Hon'ble Dinesh Kumar Singh-I,J.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Dinesh Kumar Singh - I J.)
1. Heard Sri Rajeev Lochan Shukla, Advocate holding brief of Sri Santosh Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for the revisionist, Sri G.P. Singh, learned A.G.A. and perused the record.
2. By means of this revision the revisionist has challenged the impugned order dated 04.08.2018 passed by Additional Session Judge/Special Judge (Anti-Corruption), Meerut whereby charges have been framed, consequent upon the order dated 21.07.2018 whereby the discharge application has been dismissed in Special Criminal Case No. 97 of 2016 (CB No. 481/1998, Case No.0600001 of 2011) (State vs. Mukesh Kumar Singhal) arising out of FIR No. 92 of 1998 registered at P.S. Khurja Dehat, Bulandshahar under sections 420/409/218/120B/201/467/468/471 IPC .
3. It appears from the impugned order dated 21/07/2015 that as per prosecution case, the revisionist was functioning as branch manager, Oriental Bank of Commerce at the relevant point of time, that is, from 1997-1998 and that in collusion with The co-accused with a view to obtaining financial gain by way of helping certain persons obtain compensation amount illegally in prosecution of criminal conspiracy he was instrumental in preparation of several forged documents & in opening of several bank accounts in a forged manner which were later on closed after withdrawal of the amount of compensation credited in those accounts. An FIR was got registered by the informant Ram Charan Singh in this regard being crime no. 92 of 1998 under sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 201, 218 and 120 B IPC at PS Khurja, District Bulandshahar against the revisionist and some other accused persons, wherein, after investigation, charge sheet was submitted under all the afore- mentioned sections. The presiding officer of the trial court was presented an application 55 Kha under section 227 Cr. P.C. by the revisionist for being discharged, which has been dismissed by impugned order dated 21/07/2018 and the charges have been framed against the revisionist vide order dated 04/08/2018
4. It is recorded in the impugned order dated 21/07/2018 that in this matter earlier the learned presiding officer had framed charges against the applicant and other co-accused under afore- mentioned sections vide order dated 14/9/2015, which was challenged by the accused in proceedings under 482 Cr. P.C. being case no. 12734 of 2016, in which the charges were quashed because it was held that the said court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.
5. The main emphasis laid in the application 55 Kha was that the prosecution could not have been initiated against the applicant pursuant to the filing of charge- sheet dated 17/10/2011 because no sanction for prosecution was obtained from the competent authority. It is further mentioned that by the prosecuting agency, charge- sheet dated 28/09/2009 pertaining to crime no. 92/1998 under sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 201, 218, 120 B IPC was sent to the Asstt. General Manager (HRD), Oriental Bank of Commerce, New Delhi for seeking sanction to prosecute the applicant which was responded by letter dated 19/01/2010 of Asst General Manager declining the sanction, which was evident from Parcha dated 09/03/2011 of the case diary, therefore the prosecution against the applicant was not maintainable. It is further mentioned in the impugned order that the Crime Branch had sent another letter dated 03/02/2011 to the bank for securing sanction to prosecute the applicant but again the same was declined vide letter dated 23/02/2011. It was argued before the trial court that in the light of law laid down in T. S. Ramaswamy vs State of Tamil Nadu, 1994 Cr LJ 545 and several other case laws, it was established position of law that prosecution sanction was necessary to be obtained before prosecuting a public servant for an act committed during discharge of his official duty.
