M.Sridhar vs The Managing Director

- [W.P.(MD)No.20001 of 2015]:

3.1. The Appellant had completed his 8th Standard in Panchayat Union Middle School, Kadaladi Panchayat Union, Ramnad District. He was issued with a Transfer Certificate. As a matter of fact, he was appointed as 'Trainee Driver' in the Respondents/Transport Corporation on 09.05.1992. He was confirmed as Driver on 20.01.1993. After 13 years, i.e., on 25.05.2005, he was issued with a Charge Memo on the basis that he had produced a Bogus Educational Certificate at the time of appointment and he was directed to file his objections, within 72 Hours. On 18.07.2005, he submitted his explanation by denying the charge.

3.2. It is the stand of the Appellant that without providing an opportunity to supply the documents, the second Respondent/General Manager, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Kumbakonam Limited), Division -III, Karaikudi Region, Karaikudi, on 09.08.2005, had issued an Enquiry Notice to conduct Domestic Enquiry. Indeed, on 26.12.2005, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report and drew Minutes as if the Appellant had produced Bogus Certificate.

3.3. On 09.01.2006, the second Respondent issued a Notice to the Appellant calling for his objection, if any, on the Enquiry Report. On 20.01.2006, the Appellant submitted his representation to the second Respondent seeking some documents which were relied upon by the Enquiry Officer and based on the said documents, the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion. In fact, the version of the Appellant is that on 04.03.2006, the second Respondent had refused to furnish copies of documents as if the Appellant had signed each and every page of the Enquiry Proceedings and knew about all the Enquiry Proceedings and held that there was no need to supply the documents. Further, on 25.03.2006, the Appellant sent another representation before the second Respondent with a request to furnish the documents and also sought time to submit his explanation. The second Respondent, on 17.04.2006, without furnishing the documents, issued notice to the Appellant calling upon him to submit his explanation on the Enquiry Report. On 27.05.2006, the Appellant submitted his representation to the Respondents to furnish the documents relied upon in the Enquiry Report. On 10.08.2006, the second Respondent had issued a show cause notice to the Appellant to submit his explanation. On 08.03.2012, the second Respondent sent a reminder letter to the Appellant calling upon him to submit his explanation. On 01.10.2015, the second Respondent issued a show cause notice calling upon the Appellant to submit his explanation on the Enquiry Report, within 7 days, failing which, he was informed that he will be terminated from service. On 19.10.2015, the second Respondent passed the impugned order terminating the Appellant from service. Therefore, the Appellant had preferred the Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No.20001 of 2015.

W.A.(MD)No.1323 of 2017:-

4. The Background Facts - [W.P.(MD)No.20009 of 2015]:

4.1. The Appellant had completed his 8th Standard in Panchayat Union Middle School, Kadaladi Panchayat Union, Ramnad District in the year 1979 and he was issued with a Transfer Certificate. On 09.05.1992, he was appointed as 'Trainee Driver' in the Respondents/Transport Corporation. On 20.01.1993, he was confirmed in service as Driver. Further, after 13 years i.e., on 25.05.2005, he was issued with a Charge Memo as if he had produced a 'Bogus Educational Certificate' at the time of appointment. On 18.07.2005, he had submitted his explanation by denying the charges. As a matter of fact, the second Respondent, without accepting the explanation of the Appellant, had issued an 'Enquiry Notice' on 09.08.2005 to conduct Domestic Enquiry. On 26.12.2005, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report and drew Minutes as if the Appellant had produced Bogus Certificate.

4.2. On 09.01.2006, the second Respondent issued a Notice to the Appellant calling for his objection, if any, on the Enquiry Report. The Appellant, on 20.01.2006, had submitted his representation before the second Respondent seeking some documents which were relied upon by the Enquiry Officer and based on the said documents, the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion.

4.3. On 04.03.2006, the second Respondent had refused to furnish the copies of documents as if the Appellant had signed each and every page of the Enquiry Proceedings and knew about all the Enquiry Proceedings and as such, there was no need to furnish the documents. On 25.03.2006, the Appellant sent another representation to the second Respondent requesting to furnish the documents and also sought time to submit his explanation.

4.4. It is the stand of the Appellant that on 17.04.2006, the second Respondent, without furnishing the documents, sent a notice to the Appellant calling upon him to offer his explanation on the Enquiry Report. Indeed, on 27.05.2006, the Appellant sent a representation to the Respondents to furnish the documents relied upon in the Enquiry Report.

4.5. On 10.08.2006, the second Respondent/Transport Corporation had issued a show cause notice to the Appellant to submit his explanation. On 08.03.2012, the second Respondent sent a reminder letter to the Appellant calling upon him to offer his explanation. On 01.10.2015, the second Respondent issued a show cause notice calling upon the Appellant to submit his explanation on the Enquiry Report, within 7 days and further, he was informed that otherwise, he will be terminated from service. Ultimately, on 19.10.2015, the second Respondent passed the impugned order terminating the Appellant from his service. Hence, the Appellant filed the Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No.20009 of 2015.

W.A.(MD)No.1324 of 2017:-

5. The Writ Facts - [W.P.(MD)No.20145 of 2015]:

5.1. The Appellant, in the year 1975, completed his 8th Standard in Vinayagar Senior Basic School, Vellipattinum, Ramnad District and he was issued with a Transfer Certificate. On 31.03.1997, the Appellant was appointed as 'Trainee Driver' in the Respondents/Transport Corporation. He was confirmed as Driver on 17.01.1998. After 8 years i.e., on 25.05.2005, he was issued with a Charge Memo stating that he had produced a Bogus Educational Certificate at the time of appointment and he was directed to file his objections, within 72 Hours. He denied the charges by offering his explanation on 01.07.2005. The second Respondent, without accepting the explanation, issued an Enquiry Notice on 05.12.2005 for conducting a Domestic Enquiry. The Enquiry Officer, on 06.02.2006, submitted his report and drew Minutes as if he had produced Bogus Certificate.

5.2. On 15.02.2006, the second Respondent issued a Notice to the Appellant calling for his objection, if any, on the Enquiry Report. On 25.02.2006, the Appellant submitted his representation to the second Respondent seeking some documents which were relied upon by the Enquiry Officer and based on the said documents, the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion. On 31.03.2006, the second Respondent refused to furnish the copies of documents since he had signed each and every page of the Enquiry Proceedings and knew about all the Enquiry Proceedings and, therefore, there was no need to submit the documents. On 18.04.2006, the Appellant sent another representation to both the Respondents with a request to furnish the documents and also sought time to submit his explanation. The second Respondent, on 01.10.2015, issued a show cause notice calling upon him to submit his explanation on the Enquiry Report, within seven days and further, he was informed that otherwise, he will be terminated from service. On 19.10.2015, the second Respondent passed the impugned order terminating the Appellant from service. Hence, the Appellant had preferred the Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No.20145 of 2015.

W.A.(MD)No.1325 of 2017:-

6. The Writ Factual Matrix- [W.P.(MD)No.20153 of 2015]:

6.1. The Appellant had completed his 8th Standard in the year 1980 in Panchayat Union Middle School, Kadaladi Panchayat Union, Ramnad District and he was issued with a Transfer Certificate. He was appointed as 'Trainee Driver' in the Respondents/Transport Corporation on 14.02.2001. He was confirmed as Driver on 28.10.2002. After four years i.e., on 25.05.2005, he was directed to file his objections for producing the Bogus Educational Certificate at the time of appointment, within 72 Hours. On 03.06.2005, he furnished his explanation by denying the charge. On 17.10.2005 the second Respondent, according to the Appellant, had not provided any opportunity to supply the documents and issued an Enquiry Notice to conduct Domestic Enquiry. On 23.11.2005, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report and drew Minutes as if the Appellant had produced Bogus Certificate.

6.2. On 29.12.2005, the second Respondent/Transport Corporation issued a notice to the Appellant calling for his objection, if any, on the Enquiry Report. He submitted his representation on 09.01.2006 to the second Respondent requiring some documents which were relied upon by the Enquiry Officer and resting on the same, the Officer came to the conclusion. On 28.02.2006, the second Respondent refused to furnish copies of documents as if the Appellant had signed each and every page of the Enquiry Proceedings and knew about all the Enquiry Proceedings and, therefore, there was no need to supply the documents. Apart from that, he sent another representation to the second Respondent requiring the latter to furnish the documents relied upon in the Enquiry Report. On 10.05.2006, the second Respondent, without furnishing the documents, had issued a show cause notice to the Appellant to submit his explanation.

