JUDGMENT R.R.K. Trivedi, J.
1. In the above petition, petitioner has challenged the order passed by respondent No. 1 by which he has forwarded to the Collector of the District a certificate under his signature specifying the amount of wages due from the petitioner for being recovered as arrears of land revenue.5 In both the petitions counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged and learned counsel for the parties have agreed that the petitions may be heard and decided finally at this stage.
2. Brief facts from which the aforesaid two petitions have arisen are that petitioners failed to pay the wages of the workers for the month of December, 1992 which ought to have been paid to them by 10th of the following month. The workers approached respondentNo. 1 Additional Labour Commissioner, for securing payment 5 of their wages. Respondents No. 1 acting under Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Peace (Timely Payment of Wages) Act 1978 (hereinafter referred to as U.P. Act of 1978), gave a notice requiring petitioner to give information in Form 3 prescribed under Rule 4 (1) of the Rules framed under U.P. Act of 1978. The petitioner put in appearance and filed a reply raising various pleas justifying non-payment of the wages within time. Respondent No. l, however, disagreed with the contentions raised by petitioner and issued a certificate on February 10, 1993 for recovery of Rs. 13 Lakhs as arrears of ! land revenue in respect of wages for the month of December, 1992 which is subject matter of challenge in Writ Petition No. 4784 of 1993. Another certificate was issued on February 23, 1993 for Rs. 20 Lakhs in respect of wages of the 1 employees for the month of January, 1992 which has been challenged in Writ Petition No. 6471 of 1993. The question of facts and law in both the writ petitions are common with the only difference that they perta in to the payment of wages in respect of different months as mentioned above and both the writ petitions may be conveniently decided by a common judgment.
3. Shri J.N. Tewari, learned counsel appearing for petitioner, has challenged the impugned orders passed by the respondent No. l on the following grounds:
4. Firstly, it had been contended that respon- A dent No. 1 has failed to record reasons for not accepting various contentions raised on behalf of petitioners in their written objection filed in response to the show cause notice issued under Rule 4. It has been submitted by the learned counsel that where a reply is submitted in response to the show cause notice, reasons ought to be recorded by the authority concerned for not accepting the objection and as respondent No. 1 has failed to record the reasons, the impugned orders are vitiated. For this submission, learned counsel has relied on the case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi and Ors. (1991)2 SCC 716.
5. Second submission of learned counsel for petitioner is that the industry of the petitioner has been declared sick under the provisions of Sick Industries Companies (Special Provisions) Act of 1985 (hereinafter referred to as Act of 1985) and the scheme for financial assistance and rehabilitation of petitioner's factory is under consideration of the Board of Industrial Finance and Reconstruction (in short B.I.F.R.) and the pro- i ceedings under the U.P. Act of 1978 are barred under Section 22 of the aforesaid Act, It has been submitted that the proceedings under U.P. Act of 1978 for the recovery of the amount as arrears of land revenue are covered by Section 22 of the Act of 1985 and respondent No. 1 could not legally proceed in view of the non-obstante provision contained in Section 22 without first obtaining the consent of the Board. In support of this submission learned counsel has placed reliance on cause:
(1) Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. and Ors. JT 1993 (1) SC 310 (2) S/S Shri Chamundi Mopeds Ltd, v. Cnurch of South India Trust Association, Madras AIR 1992 SC 1439 (3) Grampanchayat v. Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. and Ors. AIR 1990 SC 1017
6. The last submission of learned counsel challenging the impugned orders is on the ground of mala fide exercise of authority under Section 3 of U.P. Act of 1978. In this connection it has been submitted that the employees have started agitation against management and have gheraoed the factory and the office for which reason the management is not in a position to get the papers necessary for payment of wages nor they are able to dispose of the finished goods already lying in the stock of which necessary funds could be raised for clearing the liability of wages. It has been submitted by learned counsel for petitioner that respondent No. 1 had been fully aware of all the development in this connection. He had been kept informed about the happenings but no action was taken so that the work in the factory may be continued. It has also been submitted that all these reasons were mentioned in the objections which have not been considered.
