As both the appeals arise out of common order and appellants are common, they were heard together and disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The land of the appellants were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). At that stage, writ petitions were filed by the appellants for mandamus forbearing the respondents from interfering with their possession of properties to an extent of 2.06 acres along with industrial building comprised in survey No.1542/1A (0.62 acres); survey No.1542/1B (0.2 acres) and survey No.1542/3 (1.20 acres) in Sriperumbudur Village, V.R.P. Chatram, Bangalore Trunk Road, Sriperumbudur Taluk, except in accordance with the procedure envisaged under the Act. One of the appellant filed the other writ petition challenging the award passed by the 2nd respondent in Award No.3/99 dated 29th Nov., 1999 with further prayer to direct respondents 1 to 4 to cancel the encumbrance created pursuant to Award No.3/99, including the allotment orders issued in favour of respondents 5 and 6 or any lis made on the appellant's property.
Learned single Judge dismissed the writ petitions and, hence, the writ appeals were preferred.
3. At the time of admission of the appeals, the appellants argued the case in person. The main plea was taken that the State Government neither informed the appellants with regard to acquisition of their lands and awards were passed without notice and without hearing them. It was further informed that G.O. Ms.61 dated 5th March, 1998, issued from Industries Department was initially challenged by them in a writ petition, but pursuant to the Court's order when they represented the matter before the State, they came to know that the Government Order issued u/s 4 (1) of the Act does not relate to their lands. In the year 2005, when SIPCOT approached to dispossess them, these writ petitions were preferred and later on, in 2008 the appellants have come to know of the award. Only thereafter, they challenged the award by filing the writ petition in the year 2008 and, therefore, there was no delay on their part.
4. At the time of hearing, two short points were raised by learned counsel for the appellants before this Court. But, before discussing such issues, it is desirable to notice the relevant facts, as mentioned hereunder :-
The State Government granted administrative sanction by G.O. Ms. No.61 dated 24th Feb., 1997 for acquisition of 0.27.08.0 Hectares of patta land and also for alienation of an extent of 62.72.0 Hectares of poramboke land in villages of Pondur, Irungulam, Araneri, Mambakkam, Thirumangalam, Sirumangadu and Santhavelur in Sriperumbudur Taluk for setting up industrial complex by invoking the urgency clause of Section 17 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. Draft Notification u/s 4 (1) was approved on 24th March, 1997, which was gazetted on 25th Sept., 1997 vide G.O. Ms. No.245. Publication was made in 2 dailies, 'Malai Malar' and 'Malai Kathir' on 5th Oct., 1997, in terms of Section 4 (1). Local publication was also made by beat of 'tom tom' on 4th Nov., 1997. Draft declaration u/s 6 was approved on 12th Nov., 1997 and Declaration u/s 6 was published in the Gazette on 13th Nov., 1997. Such Declaration u/s 6 was also published in 2 newspapers 'Malai Kathir' and 'Malai Murasu' on 27th Nov., 1997, followed by local publication made on 4th Dec., 1997.
Notices were issued to the petitioner u/s 9 (1) on 10th Dec., 1997. It was also published in the village on 10th Dec., 1997. The appellants received the individual notices on 2nd Jan., 1998, whereinafter the award enquiry was made on 25th Aug., 1998 and 12th Nov., 1999 and on deposition of award amount, possession of survey No.1542/1B2, 1542/3 and 1542/2B were taken on 17th Nov., 1999 by the Special Tahsildar and handed over to SIPCOT on the same day. Possession of the other lands having S. No.1542/1A2B was taken and handed over on 12th Feb., 2001. Total award amount was deposited by 29th Nov., 1999 when the award was passed.
