JUDGMENT M. Katju, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed with a prayer that the respondent R.T.A., Ghaziabad be directed not to grant or issue any permit on the route Khurja-Shikarpur Jahangirabad and allied route.
2. The aforesaid route falls exclusively with the jurisdiction of the R.T.A., Ghaziabad.
3. The petitioner is an operator on the said route and obviously, he does not want others to be granted a permit on the said route. In this connection, it may be noted that under Section 47(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 strength of the route could be fixed by the R.T.A. This concept of strength has been deliberately omitted in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and now there is no concept of strength. It is obvious that the intention of omitting any provision analogous to Section 47 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was that there should be competition because under the old Act, the existing operators would obstruct grant of permits on their routes on the basis of the strength fixed by the R.T.A., and thus, they created a monopoly in their favour. This was obviously not in the interest of the public as competition ensures that the rates are kept at a reasonably low level and the quality of service provided is good. Since there was a policy of liberalisation in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 this Court cannot obstruct the aforesaid the said policy of Parliament.
4. In Mithlesh Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 443, the Supreme Court referred to the liberalised policy under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
In para 5 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court observed :
"A comparative reading of the provisions of the Act and the old Act makes it clear that the procedure for grant of permits under the Act has been liberalised to such an extent that an intended operator can get a permit for asking irrespective of the number of operators already in the field."
In para 7 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court observed that there is no threat to the existing operators as their fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) is not being threatened in any manner merely because others are also being given permit to operate on the route. The only effort of the existing operators is to stop new operators from coming in the field as competitors. The Supreme Court observed that this stand of the petitioner was not justified. More operators means healthy-competitions and efficient transport system. Overcrowded buses, passengers standing in the aisle, clinging to the bus-doors and even sitting on the rooftops are some of the common sights in this country. More often one finds a bus which has noisy engine, old upholstery, uncomfortable seats and continuous emission of black-smoke from the exhaust pipe, which is not in the public Interest.
5. The Supreme Court referred to several earlier decisions of the Court, e.g., Jashbhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, AIR 1976 SC 578 ; Rice and Flour Mills v. N. Teekappa Gowda and Ors., AIR 1971 SC 246, etc. in which it was held that rival operators have no locus standi to file a writ petition. The Supreme Court observed that the Act provides liberal policy for the grant of permits to those who intend to enter the motor transport business. The provisions of the new Act are in conformity with Article 19(1)(g).
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to para 14 of the aforesaid judgment. In our opinion, para 14 of the aforesaid judgment goes against the petitioner as the said para discloses the contention of the petitioner that it is in the public interest to limit the grant of permits on the route was negatived.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the Division Bench decision of this Court in Surendra Rao v. R. T. A. Gorakhpur, 1992 (2) AWC 849 : AIR 1992 All 211, and has referred to para 4 of the said decision. He has submitted that while existing operators cannot oppose the grant of permit nor can they challenge the order granting permit, it has also been observed in para 4 of the said judgment that the area of the route cannot be permitted to be converted into a racing ground for heavy vehicles in order to pick up more passengers en route thereby exposing both the person and property of the public to great danger.
8. In our opinion, the aforesaid observation in para 4 of the decision in Surendra Rao's case (supra), cannot be interpreted to mean that grant of permit can be denied on the ground that there are already enough motor vehicles on the route. If a route is being converted into a racing ground, then those who are inefficient will be eliminated by competition. In our opinion, the applicant for permit on any route (except a nationalised route) has to be granted the permit on his paying the requisite fees. For this purpose, the observation in para 4 of the Surendra Rao's case (supra), is to be read along with decision of the Supreme Court in Mithlesh Kumar's case (supra), where it was observed in para 5 that a permit has to be granted on asking for it. The observations of the Supreme Court are binding on the High Court under Article 141 of the Constitution, and this Court cannot take a view contrary to that of the Supreme Court.
9. Competition is healthy and good and is in the public interest because it ensures low rates and efficient transport system. If a contrary view is taken, the will of Parliament as evident from omission of Section 47 (3) of the old Act will be frustrated by indirect methods.
10. We, therefore, dismiss the writ petition with the observation that any applicant for a permit of any route (except a nationalised route) has to be granted the permit on his paying the prescribed fees.
11. Let the Registrar General of this Court send copy of this order to the Secretary, Transport, U.P. who will communicate it to all R.T.A.S and the State Transport Authority, U.P.