7. Shri K.P. Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for respondents No. 4 to 7, has submitted that petitioner is not entitled for any relief from this court as the certificate has been issued by respondent No. 1 with due regard, as admitted before respondent No. 1, on the undisputed facts that wages are due to the workers and the same have not been paid within the time stipulated by law, necessary action could be taken under U.P. Act of 1978 and no reasons were required to be recorded by him while passing the impugned order. There is no provision in the U.P. Act of 1978 or Rules framed thereunder making it obligatory on respondent No. 1 to record reasons for his satisfaction or to pass a reasoned order. Swift and prompt action with regard to payment of wages is the object of the Act which may be defeated if the respondent No. 1 is required to enter into the adjudication of the various pleas raised by the petitioner in its objection.
8. Learned counsel for respondents has further submitted that Section 22 of the Act of 1985 will have no application in respect of the earned wages of the employees of the industry. Learned counsel has submitted that the purpose of the Act of 1985 is the rehabilitation of the sick industries but the rehabilitation is not possible unless industrial peace is secured which is essential for the smooth running of the factory. If the wages already earned by the employees are not paid the industrial peace cannot be expected. The workers cannot be expected to work peacefully without payments of their wages. If the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner are accepted, it would defer the very purpose for which the Act of 1985 has been enacted by legislature, i.e. rehabilitation of sick industries. The execution, distress or the like action against the properties of the industry will not cover such payments and such proceedings which are necessary to keep the industry running. Wages of the workers are just like the payment for the new raw materials necessary for production and payment in respect of the power consumed by the factory to keep the industry running. Learned counsel has further submitted that if the interpretation of the provisions of the Act of 1985 as suggested on behalf of petitioner is accepted, the workers of the factory shall be forced to work without payment of their wages which will amount to Begar and shall be violative of Article 23 of the Constitution which prohibits the traffic in human beings and Begar in any form.
9. Learned counsel for respondents has placed reliance on cases Basti Sugar Mills Company Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Anr. (AIR 1979 SC 262) and Workmen v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Ors.(l978-II-LLJ-17). It has been submitted that the liability of the petitioner to pay the wages for the work already done is absolute and the petitioner cannot be allowed to shirk this liability on the grounds raised in the objections.
10. I have thoroughly considered the submissions made by learned counsel for parties and also the material on record. In my opinion, since the essential ingredients on which basis the provisions of Section 3 of U.P. Act of 1978 could be invoked are admitted and not in controversy, the action taken cannot be said to be unjustified. It is not disputed that the employees of petitioner have worked for the month of December, 1992 and January, 1993 and for such work they have not been paid their wages within the time fixed by law and the amount in respect of which default have been committed exceeds Rs. 50,000/- A bare perusal of Section 3 shows that the Labour Commissioner could issue a recovery certificate to the Collector for recovery of the amount of wages due from the petitioners concerned as arrears of land revenue. The submission of learned counsel that before issuing such certificate as a show cause notice was served and a reply was submitted in response to that, the reasons must have been recorded by the respondent No. 1 has no substance. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case reported in (1991) 2 SCC 716 in Para 22 has said about the applicability of the principles of natural justice in the following manner:
"22. From this perspective, the question is whether omission to record reasons vitiates the impugned order or is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The omnipresent and omnisient (sic) of the principles of natural justice acts as deterrence to arrive at arbitrary decision hi flagrant infraction of fair play. But the applicability of the principles of natural justice is not a rule of thumb or a strait-jacket formula as an abstract proposition of law. It depends on the facts of the case, nature of the injury and effect of the order/ decision on the rights of the person and attendant circumstances."
11. If the facts of the present case are conside red in the light of the aforesaid observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it cannot be doubted that the order passed by the respondent No. 1 does not suffer from the error of law. In view of the admitted facts, necessary for invoking power contemplated under Section 3, he was not required to record any reasons though in the impugned order it has been stated by respondent No. 1 that the alleged grounds have been raised only to delay the payment of wages already earned by the workers. The satisfaction thus arrived at does not suffer from the error of law.