6. The trial court made it clear in its order that in proceedings under sections 5 of the PC Act it would require to move an application for discharge under sections 239 Cr. P.C. instead of 227 Cr. P.C. and thereafter, after having heard both the sides it gave finding that it was evident from perusal of the record that the charge sheet was submitted under sections 409, 420, 467, 460, 471, 201, 218 and 120 B IPC, whereon cognizance had been taken. It was further mentioned that while holding the post of Manager of the Bank in question in the year 1997 the revisionist in prosecution of criminal conspiracy prepared forged documents and thereby committed the offence of cheating and also had caused the disappearance of the evidence of his committing offence and all these acts could not be taken to have been done in discharge of his official duty. The trial court has relied upon the law laid down in Prakash Singh Badal vs State of Punjab, AIR 2007 Supreme Court 1274, in which it was held that looking to the nature of offence under afore- mentioned sections it could not be said that such criminal acts were performed in discharge of official duties by the public servant, hence there was no necessity for seeking prior prosecution sanction under sections 197 Cr. P.C.. It was further recorded in the impugned order that it was evident from the perusal of the documents on record that while holding a public post, in the year 1997, the revisionist along with co-accused was involved in hatching a criminal conspiracy in pursuance of which a sum of Rs. 9, 39, 894/- of compensation amount was withdrawn illegally involving preparation of various forged documents and besides that the applicant had helped in opening 11 accounts on 12/01/1998 in a forged manner in the bank concerned and all those accounts were closed after having made payments of 11 loose cheques on 17/01/1998, copies of all such chques were also enclosed with the case diary. Thus, the revisionist appears to have helped in opening the said accounts in collusion with account holders with a view to helping them obtain compensation amount illegally and thereafter when the said amount had been drawn, the said accounts are allowed to be closed in short span of time which suggests collusion of the revisionist for illegal personal gain and loss to the bank. Therefore the trial court has found primafacie evidence on record constituting the offences under the afore-mentioned sections. It has further been mentioned in the impugned order by the trial court that at the time of framing of charge the court is only required to consider as to whether there was primafacie evidence to frame the charge against the accused as was held by the Hon'ble Apex court in a number of cases.
7. The trial court has also relied upon Rajbir Singh vs State of U.P. and another, (2006) 4 Supreme Court cases 51, in which the F.I.R. was showing that three accused had come at the spot armed with firearms and after giving exhortation to kill Hori Lal and others resorted to firing as a result of which Hori Lal and a girl belonging to scheduled caste who had come there to purchase some articles, died. During investigation name of respondent 2 appeared that one of the accused handed over his rifle to respondent 2, who ran away from the spot. The trial court framed charges against respondent 2 under sections 302 read with sections 34 IPC and sections 3 (2) (v) of SC and ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. Respondent 2 filed a revision before High Court challenging the framing of charge and the High Court set aside the order on the basis of reasoning that the firing was not aimed at the deceased girl and that she received injuries accidentally. The Hon'ble Apex Court held the reasoning of the High Court to be erroneous and unsustainable and held that as the prosecution case was that respondent 2 had run away from the scene after accused handed over his rifle to him showed commission of offence under sections 201 IPC and also held that the High Court had failed to appreciate offence under sections 301 IPC which was also attracted. In paragraph 8 of the judgment it has been recorded that section 228 (1) (b) Cr. P.C. says that if, after some consideration and hearing, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which is triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. The scope of this provision has been considered in a catena of decisions of the Apex Court. In State of Bihar vs Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 it is held that reading sections 227 and 228 Cr. P.C. together in juxtaposition, it would be clear that at the beginning and at the initial stage of the trial, veracity and effect of evidence, which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulous judged nor any weight is to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligated for the court at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under sections 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage, the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in conviction. The strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient evidence for proceeding against the accused. If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.
8. In view of above the learned trial court dismissed the application for discharge of the revisionist and has framed the charges under sections 120 B IPC read with 420, 467, 468, 471, 467/34 IPC, 468/34 IPC, 471/34 IPC, 218/34 IPC, 201/34 IPC, 420/34 IPC and 409/34 IPC.