5. Learned counsel for the respondents informed that an interim order was passed by this Court on 25th Oct., 2005 in W.P. No.34469/05, wherein it was ordered not to dispossess the petitioners if already not dispossessed. But, much before the same, the petitioners have been dispossessed from their respective lands on 17th Nov., 1999 and 12th Feb., 2001. The lands have been allotted in favour of Pasteur Health Care and Sam Trading Corporation.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the finding of learned single Judge that the appellants are guilty of laches is incorrect, the knowledge of the award passed in the year 1991 was made known only on 18th March, 2008 when the 3rd respondent filed a copy of the award. It was submitted that the award was never communicated to the appellant though it is incumbent to do so u/s 12 (2) of the Act. Referring to the said provision (Section 12 (2)) and judgment of the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra Vs Deputy L.A. Officer (AIR 1961 SC 1500), it was submitted that the copy of the award having not supplied to the appellants, it should be held that there is no award in the eye of law and having made known to the appellants on 18th March, 2008, it should be held that the award is beyond the period of limitation.
He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in State of U.P. - Vs Rajeev Gupta (1994 (5) SCC 686), wherein the Supreme Court held that if no award is made within the specified period, the entire proceeding of acquisition of land shall lapse. In other words, on expiry of two years from the date of publication of Declaration u/s 6, unless the proviso is attracted, if no award is made in the meantime, in the eye of law the proceeding initiated u/s 4 (1) of the Act culminated into the Declaration made u/s 6 shall stand lapsed and no proceeding, in the eye of law, thereafter would exist to take further action.
7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents while submitted that the petitioners had knowledge with regard to the proceeding, it was argued that the proceeding u/s 4 (1) or Declaration u/s 6 earlier having not challenged, inspite of knowledge, the writ petition against the land acquisition proceeding after issuance of award is not maintainable. He placed reliance on one or other decision of Supreme Court, which will be discussed at the appropriate stage. It was further contended on behalf of the respondents that subsequent writ petitions against the land acquisition proceeding will be barred by principles of res judicata inasmuch as while preferring the earlier writ petition the appellants never chose to challenge the land acquisition proceeding u/s 4 (1) or the Declaration u/s 6 though they had knowledge with regard to the same.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and noticed the rival contentions.
9. From the record it will be evident that the petitioners were served with notice dated 10th Dec., 1997 u/s 9 (1) and 10, which were received by Ms.Divya Dolia on 2nd Jan., 1998. A copy of the notice and service report have been enclosed by the 2nd respondent. The possession was taken by the Special Tahsildar on 17th Nov., 1999 and 12th Feb., 2001 and handed over to SIPCOT. The documents with regard to taking over possession and handing over is also brought on record. Inspite of knowledge of such notice dated 10th Dec., 1997, served on the appellants on 2nd Jan., 1998, when the writ petition, W.P. No.19713/99 was filed by the appellant on 8th Dec., 1999, for reasons best known to them, they suppressed the aforesaid fact that they have already received the notice with regard to award enquiry in connection with the land acquisition proceeding in question.
10. Learned counsel for the appellants referred to an order contained in Rc. No.32/97 dated 13th Nov., 1999 passed by the Special Tahsildar (LA), SIPCOT, wherein reference of one G.O. Ms. No.61 dated 5th March, 1998, issued from the Industries Department has been made. It was submitted that by giving wrong reference to the G.O. Ms. No.61 dated 5th March, 1998, the appellants were misguided by the respondents. But such submission cannot be accepted in view of the fact that the copy of the order contained in Rc. No.32/97 dated 13th Nov., 1999 was not communicated to the appellant and it was an internal communication made by the Officer to the Sub Treasury, Sriperumbudur and the District Revenue Officer (LA) for the purpose of intimating the compensation amount to which owners/interested persons are entitled.
11. Inspite of receipt of notice by the appellants on 2nd Jan., 1998, apart from the fact that they have not brought the aforesaid fact to the notice of the Court in W.P. No.19713/99, the appellants did not choose to appear before the Collector by raising a dispute with regard to the compensation amount. Now, for their laches, they want to derive advantage of sub-section (2) to Section 12 by stating that they should have been forwarded with a copy of the award, if not appeared before the Collector at the time of award and non-supply of the same will vitiate the total proceeding.
