JUDGMENT S.N. Srivastava, J.
1. These five petitions are interknit together by common questions canvassed across the Bar and therefore, all these petitions have been heard with the consensus of the learned Counsel for the parties and are being disposed of by a composite order.
2. The question that emerges for adjudication is whether the stamp duty is payable in the matter of Tahbazari settled by public auction in the event of bid having been signed by the bidder and the Chairman of Nagar Palika Parishad/Zila Panchayat and other Officers?
3. Sarvsri A.K. Srivastava, Arun Tandon, and Ikram Ahmad argued the case on behalf of the petitioners and on the other hand learned Standing Counsel representing the State Authorities canvassed in vindication of the stand of the State Authorities in the matter.
4. Only so much facts as bear on the controversy involved in the first petition namely Writ Petition No. 12284 of 2003, are that for the year 2002-2003, Zila Panchayat, Jalaun published auction for right of collection of Tahbazari from vehicles plied within the limits of Zila Panchayat, Jalaun for purposes of sale of sand, Morram, Boulders and the bid of Rs. 39,20,000/- was settled in favour of the petitioner. By means of notice dated 27.8.2002, issued by Deputy Commissioner (Stamp), Jhansi, the petitioner was enjoined to pay stamp duty on the amount of bid at par with the stamp duty chargeable on a Patta under Section 2(16) of the Stamp Act. The objection filed by the petitioner met the fate of rejection equating bid sheet to a Patta under Section 2(14) of the Stamp Act, and holding petitioner liable to pay stamp duty in accordance with Schedule-I-B, Entry 35(b), read with Explanation 4 thereto. The appeal preferred before the Commissioner, Jhansi Mandal came to be dismissed by means of the order dated 28.2.2003. It is in the above background that the petitioner has knocked the door of this Court invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has pressed into service series of submissions and on that basis tried to portray the impugned orders as perverse, unjust and arbitrary. The argument of some substantiality is that the bid sheet is not a document requiring any registration or in consequence payment of stamp duty and further that there is no indicia of any evidence that final bid was ever accepted by Nagar Palika Parishad. To shore up his submission, the learned Counsel cited the case law Mohd. Yaqoob Khan and Anr. v. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, AIR 1977 Alld. 93 (FB), in vindication on his stand. In the case (supra) relied upon by the petitioner, the bid had been accepted and bid sheet was prepared and was signed by the petitioners in that case and they were required to deposit the bid amount and again the bid was signed by them as well as three members of the Municipal Board and the same was subsequently approved by the Board. The question that arose in that petition was whether the bid sheet when it was signed by the highest bidders amounted to an agreement creating right or liability. It was held by the Full Bench that the bid-sheet neither creates nor purports to create any right or liability and it was in consequence held that it falls to satisfy the requirements of an instrument much-less an instrument of lease. In opposition, the learned Standing Counsel cited the authority in the case of Jagdish Lala and Anr. v. The Collector, Budaun and Ors., AIR 1979 Alld. 307 (Special Bench). In this case decision rendered in M.Y. Khan (supra) was considered and a decision was entered holding the view that the document in question was agreement to let and as such was chargeable to stamp duty. The facts, in the case of Jagdish Lala (supra) were that Municipal Board, Budaun auctioned the right to hold the market for the period 1.4.68 to 31.3.69 and the highest bid was accepted by the President of the Municipal Board and the bid-sheet was signed by the highest bidder as well as President Municipal Board. The question that the Special Bench consisting of Hon'ble Satish Chandra, C.J., K.C. Agarwal and R.R. Rastogi, JJ., formulated for adjudication was whether the document in question could be held to be an agreement to let and as such was dutiable under Article 35(b) of Schedule 1-B. The Special Bench answered the question. In the affirmative holding that the document in question was an agreement to let and as such was chargeable to duty as a lease under Article 35(b) of Schedule 1-B of the Stamp Act. In taking this view, what weighed with the Special Bench was the consideration that the offer made immediately after the conclusion of the auction by the contractors was signed by the Contractor as well as the Competent Authority authorised in this regard and thus, it amounted to acceptance and in this view of the matter, the agreement became complete and as such was chargeable to stamp duty as an agreement to let, under Article 35(b) of Schedule 1-B of the Stamp Act. The Special Bench read into definition of the word 'lease' alongwith the word 'instrument' and held that "even if a document purports to create or transfer a right, the same would attract the provisions of the Stamp Act."
