A sale deed in favour of the petitioner was executed and registered on 20.6.2003. On the basis of a complaint dated 16.3.2011, the Sub-Registrar, Sadar, on 19.4.2011, made an inspection and, thereafter, the Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue), wrote for permission to the Special Secretary (Tax and Registration) Anubhag-5 U.P. government on 21.4.2011 as only after a permission was obtained from the State Government could proceedings be initiated after four years of the execution of the document. The permission as was sought for was granted on 25.5.2011 by the Deputy Secretary State of U.P. The original record of the case was summoned by me and a perusal of the order dated 25.5.2011 showed that on the left hand corner of it an order dated 14.6.2011 was transcribed that the stamp clerk was required to place the file before the Additional District Magistrate alongwith all the relevant record. Thereafter, it appears from another order passed on 18.6.2011 on the very same order of the approval dated 25.5.2011 that a direction was issued that the case be registered and notices be issued. In Hindi, following were the words " Waad Panjikrit Hokar Notice Jari ho". Thereafter on 23.6.2011, a notice was actually issued to the petitioner saying that there was a deficiency of Rs. 2,23,000/-. The notice which was issued on 23.6.2011 stated that there was some sale deed in favour of the petitioner executed by Adil Abbasi a Resident of village- Kundigarh Tola, Tehsil Sadar District- Azamgarh and that there was a deficiency of stamp duty to the tune of Rs. 2,23,000/- and further it was stated that the petitioner had to appear on 13.7.2011 for the filing of his objections. The petitioner thereafter filed his objections on 21.9.2011. The order sheet reveals that the matter proceeded at a very tardy pace and ultimately on 16.1.2017 some spot inspection was got done with regard to the Plot No. 334. Thereafter, the case was decided on 14.11.2017 and it was found that there was a deficiency of Stamp Duty to the tune of Rs. 2,23,000/-. A penalty of Rs. 50,000/- was also imposed. Further a simple interest at the rate of 1.5% per month was made chargeable till the time the deficiency was made good. The petitioner, thereafter, filed a revision which was also dismissed on 14.2.2018. Aggrieved thereof the instant writ petition has been filed.
Learned counsel for the petitioner made the followings submissions:-
I. The notice dated 23.6.2011 was absolutely vague as it neither mentioned the date of the instrument which was deficiently stamped nor the details of the property which was sold through the sale deed and, therefore, the proceedings were void as they had resulted from a notice which was absolutely vague.
II. The petitioner has stated that the proceedings were barred under Section 47 A (3) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as the Section provided that proceedings could be initiated within four years from the execution of the document and if they had to be initiated after four years but before 8 years of the execution then a prior permission of the State Government had to be obtained. Since the learned counsel read out Section 47-A (3) of the Indian Stamp Act, the same is being reproduced here as under:-
"47-A. Under-valuation of the instrument.-(3). The collector may, suo motu, or on a reference from any Court or from the Commissioner of Stamps or an Additional Commissioner of stamps or a Deputy Commissioner of Stamps or an Assistant Commissioner of Stamps or any officer authorized by the State Government in that behalf, within four years from the date of registration of any instrument on which duty is chargeable on the market value of the property, not already referred to him under sub-section (1), call for and examine the instrument for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness of the market value, of the property which is the subject for such instrument, and the duty payable thereon, and if after such examination he has reason to believe that the market value of such property has not been truly set forth in such instrument, he may determine the market value of such property and the duty payable thereon:
provided that, with the prior permission of the State Government, an action under this sub-section may be taken after a period of four years but before a period of eight years from the date of registration of the instrument on which duty is chargeable on the market value of the property."
Learned counsel submitted that the sale deed was registered on 20.6.2003. The alleged complaint was made on 16.3.2011. Thereafter the Sub-Registrar Sadar informed the Assistant Inspector General of Registration on 19.4.2011 regarding the complaint. The Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue) on 21.4.2011 tried to take the permission to institute the case as four years had elapsed. The permission as was asked for was granted on 18.6.2011, and thereafter when the case was registered an order was passed that notices had to be issued. Only on 23.6.2011 notice was actually issued and the petitioner replied to the notice on 7.9.2011.
Learned counsel has submitted that, admittedly, 8 years period expired on 20.6.2011 and if notices were being issued on 23.6.2011 the proceeding was per se barred by limitation and therefore could not have been proceeded with. He, therefore, submits that the orders may be quashed.
III. Learned counsel for the petitioner in the alternative also submitted that, if notices were considered to be proper and it was held that the case was initiated within the limitation prescribed, the orders were still bad as they were based on a Naib Tehsildar's report dated 16.1.2017 when the sale was of the year 2003. According to him, this could not have been done as the sale was of the year 2003 and the report of the year 2017 would not have at all given a clear picture with regard the value, the property had in the year 2003.
IV. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that even if the report had to be believed then the property in question had to be treated residential as the report said so.
In reply, learned Standing Counsel, however, submitted that the notice could not be considered vague as it definitely disclosed the name of the seller and that of the buyer. Further, he submits that the proceedings were initiated well within the limitation prescribed by Section 47-A (3) of the Indian Stamp Act. According to the learned Standing Counsel, notices would be deemed to have been issued the day it was observed by Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue) that the case be registered and notices be issued. In fact, the learned Standing Counsel vehemently argued that the case would be deemed to have been initiated on 19.4.2011 itself when the Sub Registrar (Sadar) had informed the Assistant Inspector General of Registration.
