JUDGMENT Young, J.
1. This is a second appeal from the decision of the District Judge Aligarh. The plaintiff brought a (sic) or a declaration that a certain compromise in connection with a house was not binding upon her. The learned Judge in the Court below found as a fact that her vakil had been authorised by his vakalatnama to do all things for the lady as if she had done them personally; that he was authorised to enter into a compromise; that he had, in fact, entered into a compromise and that having done so with full knowledge and consent and authority of the lady, her action could not lie. The compromise itself, the Judge finds--and I see no reason to disagree with him--is an eminently fair and reasonable one. On the face of it no suggestion could possibly be made that the plaintiff, even though she was a woman, had been in any way taken advantage of or defrauded. This is not one of those cases where the compromise itself is some evidence of fraud. It is agreed by counsel for the appellant that he has no case, if the vakalatnama did, in fact, give the vakil full authority to act for the plaintiff and compromise the case on her behalf. In my opinion, there is no doubt about the terms of the vakalatnama. It is true that an expression used in it is "file an application for compromise." But I am satisfied that that term does not simply mean the executive act of taking a compromise agreed to by his client to the Court and filing it. The terms of the vakalatnama, which has been translated, give the vakil the greatest possible authority that any vakil could have and it finally ends up with the statement that any act of Vakil would be considered the personal act of the plaintiff herself and would be binding upon her.
or words to that effect. Under these circumstances there is no doubt that authority was given to the vakil under it to enter into the compromise. This being so, the only possible ground of appeal would be that the lady was a pardanashin lady and that she had not understood the nature of her act, and that therefore the vakalatnama was not binding upon her. No case has been made out upon this point, and indeed it would be impossible to do so. The plaintiff herself appeared in Court and gave evidence and according to the Judge was an intelligent woman and well understood her business. Indeed she seemed to have the better of the contest with counsel in the Court of first instance. She obviously is not a woman that would be described as a pardanashin lady, within the meaning of the terms. The facts having been found as above and the vakalatnama being perfectly clear in its terms, the appeal must be dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal in Letters Patent is refused.