JUDGMENT D. P. S. Chauhan, J.
1. The petitioner is an undertaking running the business of manufacturing automatic gears. Proceedings under Section 7-A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') were initiated against it. A detailed objection (Annexure 6 to the Petition)was filed before the authority under Section 7-A of the Act consequent upon the notice dated January 28, 1992. One of the objections taken was regarding the rate of contribution applicable to the petitioner undertaking and was based on the Government Order No. 50360 (1) dated May 17, 1989, which provided for the rate of contribution to be made by the employer towards the provident fund of the employees. The grievance was that, under the second proviso of the said notification, the revised rate of contribution i.e. 10 per cent, was not applicable to the petitioner undertaking. Apart from this, there were other objections claiming set off of the amount already deposited.
2. It is not necessary to deal with the objections as raised by the petitioner before the authority under Section 7-A of the Act. The authority passed an order on March 24, 1992 requiring the petitioner to deposit Rs. 1,50,695.00. This order is the subject matter of challenge in the present petition.
3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner filed a detailed objection before the authority under Section 7-A of the Act, but none of the objections was considered or dealt with by the authority in the impugned order. According to him, the authority was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and was bound to decide the objections as raised. The impugned order is to the detriment of the petitioner, as it does not spell out as to why the petitioner's objection was not decided dealing with the objections as raised.
5. The submission as advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is based on the impugned order; which apparently shows that the authority had not at all applied its (sic.) mind to the objection as raised by the petitioner. There is not even a whisper regarding the objections made by the petitioner. Unless the authority had dealt with the question as to whether the notification dated May 17, 1989 was applicable to the petitioner, it had no authority to demand the contribution at the rate provided by the said notification, as, according to the second proviso, which is as extracted below, the sick industrial units were not brought under the purview of the said notification and the petitioner claims itself to be a sick unit:
"S.O. 360 (E), Dated May 17, 1989:
In exercise of the powers conferred by the first proviso to Section 6 of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (1 of 1952), the Central Government hereby specifies, with effect from the 1st day of June, 1989, every establishment in the Industries specified in the Schedule annexed hereto and the classes of establishments specified in the said Schedule, as the establishments and classes of establishments to which the said proviso shall apply:
Provided that nothing contained in this notification shall apply to:
(i) any establishment in which less than 50 persons are employed;
(ii) any sick industrial company as defined in Clause (o) of Section ... of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985(1 of 1986), which has made a reference under Section 15 of the said Act to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, established under Section 4 of the Act; and
(iii) any other establishment which has at the end of any financial year accumulated losses equal to or exceeding its entire assets and had also suffered cash losses in such financial year and the financial year immediately preceding such financial year.
Explanation : For the purposes of Clause (iii), "Cash Loss" means computed without provision for depreciation."
6. Learned Counsel for the respondents could not justify the impugned order, which is laconic. Apart from this, the notice upon which the proceedings started, is also defective, as the said notice does not disclose as to at what rate the petitioner is required to deposit the contribution. Further, it also does not disclose as to what contribution of the employer and the employees has not been deposited, whereas the petitioner's case is that it had deposited the employer's contribution. It is not for this Court to examine the question of fact. It is for the authority to decide the matter in a fair manner dealing with the objections item wise.
7. The impugned order, which does not spell out any reason and which does not deal with the objection of the petitioner, cannot be allowed to be sustained. The notice issued to the petitioner dated January 28, 1992 is also found to be defective and same also cannot be allowed to stand.
8. In the circumstances, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated March 24/26, 1992 and the notice dated January 28, 1992 are hereby quashed. It would be open to the concerned authority to take fresh proceedings against the petitioner after issuing fresh notices and giving opportunity to the petitioner for filing objections, and to decide the same before making claim from the petitioner at the enhanced rate of contribution in pursuance of notification dated May 17, 1989. However, under this order, the petitioner shall not escape the liability of depositing its contribution and employees share of the provident fund at the rate of 8.5 percent before the controversy at the rate of 10 percent is settled. There will be no order as to costs.