JUDGMENT Piggott, J.
1. The essential facts are that Gyasia presented to a Magistrate of the First Class, who apparently is also a Sub-Divisional Officer, or at least exercises some of the powers of a Sub-Divisional Officer, on the 10th of April 1920, a complaint in which he alleged that Mohan Singh and others had committed certain offenses punishable under the Indian Penal Code. The Magistrate examined Gyasia and then passed an order transferring the case for disposal to another Magistrate of subordinate jurisdiction. The application in revision does not challenge the order on the ground that the Magistrate to whom the case was transferred' was not subordinate to the Magistrate before whom the complaint was presented, the contention is that the latter had no jurisdiction to entertain Gyasia's complaint or to take cognizance of the offenses therein referred to, because on a previous date another Magistrate had dismissed a complaint filed by Gyasia on the same facts. I have seen the order in question; it was apparently passed under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, though the Magistrate does not say go. That Magistrate had been transferred from the district before the 10th of April 1920 and the learned Sessions Judge seems to be satisfied that the Magistrate whose order is now sailed in question was the successor in-office of the Magistrate who had dismissed Gyasia's first complaint. At any rate, he says that the complaints mast be regarded as having been presented in the same Court. It has to be admitted that there is no section of the Code of Criminal Procedure which, either expressly or by implication, bars the jurisdiction of the Second Magistrate to take cognizance of this complaint.
The learned Sessions Judge, however, is of opinion that this Court should interfere in order to enforce the principle laid down by a Bench of this Court in Queen-Empress v. Adam Khan 22 A. 106 : A.W.N. (1899) 211 : 9 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 1100. On its facts, the present ease is practically identical with that of Ram Bharos v. Bajban 22 Ind. Cas. 734 : 36 A. 129 : 12 A.L.J. 106 : 15 Cr. L.J. 158. This is a decision by a single Judge, but it is founded on various case s, as for instance that of William Cecil Keymer v. Emperor 22 Ind. Cas. 145 : 36 A. 53 : 12 A.L.J 1 : 15 Cr. (sic), in which it has been held that a Magistrate who has tried and discharged an accused person on particular charges has jurisdiction to commence a fresh enquiry into the same charges on a second complaint. The learned Sessions Judge expresses his apprehension that, if the decision in Queen-Empress v. Adam Khan 22 A. 106 : A.W.N. (1899) 211 : 9 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 1100 is treated as limited to case s in which a complaint might have been brought before either of two Courts exercising co-ordinate jurisdiction in the matter at one and the same time, and if it be held that the principle laid down in Ram Bharos v. Baban 22 Ind. Cas. 734 : 36 A. 129 : 12 A.L.J. 106 : 15 Cr. L.J. 158 is of general application where the presiding officer of a Court has been transferred and the second complaint is lodged before his successor-in-office, the result will be that the principle laid down in the former of the two decision s "will have very small scope." The concluding words of the judgment in that ease seem to me to show that the learned Judges who decided it intended that it should have very email scope. I may add that I have taken into consideration also the particular facts of this present case, because I have no doubt that it would be within my jurisdiction to quash the order complained of and to direct the dismissal of the complaint merely on the ground that the record did not show that the interests of justice would be served by the further enquiry which has now been initiated. The essential facts are that there were cross-complaints by Gyasia against Mohan Singh and others add by Mohan Singh against Gyasia. A Magistrate took cognizance of both complaint, but proceeded to try Mohan Singh's complaint first. He recorded in that case, as evidence for the defense, the evidence which Gyasia would have produced in support of his complaint, but he convicted Gyasia and sentenced him to fine and imprisonment. This conviction was subsequently set aside by the Sessions Court. In the meantime, Low ever, Gyasia's complaint had been brought before the successor-in-office of the Magistrate who had passed judgment on Mohan Singh's complaint. That Magistrate passed the order of dismissal under Section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code, on the ground that Gyasia's evidence had been heard and disbelieved by his predecessor when it was produced as evidence for the defence in the case in which Mohan Singh was complainant. Under these circumstances, and in view more particularly of the fact that the conviction of Gyasia has been set aside by the Court of Appeal, I do not feel disposed to interfere with the order now complained of, unless I were compelled to do so on the ground that it was wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. I am satisfied that this it was not. Let the record be returned.