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram. The answer of the aforesaid argument has been given by the Apex Court in its recent pronouncement in the case reported in 2001 (1) ARC SC page 352; Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava wherein the Apex Court has held that the application has to be considered as on the date when it was filed therefore, the need of the landlord has to be considered on the date when it was filed. Since Gaya Prasad (supra) is a later decision, therefore, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner deserves to be repelled. So far as the challenge to the findings recorded by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority by learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, suffice to say that though the learned counsel for the petitioner has gone through the material on record before me and tried to emphasize that the findings of the appellate authority wherein the appellate authority has affirmed the findings of the prescribed authority suffer from error of law, but failed to do so. The Apex Court in its recent pronouncement in the case reported in 2003 (6) SCC page 675; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Ors. has laid down the guidelines.
"38. Such like matters frequently arise before the High Courts. We sum up our conclusion in a nut shell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder: (1), (2), (3) and (4)..........
5. Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.
6. A patent error is an error which is self evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or completed argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.
7. The power to issue a writ of certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasioned. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the-pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis.
8. The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character.
9. In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdiction. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case."
3. In view of what has been stated above, this petition has no force and deserves to be dismissed.
4. Lastly it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that in case the arguments advanced by him do not find favour of the Court, then the petitioner-tenant may be given some reasonable time to vacate the disputed accommodation.
5. Considering the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner and facts and circumstances of the present case, I direct that the petitioner shall not be evicted from the accommodation in dispute pursuant to the decree of eviction till 30th June, 2005 provided:
(1) petitioner furnishes an undertaking before the prescribed authority within three weeks from today that he will hand over peaceful vacant possession of the accommodation to the landlord on or before 30th June, 2005; and (2) petitioner pays to the landlord or deposits the entire arrears of rent/damages, if not already paid/deposited before the prescribed authority, at the rate of rent till date within three weeks from today and continues to pay or deposits the same by first week of succeeding month so long he remains in possession or till 30th June, 2005 whichever is earlier. The landlord will be entitled to withdraw the amount so deposited.
6. In the event of default of any of the conditions referred to above, it will be open to the respondent-landlord to get the decree executed.
7. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed with the above direction.