In this connection, we may refer Supreme Court decision in Harish Chandra (supra). In the said case, Supreme Court, while dealing with the expression date of award used in proviso (b) to Section 18 (2) of the Act, held that for the purpose of Section 18 (2) (b), it must mean the date on which the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. Such finding has been given for the purpose of finding out the period of limitation. In the said case, the Supreme Court made certain observations, relevant portion of which is quoted hereunder :-
6. ........ Thus considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If the award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it, it can be said to be made when pronounced. If the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced the award is said to be communicated to the said party even if the said party is not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Similarly, if without notice of the date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced and a party is not present the award can be said to be made when it is communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression the date of the award used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words from the date of the Collector's award read in the proviso to S.18 in a literal or mechanical way.
7. In this connection it is material to recall the fact that under S. 12 (2) it is obligatory on the Collector to give immediate notice of the award to the persons interested who are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made. This requirement itself postulates the necessity of the communication of the award to the party concerned. The Legislature recognises that the making of the award under
S. 11 followed by its filing under S. 12 (1) would not meet the requirements of justice more bringing the award into force. It is right that the communication of the award to the party concerned was also necessary and so by the use of the mandatory words an obligation is placed on the Collector to communicate the award immediately to the person concerned. It is significant that the section requires that the Collector to give notice of the award immediately after making it. This proviso lends support to the view which we have taken about the construction of the expression from the date of the Collector's award in the proviso to S.18. It is because communication of the order is regarded by the Legislature as necessary that S. 12 (2) has imposed an obligation on the Collector to see if the relevant clause in the proviso is read in the light of this statutory requirement and it tends to show that the literal and mechanical construction of the said clause would be wholly inappropriate. It would indeed be a very curious result that the failure of the Collector to discharge his obligation under S. 12 (2) should directly tend to make ineffective the right of the party to make an application under S. 18, and this result could not possibly have been intended by the Legislature.
12. In the present case, it will be evident that the appellants were given individual notice on 10th Dec., 1997, served on 2nd Jan., 1998 for award enquiry. Inspite of that, the appellants did not choose to appear and the award was finally passed on 29th Nov., 1999. Therefore, it cannot be stated that the petitioners had no knowledge of the action taken for preparation of the award. Apart from the aforesaid fact, it will be evident from the Supreme Court judgment that the interpretation of Section 12 (2) has been made for the purpose of limitation under proviso (b) to Section 18 (2). For the purpose of limitation, while it is true that the date of knowledge of award is to be noticed, that cannot be a ground to render the total acquisition proceeding illegal, though it may be a good ground to maintain the petition u/s 18 (1) for enhancement of compensation.
In this case, admittedly, Declaration u/s 6 was made on 10th Dec., 1997 and award was passed on 29th Nov., 1999, which is well within two years. Inspite of notice, if the appellant did not choose to appear and states that they have come to know of the award on 18th March, 2008, they may take advantage of such knowledge for the purpose of challenging the award u/s 18 (1), but not for the purpose of counting the period of two years from the date of declaration u/s 6.
13. It is not in dispute that both the writ petitions have been preferred much after the final award was passed. In Municipal Council, Ahmednagar Vs- Shah Hyder Beig & Ors. (2000 (2) SCC 48), Supreme Court held that a writ petition filed after publication of award is not maintainable.
A Division Bench of this Court in Ramalingam & Ors. - Vs State of T.N. (2005 (3) CTC 1), also held that challenge to acquisition proceeding after passing of award is not maintainable.
Similar was the view of this Court in S.Harshavardhan & Anr. - Vs State of T.N. (2005 (3) CTC 691), wherein the Court observed that a writ petition challenging the land acquisition proceeding should not be entertained after award has been passed. No writ would lie after passing of the award.
14. As the appellants had knowledge with regard to the land acquisition proceeding as back as in January, 1998, after about 6 years it was not open to the appellant to challenge the award. We find no illegality in the order passed by learned single Judge. The writ appeals are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
GLN To
1. The Secretary Government of Tamil Nadu Industries Department Fort St. George, Chennai 600 009.
2. The Special Tahsildar Land Acquisition SIPCOT, Unit III Sriperumbudur Scheme No.37, Bangalore Trunk Road Sriperumbudur 602 105