JUDGMENT Mukerji, J.
1. This is an appeal by a judgment-debtor whose application to have a sale hell on 20th December 1980 set aside has failed. The usual objections-ware taken, namely there was a material irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale, and there was a substantial injury to the judgment-debtor. It appears that a 1/6th share in a certain village was advertised to be sold as the property of the judgment debtor, the appellant before us. A day before the date fixed for the sale, the sale of one-third share out of the 1/6th share advertised for sale was postponed at the instance of the appellant's sister, who it appears, had instituted a suit against the decree-holder, claiming one third share as the judgment-debtor's sister. The first objection is that the postponement of the sale of the one-third share made it a necessity to issue a fresh proclamation. The case of Shib Prokash Singh v. Sardar Doyal Singh [1878] 3 Cal. 544 has been cited before us in support of this contention. The property to be sold was zamindari property, and any fractional share could be sold without impairing the value of that property. If the property to be sold had been a house, it might be that purchasers who were willing to purchase the whole house would not have been willing to purchase a two thirds share at the sale. In the circumstances we do not think that a fresh sale proclamation was called for.
2. The next point is that there was a rumour made afloat that the whole sale was going to he postponed. The basis of such a rumour, if there was one, was probably the judgment debtor's application for postponement. It has not been proved that the decree-holder or anybody else gave chat rumour a currency. It has been proved by a witness examined by the appellant himself that several people came to purchase the property. The story that the purchasers went to the civil Court to make an inquiry from the Court as to whether the sale was going to be held or not is a preposterous story, for they could have ascertained from the Collectorate itself whether there was going to be a sale or not. We are of opinion that there was no material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale. There is one point more as regards material irregularity, and it is this, we are told that under the law it was necessary to put down in the sale proclamation the value of the property, that is to say an estimated value of the property. Rule 66, Order 21, does not require this, and no authority has been produced before us which shows that an estimated value should be put down in the sale proclamation. The value of a property is very difficult in most cases to ascertain, and the insertion of the value would always give rise to a dispute later, unless the parties were agreed as to the value to be put in the sale proclamation. His Lordship then discussing evidence on the question of substantial injury concluded that there had been no substantial loss with the judgment-debtor. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.