12. The second and most important question which needs determination in this writ petition is as to whether the action under Section 3 of the U.P. Act of 1978 cannot be taken without consent of the Board in view of Section 22 of the Act 1985 as the petitioner's factory has been: declared to be sick and its rehabilitation is under active consideration and under the provisions of this Act had been declared sick has not been disputed before this court which is also established from Annexure-1 to the writ petition which is an order dated March 14, 1991 passed by B.I.F.R. declaring petitioner as a sick industry . It cannot be disputed that the Central Act of 1985 is a special statute and has been enacted with a view to rehabilitate the sick industries which is of vital interest so far as the economy of the country is concerned. However, it is difficult to contemplate the rehabilitation of industry without industrial peace in the factory. The payment of wages to the workers is a necessary factor for securing industrial peace, for production from a factory or industry, three components are necessary, raw material necessary for production of the item undertaken, power and the workers to perform the various jobs in connection with production at various levels but for the aforesaid three components the industry cannot be kept running. It may be recalled that there was a serious unrest amongst the workers of a particular industry at Kanpur on account of non-payment of wages for several months and the unrest ultimately resulted in serious violence in which several workers and officers of the management lost their lives. Considering the difficult situation, the provisions of U.P.Industrial Peace (Timely Payment of Wages) Ordinance, 1977 was promulgated on December 12, 1977 which was replaced subsequently by the Act of 1978. The statement of objects and reasons for which the Act was enacted are very relevant for appreciating the purpose and object for which the Act was brought on the Statute Book:
"Statement of object and Reasons: Delays in payment of wages of workmen lead to simmering discontent among them. Sometimes a grave threat to law and order is also posed on this account.
2. The provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 have been found to be inadequate to ensure timely payment of wages. The incidence of disturbance of industrial peace being greater in comparatively bigger establishments, it was considered necessary to provide that if the wage bill in default exceeds fifty thousand rupees the amount should be recoverable as arrears of land revenue. Further in order to curb the tendency of the employers to keep large amounts of wages in arrears, it was also considered necessary to make it a penal offence to be in default of a wage bill exceeding rupees one lakh. Since the State Legislature was not in session and situation warranted immediate action, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh promulgated the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Peace (Timely Payment of Wages) Ordinance, 1977 on December 12, 1977.
3. The Uttar Pradesh Industrial Peace (Timely Payment of Wages) Bill, 1978, is accordingly being introduced to replace the said ordinance."
From the statementof objects and reasons the intention of the legislature behind enacting U.P. Act of 1978 is very clear. It aims at not allowing any kind of discontentment amongst the workers on account of non-payment of their wages, which prior to enactment of this Act was frequently happening. If the workers are not satisfied and discontented there cannot be peace in the factory which is very essential for running of the industry. The second limb of the consideration in this regard is about effect of Section 22 of the Act of 1985 over the action taken against petitioner under Section 3 of the U.P. Act of 1978. The first question for determination is as to whether the action under Section 3 of the Act is a proceeding. In my opinion, a combined reading of Section 3 will amount to proceedings. Section 3 says that where the Labour Commissioner is satisfied that the occupier of an establishment is in default of payment of wages, for reaching to satisfaction he has to take some action and this action, in my opinion, will be covered by the word 'proceeding' used in Section 22 of the Act of 1985. Further, the length of the proceedings or the time taken cannot be the sole criterion for determination whether action will amount to proceeding or not. The Labour Commissioner may satisfy himself about the ingredients contemplated under Section 3 in a quickest possible procedure but that will amount to proceedings. He has to call for an information in Form 3 and then he has to issue a recovery certificate to the Collector for realisation of the wages as arrears of land revenue. So far the proceedings for recovery of the amount as arrears of land revenue are concerned, there is no doubt that they amount to legal proceedings .Chapter XXXV in para 7 of the U.P. Revenue Manual contains in Para 911 a iist of the proceedings which shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings for purposeof the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, and for U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act 1951. Para 912 says that all cases, proceedings and other matters not covered by Rule 911 shall be deemed to be non- judicial proceedings and in case of doubt it has been left to the State Government to decide as to whether the proceedings are judicial or non-judicial. Para 911 has been amended recently by the Stale Government and the proceedings relating to recovery of amount as arrears of land revenue have been mentioned as judicial proceedings. Hon'ble Supreme Court In Re Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. has considered the word 'Proceedings' used in Section 22 and has interpreted itcovering all kinds of proceedings by which the execution or distress or the like against any of the property of industrial company may be initiated. Thus the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above case leave no doubi that the procedure provided under the Act for recovery of the unpaid wages will amount to proceedings.