9. The grounds raised by the revisionist are that the revisionist had no concern and association with the Irrigation Dept; trial court failed to appreciate that no forged documents had been recovered either from the possession of the revisionist or from the possession of the bank and yet the trial court has wrongly appreciated that the revisionist had committed an offence in prosecution of criminal conspiracy with other co-accused. The trial court failed to appreciate the fact that both the sections that is 409 and 420 IPC cannot go together because of their inherent essentials, because in a case of criminal breach of trust, a person already has dominion over the property while in a case under sections 420 IPC the offender receives the same by deceiving other person. In the case at hand neither the revisionist had dominion over the alleged property nor had he received the same by deceiving the informant/complainant. The revisionist had not induced any person to open bank account. None of the persons who opened account had lodged any complaint against the revisionist; as such no primafacie offence under above-mentioned sections was made out. The persons whose accounts had been opened with the bank by the revisionist had never denied their signature or particulars or cheques or deposit slips. The revisionist was working with the Oriental Bank of Commerce at the time of the alleged incident and whatever signatures/entries have been made, were made in official capacity being employee of the bank and the bank never disputed credibility or authenticity of the working of the revisionist and that was the reason why the bank had not given sanction to prosecute the revisionist. At the relevant point of time the revisionist was holding the post of Manager in the Oriental Bank of Commerce at Khurja and his main duty was to open the accounts of the customers which he did with due care and diligence as per the policy of the bank. Nothing attracts the ingredients of offence under sections 467, 218 and 201 IPC because neither any forged document had been found nor any incorrect entry was made by him with an intention to save person from punishment nor was he responsible for causing disappearance of any evidence. The trial court failed to appreciate the facts disclosed in Prakash Singh Badal vs State of Punjab, AIR 2007 SC 1274 which were entirely different from the facts in the present case as in the present case the revisionist had done all the acts in official capacity and nothing incriminating had been found from his possession. In Chittarajan Das vs State of Orissa, 2012 (76) ACC 612 SC it had been held by the Hon'ble Apex court that protection of sections 197 Cr. P.C. would remain available to the Government servant for any act performed in discharge of his official duty even after he retired from service, otherwise no public servant would be able to discharge his official duty without fear or favour. The revisionist had retired from service on 31st of January 2018.
10. To begin with, the learned counsel for the revisionist argued that no ingredient of the offences of which the charge has been framed are made out on the basis of evidence collected by the prosecuting/investigating agency. Although we were not taken through the evidence which was gathered by the investigating agency during the investigation to establish his claim except orally arguing that the revisionist had no role in award of enhanced compensation for the acquisition of land of the account holders as the same was done by the executive authorities who have been made accused against whom there are various allegations that number of more trees etc. were shown to be standing on the lands which were acquired with the sole aim that higher compensation would be awarded in lieu of acquisition of such land.
11. We find that the main role of the revisionist recorded in the charge- sheet is at page 105, 106, 107 and 108 of the paper book in which it is mentioned that one Vinay Pratap Singh, advocate had called the revisionist at his residence by telephoning him and a conspiracy was hatched with respect to opening saving bank accounts of certain persons which involved that in such opening of saving bank accounts one account should be genuine and the other should be forged. From all the farmers four photographs along with Rs. 100 each were collected by the revisionist and on various small and big blank papers their signatures and thumb impressions were obtained at various places on 31/12/1997 in the afternoon. When the revisionist was obtaining the signatures/thumb impressions with regard to opening the bank accounts, at the same time signatures with respect to having obtained the amount of compensation for trees paid from the side of Irrigation Dept through cheques were also obtained. On 12/01/1998, 11 farmers had opened new accounts in lieu of Rs. 10/- and on 17/01/1998 the payment of cheque amount were made through those newly opened accounts the same day and thereafter the said back accounts were closed. When the entire payment, to be paid through cheques to each farmer, was made on 17/01/1998 to Jitendra Sharma, only some amount of each farmer was deposited the same day. There was no account opened of Jitendra Sharma while each farmer had opened his account in the bank, therefore they ought to have been paid directly. It makes clear that after having taken 11 farmers in confidence, Vinay Pratap Singh, Jitendra Sharma, Yashpal Singh and the revisionist frauduently had withdrawn some amount from their accounts on 17/01/1998 and had embezzled the same. There was need of only one photograph for opening the account while the revisionist had taken four photographs. The accounts were opened between 12/01/1998 to 23/1/1998, the introducer was Vinay Pratap Singh. The cheques which had been used on 17/01/1998 for withdrawing money from the account of concerned farmers were loose cheques. The payment of amount to all the farmers was made on 17/01/1998 by Jitendra Sharma on one token only though he had no bank account in Oriental Bank of Commerce, Khurja. It has been further recorded in the charge- sheet that thus, the revisionist, in collusion with junior clerk Yashpal Singh, Vinay Pratap Singh and Jitendra Sharma of Irrigation Dept, had under a well thought out plan, had usurped the money from such accounts which amounted to the tune of Rs. 9, 39, 894/-.
