ORDER Braund, J.
1. This is a case in revision. Megh Singh was a tenant of three holdings in a village. Of two of them he was the sole tenant and of the third he was the tenant jointly with another person. If the gross amount of the rent payable in respect of the three holdings, assuming Megh Singh to be liable as a joint and several tenant for the entire rent of the third of the three holdings, were added up, it would be found to exceed five hundred rupees. But if the rent payable by Megh Singh in respect of the third holding is to be assumed to be only half of the entire rent of that holding, then the total rent payable by him amounts to less than five hundred rupees. The zamindar, having obtained a decree, eventually in 1940 applied to have it executed. At that point Megh Singh took an objection on the ground that under Section 3, U.P. Stayed Arrears of Rent (Remission) Act, 1939, the execution could not be entertained. That contention depended on Section 5 of the same Act, which turned on the question of whether the rent payable by Megh Singh was or was not more than five hundred rupees. The execution Court refused the execution on the ground that the rent did not exceed five hundred rupees, which was only another way of saying that in relation to the third holding the rent payable by Megh Singh was not the entire rent but only half. On appeal to the District Judge, he took a different view and held that the rent payable by Megh Singh, in view of the fact that he was jointly and severally liable for it, was the entire amount of the rent reserved in respect of the third holding. It now comes here in revision. Since the decision of the District Judge the substantive question has, for the time being at least, been concluded by the majority decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Suryapal Singh v. Chiranji ('44) 31 A.I.R. 1944 All. 170. I am bound to follow that decision.
2. This revision, however, falls to my mind to be decided on another ground altogether. The revision is actually one under Section 276, U.P. Tenancy Act (Act No. 17 [XVII] of 1939) and what I have to decide is whether this is a case in which sitting in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of the Court, I can interfere. In my view it is not. I consider that a strict exercise of the revisional jurisdiction is not only imposed on us by law but is in the highest public interest. I have been pressed to say that, because the learned District Judge has wrongly decided as a matter of law that the rent payable by Megh Singh exceeded five hundred rupees, therefore, he had no jurisdiction to entertain his execution application. In my judgment this is a fallacy. There is not the slightest doubt that the Code of Civil Procedure vests the Court with jurisdiction to entertain an execution application in the abstract. It is equally plain that Section 3, U.P. Stayed Arrears of Rent (Remission) Act, 1939, says that no Court is to "entertain" any such application (assuming, of course, that an execution application is an application within the meaning of that section), where the applicant pays rent exceeding Rs. 500. It seems to me to follow that wherever a case of this kind comes before the Court, it has to do two things, both of which it has the most ample jurisdiction to do. The first is that it has to decide as a matter of fact, and may be also of law, whether the decree-holder is a man by whom rent of more than five hundred rupees was payable in the fasli year 1344. And, having done that, if it decides that question in the sense that the rent payable by him was more than five hundred rupees, then it proceeds to the second question which is whether it will execute the decree.
3. That is what happened in this case. The Court decided that the rent payable by Megh Singh in the particular year did not exceed five hundred rupees. To my mind, no one can possibly say that the Court had no jurisdiction to decide that question. And, as I am never tired of saying, a Court which has jurisdiction, has jurisdiction to decide a matter within its jurisdiction either rightly or wrongly. Having decided this question, which it has jurisdiction to decide, the Court automatically had jurisdiction to go on and deal with the execution application. At no stage was it acting outside its jurisdiction. What the present applicant now wants me to do is to say in revision that the lower Court decided a question of fact or a question of law, wrongly and that, because it decided it wrongly, therefore, it forfeited any jurisdiction it had. As I have pointed out, it decided something which it had jurisdiction to decide. It decided it in a way, namely, wrongly as it since transpires in which it had jurisdiction to decide it. And, having decided that which it had jurisdiction to decide, it automatically in my opinion, acquired, and can never be deprived of jurisdiction to deal with the execution application before it. That is the way in which I see the matter. I only desire to add that in the Pull Bench case to which I have already referred I think my learned brother Allsop J. took the same view as I do of the proper exercise of the revisional jurisdiction in a case such as this. This appears to follow from the concluding paragraph of his judgment. In all these circumstances I think this revision must be dismissed with costs.