13. Now it has to be considered whether Section 22 of the Act of 1985 will be applicable to the Proceedings under Section 3 of U.P. Act of 1978 and all the follow up acts after a certificate of recovery of the amount is sent to the Collector for realisation of the amount as arrears of land revenue. Both the Acts have been brought on the Statute Book to carry out independent and important objects though the area for their operation is the same, that is the industrial area. If one contains special Provisions with a view to securing the timely detection of sick and potentially sick companies owning industrial undertakings, the speedy determination by the Board of experts of the preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other measures which need to be taken with respect to such companies and the expeditious enforcement of the measures so determined are necessary for rehabilitation, the other aims to secure the necessary peaceful atmosphere to keep the industry running. In short, it can be said that the one looks after the defective life line of the body and the other provides for the healing of necessary limbs like hands and legs of the same body. But both are necessary to keep the whole body moving.
14. In my opinion, the purpose and object of Section 22 cannot be to cover those proceedings or actions which are necessary for running the industry irrespective of the fact whether it is sick or non-sick. If the industry cannot run without workers the workers also cannot be expected to work without payment of their wages. The timely payment of the wages for which the provisions of the Act of 1978 have been enacted would thus be a step helping rehabilitation and it cannot be said that it creates any obstacle in fulfilling the object for which the Act of 1985 has been enacted. Both the Acts are thus complimentary to each other. Section 22 cannot thus affect the proceedings taken under Section 3 of the Act of 1978 for compelling petitioner to make payment of the wages already accrued to the workers observed as under, while excluding the proceedings for objectment of the sick industrial unit for the lease land at the instance of landlord for non-payment of the rent.
"It could not be the intention of Parliament in enacting the said provision to aggravate the financial difficulties of a sick industrial company while the said matter were pending before the Board of the Appellate Authority by enabling a sick industrial company to continue to incur further liabilities during this period. This would be the consequences if Sub-section (1) of Section 22 is construed to bring about suspension of proceedings for eviction instituted by land lord against a sick industrial company which has ceased to enjoy the protection of the relevant rent law on account of default in payment of rent. It would also mean that the landlord of such a company must continue to suffer a loss by permitting the tenant (sick industrial company) to occupy the premises even though it is not in a position to pay the rent, such an intention cannot be imported to parliament....."
15. In my opinion, the aforesaid reasoning adopted by Hon'ble Supreme Court applies with full force to the facts of the present case also. The Parliament while putting Section 22 of the Act, 1985 could never have intended that the industrial unit under the garb of sickness or for any like difficulty may be allowed to shirk its liability to pay the wages to its workers for the work they have done. Thus proceedings under Section 3 of the U.P. Act of 1978 will not be affected by Section 22 of Act of 1985.