12. We are not inclined to scrutinise evidence in respect of each and every Section which has been slapped against the revisionist by the trial court as to whether of each such section there was evidence on record or not before framing of charge, because the charge can be amended at any stage till the final pronouncement of the judgment, which is a settled law. Merely because charge has been framed under sections with respect to which in particular there is no evidence available on record to meet out its ingredients, does not appear to cause any prejudice to the revisionist. We would like to rely upon the law under section 228 Cr. P.C. in criminal appeal no. 315 of 2011, Mauvin Godinho vs State of Goa and other connected appeals, (2018) 3 Supreme Court cases 358, in which it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that while framing charges under sections 228 Cr. P.C., the court should apply primafacie standard, although the application of this standard depends on facts and circumstances in each case, a primafacie case against the accused is said to be made when the probative value of the evidence on all the essential elements in the charge taken as a whole is such that it is sufficient to induce the court to believe in the existence of the facts pertaining to such essential elements or to consider its existence so probable that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that those facts existed or did happen. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting trial. In the present case on the basis of allegation which are contained in the charge- sheet regarding which evidence has been brought on record by the prosecuting agency, it could not be at the outset held that there was no evidence against the revisionist as charge under Section 120 B IPC is also there. In above conspectus it cannot be ruled out that there may have been involvement of the revisionist. The argument of the learned counsel for the revisionist that he had nothing to do with the revenue/administrative authorities who were instrumental in awarding compensation and moreover no such paper/document was produced by the investigating authorities which could be said to have been forged by the revisionist rather the bank was of the view that the accounts which were opened by the revisionist were in accordance with Rules and that there was no involvement of the revisionist in the case on hand. We may mention here that the defence taken by the revisionist cannot be taken at this stage because that would be subject matter of trial and we find that primafacie there was enough material for the court to fame the charges and that if any charge is found to have been made beyond evidence on record, the revisionist would still have opportunity to meet out the same and the court can always modify the charges at any stage till the final judgment is pronounced.
13. Next, we would like to deal with the most important argument which has been raised by the learned counsel for the revisionist that the prosecution was barred by Section 197 Cr. P.C. as no prosecution sanction had been obtained before taking cognizance in the matter and earlier on two occasions the bank had refused to accord permission to prosecute the revisionist.
