The petitioner has come up with the present writ petition challenging the order of the first respondent culminated in his communication dated 10.12.2007.
2. The short facts which are relevant for the purpose of disposal of the present writ petition, are set out here under:-
2.1. The petitioner is a Special Invitee to the Executive Committee of the South Indian Film Chamber of Commerce (herein after referred to as Chamber). The Chamber was established in the year 1939 and registered under the Societies Registration Act. There are about 3000 members in the Chamber. They are classified under various groups viz., studios, producers, etc. The members of the second respondent are from the Southern States of India and represents the above distinct groups of their respective States.
2.2. On 15.11.2007, the third respondent, an Executive Committee member along with 53 other members of the second respondent, forwarded a letter to the second respondent requesting to call for a special meeting as per bye-laws 15 to amend the bye-laws by totally abolishing the existing proxy system of voting in the elections and bring in personal voting system. They have also requested that their request be placed in the Executive Committee Meeting to be held on 16.11.2007 and call for a Special Meeting for the said objects.
2.3. On 16.11.2007, the Executive Committee Meeting decided to have the General Body Meeting on 06.01.2008. The second respondent's Executive Committee sent a circular dated 05.12.2007 to convene an Executive Committee Meeting to be held on 12.12.2007 duly including an agenda relating to annual election of office bearers and Executive Committee members for the year 2007-08.
2.4. The Executive Committee met on 12.12.2007. It has been brought to the notice of the Committee members that the third respondent had written a letter dated 10.12.2007 addressed to the Registrar of Societies, Chennai, the first respondent herein praying for action against the second respondent and directions to the second respondent to conduct Special Meeting on 06.01.2008 with agenda of removing proxy and not to conduct the election before conducting the Special Meeting. It was also informed that the first respondent vide his impugned communication dated 10.12.2007 directed the second respondent to take steps to amend the bye-laws and thereafter, conduct the election.
2.5. On 12.12.2007, there was heated discussion on this issue and it was finally decided to hold an Executive Committee meeting on 06.01.2008 to discuss all the points to be discussed in the General Body meeting. Thereafter, the first respondent addressed to all the Executive Committee members intimating that on 06.01.2008, an Executive Committee Meeting of the second respondent would be held. It is reliably learnt that the members from various Southern States except Tamil Nadu have not sought to amend the provisions relating to authorised representatives.
The impugned communication of the first respondent dated 10.12.2007 is, thus challenged on the ground that it crossly interferes with the decision making of the second respondent. The petitioner being a Special Invitee of the second respondent is aggrieved over the said communication and hence, he has approached this Court by filing the present writ petition since there is no other effective alternative remedy.
3. The third respondent filed counter affidavits along with applications for vacating the interim stay and interim injunction in M.P.Nos.2 and 3 of 2009. In the said counter affidavits, the following facts have been set out:-
3.1. The writ petition is not maintainable on the ground that the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the order passed by the first respondent which is communicated to the second respondent, since it does not infringe the private right of the petitioner. The second respondent association accepted the said direction issued by the first respondent and acted upon by constituting a sub committee in its own with a view to amend the bye-laws of the association. The petitioner is one of the members of the said committee for the purpose of amending the bye-laws of the association. While so, in the absence of any infringement of his private right, the petitioner cannot be heard to say that he is aggrieved over the order of the first respondent and hence, the writ petition filed by him is not maintainable.
3.2. The second respondent association had been continuously conducting elections for the past several years without strictly adhering the requirements as contemplated under Rule 8(i) of the Bye-laws of the Association regarding authorised representatives (Proxy). With a view to rectify the said mistake, which had been practised by the Chamber for a long period, it was decided by a majority of its members to bring appropriate amendments in the proxy system or eliminate the same. Hence, 53 members have sent a requisition to the second respondent on 15.11.2007 with a request to call for an extra-ordinary General Body Meeting to amend the bye-laws by abolishing the existing proxy system. The said request had been placed before the Executive Committee Meeting held on 16.11.2007. In the said meeting, including the petitioner, 39 members of all region participated. Later, on 05.12.2007, in the Executive Committee Meeting, it was decided to hold the election without having any agenda in respect of the discussion regarding the proxy system. It was served on the third respondent only on 10.12.2007. Hence, 53 members of the second respondent Chamber had sent a representation to the first respondent to intervene and conduct the extra-ordinary General Body Meeting for regulating the proxy system. Thereupon, the impugned order dated 10.12.2007 had been passed.