6.3. The second Respondent issued show cause notice calling upon the Appellant to offer his explanation on the Enquiry Report, within seven days and he was further informed that otherwise, he will be terminated from service. On 19.10.2015, the second Respondent passed the impugned order terminating the Appellant from his service. Hence, the Appellant had preferred the Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No.20153 of 2015.

W.A.(MD)No.1326 of 2017:-

7. The Background Facts - [W.P.(MD)No.20154 of 2015]:

7.1. In the year 1980, the Appellant had completed his 8th Standard in Government High School, Nainarkovil, Ramnad District and he was issued with a Transfer Certificate. On 23.02.2001, he was appointed as 'Trainee Driver' in the Respondents/Transport Corporation. On 16.04.2001, he was confirmed in service as 'Driver'. After 5 years, i.e., on 20.01.2006, he was issued with a Charge Memo stating that he had produced a Bogus Educational Certificate at the time of appointment and he was directed to file his objections, within 72 Hours. On 02.03.2006, he submitted his explanation by denying the charge.

7.2. On 04.03.2006, according to the Appellant, without providing any opportunity to him in regard to the furnishing of documents, the second Respondent had issued an Enquiry Notice to conduct Domestic Enquiry. On 19.04.2006, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report and drew Minutes as if the Appellant had produced Bogus Certificate. On 09.05.2006, the second Respondent issued a Notice to the Appellant calling for his objection, if any, on the Enquiry Report. He submitted his representation before the second Respondent seeking some documents which were relied upon by the Enquiry Officer and based on the said documents, the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion. On 04.03.2006 the second Respondent refused to furnish copies of the documents as if the Appellant had signed each and every page of the Enquiry Proceedings and knew about all the Enquiry Proceedings and, therefore, there was no need to furnish the documents. Further, on 03.10.2006, the Appellant sent another representation before the second Respondent requesting him to furnish documents and also sought time to submit his explanation. On 31.10.2006, the second Respondent, without furnishing the documents, issued notice to the Appellant calling upon him to offer his explanation on the Enquiry Report. On 03.01.2007, the Appellant sent his representation to both the Respondents to furnish the documents relied upon in the Enquiry Report. On 01.10.2015, the second Respondent issued a show cause notice calling upon the Appellant to offer his explanation on the Enquiry Report, within 7 days, otherwise, he will be terminated from his service. On 19.10.2015, the second Respondent passed the impugned order terminating the Appellant from service. Hence, the Appellant has filed the Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No.20154 of 2015.

W.A.(MD)No.1327 of 2017:-

8. Resume of Germane Writ Facts - [W.P.(MD)No.20167 of 2015]:

8.1. The Appellant, in the year 1980, had completed his 8th Standard in Panchayat Union Middle School, Vallanadu, Paramagudi Taluk, Ramnad District and he was issued with a Transfer Certificate. On 01.08.1992, he was appointed as 'Trainee Driver' in the Respondents/Transport Corporation. In the year 1993, he was confirmed as Driver. On 25.05.2005, he was directed to file his objection, within 72 Hours, because of the fact that he had produced Bogus Educational Certificate. He submitted his explanation by denying the charge. On 17.10.2005, according to the Appellant, the second Respondent, without accepting his explanation, had issued Enquiry Notice to conduct the Domestic Enquiry. On 19.12.2005, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report and drew Minutes as if the Appellant had produced Bogus Certificate.

8.2. On 27.10.2009, the second Respondent issued a Notice to the Appellant calling for his objection, if any, on the Enquiry Report. He submitted his representation before the second Respondent seeking some documents which were relied upon by the Enquiry Officer and resting on the same, the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion. On 25.08.2006, the second Respondent refused to furnish copies of documents as if the Appellant had signed each and every page of the Enquiry Proceedings and knew about all the Enquiry Proceedings and, therefore, there was no need to furnish the documents. On 01.10.2015, the second Respondent had issued a show cause notice calling upon him to offer his explanation on the Enquiry Report within 7 days, etc. On 19.10.2015, the second Respondent passed the impugned order terminating the Appellant from his service. Hence, the Appellant had filed the Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No.20167 of 2015.

W.A.(MD)No.1328 of 2017:-

9. The Summation of Necessary Facts -

9.1. In the year 1980, the Appellant had completed his 8th Standard in Panchayat Union Middle School, Velanoor, Thiruppullani Panchayat Union, Ramnad District and he was issued with a Transfer Certificate. On 21.07.1997, he was appointed as 'Trainee Driver' in the Respondents/Transport Corporation. On 01.08.1998, he was confirmed as Driver. After 8 years, i.e., on 25.05.2005, the Respondents/Transport Corporation issued a charge memo to the Appellant to the effect that he had produced a Bogus Educational Certificate at the time of appointment and he was directed to file his objection, within 72 Hours. On 03.08.2005, he offered his explanation by denying the charge. On 17.08.2005, the second Respondent, according to the Appellant, without providing any opportunity to supply the documents in his favour, had issued an Enquiry Notice to conduct 'Domestic Enquiry'. On 29.12.2005, the Enquiry Officer had submitted his report and drew Minutes as if the Appellant had produced Bogus Certificate.

9.2. On 18.01.2006, the second Respondent had issued a Notice to the Appellant calling for his objection, if any, on the Enquiry Report. He submitted his representation before the second Respondent seeking some documents which were relied upon by the Enquiry Officer and based on the said documents, the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion. On 29.03.2006, the second Respondent had refused to furnish copies of documents as if the Appellant had signed each and every page of the Enquiry Proceedings and knew about all the Enquiry Proceedings and, therefore, there was no need to furnish the documents. He sent his representation to the Respondents, requesting them to furnish the documents relied upon in the Enquiry Report. On 12.05.2006, the second Respondent had issued a show cause notice to the Appellant to offer his explanation. On 04.10.2006, the second Respondent sent a reminder letter to the Appellant calling upon him to offer his explanation. On 01.10.2015, the second Respondent issued a show cause notice calling upon the Appellant to offer his explanation on the Enquiry Report within 7 days, otherwise, it was informed that he will be terminated from service. At last, on 19.10.2015, the second Respondent issued the impugned order terminating the Appellant from service. Challenging the same, the Appellant had filed the Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No.20169 of 2015.

W.A.(MD)No.1329 of 2017:-

10. The Writ Facts - [W.P.(MD)No.20170 of 2015]:

10.1. In the year 1970, the Appellant had completed his 8th Standard in Panchayat Union Middle School, Vallimadanvalsai, Ramnad District and he was issued with a Transfer Certificate. On 23.12.1991, he was appointed as 'Trainee Driver' in the Respondents/Transport Corporation. In the year 1993, he was confirmed as Driver. After 14 years, i.e., on 28.09.2005, he was directed to submit his objection, within 72 Hours, on the ground that he had produced Bogus Educational Certificate at the time of his appointment. On 31.10.2005, he submitted his explanation by denying the charge. On 14.11.2005, the second Respondent, without accepting his explanation, had issued an Enquiry Notice to conduct the Domestic Enquiry. On 07.01.2006, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report and drew Minutes as if the Appellant had produced Bogus Certificate.

10.2. On 18.01.2006, the second Respondent issued a Notice to the Appellant calling for his objection, if any, on the Enquiry Report. On 25.01.2006, he submitted his representation before the second Respondent seeking some documents which were relied upon by the Enquiry Officer and based on the said documents, the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion. On 04.03.2006, the second Respondent refused to furnish copies of documents as if the Appellant had signed each and every page of the Enquiry Proceedings and knew about all the Enquiry Proceedings and as such, there was no need to supply the documents.

10.3. On 27.03.2006, the Appellant sent another representation to both the Respondents requesting them to furnish the documents and also sought time to submit his explanation. On 17.04.2006, the second Respondent, without furnishing the documents, issued notice to the Appellant to offer his explanation on the Enquiry Report. On 22.05.2006, he sent his representation to the Respondents to furnish the documents relied upon in the Enquiry Report. On 08.12.2006, the second Respondent sent a reminder to the Appellant to offer his explanation. On 18.11.2008 the second Respondent issued notice to the Appellant to submit his explanation. On 01.10.2015, the second Respondent issued show cause notice calling upon him to submit his explanation on the Enquiry Report within 7 days, etc. On 19.10.2015, the second Respondent passed the impugned order terminating the Appellant from his service. Therefore, the Appellant came forward to file the Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No.20170 of 2015.

