JUDGMENT Bennet, J.
1. In this case the plaintiff sued to recover Rs. 1275 on the basis of a promissory note dated 13th September 1927 executed by Ram Sarup deceased who was the husband of the defendant, Mt. Shyam Poari. The trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that no suit lay on the promissory note. An appeal was taken and the plaintiff's case was decreed on 30th August 1935. The defendant has brought an appeal on several grounds but the only ground which has been argued is the ground of limitation. The facts are that the plaintiff relied on a payment of Rs. 20 made on 4th October 1930 as saving limitation and he brought the suit on 4th October 1933. The date on which the payment was made was more than three years from the date of the promissory note, that is 13th September 1927, but the plaintiff relied on the provisions of Section 4, Limitation Act. Now Section 4 states:
Where the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day that the Court re-opens.
2. There has been a ruling of their Lordships of the Privy Council subsequent to the filing of the present suit, Maqbul Aham v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh (1935) 22 A.I.R. P.C. 85. In that case the plaintiff had obtained a preliminary decree and he had to make an application for a final decree within a certain period. The Civil Courts were closed for vacation on the date on which this period expired and if he had applied to the correct Court he would have been within limitation under the provisions of Section 4, Limitation Act. Unfortunately for him he applied to the wrong Court and he was then referred to the correct Court and later filed his application there. The plaintiff therefore desired to combine the benefits of Sections 14 and 4. Their Lordships held that this could not be done and they observed on page 248 : "The language employed in Section 4 indicates that it has nothing to do with computing the prescribed period." On that dictum, Section 4 cannot be employed in the present case to extend the prescribed period under Section 20, Limitation Act. This view of the law has also been taken in a ruling of this Bench, Puran Chand v. Abdullah (1938) 25 A.I.R. All. 606 where there was a similar question of a payment on a promissory note made during vacation after the period of limitation has expired and the period expired during that vacation. No ruling has been shown to the contrary except the ruling of a learned single Judge of this Court in Abdul Ghani v. Chiranji Lal (1927) A.I.R. All. 577. That ruling was disapproved of in a Full Bench ruling of this Court, Shanker Lal v. Rana Lal Singh (1938) 25 .A.I.R. All. 217. For these reasons we hold that this suit has been brought after the period of limitation had expired and must fail. But the suit was brought in 1933 when the only ruling available was that in Abdul Ghani v. Chiranji Lal (1927) A.I.R. All. 577 which was in favour of the plaintiff. Another point is that by the payment in question the plaintiff was induced not to bring his suit, whereas if he had known that the view of the law was going to be altered he would doubtless have filed his suit on 4th October 1930 when he could have had the benefit of filing the suit under Section 4, Limitation Act. Under these circumstances we allow the appeal, but direct that the parties should pay their costs throughout. The suit of the plaintiff is dismissed.