JUDGMENT Iqbal Ahmad, J.
1. This appeal is connected with Second Appeal No. 309 of 1928. Both the appeals are by defendant and arise out of two suits for profits filed in the revenue Court under Section 164, Agra Ten. Act, Act 2 of 1901. The trial Court ultimately passed decrees in both the suits in the plaintiff's favour on 8th March 1927. Both the suits were valued at more than Rs. 100 but at less than Rs. 200. On the date of the institution of the suit the old Agra Tenancy Act, (Act 2 of 1901) was in force but on the date of the decision by the Assistant Collector, the New Agra Tenancy Act (Act 3 of 1926) had come into force. By the former Tenancy Act an appeal was allowed to the District Judge against the decree of an Assistant Collector of the first class in any of the suits included in Group A and Group B of that Act in which the amount of the value of the subject matter exceeded Rs. 100. A suit for profits under Section 164 was included in Group B of that Act and as such an appeal against a decree in such suit, the valuation of which exceeds Rs. 100, lay to the District Judge under the old Act.
2. By the new Act an appeal in a suit for profits against the decree of an Assistant Collector of the first class is allowed in the Court of the District Judge, provided the amount of value of the subject matter of the suit exceeds Rs. 200.
3. It would thus appear that if the right of appeal was governed by the present Tenancy Act, the defendant had no right to appeal against the decrees of the Assistant Collector in the suits giving rise to the present appeal in the Court of the District Judge. But if the right of appeal is governed by the old Act, the defendant had undoubtedly a right of appeal. The learned District Judge on appeal by the defendant held that inasmuch as the decree of the Assistant Collector appealed against was passed after the coming into force of the present Tenancy Act, the right of appeal must be governed by that Act, and inasmuch as the valuation of the suits did not exceed Rs. 200, he was not competent to entertain the appeals. Holding this view he dismissed the appeals filed by the defendant. The learned Counsel for the defendant-appellant assails the decree of the learned District Judge on the ground that he was wrong in holding that the appeals filed by the defendant were not governed by the former Tenancy Act. This contention of the learned Counsel is well founded and is supported by the recent Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Rama Singha v. Shankar Dayal A.I.R. 1928 All. 437. It was held in that case that a suit which was instituted before the coming into force of the new Act but was decided after it had come into operation, was in the matter of appeals, governed by the old Act. Accordingly I hold that the learned District Judge was competent to entertain and hear the appeals, and the view of the law taken by him is erroneous. The learned Counsel for the respondents has not supported the decree of the District Judge on the ground that no appeal lay to him, but his contention before me is that the decree of the learned District Judge dismissing the appeals filed by the defendant should be upheld on the ground that the appeals filed by the defendant were filed beyond the expiry of the period of limitation. His argument is that though the right of appeal is a substantive right, no one has a vested right in a period of limitation and he argues that the Indian Limitation Act not having been made applicable to suits and proceedings under the new Agra Tenancy Act, Act 3 of 1926, the defendant is not entitled, in the computation of the period of limitation for filing an appeal to the exclusion of the time taken in obtaining certified copies of the judgment and decree of the learned Assistant Collector. In support of this contention he has placed reliance on the decision of Baijnath v. Doolarey Hajjam A.I.R. 1928 All. 708. It was held in that case that the rules of limitation are prima facie rules of procedure and that rules applicable to an appeal must be rules of limitation which are in force at the time when the appeal is filed. He has also placed reliance on Section 231, Agra Tenancy Act, and has argued that the provisions of that section lead to the conclusion that no section of the Indian Limitation Act except Section 5 of that Act has been made applicable to suits and proceedings under the Tenancy Act.
4. I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents. By Section 231, Act 3 of 1926, all that the legislature intended to and did provide was that the provisions of Section 5, Lim. Act, would apply to all suits and proceedings under that Act. The necessity for enacting that section must have been occasioned by the provision in Section 5, Lim. Act that section may be made applicable by any enactment for the time being in force to applications other than those enumerated in that section. Further Section 5, Lim. Act, does not apply to suits, and it seems that in this respect the framers of the Agra Tenancy Act wanted to extend the scope of that section and to apply it to suits as well. The mere fact that there is a specific section in Act 3 of 1926 providing for the applicability of Section 5, Lim. Act, does not lead to the conclusion that it was intended by that section to exclude the applicability of the rest of the Limitation Act to suits and proceedings under the Tenancy Act. It will be noticed that neither the old nor the present Tenancy Act prescribes any period of limitation for appeals preferred in the Court of District Judges against the decrees of Assistant Collectors of the first class and as pointed out in the case of Ram Lal v. Amar Chand [1912] 10 A.L.J. 535:
As a matter of recognized practice, limitation for appeals to District Judges has always been taken to be one month from the date of the decree.
5. It was further held in that case that inasmuch as the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, with certain modifications and exceptions, have been made applicable to all suits and other proceedings under the Tenancy Act so far as they are not inconsistent therewith, an appeal against a decree of an Assistant Collector to the District Judge is governed by the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure and that Article 152, Lim. Act, is the article applicable to such appeals.
6. In my judgment the defendant in computing the period of limitation for the appeals filed by him in the Court of the District Judge was entitled to exclude the time taken in obtaining certified copies of judgments and decrees, and it is agreed by the learned Counsel for the respondents that if that time is excluded the appeals filed in the Court of the District Judge were within time. For the reasons given above I allow these appeals, set aside the decrees of the learned District Judge in both appeals and send the cases back to him with direction to re-admit the appeals to their original number and dispose them of according to law. Costs here and hitherto shall be costs in the cause and shall abide the result.