3.3. The order of the first respondent has been specifically issued to the second respondent and if at all the same is ultra virus or seems to be an interference of the administration of the second respondent association, it is the second respondent association which had to challenge the said impugned order. But, however, the second respondent had not initiated any proceedings challenging the communication of the first respondent.
3.4. Subsequent to the filing of the writ petition, the second respondent had taken up the issue of the requisition given by the third respondent along with 53 member in the Executive Committee Meeting held on 06.01.2008 and it was elaborately discussed by the Executive Committee and the Executive Committee has decided to form a Sub committee to formulate the proposed amendments and suggestion in respect of proxy system as contemplated under bye-law No.8(i). The petitioner is one of the Sub Committee member. The Sub Committee had filed its recommendation and suggestion. The petitioner having been participated and accepted the direction issued by the first respondent, cannot now challenge the same.
3.5. After obtaining interim stay and interim injunction on 05.01.2008, the petitioner had participated in the Executive Committee Meeting of the second respondent association held on 06.01.2008. The second respondent association had discussed about the representations given by the third respondent and 53 members regarding authorised representatives. The petitioner did not even murmur anything about the interim orders obtained from this Court. On the other hand, after elaborate discussions, he himself voluntarily became the member of the Sub Committee constituted by the second respondent for the purpose of amending the bye-laws, which would show that he had accepted the decision of the second respondent association pursuant to the representations given by the third respondent and its Executive members. The Sub Committee submitted a report on 21.01.2008, which recommended suggestion and the remarks in respect of the amendments of the various bye-laws.
Thus, the counter affidavits sought for the dismissal of the writ petition.
4. I have heard Mr.Sriram Panchu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mrs.Lita Srinivasan, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the first respondent, Mr.P.B.Balaji, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent and Mr.T.Thiageswaran, learned counsel appearing for the third respondent.
5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would mainly contend that --
(i) the impugned order is liable to be set aside on the sole ground that no notice has been issued to the petitioner and the like-minded people;
(ii) representation was given on 10.12.2007 by the third respondent and orders have been passed on the same day and notice to all members should have been given by the first respondent before passing such order;
(iii) section 36 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 (herein after referred to as Act) contemplates that the Registrar, on his own motion or on the application of a majority of the members of the committee of a registered society or on the application of not less than one-third of the members of the said society, shall hold an enquiry into constitution working and financial condition of the registered society. In the case on hand, since a request has been made only by the third respondent, the Registrar, the first respondent herein ought not to have exercised the power under Section 36 of the said Act;
(iv) the first respondent ought to have directed the second respondent to hold the election and thereafter, the second respondent should have been directed to make amendments in the bye-laws;
(v) the proposal for amending the bye-laws had come from the Committee, which is holding on today without proceeding with the election;
6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the third respondent would submit that --
(i) it is not the third respondent alone, who had approached the first respondent, but the third respondent along with 53 members had approached the first respondent;
(ii) the impugned communication dated 10.12.2007 was not made under Section 36 of the said Act;
(iii) the petitioner has no right to maintain the writ petition. He cannot maintain the writ petition on behalf of others since he has not filed the writ petition on his behalf and also in the representative capacity for other members;
(iv) he has not been authorised by any other members to canvass the correctness or otherwise of the order of the first respondent dated 10.12.2007;
(v) the petitioner having participated in the Executive committee Meeting and having failed to raise any objection, cannot now lay the claim that the order of the first respondent has to go;
(vi) the petitioner volunteered himself to be a member of the Sub Committee in the Executive Committee Meeting which has taken place after he has moved this Court and obtained interim orders. Hence, he cannot be now allowed to question the correctness or otherwise of the order of the first respondent.
7.1. The first and foremost contention that has been raised on behalf of the contesting respondent which deserves to be considered is, whether the petitioner is having locus standi to maintain the writ petition. The petitioner being an individual, had approached this Court against the proceedings of the first respondent dated 10.12.2007. It is not his case, as could be seen from the averment made in the affidavit that he is fighting for the cause of others. He has stated in paragraph 3 of the affidavit that he is a Special Invitee of the Executive Committee and the Past President of the Chamber of Commerce, the second respondent herein. He has not whispered that he has filed the writ petition in the representative capacity fighting the cause of others.
