Court No. - 6
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 2832 of 2018 Petitioner :- Meva Lal Respondent :- Union Of India Through Secretary Human Resource Development Department Govt. Of India New Delhi Counsel for Petitioner :- Mr Vinay Kumar Singh Counsel for Respondent :- A.S.G.I.,Ajeet Kumar Singh,Rajesh Tripathi
Hon'ble B. Amit Sthalekar,J.
Heard Sri Vinay Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitoner, Sri Rajesh Tripathi, learned counsel for the Union of India, respondent no.1 and Sri Vinod Kumar Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Ajeet Kumar Singh for the respondents no. 2, 3 and 4.
The petitioner in the writ petition is seeking a direction to the respondents to appoint him as a permanent employee as peon in any department of Banaras Hindu University (BHU), Varanasi. In para 2 of the writ petition, it is stated that the petitioner worked as peon in agriculture department of the BHU from 21.11.1986 to 23.01.1989 and thereafter, he has done various work in other departments of the BHU as peon till 2012.
This shows that admittedly the petitioner is not working after 2012 and in any case he has not explained as to what he was doing after 1989 and when he assumed his work in BHU till 2012. His case further is that one other person Ghanshyam who was engaged as Daily wager sometime in the year 1986 has since been regularised. But when he was regularised has not been stated and the documents filed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition, only show that he was working as a daily wager.
The Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka vs Uma Devi reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 in para 43 has held as under:-
"43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. The High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of the Court, which we have described as 'litigious employment' in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates."
In (1998) 1 SCC 183, Ramchandra and others Vs Additional District Magistrate and others, the Supreme court in para 5 thereof has held as under:-
"5. We are not examining the correctness or otherwise of this interpretation because, in the present case, the appellants did not fulfil the basic requirement of Rule 4(i) namely that they should be continuing in service as ad hoc employees in order to be eligible for regularisation. The services of at least some of the appellants were terminated in February 1984. The services of others were terminated in June 1984. In view of the fact that the services of the appellants had been terminated, they will not be eligible for regularisation under the amended Rules of 1984. Those who are not in service cannot be regularised. In the writ petition which was filed, the appellants who were the petitioners, prayed for regularisation. Although they made averments relating to their termination of service, they did not pray for setting aside the orders of termination passed in their cases. So long as the orders of termination stand, they cannot get the benefit of regularisation under the amended Rules of 1984."
In this view of the matter, on the facts of the case and in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly, dismissed.
Order Date :- 27.3.2018 Kirti