ORDER
1. This writ petition has been filed against the impugned orders dated 6-9-1994 and 14-11-1994 Annexures 5 and 7 to the writ petition.
2. I have heard Sri S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel.
3. In this case on 21-11-1994 this Court granted Standing Counsel two weeks to file counter-affidavif but no counter-affidavit has been filed so far. In the circumstances I treat the allegations made in the writ petition to be correct and dispose of the writ petition finally.
4. The petitioners applied for grant of licence for starting a khandsari unit for the year 1993-94 but the same was rejected on the ground that the proposed unit is at a distance less than 25 kms. from Bareilly Sugar Mill which is run by the U.P. State Sugar Corporation. Against this order, the petitioners filed an appeal which was rejected on 1-8-1994 and against this order the petitioners had filed Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 26716 of 1994. Thereafter they again applied for licence for the year 1994-95 on 6-7-1994 but this application too was rejected on 6-9-1994. Against this order they had filed Writ Petition No. 31425 of 1994 in this Court. Both these writ petitions were heard together on 30-9-1994. The first petition was dismissed as infruc-tuous and the second petition was dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy of appeal. Accordingly the petitioner filed an appeal against the order dated 6-9-1994 which was rejected on 14-11-1994. Aggrieved, this writ petition has been filed.
5. I have perused the impugned orders. In the appellate order dated 14-11-1994 it has been stated that since the petitioners crusher for khandsari unit is proposed to be set up at a distance of 17 kms. from Bareilly Sugar Mill, hence licence cannot be granted. In my opinion the impugned orders suffer from legal infirmity and are liable to be set aside. The Government policy is given in Annexure-2 to the writ petition which I have perused. It is obvious that the purpose of creating a restriction for grant of licence within 25 kms. of a sugar mill is that supply of sugarcane to the mill should not be adversely affected.
6. In this connection it is necessary to mention that the modern method of interpretation is purposive or functional, and the literal rule of interpretation is out of vogue (see Lord, Denning's "The Discipline of Law"). As held by the Supreme Court in Director of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, 1994 (3) SCC 430 : (AIR 1994 SC 1775) "are mechanical interpretation of the words and application of the legislative intent devoid of concept of purpose and object will render the legislation inane". In Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India, 1979 (4) SCC 573 : (AIR 1979 SC 1803) the Supreme Court held "A bare mechanical interpretation of the words devoid of concept or purpose will reduce most legislation to futility. It is a salutary rule well established that the intention of the legislation must be found reading the statute as a whole". Similarly, in Administrator, Municipal Corporation v. Dattatraya, AIR 1992 SC 1846 : (1992 AIR SCW 2081) the Supreme Court observed "the mechanical approach to construction is altogether out of step with the modern positive approach. The modern positive approach is to have a purposeful construction that is to effectuate the object and purpose of the Act."
7. In S. P. Jain v. Krishna Mohan, AIR 1987 SC 222 : (1987 All LJ 88) the Supreme Court held "that the meaning must suit the purpose and the idea behind the statute in question in a particular case. The Court observed. Law should take a progmatic view of the matter and respond to the purpose for which it was made and also take cognizance of the current capabilities of technology and life style of the community. The purpose of the law provides a good guide to the interpretation of the meaning of the Act". In Kehar Singh v. State, AIR 1988 SC 1883: (1989 Cri LJ 1) the Supreme Court observed that during the last several years the grammatical or literal rule has been given a go-by and now the Courts look for the intention of the Legislature or the purpose of the statute.
8. In U. P. Bhoodan Youjna Samiti v. Braj Kishore, 1988 (4) SCC 274 : (AIR 1988 SC 2239) the Supreme Court held that the expression 'landless person' in the U. P. Bhoodan Yojna Act would mean landless peasant, and not any landless person, as that was the legislative intent.
9. Thus it is now a settled rule of interpretation that the Court is not always to go by the plain wording of the statute but should see the legislative intent. In fact this is also the method of interpretation prescribed in the Mimansa system which contained our traditional principles of interpretation. The Linga principle (also called Lakshana Artha) is one of the well known principles of interpretation in the Mimansa system, and it prescribes that one has to see the suggestive power in an expression and not merely the plain words (see K. L. Sarkar's "the Mimansa Rules of Interpretation"; Second Lecture). The Linga principle is illustrated by the well known Barhi Nyaya (grass maxim) by which in the Vedic text 'Barhi Devasadanam Damp ("O grass, I make a seat for the Gods") the word 'Barhi' is interpreted to mean Kusa grass and not any other kind of grass (although the plain words do not say so).
10. Applying the aforesaid principle of purposive construction we see that the intention of the Government policy as contained in Annexure-2 was to ensure that sugarcane supply to a sugar mill may be adversely affected. Hence if cane supply to a sugar mill is not adversely affected even by permitting setting up of a khandsari unit within 25 kms. of the mill then obviously there can be no prohibition in setting up such a unit. We must therefore not be guided by the plain words in the Government policy but must see the intention or object of the policy.
11. In the present case it has been alleged that the Bareilly Sugar Mill has not consumed sugarcane up to its maximum capacity vide para 29 of the writ petition. The certificate of the Manager, U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd., Bareilly is Annexure-I5 to the writ petition. In my opinion it was necessary for the appellate authority to examine whether the supply of sugarcane to the Bareilly Sugar Milt will be adversely affected if a licence for khandsari unit is granted to the petitioners, but this has not been done. There cannot be a rule of the thumb that no licence for khandsari unit can ever been granted for getting up a unit within 25 kms. of a sugar mill. What has further to be examined is whether grant of such a licence would adversely affect the supply of sugarcane to the sugar mill. Ordinarily under Art. 19(1)(g) every citizen has a right to do business and hence ordinarily an application for licence for setting up a new unit or business should be granted and it is only in an exceptional case that it should be denied, and that too for good reasons. In the circumstances the impugned order dated 14-11-1994 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the appellate authority to reconsider and decide the petitioners' application for grant of licence in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above within six weeks of production of certified copy of this order before the said authority after hearing the petitioners as well as the Bareilly Sugar Mill. The appellate authority shall pass a speaking order and consider all the materials which the petitioners and other parties may produce before it including any material which may be filed by them afresh after this judgment.
12. The writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs.
13. Petition allowed.