By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the judgments and orders dated 21.02.2002 and 29.08.1998, contained in Annexure Nos.9 and 3, passed by opposite party nos.1 and 2 respectively.
Brief facts, relevant for the purpose of deciding this petition are that the respondent no.3 is the landlord of a premises of which the petitioner is tenant. The landlord / opposite party no.3 filed small cause suit for recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation and ejectment on 22.04.1997 (Small causes case no.11 of 1997) which was contested by the petitioner. The suit was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 29.08.1998. The petitioner preferred revision bearing S.C.C. revision no.17 of 1998, which was also dismissed, on merits by judgment and order dated 21.02.2000.
In the meantime, the petitioner filed writ petition no.2989 (M/S) of 2000 and writ petition no. 196 (R/C) of 2001. The earlier writ petition no.2989 (M/S) of 2000 was disposed of vide order dated 21.08.2001 with direction to the revisional court to allow the petitioner to file the documentary evidence within four weeks. The opposite party no.2 may file documents, in rebuttal, within 10 days thereafter, and revisional court was directed to decide the revision within four months. The subsequent writ petition no.196 (R/C) of 2001 was also filed by the petitioner on the ground that the learned revisional court has wrongly interpreted the order of this Court dated 21.08.2001, in which, it was also directed that the whole exercise of deciding the writ petition no. 17 of 1998 should have been concluded within four months. After failing in two consecutive attempts to prolong the disposal of S.C.C. revision, the petitioner has come up to challenge the judgment of both the Courts below through the present writ petition.
Admittedly, there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and opposite party no.3. Both the Courts below have conclusively reached to the conclusion that the petitioner is a defaulter. Learned small causes court has decreed the suit for eviction and directed the petitioner to vacate the premises within 2 months vide judgment and order dated 29.08.1998. The petitioner has got success in retaining the possession over the disputed premises for the last 14 years and, thereby, making the justice delivery system to ridicule.
I have heard learned counsel for both the parties and gone through the records of writ petition.
A careful scrutiny of the judgment of the learned Trial Court shows that the learned small causes Court has discussed the evidence in a much detailed manner than required by law. After framing of issues, each and every point has been dealt with separately. The findings have been minutely scrutinized by learned IVth Additional District Judge, Bahraich, who has also discussed the pros and cons, from all the aspects and, has passed a detailed judgment, though, there is no such requirement of law as provided in Order 20 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, I do not find any ground to interfere in the discussions made and findings arrived at by the learned Trial Court as well as revisional Court. There is no infirmity in both the judgments passed by learned Court below.
Learned counsel for the petitioner also did not find any ground to assail the judgment passed by learned revisional Court and submitted, one and precisely one point, that the documents have been admitted by the learned revisional Court, in compliance of the direction of this Court, contained in writ petition no.2989 (M/S) of 2000, but the petitioner was not allowed to lead oral evidence to prove the documents, so filed. Learned counsel for the petitioner made meticulous attempts to suppress the nature of documents so as to enable this court to determine, whether any oral evidence was required, or the opportunity of leading oral evidence is being claimed by learned counsel for the petitioner as a shield to get the evidence reopened, with ultimate aim to delay the eviction. After repeated quarries by the Court, he was compelled to surrender to submit that the documents relate to assessment of premises in question. All such documents are public documents and no oral evidence is required to prove the said documents. Apart from this legal angle learned revisional Court has discussed the assessment and, has held, that the shop was assessed for the first time in the assessment year 1994-95 and, as such, the provision of U.P. Act no.13 of 1972 do not apply to building, in question. Learned revisional Court has also discussed the statutory deposit of rent together with cost of the suit and interest at the rate of 9% as required by Section 20 (4) of U.P. Act no.13 of 1972. The learned trial court has also discussed the provisions contained in Section 111 and 114 of Transfer of Property Act. What has been done by learned revisional Court was not required at all, yet it has really taken pain, probably keeping in view the tendency of the petitioner to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which has, in turn, created an impression before learned revisional Court that each and every word of his judgment shall be assailed before this Court. But unfortunately, no infirmity could be pointed out in the proceedings by learned counsel for the petitioner. I am bound to observe that this case exhibits a sheer abuse of the process of Court. I am constrained to mention that a writ remedy is an equitable one. A person approaching superior Court must come with a pair of clean hands. Taking recourse to the legal proceedings over and over again amounts to abuse of the process of law.
Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon law laid down by this Court in Smt. D. Mohapatra v. IXth Additional District Judge, Lucknow [1999 (2) ARC 614], Mst. Balasundari v. VIIIth Additional District Judge Varanasi [1987 (2) ARC 252], Virender Kumar Kushwaha v. VIIth Additional District Judge Agra [1996 (2) ARC 108] and Mohd. Ahmad v. IIIrd Additional Civil Judge, Saharanpur [2000 (2) ARC 31]. None of these authorities help the petitioner, in this case. The documents were public and have been considered by learned revisional Court. His decision not to permit the petitioner to lead oral evidence is not, at all, arbitrary and, as such, the law laid down in Balasundari's case does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. Learned revisional Court, as mentioned earlier, has dealt with the bank matter much more exhaustively, than required by law. I appreciate that the learned revisional Court was conscious enough to have entered into the details by bearing in mind that his judgment shall be scrutinized and criticised by the petitioner, in such a fashion, that the eviction may be delayed and matter may be remanded back, by hook or by crook.
In Advocate General State of Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries (1980) (3) SCC 311, the Hon'ble Apex Court was of the opinion that such a repeated filing of writ petition amounts to criminal contempt. In T.Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and another reported in AIR 1977 SC 2421, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held:
"The sharp practice or legal legerdemain of the petitioner, who is the son of the 2nd respondent, stultifies the court process and makes decree with judicial seals brutum fulmen. The long arm of the law must throttle such litigative caricatures if the confidence and credibility of the community in the judicature is to survive."
Later on in Rajappa Hanamantha Ranoji v. Mahadev Channabasappa & ors, reported in 2000 SCFBRC 321, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"It is distressing to note that many unscrupulous litigants, in order to circumvent orders of the courts adopt dubious ways and take recourse to ingenious methods including filing of fraudulent litigation to defeat the orders of the courts. Such tendency deserves to be taken serious note of and curbed by passing appropriate orders and issuing necessary directions including imposing or exemplary costs."
In Ravinder Kaur v. Ashok Kumar & anr. reported in 2003 AIR SCW 7158, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"Courts of law should be careful enough to see through such diabolical plans of the judgment-debators to deny the decree-holders the fruits of the decree obtained by them. These type of errors on the part of the judicial forums only encourage frivolous and cantankerous litigations causing law's delay and bringing bad name to the judicial system."
In Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. and others, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 114, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, then the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter on merits. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above said case has further held as under:
"In K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others (2008) 12 SCC 481, the court held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner approaching the Writ Court must come with clean hands and put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. The same rule was reiterated in G. Jayshree and others v. Bhagwandas S. Patel and others (2009) 3 SCC 141."
This is the experience of this Court that in last 40 years, a new breed of litigants has cropped up. Those, who belong to this breed, do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new breed of litigants, the Courts have, from time to time evolved new rules and, it is now well established, that the litigants, who attempt to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, are not entitled to any relief, interim or otherwise. I find force while holding this by the law laid down in Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. (2010) 2 SCC, 114 by Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held in Welcome Hotel v. State of A.P. AIR 1983 S.C. 1015 that a party who has mislead the Court in passing an order in its favour, is not entitled to be heard on the merits of the case.
With these observations, writ petition is dismissed.
Order Date :- 6.8.2012 Ram.