JUDGMENT B.S. Chauhan, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed challenging the impugned order dt. 31st March, 2003, by which the learned revisional authority, i.e., CIT has disposed of the revision application filed by the petitioner-assessee, under Section 264 of the IT Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1961) being aggrieved by the demand contained in letter dt. 11th March, 2002.
2. Heard S/Shri R.P. Agarwal and V.K. Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Shri Shambhu Chopra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.
3. While arguing the revision application by the representative of the assessee, it has vehemently been submitted that demand letter dt. 11th March, 2002, had been issued by the assessing authority without any merit. In memo of revision, the said ground had been taken that it was specifically agitated by the assessee's representative. In the impugned order, the revisional authority, instead of dealing with it and deciding it on merit, has brushed it aside saying that the issue had not been pressed.
4. It has been submitted that once the ground had been taken in revision and has been agitated before the revisional authority, there was no occasion for the revisional authority to record that the issue had not been pressed and therefore, it has been submitted by Shri Agrawal that the petition deserves to be allowed only on this ground.
5. Shri Chopra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent states that if petitioner is aggrieved of the said order of the revisional authority on this issue, he ought to have filed the review or rectification application before the revisional authority. However, Shri Chopra could not point out any provision in the Act providing for review.
6. In absence of any statutory provision providing for review, the review could not be entertained against a judicial or quasi-judicial order XX (sic) at least, rectification application under Section 154.
7. In Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar AIR 1965 SC 1457, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that in absence of any power of review, the Tribunal could not have subsequently reconsidered its previous decision and the subsequent order reopening the matter was illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction.
8. In Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh AIR 1966 SC 641, the Hon'ble apex Court has held that in absence of any provision in the Act granting express power of review, it is manifest that review could not be made and the order in review was ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction and the High Court has rightly quashed it by the grant of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.
9. While deciding the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance on a large number of judgments, particularly in Drew v. Mills (1891) 1 OB 450; Hession v. Johns-(1914) 2 KB 421; St. Nazaire Co., In re (1879) 12 Ch.D. 88; and Baijnath Ram Goyanka v. Nand Kumar Singh 14 Indian Appeal 54 (PC), wherein it had categorically been held that the power of setting aside an order, which has been made after hearing the arguments, does not lie unless it is given by the statute. The Court, under the statute, cannot review an order deliberately made after argument and entertain a fresh argument upon it with a view to ultimately confirming or reversing it. The Courts may have limited power only to make a necessary correction if the order, as drawn up, did not express the intention of the Court. A party is entitled to assail the judgment only by the mode as indicated in the statute and in absence of express provision of review, it cannot be entertained for the reason that review is practically the hearing of an appeal by the same officer who decided the case.
10. In Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji AIR 1970 SC 1273, the Hon'ble apex Court held that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication and in absence of any provision in the Act, review of an earlier order is impermissible.
11. In Maj. Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan AIR 1978 SC 1814, the apex Court followed the earlier referred two judgments in Chunibhai (supra) and Harbhajan Singh (supra) and observed that it is well-settled that review is a creature of statute and cannot be entertained in absence of a provision therefor.
12. In Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidhyalaya AIR 1987 SC 2186, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under :
"11. It is now established that a quasi-judicial authority cannot review its own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction...... In the circumstances, it must be held that the Vice-Chancellor acted wholly without jurisdiction . . .The said order of the Vice-Chancellor dt. 7th March, 1987, was a nullity." (p. 2188) Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Commissioner of Land Records & Settlement (1998) 7 SCC 162.
13. In Krishna Ashram Educational Trust v. District Judge AIR 1995 All 415, after placing reliance upon a large number of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court held that in absence of a provision for review, the authority becomes functus officio after deciding the case and it has no competence to entertain review application and change the order passed by it earlier. Nor the order/award be reviewed under the garb of clarification/rectification/correction.
Therefore, in view of the aforesaid settled legal proposition it can be summarised that in absence of any statutory provision providing for review, entertaining an application for review under the garb of rectification is not permissible.