W.A.(MD)No.1330 of 2017:-

11. The Writ Factual Matrix - [W.P.(MD)No.20182 of 2015]:

11.1. The Appellant had completed his 8th Standard in Municipal Middle School, Emaneswaram, Paramakudi Taluk, Ramnad District, in the year 1976 and he was issued with a Transfer Certificate. On 04.11.1996, he was appointed as 'Trainee Driver' in the Respondents/Transport Corporation. On 26.11.1997, he was confirmed in the post of Driver. After 9 years i.e., on 25.05.2005, he was directed to file his objection, within 72 Hours, on the basis that he had produced Bogus Educational Certificate. He offered his explanation by denying the charge. On 12.08.2005, without accepting the explanation, the second Respondent had issued an Enquiry Notice to conduct Domestic Enquiry. On 23.11.2005, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report and drew Minutes as if the Appellant had produced Bogus Certificate.

11.2. On 29.12.2005, the second Respondent issued notice to the Appellant calling for his objection, if any, on the Enquiry Report. On 24.01.2006, he submitted his representation before the second Respondent requiring some documents which were relied upon by the Enquiry Officer and based on the same, the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion. On 04.03.2006, the second Respondent, according to the Appellant, had refused to furnish copies of documents as if the Appellant had signed each and every page of the Enquiry Proceedings and knew about all the Enquiry Proceedings and, therefore, there was no need to supply the documents. On 20.03.2006, the Appellant sent another representation to both the Respondents requiring them to furnish documents and also sought time to offer his explanation. On 12.05.2006, the second Respondet, without furnishing the documents, issued notice to the Appellant calling upon him to offer his explanation on the Enquiry Report. On 22.08.2008, the second Respondent had issued a show cause notice to the Appellant to submit his explanation on the Enquiry Report. On 15.09.2008, he sent another representation to the Respondents requesting them to furnish the documents relied upon in the Enquiry Report. On 01.10.2015, the second Respondent issued a show cause notice requiring him to offer his explanation on the Enquiry Report within 7 days, etc. On 19.10.2015, the second Respondent passed the impugned order terminating the Appellant from his service. Aggrieved over the same, the Appellant had filed the Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No.20182 of 2015.

W.A.(MD)No.1331 of 2017:-

12. The Relevant Writ Facts- [W.P.(MD)No.20190 of 2015]:

12.1. The Appellant, in the year 1980, had completed his 8th Standard in Panchayat Union Middle School, Kadaladi Panchayat Union, Ramnad District and he was issued with a Transfer Certificate. During September, 1992, he was appointed as 'Trainee Driver' in the Respondents/Transport Corporation. On 08.04.1993, he was confirmed as Driver. After 13 years i.e., on 25.05.2005, he was directed to offer his objection, within 72 Hours, on the ground that he had produced Bogus Educational Certificate. On 29.08.2005 he submitted his explanation by denying the charge. On 27.12.2005, the second Respondent issued an Enquiry Notice to the Appellant without accepting his explanation and informed him that a Domestic Enquiry will be completed. On 09.03.2006, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report and drew Minutes as if the Appellant had produced Bogus Certificate.

12.2. On 17.03.2006, the second Respondent issued a Notice to the Appellant requiring him to file his objection, if any, on the Enquiry Report. On 25.05.2006, he offered his explanation to the second Respondent requiring some documents that were relied upon by the Enquiry Officer, based on which, the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion. On 23.05.2006, the second Respondent, without furnishing the documents, issued notice to the Appellant calling upon him to offer his explanation on the Enquiry Report. On 22.06.2006, he sent another representation to the Respondents requesting them to furnish the documents and also sought time to offer his explanation. On 01.10.2015, the second Respondent issued a show cause notice calling upon him to offer his explanation on the Enquiry Report, within 7 days, etc. On 19.10.2015, the second Respondent passed the impugned order terminating the Appellant from his service. Hence, the Appellant had filed the Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No.20190 of 2015.

W.A.(MD)No.1332 of 2017:-

13. Resume of Germane Writ Facts -

13.1. The Appellant, in the year 1984, had completed his 8th Standard in Panchayat Union Middle School, Pampoor, Paramagudi Panchayat Union, Ramnad District and he was issued with a Transfer Certificate. On 09.05.1992, he was appointed as 'Trainee Driver' in the Respondents/Transport Corporation. On 20.01.1993, he was confirmed as Driver. After 13 years i.e., on 25.05.2005, he was issued with a charge memo to the effect that he had produced Bogus Educational Certificate at the time of appointment and he was directed to offer his objection, within 72 Hours. He offered his explanation by denying the charge. On 17.10.2005, according to the Appellant, without providing an opportunity to supply the documents to him, the second Respondent had issued an Enquiry Notice to conduct Domestic Enquiry. On 29.12.2005, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report and drew Minutes as if the Appellant had produced Bogus Certificate.

13.2. On 09.01.2006, the second Respondent issued a Notice to the Appellant calling for his objection, if any, on the Enquiry Report. On 02.02.2006, the Appellant submitted his representation before the second Respondent requiring some documents which were relied upon by the Enquiry Officer and resting on the said documents, the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion. On 04.03.2006, the second Respondent, according to the Appellant, had refused to supply copies of documents as if the Appellant had signed each and every page of the Enquiry Proceedings and knew about all the Enquiry Proceedings and, therefore, there was no need to furnish the documents. On 24.03.2006 he sent another representation before the second Respondent making a request to furnish the documents relied upon in the Enquiry Report. On 17.04.2006 the second Respondent, without furnishing the documents, issued show cause notice to the Appellant with a view to provide an opportunity to him to offer his explanation. In fact, the Appellant submitted his representation to the Respondents requiring them to furnish the documents relied upon in the Enquiry Report on 15.09.2006. On 01.10.2015, he was issued with a show cause notice to offer his explanation on the Enquiry Report within 7 days, etc. On 19.10.2015, the second Respondent issued the impugned order terminating the Appellant from his service. Hence, the Appellant had filed the Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No.20191 of 2015.

W.A.(MD)No.1333 of 2017:-

14. The Writ Factual Matrix - [W.P.(MD)No.22715 of 2016]:

14.1. In the year 1976, the Appellant had completed his 8th Standard in Panchayat Union Middle School, Vallimadanvalasai, Thiruppullani Panchayat Union, Ramnad District and he was issued with a Transfer Certificate. On 21.07.1997, he was appointed as 'Trainee Driver' in the Respondents/Transport Corporation. On 18.08.1998, he was confirmed in the post of Driver. After 8 years, i.e., on 25.05.2005, he was issued with a charge memo to the effect that he had produced Bogus Educational Certificate at the time of appointment and was directed to submit his explanation within 72 Hours. On 05.08.2008, he had submitted his explanation by denying the charges. On 17.10.2005, without providing any opportunity to supply the documents, the second Respondent, according to the Appellant, had issued an Enquiry Notice to conduct Domestic Enquiry. On 24.11.2005, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report and drew Minutes as if the Appellant had produced Bogus Certificate.

14.2. On 12.12.2005, the second Respondent issued a Notice to the Appellant calling for his objection, if any, on the Enquiry Report. On 13.03.2006, he submitted his representation before the second Respondent requiring some documents which were relied upon by the Enquiry Officer and resting on the same, the Enquiry Officer came to the ultimate conclusion.

14.3. On 29.03.2006, the second Respondent refused to furnish copies of documents as if the Appellant had signed each and every page of the Enquiry Proceedings and knew about all the Enquiry Proceedings and, therefore, there was no need to furnish the documents. The Appellant sent another representation before the second Respondent praying for furnishing of documents relied upon in the Enquiry Report. On 03.01.2009, the second Respondent, without furnishing the documents, issued show cause notice to the Appellant to offer his explanation. On 01.10.2015, the second Respondent issued show cause notice to the Appellant calling upon him to offer his explanation on the Enquiry Report within 7 days, etc. On 19.10.2015, the second Respondent passed the impugned order terminating the Appellant from his service. Challenging the same, the Appellant had filed the Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No.22715 of 2016.