14. In this regard the learned counsel for the revisionist has relied upon the judgment of this Bench only delivered on an application under Section 482 Cr. P.C. No. 28527 of 2017, Dr. Ram Babu vs State of U.P., Laws (All) 2015 5 62, in which placing reliance upon the law laid down in Chittaranjan Das vs State of Orissa, (2011) 7 Supreme Court cases 172, this court had held that when the applicant had been exonerated in departmental enquiry and thereafter also the Government had refused to grant sanction to prosecute the applicant, even then the learned court below had proceeded to hold trial of the applicant, which was not found to be in accordance with law and the court had found that in view of the prosecution sanction not having been taken under Section 197 Cr. P.C., the criminal prosecution against the applicant, who had retired long back, was not justified and accordingly quashed the prosecution. As per the facts of this case there was allegation against the applicant that he being chief medical officer, Ghaziabad during 1987 - 1988, in collusion with others had purchased stationery of Rs. 1, 63, 941 from M/s. Industrial Co-Operative Ltd, Lucknow showing the said firm registered with the Registrar Co-Operative Societies without following the procedure. After investigation charge sheet had been submitted against the applicant under sections 409, 417, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477 - A and 120 B IPC and Section 13 (1) (d) and 13 (2) of the Act and the cognizance had been taken and the charge had been framed by the trial court under those sections on 20/07/2013. It was apparent that no prior sanction for prosecution had been taken under Section 197 Cr. P.C. from the competent authority to proceed with the criminal prosecution against the applicant as the said act was alleged to have been committed in discharge of his official duty. An application for discharge was moved by the applicant under Section 227 Cr. P.C. raising objection that the Government had not granted sanction under sections 197 Cr. P.C. hence prosecution could not go ahead and that the matter was being examined by the State, therefore he should be discharged, but no orders were passed by the court below on the said application. Thereafter an order dated 01/04/2015 was passed by the Secretary, Chikitsa Anubhag - 2, Lucknow reciting therein that in the investigation of the case crime no. 1492 of 2010 by the vigilance Dept, the enquiry report of the said Dept had been examined by the State Government and it was found that the applicant had retired in July, 2007 and that it was found that at the relevant time the applicant was not discharging the function of drawing and disbursing officer and hence he was not involved in transaction of bills pertaining to grant of contract to M/s. Capital Printing Industrial Cooperative Society Ltd. It was also found that the said firm had been duly registered with the Registrar Co-Operative Societies vide certificate dated 19/01/1988. Thus there was no need for calling for quotations or tenders in pursuance of the order of the State Government dated 03/06/1993. The applicant was also not found guilty in the departmental enquiry and since no offence was found to have been committed by him, there was no occasion for granting sanction for criminal prosecution and accordingly the Hon'ble Governor was pleased to close the matter against the applicant. The learned trial court despite these facts had rejected the discharge application by impugned order dated 13/01/2017. It was apparent in this case that the applicant had retired in July 2007 and that the Hon'ble Governor had refused sanction to prosecute the applicant vide order dated 01/04/2015, that is, after his retirement. In Chittaranjan Das's case (supra) it was interpreted that in a case in which sanction sought was refused by the competent authority, while the public servant is in service, he cannot be prosecuted later after retirement, notwithstanding the fact that no sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act is necessary after retirement of public servant. Any other view would render the protection illusory. Situation may be different when sanction is refused by the competent authority after the retirement of the public servant as in that case sanction is not at all necessary and any exercise in this regard would be an action in futility.
15. We would like to place reliance upon Gian Chandra and others vs State of Haryana, (2013) 14 Supreme Court Cases 420, although it related to a case under NDPS Act, but principle of law in respect of criminal cases may be adhered to, which says in paragraph 24 of the judgment that one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases or between two accused in the same case. Each case depends on its own facts and the close similarity between one case and another is not enough because a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. It is more pronounced in criminal cases where the backbone of adjudication is fact-based.
16. In backdrop of above position of law we can safely conclude that the facts of Dr. Ram Babu vs State of U.P. (supra) in which proceedings were quashed by this Bench had different set of facts which have already been mentioned above, hence we may not feel compelled to follow the same line of interpretation which was made in the said case particularly keeping in mind the law laid down in Chittaranjan Das vs State of Orissa (supra) in which it was held that if sanction was refused by the competent authority in respect of public servant while he was in service, he could not be prosecuted later when he retired, notwithstanding the fact that no sanction for prosecution was required under PC Act after retirement of a public servant. In Dr. Ram Babu's case (supra) the applicant had been exonerated in departmental enquiry and the Government refused to grant sanction to prosecute him and it was noticed while refusing prosecution sanction that at the relevant time the applicant was not discharging functions as DDO, hence he was not involved in the transaction in question besides not being found guilty in departmental enquiry and also it being found that the firm from which the purchase was made was duly registered with the Registrar Co-Operative Societies, hence there was no need for calling for quotations and tenders etc.. While in the present case the facts mentioned above suggest that there could be involvement of the revisionist as he was very much holding the post, in the capacity of which he was instrumental in opening the bank accounts of the persons, in whose accounts the amount of compensation was transferred and later on after withdrawal of the amounts, those accounts were alleged to have been closed and it is also alleged that the said accounts were opened on the basis of forged documents, hence it could not been ruled out that the revisionist was involved without full trial of the case. The principle of law which has been laid down in Prakash Singh Badal's case, (2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases 1, in paragraph 38 of the judgment may be borrowed in the present matter which says that the question relating to need of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein. The question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. Further in Para 50 it has been recorded that the offence of cheating under sections 420 or for that matter offences relatable to sections 467, 468, 471 and 120 B can by no stretch of imagination by the very nature be regarded as having been committed by any public servant while acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duty. In such cases, the official status only provides an opportunity for commission of the offence.
