JUDGMENT C.S.P. Singh, J.
1. This special appeal, which is directed against the decision of a learned Single Judge, is primarily concerned with the interpretation to be put on Section 6 of the U.P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act, 1952 (hereinafter called the Supplementary Act).
2. The appellant claimed Adhivasi rights by virtue of an entry in her name as an occupant in the Khasra of 1356 F. The contesting respondents were, however, entered as being in cultivatory possession in 1359 F, and this being so the Board of Revenue following a decision of this Court held that the appellant's right as an Adhivasi based on the Khasra of 1356 F, must yield to the rights of the respondents who had become Adhivasis under the Supplementary Act. Before the learned Single Judge it was urged that inasmuch as the respondents had filed a suit under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and obtained a decree for dispossession of the appellant, this went to show that rights had accrued to the respondents under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and as such they could not get the benefit of the Supplementary Act. This contention was, however, not allowed to be pressed as the learned Single Judge was of the view that such a plea had not been raised in the Courts below and further that it involved an investigation of facts.
3. The second contention urged before the learned Single Judge, was that the respondents would still not be entitled to the benefit of the Supplementary Act, inasmuch as they had filed a suit under . Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and obtained a decree which had become final before the 1st July 1952. This argument was based on the provisions of Section 6 (a) (ii) of the Supplementary Act. This contention was, however, repelled on the ground that Section 6 (a) (ii) applied to the oases where the decree for possession had been passed against the person who was in cultivatory possession in 1359 F. It is the correctness of this view that has been challenged in this appeal.
4. Section 6 of the Supplementary Act may be extracted:
"Nothing in this Act shall apply to any land-
(a) in respect of which
(i) a suit of the nature provided for in Section 180 or Section 183 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 or an appeal or other proceedings from a decree passed in such suit was pending in any revenue or Civil Court on the 30th day of June, 1952.
(ii) a decree for possession had been passed and became final on or before the said date or
(iii) an order for restoration of possession has been passed under Section 522, Criminal Procedure Code, before the commencement of this Act.
(b) ...... ...... ...... ......"
5. The language of Section 6 (a) (ii) is clear and unambiguous, and excludes the applicability of the Supplementary Act to those cases where a decree for possession had been passed and had become final. In the present case it is admitted that the decree for possession had been passed before the appointed date, and as such the respondents who claim superior Adhivasi rights on the basis of their cultivatory possession in 1359 F could not get advantage of this Act. The learned Single Judge, has, however, restricted the applicability of this sub-section, on the ground that statement of objects and reasons and the context and scheme of the Act went on to indicate that this sub-section applied only to a case where a decree had been passed against a Person in cultivatory possession in 1359 F, and not to a case where a decree has been made in favour of the person who was claiming rights on the basis of his cultivatory possession in 1359 F. With the utmost respect, we are unable to subscribe to this view. We have not been able to discover anything either in the statement of objects and reasons, or in the scheme of the Act to modify the plain intendment of the Legislature as expressed in Section 6 (a) (ii) of the Supplementary Act, which takes out of the purview of this Act cases where a decree for possession has become final before the appointed date. Moreover, we are of the view that the consideration as to whether this subsection, was enacted for the benefit of a person claiming Adhivasi rights on the basis of his cultivatory possession in, 1359 F is not relevant for the purposes of interpreting Section 6 (a) (ii). The opening part of this section begins with the words:
"Nothing in this Act shall apply to any land."
It will be noticed that all that has got to be seen for the applicability of this sub-section is, as to whether there is a decree for dispossession in respect of any land. The relevant factor to be considered under Section 6 is land and not the 'person' who claims Adhivasi rights. In this view of the matter the claim of the appellant for Adhivasi rights, in view of the entry in her favour in the Khasra of 1356 F could not be negatived on account of the fact that the contesting respondents were entered in cultivatory possession in 1359 F.
6. Counsel for the respondents, however, urged that the learned Single Judge should not have permitted the appellant to urge this point, as such a plea had not been taken before the revenue authorities. There might have been some substance in this argument had such an objection been taken before the learned Single Judge. It, however, does not appear that such an objection was taken by the respondents at the time when this contention was raised before the learned Single Judge. This being so, we are unable to uphold this objection.
7. The Special Appeal is allowed and the order and the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside. The orders dated 28-3-1962, 30-8-1962 and 20-7-1963 are quashed. The appellant will be entitled to her costs.