W.A.(MD)Nos.1355 to 1361 and 1364 to 1369 of 2017:-

15. The Appellants/Transport Corporation have preferred the instant Intra-Court Writ Appeals as 'Dissatisfied Persons' as against the order dated 02.05.2017 in W.P(MD)Nos.20169, 20170, 20182, 20190, 20201, 20191 of 2015, 22715 of 2016, 20001, 20009, 20145, 20153, 20154 and 20167 of 2015, respectively, passed by the Learned Single Judge.

16. Earlier, the Learned Single Judge, while passing the impugned order on 02.05.2017, in W.P(MD)Nos.20169, 20170, 20182, 20190, 20201, 20191 of 2015, 22715 of 2016, 20001, 20009, 20145, 20153, 20154 and 20167 of 2015, filed by the Respondents (as Writ Petitioners), at Paragraph No.15.2, had observed the following:

"15.2. Till such time, as a stop-gap arrangement, the second respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioners, which would be subject to the result of the Enquiry."

and disposed of the Writ Petitions.

17. For the sake of convenience, the parties are, hereinafter, referred to as 'Employees' and the Management/Transport Corporation.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE EMPLOYEES:

18. The Learned Counsel for the Employees submits that the Charge Memos were issued to the Employees after a long lapse of 13 years, 8 years, 4 years, 5 years, and 14 years etc., respectively, and in fact, the Termination Orders were issued after a lapse of 10 years and, therefore, the Writ Petitions ought to have been allowed by the Learned Single Judge.

19. The Learned Counsel for the Employees contends that the Management/Transport Corporation, while confirming the Employees as Drivers, had verified the Certificates submitted by them and confirmed them as permanent Drivers and, therefore, now, it is not open to them to issue Charge Memo(s) on the basis that they had produced Bogus Certificates, that too, after a long lapse of time.

20. The Learned Counsel for the Employees brings it to the notice of this Court that a Co-employee similar to the Employees had filed a Writ Petition assailing the order issued by the Management/Transport Corporation and that the Writ Petition was allowed and later, the Transport Corporation preferred Writ Appeal, which was dismissed and as against the dismissal of Writ Appeal, the Transport Corporation preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and the same was dismissed. Thereafter, the Management/Transport Corporation had permitted him to join duty and he is now working as Driver in the Corporation.

21. The Learned Counsel for the Employees proceeds to point out that after passing the common order by this Court in W.P(MD)Nos.20001, 20009, 20145 of 2015, etc., batch, dated 02.05.2017, the Management/Transport Corporation had served another show cause notice dated 18.07.2017 by enclosing the documents dated 14.09.2005, which relate only to three persons viz., U.Sethupathi, G.Muthu and S.Somu and the said fact clearly proves that there is no document available with the Educational Officer to confirm that the Employees had produced Bogus Certificates before the Management/Transport Corporation at the time of appointment.

22. The Learned Counsel for the Employees projects an argument that the Learned Single Judge failed to consider that during enquiry, the Management/Transport Corporation should have examined the concerned School Headmaster or the District Elementary Educational Officer to establish the Certificates produced by the Employees as fake one. However, such an exercise was not resorted to by the Corporation.

23. The Learned Counsel for the Employees contends that even after issuance of Charge Memos, the Management/Transport Corporation had not furnished the relevant documents to submit the explanations and that the enquiry was conducted by the Management without following the Service Law.

24. The Learned Counsel for the Employees draws the attention of this Court to the fact that there is a considerable delay in completing the Departmental Proceedings, which had caused great injustice to the Employees and on this score alone, the entire proceedings ought to be quashed and that the Employees should be permitted to join duty.

25. The Learned Counsel for the Employees comes out with a plea that the Management/Transport Corporation had failed to supply the copies of communication of the Educational Officer and District Elementary Educational Officer, Ramanathapuram District to the Employees, in spite of repeated requests made by them and in fact, the second Respondent/Transport Corporation had passed the Termination Orders, which is perverse and an illegal one.

26. The Learned Counsel for the Employees points out that out of 21 Employees, 13 were filed the Writ Petitions. It appears that some of the Employees had raised Industrial Disputes and eight Industrial Disputes are pending. It is also brought to the notice of this Court on behalf of the Employees that two were reinstated in service.

27. The Learned Counsel for the Employees points out that in respect of the Writ Petitioner-S.Karmegam in W.P.(MD)No.20169 of 2015 [W.A.(MD)No.1328 of 2017], the Headmaster was examined and in other cases, he was not examined.

28. The Learned Counsel for the Employees takes a plea that after lapse of ten years, the Learned Single Judge was not correct in granting liberty to the Management/Transport Corporation to complete the Disciplinary Proceedings and, therefore, the order of the Learned Single Judge, in this regard, is liable to be set aside by this Court, in the interest of justice.

29. The Learned Counsel for the Employees, to lend support to his contention that an inordinate delay on the part of the Management/Transport Corporation in initiating Disciplinary Proceedings against the Employees vitiates the charge memo, cites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mahadevan, P.V. v. M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board reported in 2005(4) CTC at Page No.403, at Special Page No.407, wherein at Paragraph No.14, among other things, it is observed as under:

"14.................The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer."

30. The Learned Counsel for the Employees, in support of the plea that a long and unexplained delay in issuing the show cause notice vitiates the Conduct of Enquiry, relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ranjeet Singh v. State of Haryana reported in 2008(3) CTC at Page No.781, at Special Page No.784, wherein at Paragraph No.9, it is laid down to the effect that 'as the matter is old and as we have already found that the delay vitiated the enquiry, no purpose will be served by remitting the matter, etc.'

31. The Learned Counsel for the Employees refers to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. N.Radhakishan reported in 1998(4) SCC at Page No.154, wherein, it is observed that 'a balance has to be maintained between purity of administration and the adverse effect which the prolonged proceedings have on an employee and further, held that the unexplained delay in conclusion of the proceedings itself is an indication of prejudice caused to the employee'.

32. The Learned Counsel for the Employees brings it to the notice of this Court the decision in Union of India v. Central Administrative Tribunal reported in 2005(2) CTC at Page No.169, at Special Page No.171, wherein at Paragraph No.4, among other things, it is observed as under:

"4........ According to the charge memo the alleged misconduct was during the year 1984-85 and twenty long years have since gone by from that and yet no progress whatsoever made by the Government till the Tribunal passed orders challenged in these writ petitions. In other words, there is total inaction on the part of the Government from 7.10.1994, the date on which O.A.No.1689 of 1993 was dismissed by the Tribunal, till 26.2.2000 when the Government issued the second charge memo. Again, we find there is total inaction on the part of the Government from 26.2.2000 till the employee again went before the Tribunal in the year 2002. The delay remains totally unexplained. Therefore, we have no hesitation at all in concluding that the ground of inordinate delay in proceeding with the departmental enquiry as referred to above by us, would come in the way of the Government to continue with the enquiry any further. Therefore, on that ground stated by us, the orders in challenge are sustained and the writ petitions are dismissed."

33. The Learned Counsel for the Employees draws the attention of this Court to the decision of R.Tirupathy v. The District Collector, Madurai District reported in 2006(2) CTC at Page No.574, wherein, it is observed that 'inordinate delay has not been properly explained and that the Departmental Proceedings would be prejudicial to the Petitioner'. Further, it is held that 'the issuance of Charge Memo is not an empty formality and that the provisions of Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994, were not followed and that the Charge Memo is vitiated due to violation of Principle of Natural Justice'.

34. The Learned Counsel for the Employees relies on the decision of Kumaran, K. v. The State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2007(3) CTC at Page No.763, at Special Page No.766, wherein at Paragraph Nos.9 and 10, it is observed as under:

"9........... In this case, admittedly, the petitioner has not caused any delay and the inordinate delay of 18 years is not properly explained by the respondents. It is also necessary to mention that earlier the Petitioner has filed a Writ Petition in W.P.No.20261 of 2004, seeking for a direction to the Respondents therein to pass final orders, which was disposed of directing the Respondents to pass final orders in the Disciplinary Proceedings on or before 30.9.2004, which was not complied with.