6. In view of what has been discussed above, I am of the view that the case of M. Y. Khan does not come to the rescue of the petitioners inasmuch as there is no subsequent acceptance of the auction in favour of the highest bidder. Since the bid-sheet was signed by the contractor as well as Competent Authority concerned the same was rightly considered by the authorities below as agreement/instrument and in consequence the stamp duty was imposed on the petitioners. By this reckoning, the case of Jagdish Lala (supra), squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Various other decisions were also read to me by the learned Standing Counsel namely decision in Haji Sukhan Beg v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1979 Alld. 310 and Mohammad Ali v. Board of Revenue and Ors., AIR 1987 Alld. 348. I do not consider it necessarily to refer to them except to acknowledge that I derived considerable assistance from them.
7. Coming down to the facts of the present case, it bears no repudiation that the petitioner was recipient of the benefits of agreement and had collected Tahbazari for the whole year on the basis of concluded contract. In view of the ratio decidendi flowing from the decision of the Special Bench, I am of the view that the authorities below have rightly converged to the conclusion and the findings recorded by them are based on record and have been recorded in accordance with law. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has not pressed into service any other points. In the circumstances, the petition cannot be sustained.
Writ Petition No. 11402 of 2003
8. In this case Nagar Palika Prishad, Bachhraiyoon J.P. Nagar closed the bid in public auction for the year 1999-2000 in favour of the petitioner for Rs. 4,35,000/-. It would appear from the record that Chairman, Nagar Palika Parishad as well as the petitioner subscribed their signatures to the bid-sheet and the auction money also came to be deposited in terms of the agreement. In this case also, the petitioner filed objection and consequent appeal before the Commissioner. The decision of Special Bench in Jagdish Lala's case also applies to the facts of the present case. In view of the discussion aforestated, the reasoning with which writ petition in M.G. Contractors and Anr., aforesaid, has been dismissed, will apply mutatis mutandis to the present petition. The learned Counsel has hardly convinced me that the merits of the case call for any intervention. Even otherwise, the orders do not suffer from any blemish and in the circumstances, there being no error apparent on the face of the record, no interference is called for and therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed.
Writ Petition No. 12536 of 2003
9. In this case also bid for realisation of Tahbazari was closed in favour of petitioner through public auction by the Nagar Palika Parishad, Dataganj, District Budaun and both the parties put their respective signatures to the bid-sheet. In this case also, the petitioner filed objection and consequent appeal before the Commissioner. In view of the decision aforestated, ratio flowing from Jagdish Lola's case fully applies to the facts of the present case, it is held that the bid-sheet bearing signatures of both the parties was an agreement and was chargeable to duty at par with a lease under Article 35(b) of Schedule I-B of the Stamp Act and in the circumstances, the impugned orders are found not to be suffering from any infirmity nor the learned Counsel has drawn my attention to any error apparent on the face of the record. Therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed.
Writ Petition No. 12535 of 2003
10. This petition also pertains to auction of Tahbazari rights in relation to Thela-Tonga stand for the year 1997-98. In this case also, bid-sheet was signed by both the parties. In this case also, the petitioner preferred objection and consequent appeal before the Commissioner. In view of the above discussion, the Special Bench decision in Jagdish Lala's case (supra) squarely applies to the present case. In the circumstances, the reasoning with which the petition in M.G. Contractor's case has been dismissed, will apply mutatis mutandis to the present petition. The impugned orders do not suffer from any infirmity and as such, the petition is liable to be dismissed.
Writ Petition No. 12538 of 2003
11. In this case, Nagar Palika Parishad, Dataganj, District Budaun auctioned Tahbazari rights and closed bid in favour of the petitioner. In this case also, the petitioner went through the tedium of filing objection and consequent appeal before the Commissioner. The bid-sheet having been signed by both the parties, the decision in Jagdish Lala's case fully applies to the facts of the present case. In the circumstances, the reasoning with which the petition in M.G, Contractor's case has been dismissed, will apply mutatis mutandis to the present petition. The impugned orders do not suffer from any infirmity and as such the petition is liable to be dismissed.
12. As a result of foregoing discussions, all the petitions (supra) being devoid of merit are accordingly dismissed. The parties shall bear their respective costs.