JUDGMENT Janardan Sahai, J.
1. The Judge Small Cause Court, Meerut by order dated 13.2.2003 decreed the suit for eviction of the applicant from the shops in dispute. The suit was filed against the applicant who is the tenant of the shop on the ground of default. The applicant-tenant claimed that he had deposited the rent on the first date of hearing and was, therefore, relieved from the liability of eviction in view of the provisions of Section 20 (4) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act. 1972 (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972), hereafter called as the 'Act'. The suit was registered on 14.7.2000 and summons were issued indicating 10.8.2000 for filing written statement and 17.8.2000 for final hearing. On 17.8.2000 on the request of the defendant-applicant, time for filing written statement was extended. The written statement was not filed and the Court repeatedly extended the time and by the last such extension time till 1.3.2001 was granted for filing the written statement. The deposit under Section 20 (4) was made on 17.1.2001. On these facts, the trial court held that the first date for hearing was 17.8.2000 and the deposit having been made by the tenant on 17.1.2001 was, therefore, after the date of first hearing and benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act could not be granted.
2. The question in this case, therefore, is whether the date of first hearing was 17.8.2000 or a date which would fall only after the opportunity to file the written statement was over, namely, 1.3.2001 which was also the date fixed for issues and the date when issues were actually framed.
3. I have heard Shri Ravi Kant learned senior counsel for applicant and Sri Ashok Khare, learned senior counsel for respondent. Except for the challenge to the finding of the trial court on the question of the tenant being granted benefit of the deposit under Section 20 (4), no other finding was challenged in the arguments.
4. The question involved has already been considered by the Apex Court in Sirqj Ahmad Siddiqui v. Prem Nath Kapoor, AIR 1993 SC 2525 and Ashok Kumar and Ors. v. Rishi Ram and Ors., 2002 (3) AWC 2428 (SC) : 2002 (5) SCC 641. The Explanation to Section 20 Sub-section (4) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 defines "first hearing" to mean "the first date for any step or proceedings mentioned in the summons served on the defendant". A mechanical interpretation of this provision could mean that the date of filing the written statement mentioned in the summons would be the date of first hearing as the filing of the written statement was a step or proceedings. But in Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui (supra), the Apex Court held that "the step or proceeding mentioned in the Explanation would have to be construed to be a step or proceeding to be taken by the Court, for it is after all, a "hearing" that is the subject-matter of definition......" It was observed "Further, it is not possible to construe the expression "first date for any step or proceeding" to mean the step of filing the written statement, though the date for that purpose may be mentioned in the summons, for the reason that, as set out earlier, it is permissible under the Code for the defendant to file a written statement even thereafter but prior to the first hearing when the Court takes up the case, since there is nothing in the said Act which conflicts with the provisions of the Code in this behalf. We are of the view, therefore, that the date of first hearing as defined in the said Act is the date on which the Court proposes to apply its mind to determine the points in controversy between the parties to the suit and to frame issues, if necessary."
5. The matter was again considered in Ashok Kumar case (supra). There the suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment was filed in the Court of Small Causes in the year 1979. After service of summons, the suit was adjourned to 20.5.1980 for final disposal. On that date, the tenant sought time for filing written statement, so the suit was adjourned to 25.7.1980 and thereafter time was again granted for filing written statement and date for final disposal was posted on 10.10.1980. The tenant made the required deposit on that date although the case was not taken up as the Presiding Officer was absent and the suit was again adjourned to 5.12.1980. The Apex Court held that date 20.5.1980 which was fixed for final disposal could not be treated as the first hearing as the Court granted time till 25.7.1980 for filing written statement and thereafter the suit was again adjourned for final disposal to 10.10.1980 and the Court held 10.10.1980 as the date of first hearing as the Court proposed to apply its mind to identify the controversy between the parties on that date. The Apex Court observed that although the suit was again adjourned to 5.12.1980 it would be irrelevant because the date of first hearing of the suit is the date when the Court proposes to apply its mind and not the date when it actually applies its mind and that what followed was "that the first hearing of the suit would not change on every adjournment of the suit for final disposal".