10. In view of the above facts that the charges were belatedly issued and that no valid reasons have been assigned by the Respondents for such an inordinate delay in issuing the charges and that the Respondents failed to comply with the direction of this Court passed in the earlier Writ Petition referred to above and when this Court weigh all the said factors both for and against the petitioner, it has to be held that the charges are flimsy in nature, hence, in order to meet the ends of justice, it is absolutely necessary to quash the charges against the petitioner and accordingly, they are quashed."

35. The Learned Counsel for the Employees seeks-in-aid of the decision of N.P.K.S.Sheik Abdullah v. The State of Tamil Nadu & Others reported in 2011 Writ L.R. at Page No.298, wherein at Special Page No.299, it is held as under:

"The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings."

36. Further, in the afore-said decision, at Page No.299, it is laid down as follows:

"Charge memo issued is vitiated on the ground that there was unexplained and unsatisfactory delay for initiating the proceedings for the incident which took place in the year 2002 and the charge memo came to be issued on 03.11.2009. Therefore, in order to meet the ends of justice, it is absolutely necessary to quash the charge memo issued against the petitioner and accordingly, it is quashed."

37. The Learned Counsel for the Employees cites the order of this Court dated 19.12.2009 in W.P.(MD)No.10695 of 2008 between R.Thangaraj v. The Managing Director, TNSTC (Kumbakonam) Ltd., Kumbakonam and another, wherein, at Paragraph Nos.13 to 15, it is observed as under:

"13. A perusal of the explanation submitted by the petitioner dated 09.03.2006 reveals that the petitioner has raised several objections. It is specifically pointed out by the petitioner that his teacher viz., one S.Natarajan was examined and he has categorically stated that the petitioner was studied upto eighth standard and passed. It is further stated in his explanation that the Educational Certificates produced by the petitioner, contain the signature of Assistant Educational Officer and he has also accepted and admitted during the course of enquiry. But the same was not disputed by the Management of the respondents. It is further relevant to note that the school authorities stated that due to fire accident took place in the year 1983, certain records were damaged, but the said version of the teacher was also not considered.

14. It is seen that the Original Disciplinary Authority also has not furnished the copies of the communications said to have been sent by the District Educational Officer, Ramnad dated 10.05.2005 and District Elementary School Educational Officer, Ramnad dated 14.09.2005, enabling the petitioner to defend his case effectively.

15. As far as the appellate authority is concerned, this Court is constrained to state that the appellate authority by merely incorporating the findings of the Original Disciplinary Authority, rejected the appeal without assigning any valid reason. A perusal of the order passed by the appellate authority dated 22.10.2007 reveals that the appellate authority also reiterated the finding of the Original Disciplinary Authority to the effect that the petitioner has not made any objections and given any explanations, but only he has pleaded mercy for reinstatement considering his family conditions and the said finding is contrary to the explanation of the petitioner dated 09.03.2006. This finding of the appellate authority makes it crystal clear that the appellate authority has not all applied its independent mind to the materials available on record. It is needless to state that the appellate authority is a quasi-judicial authority and it is open to the appellate authority to re-appreciate, re-assess and evaluate the materials produced before the Disciplinary Authority. But it is seen that the appellate authority has passed the impugned order in a casual manner without analysing the materials available on record and without discussing about the findings given by the Disciplinary Authority and without application of individual mind."

38. The Learned Counsel for the Employees refers to the judgment of this Court in W.A.(MD)No.600 of 2010, dated 20.04.2011, between the Managing Director, TNSTC (Kumbakonam) Ltd., Kumbakonam and another v. R.Thangaraj, wherein, at Paragraph No.8, it is observed as under:

"8. Coming to the merit of the issue, the point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant Transport Corporation is that the educational certificate produced by the respondent/writ petitioner relating to his pass in 8th standard is a bogus one. However, the Headmaster of the school at the relevant point of time had been examined in the enquiry conducted and he had stated that the respondent/writ petitioner was a student and that there was a fire accident in the said school in 1983, consequently, old records were not available. The stand of the learned counsel for the appellant Transport Corporation is that there is a doubt with regard to the occurrence of the fire accident. If it is so, the burden lies on the appellant Management to prove the same and to establish that such a fire accident had not taken place in 1983 in the said school. Apart from this, based on the reported submitted by the District Elementary Educational Officer, charges have been framed as against the respondent/writ petitioner to the effect that the educational certificate produced by the respondent/writ petitioner is a bogus one. However, the concerned District Elementary Educational Officer was also not examined by the appellant Transport Corporation. Having failed to examine the author of the report, the appellant Transport Corporation cannot be permitted now to take a stand that the evidence given by the retired Headmaster of the school where the respondent/writ petitioner had studied, cannot be believed. That apart, though power has been given to the authorities concerned to examine the certificate produced, there is a period of limitation and probe into the genuineness of the certificate should have been made within a reasonable period of time. Yet another factor to be looked into is that the post to which the respondent/writ petitioner was appointed is the post of a Driver and as far as this post is concerned, experience is a better qualification than the academic qualification. It is not the case of the appellant Transport Corporation also that as a Driver, the respondent/writ petitioner has committed any commission and omission. Under such circumstances, when the Headmaster of the said school at the relevant point of time had stated in the enquiry that fire accident had taken place in 1983, consequently, records were not available, unless it is dis- proved by way of evidence by the appellant Transport Corporation, the stand of the appellant/Transport Corporation cannot be accepted."

39. The Learned Counsel for the Employees points out that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) ..../2012 C.C.No.12740 of 2012 between M.D. & Anr TNSTC (Kumbakonam Ltd.) & Anr. v. R.Thangaraj on 07.09.2012, had passed the following order:

"We find no merit in the Special Leave Petition which is, accordingly, dismissed."

40. The Learned Counsel for the Employees cites the order of Learned Single Judge dated 26.02.2013, in W.P.(MD)Nos.7503 and 10697 of 2008, between M.Muniasamy v. The Managing Director, TNSTC (Kumbakonam) Ltd., Kumbakonam and another, wherein at Paragraph Nos.6 and 7, it is observed as follows:

"6. Today, the learned counsel for the respondents very fairly submits that the issue involved in these writ petitions is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgments.

7. Hence, for the above reasons, these writ petitions are allowed and the impugned orders are set aside by following the orders in W.P.(MD) No.10695 of 2008, which was confirmed in W.A.(MD) No.600 of 2010 and SLP (Civil) No.12740 of 2012. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioners in service within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order."

41. The Learned Counsel for the Employees also relies on the Judgment of this Court dated 06.03.2014 in W.A.(MD)No.363 of 2014, between the Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Kumbakonam) Limited, New Railway Feeder Road, Kumbakonam and another v. M.Muniyasamy, wherein at Paragraph No.11, it is observed as under:

"11. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner/respondent argued that the writ petitioner/respondent has examined the then Headmaster, who issued the certificate and proved the genuineness of the said certificate. He also pointed out that the counsel for the Transport Corporation has admitted before the learned single Judge that the issue involved is covered by the earlier judgment of this Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court in favour of the similarly placed persons and therefore, it is not open to the appellant corporation to argue contrary to the decided case in favour of the similarly placed persons."

and ultimately, the said Writ Appeal was held to be one devoid of merits and came to be dismissed.

42. The Learned Counsel for the Employees also refers to another Judgment of this Court dated 17.03.2014 in W.A.(MD)No.412 of 2014, between the Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Kumbakonam) Limited, New Railway Feeder Road, Kumbakonam and another v. K.Ashok Kumar, wherein, following the earlier Judgment of this Court and the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, in favour of similarly placed persons, the Division Bench dismissed the Writ Appeal.

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE MANAGEMENT/TRANSPORT CORPORATION:

43. Per contra, it is the submission of Learned Counsel for the Management/Transport Corporation that the Forum established under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, viz., the Labour Court is competent to deal with the factual aspects/controversies relating to the issue on hand and as such, the filing of Writ Petitions by the Employees are not per se maintainable in the eye of Law.

44. The Learned Counsel for the Management/Transport Corporation contends that the Employees have never raised a plea as regards the non- supply of documents relied on by the Management during the course of enquiry and even according to the Employees, it was only after the issuance of second show cause notice, they sought for copies of documents, which clearly proved that in no way, they are prejudice with the non-supply of documents. Therefore, it is represented that the issue of non-supply of documents was raised by the Employees after the enquiry was over as an afterthought, so as to suit the maintainability of the Writ Petition.

