ORDER D.P.S. Chauhan, J.
1. The petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking relief for quashing the order passed by the Additional District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar dated 30-10-1986 and the appellate order, dated 12-10-89 passed by the Commissioner Meerut Division, Meerut relating to revocation of his fire-arm licence, which was in respect of 12 bore DBBL gun (No. 5706/2880A/7).
2. Since counter and rejoinder affidavits have already been exchanged, I with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, propose to decide the case itself.
3. The controversy involved in the present case is dependent on determination of questions of law and the facts have only peripheral relevance.
4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner Shri R. S. Maurya, holding brief of Sri Yatindra Singh and learned standing counsel Sri Sidarth Singh.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the orders impeached, in the present petition, are illegal and void for following consideration;
(a) That the show cause notice for revocation of the petitioner's fire-arm licence founded on the ground of his involvement in crime No. 65 under Section 302/201, IPC was replied to and the District Magistrate was subsequently also apprised with the facts regarding his subsequent acquittal in the crime from the Court of Addl. Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar in Sessions Trial No. 326 of 1985 whereby the very foundation of the show cause notice disappeared, but in spite of that his licence was revoked for extraneous consideration on the ground that the petitioner is a person of hot temperament regarding which neither any show cause notice was given nor any opportunity was provided.
(b) The right to hold fire-arm is a right connected with Article 21 of the Constitution, which is not to be dealt-with lightly by any authority under the Arms Act (for brevity hereinafter referred to as "the Act") so to set at naught the guarantee by arbitrary exercise of power for irrelevant consideration.
(c) That under the Act, licensee's temperament could not be a ground for revocation of fire-arm licence under Section 17 of the Act, specially when for the same temperament was not the ground for grant of licence.
6. The brief facts pertaining to the case are:-
(a) That Mege Ram, the petitioner was granted licence in respect of 12 bore DBBL gun (No.5706/2880A/7 by the District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar on having been satisfied that he is the suitable person for grant of licence.
(b) Vide licence No. 6947 dated 17-8-1984 the petitioner was granted fire-arm licence who was subsequently involved in crime No. 65 under Section 302/201, IPC was served with a show cause notice from the District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar for showing cause as to why his fire-arm licence be not cancelled for his involvement in the crime.
(c) Petitioner, who was involved in a criminal case (crime No. 65 under Section 302/201, IPC) along with two persons Kali Ram and Nirmal, was tried in S.T. No. 326 of 1985, wherein he was acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge, who made observations to the following effect:-
"I am of the opinion that this is a case of no evidence and the prosecution has miserably failed to bring home the guilt to the accused persons beyond all shadow of reasonable doubt.
(d) Before the decision of the aforesaid criminal case, the said show cause notice dated 16-9-85 was served on the petitioner, which was replied by him. The subsequent fact of his acquittal in the said criminal case was brought to the notice of the District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar with the request for dropping the proceedings against the petitioner for revocation of his fire-arm licence as the very foundation in the notice has become nonest.
(e) The District Magistrate took notice of the fact of acquittal of the petitioner in S.T. No. 326 of 1985 and did not proceed for revoking the fire-arm on the basis that he is a man of hot temperament. About it neither any opportunity nor show cause notice was given or served on the petitioner. The District Magistrate vide his order dated 30-10-86 revoked the fire-arm licence.
(f) Petitioner, there against preferred an appeal before the Commissioner, who while maintaining the order of the District Magistrate, in an arbitrary fashion without considering the pros and cons dismissed the same in an arbitrary manner on 20-4-89. Commissioner in its order also placed reliance on same report of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, which was relating to the petitioner's involvement in village group politics.
7. The first objection is that the order of the District Magistrate as well as of Commissioner are bad as the show cause notice for revocation of petitioner's fire-arm licence was founded on the ground of his involvement in a crime case No. 65 under Sections 302/201, IPC whereas the order of revocation was passed for extraneous consideration that he was a man of hot temperament regarding which neither any opportunity was afforded to the petitioner nor any supplementary or otherwise show cause notice was given, which fact is evident from the impugned order itself passed by the Commissioner and necessitates no further proof. The revocation of fire-arm licence is done on the ground regarding which no opportunity whatsoever, was afforded to the petitioner which renders impeached orders as void being violative of principles of natural justice.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following passage from the case of S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 to show that denial of natural justice has prejudiced him.
"In our view the principles of natural Justice know of ho excusionary rule dependant on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudiced to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary it will come from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced.
9. He also relied on a case reported in 1991 All WC 34 : (AIR 1991 All 111) Chattar Mohan Singh v. Additional District Magistrate (Rural) Allahabad. In this case the position somewhat was akin to the present one as in that case reliance was placed on an affidavit of Sub-Inspector regarding which no show cause notice was served on the petitioner and the order passed relying the affidavit of the police sub-inspector was found violative of principles of natural justice. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the ground that the petitioner is a man of hot temperament and is involved in party politics of the village is an extraneous ground, not. provided by law. The temperament of the petitioner was same when the licence was granted. Then what could not be a ground for non-grant of fire-arm licence could not be a ground for revocation of licence. Even otherwise it is neither here nor there that the temperament of the petitioner changed subsequent to the grant of licence. He pointed out that the reliance has also been placed on some report of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, who on his own, stated that the petitioner is involved in party politics and is man of hot temperament and, therefore, cannot be allowed to retain the gun. This report of the S.D.M. was also not supplied to the petitioner as such it cannot be a germane material under Section 17 of the Arms Act. The impugned order having been passed in violation of principles of natural justice inasmuch as the petitioner was neither given any show cause notice regarding the ground on which revocation of licence has been done nor was supplied the report of the S.D.M., which was made sheet anchor.