6. It has, therefore, to be seen as to what in this case was the date on which the Court proposed to apply its mind. In this case, reference is being m'ade to the provisions of the C.P.C. as they should before the amendment made by Act 46 of 1999 and 22 of 2002 as the case pertains to the pre-amendment period and counsel for the parties advanced their arguments with reference to the provisions as they then stood. No doubt in the summons separate dates for filing written statement (10.8.2000) and final hearing (17.8.2000) were fixed but the date for filing the written statement was extended from time to time. If the Court had refused to extend the time for filing the written statement the date for final hearing specified in the summons would be the date of first hearing irrespective of the fact whether the hearing was actually adjourned. But as the Court had extended the time for filing the written statement, it was not in a position to Identify the controversy and to apply mind on 17.8.2000. It has been held by the Apex Court in Ashok Kumar case (supra) that the stage of first hearing would arise only after the opportunity to file the written statement. If the Court fixes a date for filing the written statement in the summons, it logically follows that the date of first hearing that has to be fixed in the summons can only be either the date on which the written statement is to be filed or any date thereafter but it cannot be a date preceding the date of filing the written statement. The effect of extending the time for filing the written statement would consequently be to push forward the date for final hearing to a date on or after the extended date for filing the written statement.
7. Sri Ashok Khare, learned counsel for respondent relied upon the observations of the Apex Court in Ashok Kumar case (supra) that the first hearing of the suit would not change on every adjournment of the suit for final disposal and submitted that where in the summons two dates were fixed--one for filing the written statement and another separate date for final hearing, the date of final hearing would not for the purpose of Section 20 (4) be extended even though time to file the written statement is extended. If this interpretation is accepted the date of first hearing would precede the extended date of filing the written statement. It is difficult to accept this Interpretation as it creates an anomalous situation. If the Court had itself granted opportunity to the defendant to file the written statement on an extended date, it cannot be in a position to apply mind to identify the controversy on any earlier date, which cannot, therefore, be the date of first hearing. It would, therefore, follow that the date for final hearing fixed in the summons would have to be pushed forward to fall on or after the extended date for filing the written statement. The correct position appears to be that with every such extension of time to file the written statement, the date for final hearing would be pushed forward. The date fixed for final hearing if it falls on or after the extended last date for filing the written statement would be the date of first hearing. If, however, the date for final hearing does not fall on the extended last date for filing the written statement, then the date fixed for final hearing falling next after the last extended date for filing the written statement would be the date of first hearing. At this stage, it can be said that the Court proposes to apply its mind to identify the controversy. Any adjournment of the date for final hearing thereafter would not matter and would not push any further the date of first hearing for the purpose of Section 20 (4) of the Act. This appears to be a correct interpretation of what was laid down in Ashok Kwnar case (supra), by the observations that the date of first hearing would not change on every adjournment. It is to be noted that in that case, the Court had fixed 20.5.1980 as the date for final disposal which on extension of time for filing written statement was extended to 25.7.1980 and again to 10.10.1980 and the adjourned date 10.10.1980 was held to be the date of first hearing. It was held that the adjournment again granted fixing the date 5.12.1980 was irrelevant. Order V Rule 5, C.P.C. provides that in a small cause suit, the date fixed in the summons would be for final disposal. The mere fact that a separate date for filing the written statement is not specified would not matter as the written statement would have to be filed on or before the first date of hearing as provided under Order VIII Rule 1, C.P.C. and, therefore, the written statement would have to be filed (unless the Court extends the time) on or before the date for final disposal fixed in the summons. But so long as the Court keeps on extending time for filing the written statement, it cannot logically propose to apply its mind to identify the controversy and as such, the date of final hearing in no case can precede the extended date for filing the written statement. The decision of this Court in Smt. Choti v. XIIIth Additional District Judge, Agra, 1999 (3) AWC 1813 : 1999 (2) ARC 71, is on different facts. In that case, the summons were issued fixing a date 22.2.1996 for appearance but as the summons were not on the record, it was observed by this Court that it was not clear whether the date was for appearance alone or for final hearing also. On 22.2.1996 the defendant filed application for the copy of the plaint but the trial court found that the copy of the plaint had already been given and rejected the application and fixed 14.4.1996 for final hearing and it was held that the Court proposed to apply mind on that date and that was the first date of hearing. The question about the effect of extending the date for filing the written statement was not involved there.
8. The deposit in this case having been made before the extended date for filing written statement, the view to the contrary taken by the Court below that the deposit was made after the date of first hearing is erroneous in law. The decree of the Judge Small Causes Court, Meerut dated 13.2.2003 for the eviction of the applicant is, therefore, set aside. The plaintiff would be entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in the trial court as decreed by the trial court. In all other respects, the decree is set aside. The revision is partly allowed.