Learned Standing Counsel has also stated that, in fact, there was an earlier complaint of the year 2004 and the complaint of the year 2011 was only a repetition of the complaint of 2004 and, therefore it could not be said that it was a belated complaint.
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after having gone through the record (original record was produced by the learned Standing Counsel) I am of the view that no proceedings can be initiated and decided unless the notice is proper. A bare perusal of the notice shows that neither was there any plot mentioned in it nor was any date of the sale deed mentioned. Such notice, even though, was contested by the petitioner, cannot be relied upon and the proceedings cannot be said to have been proceeded with in accordance with law. In 1981 SC 136 (S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and others), it has been noted that:
"The requirements of natural justice are met only if opportunity to represent is given in view of proposed action. The demands of natural justice are not met even if the very person proceeded against has furnished the information on which the action is based, if it is furnished in a casual way or for some other purpose. The person proceeded against must know that he is being required to meet the allegations which might lead to a certain action being taken against him. If that is made known the requirements are met."
Therefore, when there was no detail of the Sale Deed in the notice it can safely be concluded that it was void even if the petitioner had replied to it. It could, therefore, be said that there was no notice in the eyes of law. In this regard, learned counsel also relied upon 2010 (13) SCC 427(Oryx Fisheries Private Limited vs. Union of India and Others).
Secondly I find that the proceedings were definitely barred by limitation. When on 18.6.2011, the case was registered and a direction was issued by the Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue) it did not mean that the petitioner had known about the case. The filing of the case could be known by the petitioner only after a notice was received by him. Thus, initiation of the case could have been presumed only when notice was actually issued.
In the instant case, notice was issued on 23.6.2011. This was a date which was definitely 8 years after the execution of the sale deed dated 20.6.2003. In 2015 (9) ADJ 503 (Smt. Vijaya Jain vs. State of U.P and Others) it has very clearly been stated that unless notices are issued with an intention that they may reach the addressee it cannot be said that the case was initiated. Paragarph 23 of this judgement is relevant for our purpose and so it is being reproduced here as under:
"From the provisions extracted above, it is apparent that the Collector proceeds under sub section (3) of Section 47-A read with rule 7 when he has reason to believe that the market value of the property comprised in the instrument has not been truly set forth and that in the opinion of the Collector, circumstances exist warranting him to undertake the enquiry contemplated under rule 7. What we however find from the notice dated 09 September 2013 is that the Collector has proceeded to record, albeit prima facie, that the instrument in question has been insufficiently stamped to the extent of Rs.8,89,000/-. The notice apart from referring to a note dated 20 May 2013, received from the Assistant Inspector General of Registration neither carries nor discloses any basis upon which the Collector came to the prima facie conclusion that the appellant was liable to pay Rs. 8,89,000/ as deficit stamp duty. In our opinion a notice of this nature must necessarily disclose to the person concerned the basis and the reasons upon which the Collector has come to form an opinion that the market value of the property has not been truly set forth. In the absence of a disclosure of even rudimentary details on the basis of which the Collector came to form this opinion, the person concerned has no inkling of the case that he has to meet. A notice in order to be legally valid and be in compliance with the principles of natural justice must necessarily disclose, though not in great detail, the case and the basis on which action is proposed to be taken against the person concerned. Not only this and as is evident from a bare reading of rule 7, at the stage of issuance of notice, the Collector has to proceed on the basis of material which may tend to indicate that the market value of the property has not been truly and faithfully disclosed in the instrument. The stage of computation of market value comes only after the provisions of sub rules (2) (3) and (4) of rule 7 come into play. At the stage of issuance of notices, the Collector calls upon the person concerned to show cause "as to why the market value of the property.... be not determined by him."
Further, the judgement reported in 2017 (135) RD 18 (Smt. Bhagwan Kaur vs. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority/Additional Commissioner, Saharanpur Division, Saharanpur and Others) was also to this effect and it clearly lays down that notice had to be issued within four years of the execution of the document. It also lays down that if prior permission was there then notice had to be issued within 8 years. Further it lays down that notice if had to be issued then it should actually be issued to the addressee. An intention on the file to issue notice would not mean that notice had actually been issued. Special Bench decision reported in 1998 Allahabad 237 (Girjesh Kumar Srivastava and Another vs. State of U.P. and Others) has also in paragraph 15 very clearly stated that limitation would be calculated from the date when actually action is initiated by the Collector.
In the instant case, the authority by issuing a notice on 23.6.2011 would be said to have had taken action on that date. By simply registering of the case and by simply observing that notice had to be issued, it could not be said that action was initiated.
Since, I have held that the notice was vague and the same was issued after the period of limitation, I need not decide the other issues which were raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
The impugned orders dated 14.2.2018 and 14.11.2017 passed by the respondents no. 1 and 2 respectively are quashed. The writ petition is allowed.
The record as was produced by the learned Standing Counsel is returned to him.
Order Date :- 25.4.2018 praveen.