(Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHITRA VENKATARAMAN, J) This Writ Appeal is against the order passed by the learned single Judge dated 11.11.2008 in W.P.(MD)No.2259 of 2008 wherein the writ appellant/writ petitioner has sought for a Writ of Mandamus to direct the second respondent to instruct the first respondent to release the petitioner's gas connection No.6148 on the strength of the petitioner's representation dated 05.03.2008.
2. The appellant herein has LPG connection eversince 1976. His connection was disconnected by the second respondent on the ground that the petitioner is having two LPG connection under the same address. Admittedly, connections are one in the name of the appellant and the other in the name of the appellant's wife.
3. The contention of the respondents is that possession of two connections in the same house is illegal and that LPG connection for domestic purpose is highly subsidised, which comes under the purview of the Essential Commodities Act. The respondents contended that as per clause 3(1)(a) of Gas Control Order, 2000 (Regulation of Supply and Distribution), a person can possess only one LPG connection under the same household in view of the high subsidy given on this product by the Government. Further, wife of the appellant got connection on the declaration that she did not possess any other LPG Connection. Such declaration is a false one.
4. Learned single Judge took the view that "as per the law governing LPG Connection, husband and wife cannot have one connection each while they are living in one roof and it is an admitted fact that the husband and wife are living under one roof. Hence, the respondents are entitled to seek cancellation of the connection the appellant had." Learned single Judge directed the appellant herein to surrender his LPG Connection and get one additional cylinder in favour of his wife or vice versa and to that effect the appellant would make necessary application to the second respondent which shall be considered immediately.
5. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner/appellant herein has come before this Court contending that he got LPG connection as early as 1976 and the regulation, which was of the year 1993 and 2000, will not be applicable to him.
6. In response, learned counsel for the second respondent reiterated the stand taken before the learned single Judge and submitted that considering the policy undertaken to have LPG connection to everybody, rightly the decision was taken that the petitioner/appellant cannot have more than one connection. Learned counsel placed reliance on the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas Notification in G.S.R.529(E) in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), dated 3.8.1993. The notification under the Essential Commodities Act gives the definition of "consumer" under Clause 2(b) of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Regulation of Supply and Distribution) Order, 1993 as follows:
"2(b) "consumer" means a person, firm, company, institution, association of persons, co-operative society or organisation, whose name is registered with a distributor or with a Government Oil Company or with a parallel marketeer for supply of liquefied petroleum gas either in bulk or in cylinders." Clause 3 of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Regulation of Supply and Distribution) Order, 1993 relating to restriction on possession, supply and consumption of liquefied petroleum gas states that where a person has been granted a connection for liquefied petroleum gas under the public distribution system then he shall not possess more than one connection of liquefied petroleum gas granted under the public distribution system.
7. We do not accept the plea of the respondents herein that the term "a person" has to be construed as referable to "a family". v The definition of "consumer" in clause 2(b) of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Regulation of Supply and Distribution) Order, 1993 is very clear to mean "a person" as referable to an individual alone and not to a collection of individuals forming a family.
8. The definition of "consumer" is unambiguous and clear that when it intended a collective body to be called "consumer", it clearly stated so, as for example a firm, a company, an institution, association of persons, etc. There is hardly anything in the definition of "consumer" to suggest that "a person" means and includes a collective body of two individuals or a family of individuals. Keeping in mind the distinction that each one of the enumerated entity is a distinct entity, it is difficult to accept the plea of the respondents that the term "consumer" meaning "a person" would bring within its fold two individuals. On the other hand, by the distinct characterisation, each independent entity is a consumer entitled to have a connection in their own name.
9. Hence, going by the definition of "consumer" to mean "a person" we hold that it is referable to "an individual" alone and not to a collection of individuals forming a family. A mere chance of two individuals sharing a household will not bring them within the fold of "a person" and the definition in Clause 2(b) does not yield to any such construction as has been projected by the respondents.
10. In the absence of anything to read into the said definition that "a person" would mean "a family", the stand taken by the respondents that the husband and wife living under one roof will be construed as "a person" and that they shall not have more than one connection cannot be countenanced. Even going by the provisions of the General Clauses Act 1897 defining "a person" under Section 3, it is difficult to accept the construction placed as to the meaning of "a person" under the notification. Hence, going by the fact that the petitioner/appellant and wife are two independent individuals and hence, "a consumer" in their own individual right as per the definition in the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Regulation of Supply and Distribution) Order, 1993, each one of them are entitled to have a connection in their individual names. There is hardly anything in these provisions to show that an additional cylinder to the consumer means an additional connection to fall within the mischief of Clause 3. It is not the case of the respondents herein that the appellant is having more than one connection in his individual name or in the name of the appellant's wife. Going by the clear terms of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Regulation of Supply and Distribution) Order, 1993, particularly, clauses 2(b) and 3, we do not find any justification in the contention of the respondents to construe " a person" as referring to a family and that the owning an additional cylinder amounted to having more than one connection.
11. Learned counsel for the second respondent submitted that allowing more than one connection to persons under the same roof would result in the abuse of the connection. It is not denied by the respondents that there are mechanisms under the Essential Commodities Act to check wherever there is abuse and misuse of connection and that wherever the violations are found, the same are visited with penal consequences. It must be noted that in the absence of any proof, the mere possibilities of an abuse, by itself, cannot be a ground for accepting the plea that allowing an additional cylinder to a person would lead to abuse of the supply of LPG connection which is made under a subsidised rate. It is for the respondents to effectively implement the available preventive measures of checks and balances on the use for which supply of gas is made at a subsidised rate. On mere assumption of a possibility of a violation, one cannot read a restriction in the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Regulation of Supply and Distribution) Order, 1993 issued under the notification pursuant to the provisions under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.
12. We do not find any provision of law as has been stated by the learned single Judge to support the case of the respondents herein as regards the LPG connection that a consumer would mean a family and that it will have only one connection. In the absence of any specific provision of law pointed out by the respondents as governing the field, we have no hesitation in setting aside the order of the learned single Judge and accordingly, it is set aside. The Writ Appeal stands allowed. No costs.
asvm/ksv To The Area Manager, Indane Oil Corporation, Area Office, No.2, Race Course Road, Chinna Chokkikulam, Madurai - 2.