45. The Learned Counsel for the Management/Transport Corporation takes a stand that the question of fact that arise for determination is as to whether the Employees perused the documents during the Enquiry Proceedings and they were satisfied over the same and as to whether the documents sought for by them after the Enquiry Proceedings were relevant or otherwise.

46. The Learned Counsel for the Management/Transport Corporation contends that the Employees were removed from service pursuant to the punishment imposed on them and they were not in employment for more than two years, etc., and as such, the direction for reinstatement as stop-gap arrangement should not have been granted by the Learned Single Judge.

47. The Learned Counsel for the Management/Transport Corporation strenuously projects an argument that the Management/Transport Corporation had supplied the documents to the Employees pursuant to the directions issued in the Writ Petitions and notices were issued to the Employees calling upon them to offer their explanation to the Enquiry Report and initially, one month time was sought for by the Employees to submit their explanation which was granted and despite the lapse of time, till date, the Employees had not submitted their explanation and because of their non-co-operation, the Management/Transport Corporation are not in a position to complete the proceedings, as per the directions issued by the Learned Single Judge in the Writ Petitions.

48. The Learned Counsel for the Management/Transport Corporation relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Transport & Dock Employees Union v. Mumbai Port Trust reported in 2011(2) SCC at Page No.575, at Special Page No.582, wherein at Paragraph No.14, it is observed as under:

"14. In our opinion the writ petition filed by the appellants should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act. It is well settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction, and the discretion should not ordinarily be exercised if there is an alternative remedy available to the appellant. In this case there was a clear alternative remedy available to the appellants by raising an industrial dispute and hence we fail to understand why the High Court entertained the writ petition. It seems to us that some High Courts by adopting an over liberal approach are unnecessarily adding to their load of arrears instead of observing judicial discipline in following settled legal principles. However, we may also consider the case on merits."

49. The Learned Counsel for the Management/Transport Corporation cites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jainendra Singh v. State of U.P. reported in 2012(8) SCC at Page No.748, wherein it is held as under:

"The cardinal principles on this issue can be summarised thus:

(i) Fraudulently obtained orders of appointment could be legitimately treated as voidable at the option of the employer or could be recalled by the employer and in such cases merely because the respondent employee has continued in service for a number of years, on the basis of such fraudulently obtained employment, cannot get any equity in his favour or any estoppel against the employer.

(ii) Verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to the post under the State and on account of his antecedents the appointing authority if finds it not desirable to appoint a person to a disciplined force can it be said to be unwarranted.

(iii) When appointment was procured by a person on the basis of forged documents, it would amount to misrepresentation and fraud on the employer and, therefore, it would create no equity in his favour or any estoppel against the employer while resorting to termination without holding any inquiry.

(iv) A candidate having suppressed material information and/or giving false information cannot claim right to continue in service and the employer, having regard to the nature of employment as well as other aspects, has the discretion to terminate his services.

(v) The purpose of calling for information regarding involvement in any criminal case or detention or conviction is for the purpose of verification of the character/antecedents at the time of recruitment and suppression of such material information will have a clear bearing on the character and antecedents of the candidate in relation to his continuity in service.

(vi) The person who suppressed the material information and/or gives false information cannot claim any right for appointment or continuity in service.

(vii) The standard expected of a person intended to serve in uniformed service is quite distinct from other services and, therefore, any deliberate statement or omission regarding a vital information can be seriously viewed and the ultimate decision of the appointing authority cannot be faulted.

(viii) An employee on probation can be discharged from service or may be refused employment on the ground of suppression of material information or making false statement relating to his involvement in the criminal case, conviction or detention, even if ultimately he was acquitted of the said case, inasmuch as such a situation would make a person undesirable or unsuitable for the post.

(ix) An employee in the uniformed service presupposes a higher level of integrity as such a person is expected to uphold the law and on the contrary such a service born in deceit and subterfuge cannot be tolerated.

(x) The authorities entrusted with the responsibility of appointing constables, are under duty to verify the antecedents of a candidate to find out whether he is suitable for the post of a constable and so long as the candidate has not been acquitted in the criminal case, he cannot be held to be suitable for appointment to the post of constable."

50. The Learned Counsel for the Management/Transport Corporation, in support of his contention, refers to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. M.Bhaskaran reported in 1995 Supp (4) SCC 100, wherein it is observed that persons procuring employment as Workmen in Railway on the basis of Bogus and Forged casual Labourer service cards, held, guilty of misrepresentation and fraud. Further, it is held that mere long continuance of such employment could not create any equity in favour of the workmen or any estoppel against the employer.

51. The Learned Counsel for the Management/Transport Corporation points out the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar reported in 1995(4) SCC at Page No.683, at Special Page No.684, wherein it is held as under:

"The circumstance of the non-filing of the appeals by the State in some similar matters or the rejection of some SLPs in limine by the Supreme Court in some other similar matters by itself, cannot be held as a bar against the State in filing an SLP or SLPs in other similar matter/s whether it is considered on behalf of the State that non-filing of such SLP or SLPs and pursuing them is likely to seriously jeopardise the interest of the State or public interest."

52. The Learned Counsel for the Management/Transport Corporation cites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant reported in 1995(5) SCC at Page No.75, at Special Page Nos.94 and 95, wherein at Paragraph No.35, it is observed as under:

"35(1) Where the dispute arises from general law of contract, i.e., where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general law of contract, a suit filed in civil court cannot be said to be not maintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) or Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

(2) Where, however, the dispute involves recognition, observance or enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said Act.

(3) Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observance or enforcement of rights and obligations created by enactments like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 - which can be called "sister enactments" to Industrial Disputes Act - and which do not provide a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to approach the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act provided they constitute industrial disputes within the meaning of Section 2(k) and Section 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such dispute shall be either treated as an industrial dispute or says that it shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act. Otherwise, recourse to civil court is open.

(4) It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act are not equally effective for the reason that access to the forum depends upon a reference being made by the appropriate Government. The power to make a reference conferred upon the Government is to be exercised to effectuate the object of the enactment and hence not unguided. The rule is to make a reference unless, of course, the dispute raised is a totally frivolous one ex facie. The power conferred is the power to refer and not the power to decide, though it may be that the Government is entitled to examine whether the dispute is ex facie frivolous, not meriting an adjudication.

(5) Consistent with the policy of law aforesaid, we commend to Parliament and the State Legislatures to make a provision enabling a workman to approach the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal directly - i.e., without the requirement of a reference by the Government - in case of industrial disputes covered by Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way in removing the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act.

(6) The certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance with the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 are statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both upon the employers and employees, though they do not amount to "statutory provisions". Any violation of these Standing Orders entitles an employee to appropriate relief either before the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act or the civil court where recourse to civil court is open according to the principles indicated herein.

(7) The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act and its sister enactments is to provide an alternative dispute-resolution mechanism to the workmen, a mechanism which is speedy, inexpensive, informal and unencumbered by the plethora of procedural laws and appeals upon appeals and revisions applicable to civil courts. Indeed, the powers of the courts and tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act are far more extensive in the sense that they can grant such relief as they think appropriate in the circumstances for putting an end to an industrial dispute."

53. The Learned Counsel for the Management/Transport Corporation submits that when the Employees in Law do have a viable and effective remedy of approaching the competent Forum under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, viz., the Labour Court, the filing of Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable and in this regard, he refers to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., reported in 2003(3) SCC at Page No.524, wherein at Special Page No.525, it is held that Writ Petition under Arts. 226/227 by an insurer challenging the award of Tribunal was not maintainable as remedy by filing an appeal before the High Court under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act was available to the insurer.

54. The Learned Counsel for the Management/Transport Corporation cites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Lakshmidevamma reported in 2001(5) SCC at Page No.433, wherein it is held that right of employer to lead evidence before Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in justification of the impugned action is not a statutory right but a procedure laid down by the Supreme Court.

