JUDGMENT
1. This is a plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit in which the plaintiff asked for the following reliefs:
(a) That it may be declared that the plaintiff is the adopted son of Sahi Ram deceased, and that he is in possession as such of the estate of Sahi Ram aforesaid, laid at Rs. 1000.
(b) That an injunction may be issued to the defendants restraining them from offering obstructions to the possession of the plaintiff laid at Rs. 20.
2. One or two observations may be made about this relief before we proceed. The body of the plaint refers to the entire estate of Sahi Ram, and it is in respect of that estate that the plaintiff asks for a declaration that he is in possession. But on the other hand the plaint refers specifically to the occupancy lands of the deceased, and the inference is clear that the estate consisted only of an occupancy holding. The next point is that the relief is really two reliefs joined in one paragraph, and it is really a matter of drafting merely that the paragraph was not divided into two, and we do not think, therefore, that the mere conjunction of the two reliefs in one paragraph makes them otherwise than two reliefs, or that it can form the foundation of any conclusion as to the real object of the plaintiff. If such a conclusion can be drawn against him it could equally well be drawn if the first relief had been separated into two. The defendant denied the adoption and pleaded Section 11, Civil P.C. The trial Court held that the suit was triable by a civil Court but that the plaintiff had failed to prove his adoption. The lower appellate Court did not decide the question of adoption because it decided the preliminary point against the plaintiff holding that the suit was not triable by a civil Court but could have been tried and should have been tried by a revenue Court under Section 95, Tenancy Act of 1901. The plaintiff comes here in appeal, the grounds of his appeal being framed as follows:
Firstly, because the Courts (sic, Court) below erred in holding that the suit was not maintainable in a civil Court Secondly, because it is amply proved on the evidence on the record that the appellant is the duly adopted son of Mt. Bhuria.
3. The only point with which we are concerned is whether the lower appellate Court was right in holding that the suit was not maintainable in a civil Court. It is clear that where the one and only object of the plaintiff is really to obtain a declaration of his right to a tenancy the suit is triable by a revenue Court and by the revenue Court only, whether or no one of the reliefs asked for is such a relief as could, if that alone had been asked for, be entertained by a civil Court. We have been referred to the decision in Misri Lal v. Gopi Charan A.I.R. 1928 All. 538. In that suit the plaintiff made a widow and the zamindar parties and he asked for cancellation of a document of relinquishment executed in favour of the zamindar by the widow, and he also asked for a declaration that he was the occupancy tenant of a holding. The plaintiff subsequently withdrew the prayer for a declaration that he was the occupancy tenant and confined his suit to the relief asking for the cancellation of the document. It was held that the jurisdiction of the civil Court to grant this relief was barred by Section 167, Tenancy Act, that the real test was whether the dispute was one in respect of which any suit or application could have been brought in the revenue Court. It is true that in that case Sulaiman, A.C.J., at p. 21 said:
The Court cannot grant the declaration sought for without deciding the question of the disputed tenancy as against the contesting zamindar.
and in the present case that particular test does not apply. In that case the plaintiff would have had no case for the cancellation of the document unless he first established that he was the tenant. Here in the matter of adoption a plaintiff could clearly have a right to obtain a declaration of his adoption without establishing any point, such as that he was a tenant, appropriate to the jurisdiction of the revenue Court. The principle, however, does underline the case to which we have referred that it is the essential object of the plaintiff which has to be considered, and if he can obtain that object by a suit in the revenue Court, the revenue Court is the proper one There are, however, two other cases and possibly more which are directly in point, namely, Dorilal v. Sardar Singh [1908] 5 A.L.J. 514 and Ramcharittar Rai v. Jinsi Ahirin [1913] 36 All. 48. This is sufficient for the disposal of the appeal, but we would add one observation. While the principle has been accepted that where from the plaint as framed it is possible to properly deduce that the sole object of the plaintiff is to obtain something which he could obtain from the revenue Court, he must go to the revenue Court for it. But this must not be taken to mean that it follows that in every case where two reliefs have been joined in the same plaint, one which taken by itself would be cognizable by the civil Court, and the other which taken by itself would be cognizable by the revenue Court, in no case would it be proper to permit the plaintiff to strike out the relief which was properly cognizable by the revenue Court and pursue the relief in the civil Court which was properly cognizable by such a Court. The appeal is dismissed with costs.