IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) PRESENT THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI KALYAN JYOTI SENGUPTA AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR
WRIT PETITION NO.11499 OF 2014
DATED:16.4.2014 Between:
Md. Riyazuddin, Kurnool District, Petitioner And The Deputy Inspector General of Registration, Kurnool and others.
Respondents THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI KALYAN JYOTI SENGUPTA AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR
WRIT PETITION NO.11499 OF 2014
ORDER: (per the Hon’ble the Chief Justice Sri Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta)
This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for the following reliefs:
“It is therefore prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus or otherwise declaring the Rule 21(2) of the A.P.C.S. (CCA) Rules, 1991 as arbitrary, illegal, unconstitutional, violating Article 14, 16, 21 and 311 of the Constitution of India apart from violating the principles of natural justice and also contrary to Rule 20 of the A.P.C.S. (CCA) Rules and also declare para-47 of the judgment in O.A. No. 7095/2011, dt. 28.1.2014 and consequential memo No. S/189/2010, dt. 1.3.2014 issued by the 1st respondent as equally arbitrary and erroneous and set aside the same and pass such other order or orders as it deems fit and proper.”
It is an admitted position that the petitioner before us filed an Original Application before the concerned Administrative Tribunal challenging the vires of the Rule.
We notice from the prayer that there are two of the reliefs claimed by the petitioner, one is challenge as to the constitutional validity of the aforesaid Rule and another is challenge against a portion of the impugned judgment and order of the learned Tribunal.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Tribunal has decided the matter in such a way that his client has been rendered remediless and that is why his client has approached this Court by this writ petition.
We deal with the first part of the relief as to the challenge to vires of the Rule. At the first instance, because of the observations of the Supreme Court as mentioned in paragraph-99 of the judgment rendered
[1]
in the case of L.Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India , we cannot entertain the writ petition even ignoring the judgment of the learned Tribunal. Therefore, we shall reproduce paragraph-99 of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, which is as follows:
“In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that Clause 2(d) of Article 323A and Clause 3(d) of Article 323B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323A and 323B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article 323B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.
(emphasis supplied).
When we go into the matter, we are of the view that we have no jurisdiction to decide the matter including the judgment and order of the learned Tribunal. But, factually, the Tribunal has decided the matter and the Supreme Court has also held in the aforesaid paragraph that the Tribunals will play a supplemental role to the High Court even if the judgment has been rendered rightly or wrongly. Even if we had jurisdiction, then, it operates as res judicata and that fact is well settled by the Supreme Court in umpteen number of cases that the principle of res judicata will be applied in case of writ proceeding. Hence, the first limb of the prayer is not entertained by this Court.
In so far as the second limb of the prayer is concerned, the Tribunal has decided the matter exercising jurisdiction vested in it and this Bench is not competent to accept the challenge to a portion of the judgment and order of the learned Tribunal.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, we dismiss the writ petition. As considerable time has been taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in spite of having understood the position of law, we think this matter is a frivolous one before us, and there will be costs. Accordingly, costs of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand Only) is to be paid by the petitioner to the A.P. State Legal Services Authority, Hyderabad within three weeks from date. However, this judgment and order will not prevent the petitioner from approaching the appropriate forum for redressal of his grievance.
The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with costs as aforestated.
Consequently, the miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed. No costs.
K.J. SENGUPTA, CJ 16th April, 2014 SANJAY KUMAR, J
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[1] AIR 1997 SC 1125