JUDGMENT M.P. Mehrotra, J.
1. This appeal arises out of a suit under Order XXI, Rule 103, C.P.C. The brief facts are these: The house in dispute was owned by one Abdul Ghani and the plaintiff-appellant, Mohd. Mustafa purchased it on 10th June, 1959. The house was in the tenancy of one Ghissu who was admittedly dead on 10th June, 1959 when the house was purchased by the plaintiff. Ghissu's four sons and his widow were in possession of the house. They were impleaded as the five defendants in the suit. The plaintiff, while purchasing the said property on 10th June, 1959, had also obtained the right to realize certain arrears of rent which were said to be due to the landlord from the tenants. On 14-9-1959 the plaintiff sent a notice addressed to the four sons of Ghissu requiring them to pay arrears of rent and determining their tenancy. The said defendants, however, neither paid the rent nor vacated the premises. Therefore, the plaintiff filed original suit No. 44 of 1960 against the said four sons of Ghissu. The reliefs claimed were ejectment and recovery of the arrears of rent and damages. Out of the four sons, who were impleaded as the defendants in the said suit, the names of two, namely. Mansoor and Shakoor, were deleted during the pendency of the suit. The trial court decreed the suit for arrears of rent against Dullu and dismissed the claim for ejectment. The lower appellate court modified the trial court's decree to the extent that the claim for arrears of rent was decreed against Abdul Ghaffar also along with Dullu. In the second appeal this Court granted full relief to the plaintiff, including the claim for ejectment of the said two defendants, namely, Dullu and Abdul Ghaffar. In purusance of the decree for ejectment the plaintiff obtained possession on 1-1-1964. Ghissu's two sons, Mansoor and Shakoor and his widow, Sayeedan, were also evicted on the basis of the aforesaid decree even though they were no parties to the same. They, therefore, preferred objections under Order XXI, Rule 100 C.P.C. and on the same the impugned Order dated 25-4-1964 was passed by the execution court allowing the said objection and upholding the right of the said three defendants to regain possession and consequently the plaintiff was ordered to be dispossessed from the property in suit. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the aforementioned suit under Order XXI, Rule 103, C.P.C. claiming that he was not liable to be dispossessed and the impugned order dated 25-4-1964 passed by the execution court was liable to be set aside. He impleaded all the four sons and the widow of the late Ghissu as defendants in the suit. Inter alia, his allegation in the plaint was "that the entire family of Ghissu was never a tenant of the house and that the new tenancy had been taken up by Dullu and Abdul Ghaffar who had the responsibility of paying the rent. No tenancy had, however, been created in favour of any other person." It was also alleged that on 1-1-1964 in the execution of the decree possession was taken from Dullu and Abdul Ghaffar, judgment-debtors who alone were in actual physical possession and occupation of the property and not the other two sons and the widow of the late Ghissu. It was also pleaded that in view of the rejection of an earlier application dated 14-12-1963 which was made by the defendants, the second application under Order XXI, Rule 100, C.P.C. on which the impugned order dated 23-4-64 was passed was not maintainable. Two sets of written statements were filed -- one by the defendants 1 to 3 and the other by the defendants 4 and 5. It will be seen that the first three defendants were those heirs of Gthissu who were not parties to the first suit, namely, suit No. 44 of 1960. The second set of defendants, namely, Nos. 4 and 5, were the only parties to the said earlier suit. The defence was common. Their plea was that after the death of Ghissu all his heirs, namely, the defendants 1 to 5, became tenants by inheritance. The plaintiff also admitted them to be his tenants after Ghissu-Hence the defendants 1 to 3, who were not parties to the earlier suit, were not liable to be evicted in the execution of the decree passed in the said suit. They were, therefore, wrongly evicted in the execution of the said decree and were entitled to get back possession. The impugned order dated 25-4-1964 was therefore, correctly passed in their favour. After framing the necessary issues the trial court tried the suit and dismissed the same. It recorded a finding that the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 did not acquire the tenancy rights by inheritance. They were therefore, held to be trespassers but, still, the trial court held that as they were not impleaded in the earlier suit, therefore, in the execution of the decree passed in that suit they could not be evicted.
2. The plaintiff went up in appeal to the lower appellate court but the same did not succeed. It was held that all the heirs of the late Ghissu inherited the tenancy. As they were not parties to the earlier suit, therefore, they were not liable to be evicted in the execution of the decree passed in the said suit. The impugned order dated 25-4-1964 has therefore, held that the plaintiff had failed to prove his allegation in the plaint that after the death of Ghissu there was a fresh tenancy in favour of the defendants 4 and 5.
3. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff has now come up in the instant second appeal and in support thereof I have heard Shri S. N. Misra. His contentions are these:
(1) On May 29, 1964 the Rent Control & Eviction Officer, Allahabad had released the property in dispute in favour of the plaintiff. The said fact should have been noticed by the courts which they failed to do. It may be stated that an application was also filed on behalf of the appellant seeking time to bring on record certified copies of documents and papers in support of the said plea. Reliance was placed on (i) P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders (AIR 1975 SC 1409) and (ii) Lachmeshwar v. Keshwar Lal (AIR 1941 FC 5) for the contention that an appellate court is entitled to take into consideration subsequent events which come into existence after the decree appealed against.
(2) The lower appellate court was not justified in holding that all the five defendants in the suit inherited the tenancy from the deceased Ghissu. It was pointed out that the trial court had held that the defendants 1 to 3 did not inherit such tenancy and were mere trespassers. Trespassers, it was pointed out, are not entitled to file a suit under Order XXI, Rule 103, C.P.C. as under Order XXI, Rule 99, C.P.C. a bona fide claimant alone can resist execution. It was contended that definition of 'tenant' under Section 2 (g) of U. P. Act 3 of 1947 is such that there can be only one tenant and not more than one unless there is a contract to the contrary. It was submitted that in the instant case apart from Dullu no other defendant, who claimed the tenancy rights as successor to the deceased Ghissu, ever paid a single shell as rent. Reliance was placed on (i) Gool Rustomji v. Jal Rustomji (AIR 1972 Bom 113).
(3) Even if all the five defendants were joint tenants, still, there was no division of tenanted accommodation inter se and all of them were jointly in occupation and hence the decree passed against some of them was binding on all. Reliance was placed on (i) Gool Rustomji v. Jal Rustomji (AIR 1972 Bom 113) and (ii) Smt. Bhartoo v. Mst. Asa Devi (1966 All WR (HC) 55).
4. In this connection it was also contended that as the tenancy of all the tenants had been determined by notice by the plaintiff, therefore, they had no right left. Reliance was placed on Jag-dish Chandra Chatterjee v. Sri Kishan, (1972) 2 SCC 461 = (AIR 1972 SC 2526). For the plaintiff reliance was also placed on Anand Nivas (P.) Ltd, v. Anandji (AIR 1965 SC 414).
5. On behalf of the respondents, Shri Bashir Ahmad contended that a suit under Order XXI, Rule 103, C.P.C. is not a title suit is meant to seek a reversal of a summary decision given in the execution proceedings. In other words, in the suit the only controversy which can be examined is whether the decision of the execution court -under Order XXI, Rule 10, C.P.C. was a correct one or not. It was pointed out that such a suit has certain special features namely, (a) it is not a regular suit but in the nature of a revision of the summary decision given by the execution court; (b) a special court fee is leviable under Article 17 of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act; (c) it has a special period of limitation under Article 98 of the new Act which corresponds to Article 11-A of the old Act and (d) the joinder of causes of action permissible under Order I, Rule 3, C.P.C. is not applicable to such a suit. Counsel placed reliance on the following cases:--
(1) Peer Bux v Karam Chand, (1963 All LJ 725);
(2) Mandreshwar Prasad v. Motilal (AIR 1968 Pat 232);
(3) Mahabir v. Rajendra Pd. (1970 All WR 786);
(4) Phul Kumari v. Ghanshyam Misra ((1908) 35 Ind App 22) (PC);
(5) Dinkarrao v. Ratansi (AIR 1938 Nag 300) and (6) Tulsi Dae v. Shiv Dat (AIR 1927 Lah 631).
6. Shri Bashir Ahmad next contended that the tenancy of Ghissu in the instant case was a monthly one and, therefore, clearly inheritable. Reliance was vlaced on Shiv Nath v. R. B. Lal, 1967 All LJ 944 = (AIR 1969 All 333) (FB).