17. We would also like to place reliance upon R.K. Pradhan vs State of Sikkim, (2001) 6 SCC 704, in which it was recorded that the legislative mandate engrafted in sub-section (1) of Section 197 debarring a court from taking cognizance of an offence except with the previous sanction of the Government concerned in a case where the acts complained appears to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his official duty or purporting to be in the discharge of his official duty and such public servant is not removable from office save by or with the sanction of the Government, touches the jurisdiction of the court itself. It is a prohibition imposed by the statute from taking cognizance. Different tests have been laid down in decided cases to ascertain the scope and meaning of the relevant words occurring in Section 197 of the Code, ''any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty'. The offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. No question of sanction can arise under Section 197, unless the act complained of is an offence. The only point for determination is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits. What a court has to find out is whether the act and the official duty are so interrelated that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of official duty, though, possibly in excess of needs and requirements of situation. Thus, from a prospective survey of aforesaid decisions, it would be clear that for claiming protection under Section 197 of the Code, it has to be shown by the accused that there is reasonable connection between the act complained of and the discharge of official duty. An official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. For invoking protection under Section 197 of the Code, the acts of the accused complained of must be such that the same cannot be separated from the discharge of official duty, but if there was no reasonable connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishes only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required. If the case as put forward by the prosecution fails or the defence establishes that the act purported to be done was in discharge of duty, the proceedings would have to be dropped. It is well-settled that question of sanction under Section 197 of the Code can be raised at any time after the cognizance, maybe immediately after cognizance or framing of charge or even at the time of conclusion of trial and after conviction as well. But there may be certain cases where it may not be possible to decide the question effectively without giving opportunity to the defence to establish that what he did was in discharge of official duty. In order to come to the conclusion whether claim of the accused that the act that he did was on course of performance of his duty was a reasonable one and neither pretended nor fanciful, can be examined during the course of trial by giving opportunity to the defence to establish it. In such an eventuality, the question of sanction should be left open to be decided in the main judgment which may be delivered upon conclusion of the trial.
18. In above position of law we are of categorical opinion that it is bounden duty of the courts to ensure that guilty is punished. No guilty public servant should be allowed to get away on technical grounds to escape the punishment. It may be true that the bank did not grant permission to prosecute the revisionist because he was their employee/officer. It will have to be seen in the light of evidence as to whether the acts which are alleged to have been committed by him, regarding which the evidence has been gathered by the investigating agency that he was instrumental in opening accounts of several persons on the basis of forged documents in collusion with other co-accused to help them get compensation amount at higher rates than they were actually entitled to and that soon after the withdrawal of the said amount of compensation from such newly opened accounts, they were closed also, whether it all was done innocently in discharge of official duty of the revisionist or was that beyond the pale of duty has to be determined on the basis of trial. It would be improper rather would amount to abetting the offence not to proceed with the trial to ensure that the guilty is punished. Therefore the impugned orders do not deserve to be set aside and the revision deserves to be dismissed.
19. The revision is accordingly dismissed.
(Dinesh Kumar Singh-I, J.) (Ramesh Sinha, J.) Order Date :- 26.10.2018 AU h