55. The Learned Counsel for the Management/Transport Corporation refers to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Pitchumani, P. v. The Management of Sri Chakra Tyres Ltd. reported in 2004(3) CTC at Page No.1, wherein at Special Page No.8, at Paragraph No.14, it is observed as under:

"14. In view of what is stated supra, we hold that

(i) only such violations under I.D. Act, which involve public duties, are amenable to Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India;

(ii) dismissals, transfers and other matters concerning the service conditions of employees governed by I.D. Act, have to be adjudicated only by the forums created under the said statute and not otherwise;

(iii) it is needless to mention that the disputes relating to matters not governed by I.D. Act have to be resolved only by common law Courts;

(iv) the transfers effected in these cases do not involve any public duties and involve the disputed questions of fact and they should be resolved only before the forums under the I.D. Act;

(v) the appellants/petitioners-employees shall be entitled to seek for reference by filing application under Section 10 of the I.D. Act within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order;

(vi) if any industrial disputes are raised, then the concerned forums, be it Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, shall dispose of the same within four months from the date of receipt of the reference, after affording opportunity to either party.

(vii) without prejudice to the contentions of the appellants/petitioners-employees, one week time from the date of receipt of a copy of this order is given to the employees to join at the transferred places and in respect to such of those dismissed employees, for non-joining at the transferred places, the delay is condoned if they join as stipulated above and in that event, dismissal orders passed against them disappear automatically; and

(viii) the respondents-managements shall sympathetically consider the payments of wages/salaries to the appellants/petitioners-employees so as to maintain the industrial peace and harmony."

56. The Learned Counsel for the Management/Transport Corporation submits that the Rules of Indian Evidence Act, 1872, do not apply to domestic enquiries or before Administrative Tribunals and in this regard, cites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh reported in 1977(2) SCC at Page No.491. Also, in the afore-said decision, it is observed that 'all materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible, though departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Evidence Act. The essence of judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations, and observance of rules of natural justice. Fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment, vitiate the conclusion reached, such a finding, even of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held to be good'.

DISCUSSION:

57. It is to be noted that the object of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is to impart social justice to the workman. When a dispute involves observance, or enforcement of the rights or obligations created under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, an affected party/worker has a remedy under the said Act. There is no prescribed limitation under the Industrial Disputes Act, since the Legislature purposively in its wisdom has not prescribed any limitation period. Under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, a remedy is available only when a workman is dismissed, discharged or terminated.

58. Coming to the aspect of supply of documents to a delinquent employee, if they are relevant, they are to be supplied, in the considered opinion of this Court, the term 'Natural Justice' is no unruly horse. Further, no man shall be hit below his stomach. The Principle of Natural Justice requires that an opportunity is to be provided to the person charged. However, when the employee does not deliberately avail of an opportunity, in spite of repeated reminders, he cannot be heard to say that the Principles of Natural Justice were breached. The object of Natural Justice is to secure Justice. As a matter of fact, the Principles of Natural Justice can be pressed into service in an area not covered by any Law validly made. The Principles of Natural Justice supplement the Law and not supplant the Law of the Land.

59. It may not be out of place for this Court to make a mention that the Principles of Natural Justice apply not only to judicial or quasi judicial but even to administrative orders which have civil consequence. The Principles of Natural Justice are the Constituent Element of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Depriving a delinquent of an opportunity of taking inspection of all documents will amount to the violation of Principles of Natural Justice.

60. The Principles of Natural Justice will operate as an implied mandatory requirement, thereby, protecting the enacted Law from the vice of arbitrariness.

61. The broad principle is that an individual trying a cause should not only act fairly but must be able to act above suspicion of unfairness and bias as per the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh Arora v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) reported in 2012 Crl.L.J. at Page No.2167 (SC).

62. It is to be pointed out that Article 14 of the Constitution of India lays down the Rule of 'Equality' in widest sense, as opined by this Court. Article 15 of the Constitution prohibits 'Discrimination' on grounds mentioned therein. Article 16 embodies the same Rule, but its ambit is narrow, because of the fact that it is confined to State activities relating to an Office or employment under the State. In fact, Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India operate subject to exceptions therein as per the decision in Ewanlangki-e-Rymbai v. Jaintia Hills District Council reported in AIR 2006 SC at Page No.1589 at Special Page Nos.1594 and 1595.

63. Undoubtedly, Article 14 is a positive concept and no one can claim 'Equality' in illegality, as per the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in U.P. State Sugar Corpn. Ltd. v. Sant Raj Singh reported in AIR 2006 SC at Page No.2296 at Special Page No.2301.

64. An appointment will be null and void where an appointee procures an appointment on the basis of false Certificate as per the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in R.Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala reported in 2004(2) SCC 105. Where the benefit is obtained by committing fraud, the Authorities are not obliged to comply with the Principles of Natural Justice before cancelling the advantage obtained by such fraud, as per the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in U.P. Junior Doctors' Action Committee v. Dr.B.Sheetal Nandwani and Ors. reported in AIR 1991 SC 909.

65. In fact, 'Legal Consequences' cannot be obliterated by equitable considerations.

66. At this stage, this Court worth recalls and recollects the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that an appointment is liable to be set aside, if it is obtained by committing fraud, as per the decision of Krishan Yadav v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1994 SC 2166.

67. It is to be pertinently pointed out by this Court that a person, who obtains an appointment misrepresenting his Educational Qualification, in Law, could not be permitted to invoke the Principle of Promissory Estoppel, when his appointment is cancelled because of such representation.

68. In Service Law, a right created in a person by appointing him to a service or post cannot be extinguished without following the Principles of Natural Justice. Further, when an appointment is made in a post, the appointment cannot be deprived of his right except following the Principles of Natural Justice.

69. In a normal circumstance/situation, pertaining to a dispute(s) involving observance or enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created under the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is under the said Act. But, in the instant cases on hand before us, the Employees were appointed as Trainee Drivers under the Transport Corporation on various dates, like 09.05.1992, 31.03.1997, 14.02.2001, 23.02.2001, 01.08.1992, 21.07.1997, 23.12.1991, 04.11.1996, 9/1992 and they were confirmed as Driver on various dates on 20.01.1993, 17.01.1998, 28.10.2002, 16.04.2001, in the year 1993, 01.08.1998, 26.11.1997, 08.04.1993, 20.01.1993 and 18.08.1998. In the instant cases before this Court, it cannot be brushed aside that the Transport Corporation had passed the termination orders on 19.10.2015 after 9 years of issuance of second show cause notice. When the Employees had filed the Writ Petitions and came out with a plea that they were not supplied with the requisite documents and in this regard, there is a violation of Principles of Natural Justice and when the Transport Corporation, as a subsequent development, i.e., after passing of the order dated 02.05.2017 in W.P(MD)Nos.20001, 20009, 20145 of 2015, etc., batch, by the Learned Single Judge, in directing the Management to furnish copies of documents relied upon in the Enquiry Report, etc., [Vide Paragraph No.15.1 of the order], had supplied the copies of documents [Exs.M.1 to M.6] on 18.07.2017 and a reply was sought from the Employees and since the Employees have not given their reply, till date, no final orders are passed in the subject matter in issue, this Court, at this stage, is of the considered view that driving the Employees to raise Industrial Disputes before the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is not proper and, therefore, the filing of the Writ Petitions by them cannot be thrown overboard.

70. Insofar as the plea of Bogus Certificates being produced by the Employees is concerned, it is for the Transport Corporation to prove the charges levelled by it against the Employees in accordance with law. The 'Plea of Fraud' is a legal plea and to take the plea, ordinarily, there may not be any limitation because of the reason that 'fraud vitiates from the beginning'. In respect of procuring appointment based on misrepresentation relating to Educational Qualification, in Law, 'Principles of Estoppel' will not apply. As a matter of fact, the procurement of an appointment on the basis of Bogus Certificate/False Certificate is to be proved to be guilt and if a candidate is not possessing/did not possess a requisite qualification, then, certainly, his appointment will be in jeopardy/at peril, as opined by this Court.

71. A perusal of the Enquiry Report of the Enquiry Officer dated 26.12.2005 shows that on behalf of the Management (Transport Corporation), Exs.M.1 to M.6 were marked and witness-M.W.1 was examined on their side. However, on the part of delinquent side, no witness was examined. Further, no document was marked.

72. A mere running of the eye over the contents of the Enquiry Report dated 26.12.2005 shows that the Enquiry Officer had categorically opined that the delinquent had not established through documentary and oral evidence, to the effect that his Educational Qualification Certificate was a true one.