7.2. Secondly, the petitioner cannot represent the second respondent so as to fight for the cause of the second respondent Chamber. In ground 'e' of the affidavit in support of the writ petition, it is stated that "the impugned communication passed by the first respondent undermines the foundation and substratum of the society which is meant for representing members all over South India. It amounts to taking away the fundamental right of association to carry on its business. It also violates the constitutional right to equality by discriminating between the members without any rationale, criteria or nexus to the purpose if the society". As stated already, he can neither represent nor fight for the cause of the Chamber.
7.3. Thirdly, the petitioner after filing the present writ petition and after obtaining the interim orders, seems to have participated in the Executive Committee Meeting held on 06.01.2008 and in the said Executive Committee Meeting, it was decided to form a Sub Committee to formulate the proposed amendments and suggestions in respect of proxy system as contemplated under bye-law 8(1). The Sub Committee constituted by the second respondent consists of 14 members including the petitioner herein. The Sub Committee also filed recommendations and suggestions in and by the minutes dated 21.01.2008, to the Executive Committee, recommending amendment in respect of the bye-laws. The petitioner having participated as a member of the Sub Committee, now cannot be heard to say that the action of the first respondent is unacceptable.
7.4. Fourthly, by the impugned order, the first respondent has given certain directions to the second respondent and if at all the same is not acceptable, the second respondent is the competent person to question the proceedings of the first respondent. The petitioner, who is not holding any post in the second respondent Chamber so as to canvass the correctness or otherwise of the order of the first respondent, has taken a role of the second respondent and now, pleading before this Court questioning the order of the first respondent.
7.5. Who could be an aggrieved person came in for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in J.M.Desai v. Roshan Kumar reported in A.I.R. 1976 SUPREME COURT 578. Their Lordships have held that it depends upon the nature and extent of prejudice and injury suffered by him. Paragraphs 12 and 33 of the said decision are usefully extracted here under:-
"12. According to most English decisions, in order to have the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner should be an "aggrieved person" and in a case of defect of jurisdiction, such a petitioner will be entitled to a writ of certiorari as a matter of course, but if he does not fulfil that character, and is a "stranger", the Court will, in its discretion, deny him this extraordinary remedy, save in very special circumstances. This takes us to the further question: Who is an "aggrieved person"? And what are the qualifications requisite for such a status? The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and, to an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definitions. At best, its features can be described in a broad tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. English Courts have sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a wide construction on the expression "aggrieved person". However, some general tests have been devised to ascertain whether an applicant is eligible for this category so as to have the necessary locus sandi or 'standing' to invoke certiorari jurisdiction.
33. This Court has laid down in a number of decisions that in order to have the locus standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 226, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the application, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. In other words, as a general rule, infringement of some legal right or prejudice to some legal interest inhering in the petitioner is necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter."
7.6. In the case on hand, the petitioner cannot be said to be an aggrieved person since he is not deprived of something to which he is legally entitled. The restricted meaning of a person aggrieved could only mean denial or deprivation of his or her legal rights. Thus, a person aggrieved must be a person who has suffered a legal grievance against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something.
7.7. Thus, for the reasons adduced above, the one and only conclusion that could be arrived at is --
(i) the petitioner has no locus standi to question the order of the first respondent;
(ii) the petitioner cannot be an aggrieved person over the order of the first respondent;
(iii) the petitioner cannot represent the second respondent;
(iv) the petitioner subsequent to the filing of the present writ petition and subsequent to the interim orders obtained in this writ petition, participated in the Executive Committee Meeting and volunteered himself to be a member of the Sub Committee for the purpose of making amendment in the bye-laws. Now, he cannot be heard to say that he is aggrieved over the order of the first respondent dated 10.12.2007 since he was a party to the proceedings initiated by the second respondent which has acted on the orders of the first respondent dated 10.12.2007;
7.8. The above conclusions arrived at by me for the reasons stated earlier, will amply prove that the petitioner is neither having locus standi to question the action of the first respondent nor he be permitted to canvass the correctness or otherwise of the order of the first respondent;
8. Even though I have come to the conclusion that the petitioner is not aggrieved over the order of the first respondent and cannot maintain the writ petition for the reasons adduced earlier, still in view of the submission made on the other counts also, I am obliged to consider the same.