16. The problem can be considered from another angle also. As argued by learned counsel for the respondent, in case Section 22 is held to be applicable to the proceedings under Section 3 of the Act of 1978, it would amount to forcing the workers to work without payment and this may be termed as "Begar" which is prohibited under Article 23 of the Constitution. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982-II-LLJ-454) held that Begar may be loosely described as labour or a service which a person is forced to give without receiving any renumera-tion and thus it is a form of forced labour. If Section 22 is given such a wide effect as argued by learned counsel for petitioner by which the workers may be forced to work without payment of wages, there is no doubt that the situation shall be in clear contravention of Art 23 which could never have been the intention of the Parliament In my opinion the petitioner has failed to make out any case for interference by this Court on the basis of Section 22 of the Act of 1985 and the respondent No. 1 has not committed error or illegality in passing the impugned order.
17. The last submission made on behalf of the petitioner was with regard to malafides imputed against respondent No. 1 that he passed the impugned orders in spite of full knowledge of the difficulties on the part of petitioner in paying the amount of wages which were also narrated in the objection filed. I have considered this aspect of the case also. For non-payment of wages already accrued to the workers would not be any justification on the part of petitioner. Under the Provisions of U.P.Act of 1978 respondent No. 1 had no option but to proceed and take action to prevent the unrest among the workers. The liability was admitted by petitioner is clear from the impugned order. The time fixed by law for payment has already elapsed. Thus no malafides can be imputed to respondent No. 1 for passing the impugned orders. The time fixed by law for payment has already elapsed. Thus no malafides can be imputed to respondent No. 1 for passing the impugned orders. It may also be noticed that by order dated March 26, 1993 petitioner was allowed two weeks time to pay the salary of the workers for the months of December, 1992 but it has not been paid. The order dated March 26, 1993 is being reproduced below:
"Heard learned counsel for parties. Judgment reserved."
18. In the meantime auction of the Property of the Petitioner shall not be done for a period of two weeks provided salary of workers for the month of December, 1992 is paid within the aforesaid period. The attachment of the Property, however, shall continue except the Bank Account and the finished goods. The entire amount in the bank in the account of the Petitioner shall be placed in the hands of Additional Labour Commissioner, Ghaziabad. So far the finished goods are concerned, petitioner may be permitted to sell the same under supervision and the amount so received from sale of finished goods along with amount in Bank, shall be first utilized for the payment of wages of the workers under the supervision of above officer. The respondents Nos. 4 to 7 and their members shall permit theiofficers of the petitioner to enter inside the premises of factory and to facilitate the payment of wages in dispute as directed by this order.
In case of default in paymentof wages itshall be open to respondent No. 1 to 3 to proceed with the recovery of amount. :
19. Now the petitioner has filed another application requesting this court to provide guidelines to the Additional Labour Commissioner for arranging payment to the workers and the time limit fixed by order dated March 26, 1993 has been sought to be extended. I have perused the order passed by respondent No. 1 dated April 2, 1993. The time provided by the order dated March 26, 1993 could be availed by petitioner for paying necessary wages to the workers. However, it appears that the Additional Labour Commissioner invited both the parties and after hearing their views felt difficulty in securing payment of the wages on the ground of difference of opinion between petitioner and respondents. I do not find any justification for the alleged dispute in views. It was made known in the order that from the sale proceeds the amount due as wages shall be paid first. No effort has been made towards payment. Even the cash amount lying in the Bank has not been made available for payment for which the Bank had already indicated its willingness to place it in the hands of respondent No. 1 through letter dated March 30, 1993, filed as Annexure 1 to the application. I do not find any justification for nonpayment of wages. However, considering the facts and circumstances and in the interest of both the parties, the period for making payment of the whole amount covered by both the writ petitions i.e 13 lakhs plus 20 lakhs, totalling 33 lakhs, is extended upto April 30, 1993. Other terms and conditions provided in the order dated March 26, 1993 shall remain as such. In case the payment as directed by the impugned orders dated February 10, 1993 and March 23, 1993 is not made upto April 30, 1993 it shall be open to the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 to proceed with the recovery of the amount in accordance with law.
20. For the reasons recorded above, both the writ petitions have no merits and subject to the aforesaid observation/directions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
21. A copy of this judgment shall be placed in the connected Writ Petition No. 6471 of 1993.