JUDGMENT A.P. Sahi, J.
1. Heard Sri Hemant Kumar - learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ankur Goel holding brief of Smt. Sunita Agrawal - learned Counsel for the University.
2. On behalf of respondents, a counter-affidavit has been filed sworn by Sri A.A. Khan, Personal Assistant in the legal section of Aligarh Muslim University.
3. The challenge in the present petition is to the order dated 29.9.2005 passed by the Vice Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, whereby the petitioner's alleged resignation is sought to be accepted from the post of Senior Lab. Assistant in Dental College of the University w.e.f. 16.7.2005. The principal ground of attack to the aforesaid order is that the petitioner out of disgust had written the words "I have resigned" but she sent a letter to the Registrar on 21.7.2005 to the effect that the aforesaid resignation tendered by her be not accepted and be treated as withdrawn. The petitioner also contends that she sent an application on 19.8.2005 to the Principal of the Dental College, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, which was also to the same effect. The petitioner contends that once she had withdrawn her resignation, there was no question of the same being accepted by the Vice Chancellor by the impugned order on 29.9.2005.
4. The aforesaid fact of dispatch of the letter withdrawing the resignation has been admitted in paras 10 and 11 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent - University. However, the University further has taken a stand that the recommendations came to be accepted by the Vice Chancellor and since the petitioner is a non-teaching employee of the institution and since she is an ad hoc employee, therefore, she had no right to withdraw the resignation and the resignation became complete as and when it was tendered by the petitioner.
5. The regulations governing the terms and conditions of non-teaching employees framed and approved by the Executive Council in the year 1972 and which are applicable to the facts of the controversy as admitted to the parties has been placed before the Court. Regulation 6(III)(b) defines the Vice Chancellor to be the appointing authority for the post below the ranks mentioned in Clause (a) and Clause (c) of the aforesaid sub-regulation. There is no dispute on this score, therefore, that the Vice Chancellor is the appointing authority in respect of the post held by the petitioner. The next regulation, which requires to be considered in the context of the present controversy, is the regulation pertaining to resignation, the same is quoted herein below :
16. Resignation:
Subject to acceptance of resignation by the competent authority a permanent employee/an employee appointed on probation may, by notice of three months (for permanent employee)/one month (for employees on probation) in writing addressed to the appointing authority, resign from the service of the University or by payment of salary in lieu thereof, provided further that if that employee is compelled to resign under circumstances beyond his own control, the condition of notice may be waived by the competent authority.
No notice would be necessary to be given by a temporary employee. Acceptance of resignation would, however, be the pre-requisite for his obtaining release from service.
6. The relevant part of the aforesaid regulation is contained in the last 3 lines which clearly states that in the case of a temporary employee no notice would be necessary but the acceptance of resignation would be required as a pre-requisite for the employee obtaining release from service. It is, therefore, evident from the aforesaid regulation that the acceptance of the resignation is a sine qua-non before the jural relationship between an employee and the employer comes to an end. In the instant case, it is admitted that the petitioner had tendered an application for withdrawal of her application long before it was accepted on 26.9.2005. In view of this undisputed position and in view of the fact that no orders were passed on the said application moved by the petitioner, the Vice Chancellor could not have proceeded to accept the resignation in view of regulation 16 referred to herein above. The petitioners' case stand supported by a series of decisions of the Apex Court in this regard. In the case of Union of India etc. v. Gopal Chandra Misra and Ors. etc. , it was held that a resignation can be withdrawn before the date from which it is intended to be given effect to. The Apex Court in the case of Balram Gupta v. Union of India and Anr. reported in 1987 (Suppl) SCC 228, has held that a resignation can be withdrawn before acceptance and the same view has been followed in the case of Nand Keshwar Prasad v. Indian Farmers Fertilizers Cooperative Ltd. and Ors. and J.N. Srivastava v. Union of India and Anr. . The Apex Court in a later decision in the case of Power Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Pramod Kumar Bhatia, , has ruled that the jural relationship of an employee comes to an end only after the employee is relieved upon the resignation having been accepted by the employer. This view has been further followed by the Apex Court in the case of Shambhu Murari Sinha v. Project & Development India Ltd. and Anr. , and Shambhu Murari Sinha v. Project & Development India Ltd. and Anr. .
7. Another aspect of the matter which deserves to be noted is that the aforesaid regulation clearly stipulates a bilateral act for the resignation to be given effect to. This clearly indicates that the resignation is not a unilateral action and, as such, the Apex Court in the case of Moti Ram v. Param Dev and Anr. , has held that where the Act of resignation requires acceptance, it is a bilateral act and it will become complete only after the office is relinquished upon the acceptance having been made by the competent authority.
8. It is not the case of the respondents that they had passed any order on the application of withdrawal moved by the petitioner. In view of this as well, since nothing was done on the said application, the Vice Chancellor could not have proceeded to accept the resignation without attending to the said application.
9. In view of the aforesaid position of law, the order impugned dated 29.9.2005 is unsustainable and is hereby quashed. The writ petition stands allowed with no order as to costs.