14. Language used in Section 154 of the Act 1961 appears to be verbatim to Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called the CPC) and in exercise of that power, correction is permissible only when it is necessary to give effect to the judgment, decree or order so that the manifest rights of the parties intended to be effectuated by the earlier decision of the Court may not be defeated. When decree is not clear as to what was decided and what the Court intended, the Court may amend it so as to carry out its meaning, (vide Rai Jatindra Nath Chowdhury v. Uday Kumar Das AIR 1931 PC 104 and Seth Manakchand v. Chaube Manoharlal AIR 1944 PC 46). This provision cannot be resorted to in order to annul the decree or where there is no clerical or arithmetical mistake or error arising from accidental slip or omission or the power cannot be used to re-determine the rights of parties already adjudicated upon. In Dwaraka Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1999) 3 SCC 500, the Hon'ble apex Court held that powers cannot be used to grant something which had not been granted earlier as it would not amount to accidental omission or mistake. In I.L. Janakirama Iyer v. P.M. Nilakanta Iyer AIR 1962 SC 633, the apex Court held that as in the decree the mesne profit had been typed as a net profit and it was merely a typographical error, in exercise of power under Section 152 CPC the word "net" must be substituted by "mesne". The powers of the Court are limited only to correct this kind of typographical mistakes. In K. Rajamouli v. A.V.K.N. Swamy (2001) 5 SCC 37, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if while deciding a case interest pendente life had not been granted it cannot be granted while allowing the application under Section 152 CPC. In Plasto Pack Mumbai v. Ratnakar Bank Ltd. AIR 2001 SCW 3426, a similar view has been reiterated observing that power to amend a decree cannot be exercised so as to add to or subtract therefrom, any relief granted earlier.
15. In Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho AIR 2001 SC 1084, the Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgments in State of Bihar v. Neelmani Sahu (1996) 11 SCC 528 and Bai Shakriben v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (1996) 4 SCC 533 and held that the inherent powers as exemplified in Section 152 CPC generally be available to all Courts and authorities irrespective of the fact whether the provisions contained under Section 152 CPC may or may not strictly apply to any particular proceeding.
But the power to rectification of clerical and arithmetical errors or accidental slips does not empower the Court to have a second thought over the matter and to find a better order or decree could or should be passed. There cannot be reconsideration of merits of the matter to come to a conclusion that it would have been better and in the fitness of things to have passed an order as sought to be passed on rectification. On a second thought, the Court may find that it may have committed a mistake in passing an order in certain terms but every such mistake cannot be rectified in exercise of the Court's inherent powers as contained under Section 152 CPC. It is to be confined to something initially intended to left out or added against such intendment.
16. Similar view has been reiterated in Lakshmi Ram Bhuyan v. Hari Prasad Bhuyan AIR 2002 SCW 4843 issue as the apex Court held that such powers can be used limited to the extent that a clerical or arithmetical mistake occurred in the judgment, decree or order or error arising therein from any accidental slip or omission can be corrected subsequently by the Court either on its own motion or on the application of any of the parties. While deciding the said case, the Court placed reliance upon the judgment in Swire, In re (1885) 30 Ch.D 239, wherein it had been held that the said provisions enabled the Court to vary its judgment so as to give effect to its meaning and intention, when the order was passed.
17. Thus, in view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the provision of Section 154 of Act of 1961, which provide for rectification does not confer such a wide power that it may take within its ambit to reconsider the case. Thus, in absence of any provisions providing for review, such a course was not available to the petitioner-assessee. As the petitioner has stated on oath that the issue has been raised in the memo of revision and has been agitated specifically, there is no reason to disbelieve him and the matter deserves to be remanded to the revisional authority to decide afresh.
18. There is much dissatisfaction over the other issue also, and it has been submitted by Shri Agarwal that the adjustment under Section 143(1)(a) is permissible only with respect to those items which are not debatable. In the present case, the adjustment has been made regarding classification of business loss. By considering part of the business loss as speculation loss, which according to Shri Agarwal is not permissible in view of Section 43(5) of the Act, 1961, this being a debatable issue, no adjustment under Section 143(1)(a) was permissible.
19. Shri Chopra has vehemently opposed the submission made by Shri Agarwal on this issue. However, we are of the considered opinion, that if the issue of competence of issuing the demand letter dt. 11th March, 2002, which goes to the root of the cause, is decided in favour of the assessee, there will be no occasion to any authority to decide any other issue.
20. Thus, without entering into the merit of the case, we set aside the order passed by the revisional authority dt. 31st March, 2003, and remand the case back to be decided afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the representative of both the parties.
21. Assessee may apply before the revisional authority for interim relief.
22. Petition succeeds and is allowed. Impugned order dt. 31st March, 2003, is quashed.