9.1. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that Section 36 of the Act contemplates that the Registrar, on his own motion or on the application of a majority of the members of the committee of a registered society or on the application of not less than one third of the members of the society, shall hold an enquiry into the constitution, working and financial condition of the registered society. However, in the case on hand, since the representation has been given by the third respondent alone, the Registrar ought not to have exercised his power under Section 36 of the Act and ought not to have passed the impugned order.
9.2. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the impugned order was not passed by the first respondent by virtue of power under Section 36 of the Act and hence, it does not require an application by the majority of the members of the committee of the registered society or requires one third members of the society. Further, it is contended that that a representation dated 10.12.2007 was given to the Registrar not only by the third respondent but also by other fifty three members of the society. Therefore, the Registrar considering the said representation passed the impugned order and the same cannot be faulted. But, however, it is contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that except Section 36 of the said Act, no other provision is available under the Act for the Registrar to exercise his power.
10. I have considered the submissions made in this regard.
11. As rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, except Section 36 as found in Chapter IV of the Act, nowhere the power is given to the Registrar to exercise his right to hold an enquiry into constitution, working and financial condition of the society. It would be useful to extract Section 36 of the Act which is extracted here under:-
" 36. Power of Registrar to inquire into the affairs of registered society:- (i) The Registrar, may, of his own motion or on the application of a majority of the members of the committee of a registered society or on the application of not less than one-third of the members of that registered society, or, if so moved by the District Collector hold or direct some person authorised by the Registrar by order in writing in this behalf to hold, an inquiry, into the constitution, working and financial condition of that registered society".
Hence, the contention raised on the side of the third respondent that the impugned order does not relate to Section 36 of the Act may not be correct. Learned counsel appearing for the third respondent is unable to point out any other provision under the Act, which empowers the Registrar to go into the constitution, working and financial condition of the registered society. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the Registrar while passing the impugned order, had exercised his power under Section 36 of the Act.
12. Then, the next question arises for consideration is whether the Registrar has exercised his power rightly under Section 36 of the Act as contemplated thereon. A reading of Section 36 (1) of the Act makes it very clear that the Registrar--
can hold the enquiry into the constitution, working and financial condition of the registered society. In the case on hand, except the application made by the third respondent on 10.12.2007 which finds a place in the reference column in the impugned order, no other members of the committee or members of the society seems to have requested the Registrar of the society to consider the grievance expressed thereon. When the provision is very clear that the Registrar shall act of his own motion or on the majority of the members of the committee of the registered society or not less than one-third of the members registered society, the Registrar ought not to have acted on mere representation made by the third respondent alone. This point is, thus held in favour of the petitioner.
13. In view of the conclusions arrived at by me that the petitioner cannot maintain the present writ petition, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the impugned order is liable to be set aside since no notice has been issued to the petitioner and the like-minded people does not require any consideration.
14. Thus, considering the over all circumstances of the case, the following conclusions are arrived at:-
(i) The impugned order of the first respondent dated 10.12.2007 could be construed only as an order made under Section 36 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 since there is no other provision in the Act to hold or direct some other person authorised by him to hold an enquiry into the constitution, working and financial condition of the society;
(ii) The Registrar ought not to have acted on the representation made by the third respondent since Section 36 of the Act enumerates that the Registrar may, of his own motion, or on the application of the majority of the members of the committee or on the application not less than one-third of the members of the society, is empowered to hold or direct some other authorised person to hold an enquiry into the constitution, working and financial condition of the society;
(iii) However, the petitioner cannot be construed as a person affected by such order and he has no locus standi to maintain the writ petition for the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs 7.1 to 7.8.
15. In fine, the writ petition stands dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
17.08.2009 Index:Yes/No Internet: Yes/No sbi Note to office:
Issue order copy on 31.08.2009.
To
1.The District Registrar (Administration), In the cadre of Assistant Inspector General of Registration, Central Chennai, Office of the District Registrar, Old No.72, New No.100, Chamiers Road, Nandanam, Chennai-18.
K.VENKATARAMAN, J sbi Pre-delivery Order in W.P.No.539 of 2008 DATED: 17.08.2009.