73. Further, a reading of the Enquiry Report in respect of M.Sridhar [Appellant in W.A.(MD)No.1322 of 2017] reveals that M.W.1 in his evidence had deposed that a copy of the Educational Certificate was sent to Ramanathapuram District Elementary Educational Officer to find out the genuineness of the Certificate and he had informed by way of a letter dated 10.05.2005 that it was a bogus one and also when a letter dated 18.08.2005 was sent to the afore-said Officer and his explanation was sought as to how the Certificate was a bogus one, he informed through his letter dated 14.09.2005 that the afore-said bogus Educational Certificates in the concerned School records were not entered.

74. At this stage, the Learned Counsel for the Management/Transport Corporation submits that it is not mandatory or compulsory on the part of the Corporation to examine a witness to prove the charge on their behalf, because of the reason that the replies obtained by the Transport Corporation from the necessary School Authorities prove the case of Transport Corporation clinchingly. In this regard, the Management/Transport Corporation cannot be compelled to examine a witness and it is the option available to the Management/Transport Corporation to prove their case in whatever manner possible by taking recourse to Law of the Land. The Learned Counsel for the Transport Corporation submits that the Certificate of the District Elementary Educational Officer itself is enough and his examination is not mandatory in law.

75. Furthermore, it is to be remembered that the 'onus of proof' is not static. It shifts from one place to another. Also that, if certain facts are within the special knowledge of a concerned person, then it is for him to speak about those facts, failing which, an adverse inference can also be drawn.

76. It appears that on 09.01.2006 the Disciplinary Authority issued notice to the Delinquent Employees calling upon them to furnish reply [by enclosing the Enquiry Report] within five days, for which, on 20.01.2006, they furnished a letter to the Transport Corporation (Management) requiring them to provide the copies of Enquiry Proceedings/Minutes in entirety, which, according to the Management/Transport Corporation, is only after conclusion of the Enquiry and in fact, the Enquiry Officer had submitted his report on 26.12.2005. In any event, it comes to be known that on 18.07.2017 the Management/Transport Corporation had supplied the documents viz., Exs.M.1 to M.6 and it is for the Employees to furnish their reply. The grievance of the Management/Transport Corporation is that the Employees had not given a reply and as such, no final orders are passed in the subject matter in issue.

77. The Employees have given letters dated 28.07.2017 etc., addressed to the Managing Director of the Transport Corporation, wherein they had prayed for 30 days time to offer their explanation for the explanation dated 18.07.2017, sought for by the Management and till date, the fact of the matter is that the Employees have not furnished a reply and, therefore, the Management/Transport Corporation is not in a position to pass final orders in the subject matter in issue.

78. In reality, the employee [M.Sridhar - Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD)No.20001 of 2015] at Paragraph No.4 of the affidavit filed in W.P.(MD)No.20001 of 2015 had, among other things, mentioned that the second Respondent therein proceeded to conduct enquiry and issued Enquiry Notice on 09.08.2005 to appear for an enquiry and that apart, during enquiry, two communications from the Assistant Elementary Educational Officer, Ramanathapuram, dated 10.05.2005 were relied upon by the second Respondent therein to presume that he had submitted a Bogus Certificate. In this regard, it is the categorical version of the Employee [M.Sridhar - Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD)No.20001 of 2015] that copies of those communications were not given to him to offer his explanation and that on receipt of the Enquiry Notice dated 09.08.2005, he had made a request to the second Respondent therein to furnish some of the documents relied upon by the Department, but, without giving any reply, the Management had proceeded with the enquiry.

79. Continuing further, it is the stand of the Employees, more particularly, M.Sridhar - Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD)No.20001 of 2015 [Appellant in W.A.(MD)No.1322 of 2017] that in the Domestic Enquiry conducted by the second Respondent therein, the District Educational Officer, Ramanathapuram and the Assistant Elementary Educational Officer, Ramanathapuram, who transmitted a vague report, were not enquired/examined on the side of the Management before the Domestic Enquiry Officer in Domestic Enquiry Proceedings. However, in regard to the enquiry proceedings relating to S.Karmegam (Writ Petitioner in W.P.(MD)No.20169 of 2015), the Head Master was examined.

80. Insofar as the present cases are concerned, although a plea was taken on behalf of the Management/Transport Corporation that there was no material placed before the Learned Single Judge to arrive at a conclusion that the Principles of Natural Justice were not followed, this Court is of the considered view that the Appellants/Employees (Writ Petitioners) came out with a plea before the Learned Single Judge that repeatedly they sent representations before the second Respondent in W.A.(MD)Nos.1322 to 1333 of 2017 praying for furnishing of documents and sought time to submit their explanations after furnishing the required documents and the Management/Transport Corporation, through their communication dated 18.07.2017, had supplied the documents [subsequent development] and final orders are to be passed by the Management/Transport Corporation, and at this distance point of time, it is not open to the Management/Transport Corporation to turn around and take such plea in this regard.

81. Moreover, the Learned Single Judge had set aside the Termination Orders of the Employees in W.P(MD)Nos.20001, 20009, 20145 of 2015, etc., batch, on the basis of non-supply of copies of documents and there being a case of violation of Principles of Natural Justice and in this regard, since the Learned Single Judge had rendered a factual finding, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the same, to prevent an aberration of justice and to promote substantial cause of justice.

DISPOSITION:

82. In the light of the foregoing detailed qualitative and quantitative discussions and on an over-all equitable consideration of the surrounding facts and circumstances of the instant cases, in an integral manner, this Court, while affirming the findings of the Learned Single Judge in regard to the violation of Principles of Natural Justice, which resulted in Termination Orders, directs the Employees to furnish their individual replies for the Enquiry Officer's Report to the Domestic Enquiry Officer/Management/Transport Corporation, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment, so as to enable the Domestic Enquiry Officer, to proceed further by following due process of Law. Soon after receipt of individual replies from the concerned Employees, within the time adumbrated by this Court as stated supra, the Domestic Enquiry Officer shall look into/examine the same and based on the individual replies, the Domestic Enquiry Officer is directed to conduct Enquiry strictly in accordance with the Rules and Regulations and guided by the Principles of Natural Justice and pass final orders De novo in an Impartial, Fair, Unbiased and Dispassionate manner, based on the facts and circumstances of the present cases, which float on the surface, within a period of six weeks thereafter.

83. Insofar as the direction issued by the Learned Single Judge in the impugned order dated 02.05.2017 in W.P(MD)Nos.20001, 20009, 20145 of 2015, etc., batch, at Paragraph No.15.2 that 'Till such time, as a stop-gap arrangement, the second respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioners, which would be subject to the result of the Enquiry" is concerned, in the considered opinion of this Court, the same is legally untenable and hence, the same is set aside, in furtherance of substantial cause of justice.

84. The Employees are directed to lend their unstinted co-operation and assistance to the Management/Transport Corporation, so as to enable the latter to bring the Disciplinary Proceedings to an end, in a complete and comprehensive manner. It is open to the Employees to raise all Factual and Legal Pleas before the Domestic Enquiry Officer including the placing of reliance of relevant orders/Judgments/copy of Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) ..../2012 C.C.No.12740 of 2012 and to utilize the same to a maximum extent. It cannot be gainsaid that the Domestic Enquiry officer shall take note of the same and pass necessary reasoned speaking orders by applying his thinking judicial mind, by adverting to the points/meeting out the points to be urged by the Employees.

85. It is open to the Employees to make a request before the Management/Transport Corporation or before the Domestic Enquiry Officer to cross-examine the relevant witnesses, viz., the Headmaster of the concerned Schools, the District Elementary Educational Officer or any other person [In case, if they are examined on the side of the Management] and also to let in oral or documentary evidence on their side. The Domestic Enquiry Officer shall permit the Employees, if they make a request for summoning or cross- examining the Management witnesses to be examined and later, pass appropriate final orders in the subject matter in issue, within the time determined by this Court as stated supra.

86. With the aforesaid Observation(s)/Direction(s), the Writ Appeals stand disposed of. No costs. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.

To

1.The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Kumbakonam) Ltd., Kumbakonam.

2.The General Manager, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Kumbakonam) Ltd., Division-III, Karaikudi Region, Karaikudi.

.