7. In my opinion, this appeal lacks merit and is fit to be dismissed.
8. So far as the first contention of Shri Misra is concerned, I may state that the plaintiff-appellant did not get his pleadings amended to incorporate the plea which is now sought to be raised on his behalf. The suit was filed on May 24, 1964 and during the pendency thereof the aforesaid release order is said to have been passed in favour of the plaintiff. Irrespective of the question whether he was entitled to base his claim on the said release order in a suit under Order XXI, Rule 103, C.P.C., it has to be held that even if he was so entitled, still, he did not base his case on the pleadings on the said release order. Unless the plaintiff chose to seek relief en the basis of the said independent cause of action, he could not be heard to rely on the same at the subsequent stages. In view of this aspect of the matter, it is not necessary to go into the questions which have been raised at the bar regarding the nature and scope of a suit under Order XXI. Rule 103, C.P.C. It is also not necessary to consider the case law on which reliance has been placed by Shri Misra for the proposition that an appellate court is entitled to take into consideration subsequent events which come into existence after the decree appealed against. It may, however, be added that in the instant case we are not dealing with a situation where the subsequent events caine into existence after the decree appealed against rather it is a situation where the events on which reliance is sought to be placed came into existence during the pendency of the suit and, therefore, if really the plaintiff wanted to rely on such event he should have certainly got his plaint amended to base his claim on such subsequent event which came into existence after the filing of the suit but before its conclusion. This observation, however, should not be held to imply that I am holding that in a suit under Order XXI, Rule 103, C.PC. it is possible for a plaintiff to join independent causes of action. As I have stated above, Shri Bashir Ahmad contended that in view of the special nature of the suit it is not possible to enlarge the scope of such a suit to allow a joinder of independent causes of action. It is not necessary to go into that question and I say nothing as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to get the plaint amended to base his claim on the aforesaid order of release. I have proceeded on the hypothesis that even if the plaintiff was entitled to do so he failed to get the pleadings amended to incorporate the said plea. In view of this discussion the application dated 6th July, 1976, moved by the plaintiff-appellant seeking to bring on record documents about the subsequent development in the case deserves to be rejected as no foundation was laid by amended pleadings to enable the court to consider the question of release. By my separate order on the said application I have rejected the same.
9. So far as the second contention of Shri Misra is concerned, again I find the same untenable. It is true that the trial court held that the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 did not inherit the tenancy from their father, the late Ghissu. However, the lower appellate court reversed the said finding. It has returned a finding of fact that the plaintiff's allegation that there was a fresh tenancy with the defendants 4 and 5 after the death of Ghissu was not substantiated by the evidence on record and that in view of the fact that the latter's tenancy was a monthly one the same should be deemed to have inherited by all his heirs, This finding, so far as its factual aspect is concerned, is binding on me in second appeal. So far as the legal effect of this finding is concerned, I do not think that Shri Misra is right in contending that in Section 2 (g) of the repealed U. P, enactment there can be only one tenant and not a plurality of joint tenants. I have not found anything in the said provision to warrant such an interpretation. AIR 1972 Bom 113, on which reliance has been placed, is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as the relevant provision in the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947} is materially different. Section 5 (11) (c) of the said Act lays down as under:--
"'Tenant' means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises and includes,
(a) .....
(aa) .....
(b) .....
(c) any member of the tenant's family residing with him at the time of his death as may be decided in default of agreement by the court." There is nothing to the said effect in Section 2 (g) of the U. P. Act.
10. So far as the third contention of Shri Misra is concerned, I think that legally it is not a correct proposition that it is open to proceed against some of the joint tenants on the basis of a decree which is obtained against some other joint tenants. AIR 1972 Bom 113 and 1966 All WR (HC) 55 on which reliance has been placed do not support such a propositions of law. The question of the enforceability or binding nature of a decree has to be kept distinct from the question of the nature of substantive rights of the parties. The fact that in a case of joint promisors and joint promisees the rights and obligations are joint has no bearing on the question whether a decree obtained by or against one of such joint promisees or promisors is enforceable against or binding upon the other joint promisees or joint promisors who are no parties to the decree. In this connection it may be recalled that under Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act only four kinds of judgments ere judgments in rem. In other words, they are binding against the whole world, other judgments are judgments in per-sonam, that is to say, they are binding between the parties alone. The four kinds of judgments in rem are: judgments rendered in exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction. It is obvious that the judgment which was obtained by the plaintiff in the earlier suit cannot be said to be a judgment in rem as it does not belong to any of the aforesaid four categories. Therefore, the said judgment was a judgment in per-sonam and could be binding between the parties alone and not otherwise. Shri Misra's contention that the tenancy had been determined by notice addressed to all the heirs of the late Ghissu is also not strictly correct. Admittedly, the notice determining the tenancy was not addressed to the widow. Moreover, it is not sufficient that a tenant's tenancy is determined to get his eviction. Unless the decree is passed against such a person he cannot be evicted by force. Therefore, again the point becomes important that while in the earlier suit a decree was obtained against some of the joint tenants others were not impleaded and, therefore, they were not liable to be evicted in the execution of the decree which was passed against defendants 4 and 5 in the said suit. The two cases on which Shri Misra has placed reliance, namely, 1972 (2) SCC 461 = (AIR 1972 SC 252,6) and AIR 1965 SC 414 do not seem to be of much help to him in the contention which he has raised. The said two cases are clearly distinguishable and seem to have no bearing on the facts of the instant case.
11. This appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with cost.