10. Next submitted that from Section 17(3)(a) the ground "for any reason unfit to have licence under the Act" gives an arbitrary scope to the executive authorities for encroaching upon the fundamental right of a citizen guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. In this connection learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on two cases, one reported in 1989 All WC 866 (2): (1989 All LJ 1053) Awdesh Kumar v. The District Magistrate, Banda (para 8), which is extracted as below :-
"The object of the licence of fire-arm cannot be underestimated. It is for the safety and security of the life and property of the licensee. It becomes an instrument to keep his life safe. It is so vital to the life liberty and protection of the licensee that it cannot be cancelled except in accordance with the law. It needs no mention that in view of Article 21 of the Constitution no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Once licence is granted circumstances pointed out by the legislature for revocation or suspension of the licence have to be strictly construed as it militates against the fundamental rights contained under Article 21 of the Constitution, Technically speaking it may be that holding of a licence is just a privilege but once it is conferred it accelerates the items intended by the framers of the Constitution for the protection of the life of a citizen. In spite of the fascinating use of fire-arm licence for protection of human life its suspension or cancellation is taken very lightly. Subsequently Section 17 is a piece of penal statute which has to be construed strictly in favour of the accused or the person sought to be deprived of the privilege. In Director of Public Prosecution v. Ottewell, (1970) AC 642, it was pointed out that if after full enquiry and consideration one is left in real doubt, the accused or the person from whom the penalty is claimed must be given the benefit of doubt."
11. The other case relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner is Ganesh Chandra Bhatt v. The District Magistrate, Almora (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4723 of 1993, decided on 12-3-93) (reported in 1993 All LJ 942) where while dealing with the matter learned single Judge held (at p. 947 of All LJ):
"In my opinion the right to bear arm is embedded in Article 21 of the Constitution and which is a fundamental right. No doubt his right, like all fundamental rights is subjected to reasonable restriction but the reasonability of the restriction, must be judged from the point of view of the prevailing social conditions, and not in the abstract. Hence whatever may have been reasonable may no longer be reasonable today."
Rights to possess licenced fire-arm is actually a right under Article 21 of Constitution, the deprivation of fire-arm in process of revocation violates the guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution. The question is whether arbitrary action would be covered by clause "for any reason unfit to have licence". The answer is no. In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1325 : (1982 Cri LJ NOC 193) (Para 16) Supreme Court held "the concept of reasonableness runs through the entire fabric of the Constitution." Thus the action must satisfy the reasonability. In the present case the hot temperament of the licencee was not taken as a ground for refusal of licence and as such it cannot be allowed to be a ground for revocation. Impugned order based on the ground of hot temperament of licencee is arbitrary and cannot be sustained.
12. Since the right to hold a fire-arm is held to be a guaranteed right under Article 21 of the Constitution as it affects the right to personal security and it cannot be allowed to be invaded by the executive authorities except in accordance with the procedure established bylaw. Section 17 of the Act provides that the licensing authority by an order in writing, may revoke a licence when the licensing authority is satisfied, inter alia, that the holder of the licence is for any reason unfit to have licence. It also provides that the licence can be revoked on the ground of the holder of the licence is prohibited by Arms Act and in view of this matter the last clause' providing for revocation of a licence for any reason unfit to have licence under this Act is nothing but to equip the executive authorities with arbitrary power. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in this connection, has relied on a case of Menka Gandhi v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1978 SC 597. The conferment of such a power cannot be a procedure under law. The submission has got substance. The licence cannot be cancelled on any undisclosed ground or criteria and, therefore, the power under the last clause, as mentioned above, cannot be held to be power coupled with right and just procedure and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive and cannot be held to be the procedure established by law as it fails to satisfy the requirement of Article 21 as well as Article 14 of the Constitution. In the present case, the executive authorities have acted in arbitrary fashion and their action cannot be justified though the learned standing counsel Sri Sidharth Singh in spite of facing adverse weather, tried his best to bring about justification for the impugned orders. He submitted in reply that the licence has been cancelled not only on the ground that the petitioner is a man of hot temperament which he has rightly said as under the Act the temperament of a person cannot be a ground for grant or revocation of fire-arm licence. The temperament is a something which is a divine creation for which no person can either be privileged or punished. However, in the present case, there is no material on the record that the hot temperament has resulted in action so to. endanger the public peace or public safety.
13. Learned standing counsel submitted that there is material on the record to establish that the petitioner is a person having involvement in party politices of the village which coupled with his hot temperament is dangerous for the village society. Though learned standing counsel in his attempt has nicely defended the impugned action, but he could not have his way clear as the report of the S.D.M. was neither supplied to the petitioner to show cause as to whether there was any party politics in the village and whether he is involved therein or not and to what consequences. In this view of the matter, the submission as made by the learned standing counsel is rejected.
14. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the writ petition deserves to succeed.
15. The writ petition is allowed and the impeached order dated 30-10-86 passed by the District Magistrate Muzaffarnagar and the order dated 10-10-89 passed by the Commissioner in appeal is hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to release the gun of the petitioner within three weeks from the date of presentation of certified copy of this order and the licence of the petitioner's gun be renewable after receiving application from him and fulfilment of the necessary requirement of law within a period of one month thereafter. The weapon so handed over to the petitioner, till the licence is not renewed, shall be possessed by him under the authority of this Court on his furnishing undertaking to the District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar in writing that he will not misuse the fire-arm. It is a case where compensation for unnecessary harassment could be granted, but the fair approach of the learned standing counsel desuaded me. Under the circumstances, I make no order for compensation.